Critical Realism
27 Wikipedia Articles
Contents

Articles

Critical realism 1
Roy Bhaskar 5
Structure and agency 8
Roy Wood Sellars 12
George Santayana 13
Arthur Oncken Lovejoy 20
Bernard Lonergan 22
Samuel Alexander 25
John Cook Wilson 30
Harold Arthur Prichard 31
H. H. Price 32
C. D. Broad 34
David Graeber 37
Margaret Archer 41
Michael Polanyi 43
Thomas Torrance 49
John Polkinghorne 52
Ian Barbour 60
Arthur Peacocke 63
Alister McGrath 67
N. T. Wright 71
James Dunn (theologian) 77
Geoffrey Hodgson 79
Transcendental realism 81
Alex Callinicos 82
Göran Therborn 85
Transformative Studies Institute 86

References

Article Sources and Contributors 91
Image Sources, Licenses and Contributors 92

Article Licenses

License 93
Critical realism

In the philosophy of perception, critical realism is the theory that some of our sense-data (for example, those of primary qualities) can and do accurately represent external objects, properties, and events, while other of our sense-data (for example, those of secondary qualities and perceptual illusions) do not accurately represent any external objects, properties, and events. Put simply, Critical Realism highlights a mind dependent aspect of the world, which reaches to understand (and comes to understanding of) the mind independent world.

Contemporary critical realism most commonly refers to a philosophical approach associated with Roy Bhaskar. Bhaskar's thought combines a general philosophy of science (transcendental realism) with a philosophy of social science (critical naturalism) to describe an interface between the natural and social worlds. Critical realism can, however, refer to several other schools of thought, such as the work of the American critical realists (Roy Wood Sellars, George Santayana, and Arthur Lovejoy). The term has also been appropriated by theorists in the science-religion interface community. The Canadian Jesuit Bernard Lonergan developed a comprehensive critical realist philosophy and this understanding of critical realism dominates North America's Catholic Universities.

Locke and Descartes

According to Locke and Descartes, some sense-data, namely the sense-data of secondary qualities, do not represent anything in the external world, even if they are caused by external qualities (primary qualities). Thus it is natural to adopt a theory of critical realism.

By its talk of sense-data and representation, this theory depends on or presupposes the truth of representationalism. If critical realism is correct, then representationalism would have to be a correct theory of perception.

American critical realism

The American critical realist movement was a response both to direct realism (especially in its recent incarnation as new realism), as well as to idealism and pragmatism. In very broad terms, American critical realism was a form of representative realism, in which there are objects that stand as mediators between independent real objects and perceivers.

One innovation was that these mediators aren't ideas (British empiricism), but properties, essences, or "character complexes."

British realism


Contemporary critical realism

General philosophy

Critical realism is presently most commonly associated with the work of Roy Bhaskar. Bhaskar developed a general philosophy of science that he described as transcendental realism, and a special philosophy of the human sciences that he called critical naturalism. The two terms were combined by other authors to form the umbrella term critical realism.

Transcendental realism attempts to establish that in order for scientific investigation to take place, the object of that investigation must have real, manipulable, internal mechanisms that can be actualised to produce particular outcomes. This is what we do when we conduct experiments. This stands in contrast to empiricist scientists' claim
that all scientists can do is observe the relationship between cause and effect and impose meaning. Whilst empiricism, and positivism more generally, locate causal relationships at the level of events, Critical Realism locates them at the level of the generative mechanism, arguing that causal relationships are irreducible to empirical constant conjunctions of David Hume's doctrine; in other words, a constant conjunctive relationship between events is neither sufficient nor even necessary to establish a causal relationship.

The implication of this is that science should be understood as an ongoing process in which scientists improve the concepts they use to understand the mechanisms that they study. It should not, in contrast to the claim of empiricists, be about the identification of a coincidence between a postulated independent variable and dependent variable. Positivism/falsification are also rejected due to the observation that it is highly plausible that a mechanism will exist but either a) go unactivated, b) be activated, but not perceived, or c) be activated, but counteracted by other mechanisms, which results in it having unpredictable effects. Thus, non-realisation of a posited mechanism cannot (in contrast to the claim of positivists) be taken to signify its non-existence.

Critical naturalism argues that the transcendental realist model of science is equally applicable to both the physical and the human worlds. However, when we study the human world we are studying something fundamentally different from the physical world and must therefore adapt our strategy to studying it. Critical naturalism therefore prescribes social scientific method which seeks to identify the mechanisms producing social events, but with a recognition that these are in a much greater state of flux than they are in the physical world (as human structures change much more readily than those of, say, a leaf). In particular, we must understand that human agency is made possible by social structures that themselves require the reproduction of certain actions/pre-conditions. Further, the individuals that inhabit these social structures are capable of consciously reflecting upon, and changing, the actions that produce them—a practice that is in part facilitated by social scientific research.

Critical realism has become an influential movement in British sociology and social science in general as a reaction to, and reconciliation of, so-called "postmodern" critiques.

**Developments**

Since Bhaskar made the first big steps in popularising the theory of critical realism in the 1970s, it has become one of the major strands of social scientific method - rivalling positivism/empiricism, and post-structuralism/relativism/interpretivism.

An edited volume, *Critical Realism: Essential Readings*, is currently the most appreciated and available reader in critical realism.

There is also a Journal of Critical Realism[^1], which publishes articles on the theory and results of the practice of critical realist social science. See also, Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, published by Blackwell, which also publishes theoretical and empirical realist social science.

A lively email discussion on critical realism can be joined on the critical realism e-mail list[^2].

Since his development of critical realism, Bhaskar has gone on to develop a philosophical system he calls dialectical critical realism, which is most clearly outlined in his weighty book, *Dialectic: the pulse of freedom*.

Bhaskar is frequently criticized for the density and obscurity of his writing. That said, some readers may actually appreciate his meticulous linguistic precision, which can be time consuming to read, but read properly, it is possible to understand the precise and unambiguous meaning behind his writing. An accessible introduction was written by Andrew Collier. Andrew Sayer has written accessible texts on critical realism in social science. Danermark et al. have also produced an accessible account. Margaret Archer is associated with this school, as is the ecosocialist writer Peter Dickens.

David Graeber relies on critical realism, which he understands as a form of 'heraclitean' philosophy, emphasizing flux and change over stable essences, in his anthropological book on the concept of value, *Toward an anthropological theory of value: the false coin of our own dreams*. 
Robert Willmott has developed the realist ("morphogenetic") social theory of Margaret Archer in his Education Policy and Realist Social Theory: primary teachers, child-centred philosophy and the new managerialism, published by Routledge.

**Theological critical realism**

Critical realism is employed by a community of scientists turned theologians. They are influenced by the scientist turned philosopher Michael Polanyi. Polanyi's ideas were taken up enthusiastically by T. F. Torrance whose work in this area has influenced many theologians calling themselves critical realists. This community includes John Polkinghorne, Ian Barbour, and Arthur Peacocke. The aim of the group is to show that the language of science and Christian theology are similar, forming a starting point for a dialogue between the two. Alister McGrath and Wentzel van Huyssteen (the latter of Princeton Theological Seminary) are recent contributors to this strand. N.T. Wright, New Testament scholar and retired Bishop of Durham (Anglican) also writes on this topic:

… I propose a form of critical realism. This is a way of describing the process of "knowing" that acknowledges the reality of the thing known, as something other than the knower (hence "realism"), while fully acknowledging that the only access we have to this reality lies along the spiralling path of appropriate dialogue or conversation between the knower and the thing known (hence "critical"). (*The New Testament and the People of God*, p. 35)

N.T. Wright's fellow biblical scholar—James Dunn—encountered the thought of Bernard Lonergan as mediated through Ben Meyer. Much of North American critical realism—later used in the service of theology—has its source in the thought of Lonergan rather than Polanyi.

**Critical realism in economics**

Heterodox economists like Tony Lawson, Frederic Lee or Geoffrey Hodgson are trying to work the ideas of critical realism into economics, especially the dynamic idea of macro-micro interaction.

According to critical realist economists, the central aim of economic theory is to provide explanations in terms of hidden generative structures. This position combines transcendental realism with a critique of mainstream economics. It argues that mainstream economics (i) relies excessively on deductivist methodology, (ii) embraces an uncritical enthusiasm for formalism, and (iii) believes in strong conditional predictions in economics despite repeated failures.

The world that mainstream economists study is the empirical world. But this world is "out of phase" (Lawson) with the underlying ontology of economic regularities. The mainstream view is thus a limited reality because empirical realists presume that the objects of inquiry are solely "empirical regularities"—that is, objects and events at the level of the experienced.

The critical realist views the domain of real causal mechanisms as the appropriate object of economic science, whereas the positivist view is that the reality is exhausted in empirical, i.e. experienced reality. Tony Lawson argues that economics ought to embrace a "social ontology" to include the underlying causes of economic phenomena.

**Critical realism and Marx**

A development of Bhaskar's critical realism lies at the ontological root of contemporary streams of Marxian political and economic theory. The realist philosophy described by Bhaskar in *A Realist Theory of Science* is compatible with Marx's work in that it differentiates between an intransitive reality, which exists independently of human knowledge of it, and the socially produced world of science and empirical knowledge. This dualist logic is clearly present in the Marxian theory of ideology, according to which social reality may be very different from its empirically observable surface appearance. Notably, Alex Callinicos, whom Göran Therborn calls the 'most prolific of contemporary Marxist writers' in the UK, [5] has argued for a 'critical realist' ontology in the philosophy of social
science and explicitly acknowledges Bhaskar's influence (while also rejecting the latter's 'spiritualist turn' in his later work).\[^6\] The relationship between critical realist philosophy and Marxism has also been discussed in an article co-authored by Bhaskar and Callinicos and published in the *Journal of Critical Realism*\[^7\]

### References

\[^1\] http://www.equinoxjournals.com/ojs/index.php/JCR/
\[^2\] http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
\[^7\] Bhaskar, R. Callinicos, A. (2003), 'Marxism and Critical Realism: A Debate', in *Journal of Critical Realism*, 1.2

### Further reading

**External links**

- Bhaskar and American Critical Realism (http://www.raggedclaws.com/criticalrealism/archive/iverstegen_baacr.html)
- Critical realism (http://www.philosophyprofessor.com/philosophies/critical-realism.php)
- Chapter XI: Realism (http://www.emporia.edu/socsci/philos/chp11.htm) (Introduction to Philosophy (http://www.emporia.edu/socsci/philos/text.htm) by Dallas M. Roark)
- Critical Realism (http://www.philosophypages.com/hy/6o.htm) (philosophypages.com)

**Roy Bhaskar**

Roy Bhaskar (born May 15, 1944) is a British philosopher, best known as the initiator of the philosophical movement of Critical Realism.

**Early life**

Bhaskar was born in Teddington, London, the elder of two brothers. His Indian father and English mother were Theosophists.\(^1\)

In 1963 Bhaskar began attending Balliol College, Oxford on a scholarship to read Philosophy, Politics and Economics. Having graduated with first class honours in 1966, he began work on a Ph.D. thesis about the relevance of economic theory for under-developed countries. This research led him to the philosophy of social science and then the philosophy of science. In the course of this Rom Harré became his supervisor.

**Critical realism**

Bhaskar's consideration of the philosophies of science and social science resulted in the development of Critical Realism, a philosophical approach that defends the critical and emancipatory potential of rational (scientific and philosophical) enquiry against both positivist, broadly defined, and 'postmodern' challenges. Its approach emphasises the importance of distinguishing between epistemological and ontological questions and the significance of objectivity properly understood for a critical project. Its conception of philosophy and social science is a socially situated, but not socially determined one, which maintains the possibility for objective critique to motivate social change, with the ultimate end being a promotion of human freedom.

The term Critical Realism was not initially used by Bhaskar. The philosophy began life as what Bhaskar called 'Transcendental Realism' in *A Realist Theory of Science* (1975), which he extended into the social sciences as 'Critical Naturalism' in *The Possibility of Naturalism* (1978). The term 'Critical Realism' is an elision of Transcendental Realism and Critical Naturalism, that has been subsequently accepted by Bhaskar after being proposed by others, partly because of its appropriate connotations; Critical Realism shares certain dimensions with German Critical Theory (see the Frankfurt School).

Critical Realism should not be confused with various other 'critical realism's, including Georg Lukács' aesthetic theory, and Alistair McGrath's, Scientific Theology (or Theological Critical Realism), although they share common goals. In contemporary Critical Realist texts 'Critical Realism' is often abbreviated to 'CR'. A later dialectical development of Critical Realism in Bhaskar's work in *Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom* (1993)and *Plato Etcetera* (1994) led to a separate branch or second phase of CR known as 'Dialectical Critical Realism' (DCR) while *From East to West* (2000) marked the third or spiritual turn of CR in the form of *Transcendental Dialectical Critical Realism* TDCR.
Career

Bhaskar, who lectures internationally, has taught at the Universities of Edinburgh, Oxford, Sussex and City University, London. Following the enthusiastic reception of his first two books, Bhaskar founded the Critical Realism Conferences with notable scholars and leading CR writers Andrew Collier, William Outhwaite and Ted Benton. He was a founding member of the Centre for Critical Realism and the International Association of Critical Realism. More recently he has held visiting positions in several Scandinavian Universities. Bhaskar is currently employed at the Institute of Education in London where he is working on the application of CR to Peace Studies.

The first 'phase' of Critical Realism accrued a large number of adherents and proponents in Britain, many of whom were involved with the Radical Philosophy Group and related movements, and it was in the Radical Philosophy Journal that much of the early CR scholarship first appeared. It argued for an objectivist, realist approach to science based on a Kant-style transcendental analysis of scientific experimental activity. Stressing the need to retain both the subjective, epistemological or 'transitive' side of knowledge and the objective, ontological or 'intransitive' side, Bhaskar developed a theory of science and social science which he thought would sustain the reality of the objects of science, and their knowability, but would also incorporate the insights of the 'sociology of knowledge' movement, which emphasised the theory-laden, historically contingent and socially situated nature of knowledge. What emerged was a marriage of ontological realism with epistemological relativism, forming an objectivist, yet fallibilist, theory of knowledge. Bhaskar's main strategy was to argue that reality has depth, and that knowledge can penetrate more or less deeply into reality, without ever reaching the 'bottom'. Bhaskar has said that he reintroduced 'ontology' into the philosophy of science at a time when this was almost heresy, arguing for an ontology of stratified emergence and differentiated structure, which supported the ontological reality of causal powers independent of their empirical effects; such a move opened up the possibility for a non-reductivist and non-positivistic account of causal explanation in the human and social domain.

This explanatory project was linked with a critical project the main idea of which is the doctrine of 'Explanatory Critique' which Bhaskar developed fully in Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation (1987). This developed the critical tradition of 'ideology critique' within a CR framework, arguing that certain kinds of explanatory accounts could lead directly to evaluations, and thus that science could function normatively, not just descriptively, as positivism has, since Hume's Law, assumed. Such a move, it was hoped, would provide the Holy Grail of critical theory, an objective normative foundation.

The 'second phase' of Critical Realism, the dialectic turn initiated in Dialectic: the Pulse of Freedom (1993) won some new adherents but drew criticism from some Critical Realists. It argued for the 'dialecticising' of CR, through an elaborate reading of Hegel and Marx. Arguing against Hegel and with Marx that dialectical connections, relations and contradictions are themselves ontological - objectively real - Bhaskar developed a concept of real absence which it was claimed could provide a more robust foundation for the reality and objectivity of values and criticism. He attempted to incorporate critical, rational human agency into the dialectic figure with his 'Fourth Dimension' of dialectic, thereby grounding a systematic model for rational emancipatory transformative practice.

In 2000, Bhaskar published From East to West: The Odyssey of a Soul, in which he first expressed ideas related to spiritual values that came to be seen as the beginning of his so-called 'spiritual' turn, which led to the final phase of CR dubbed 'Transcendental Dialectical Critical Realism'. This publication and the ones that followed it were highly controversial and led to something of a split among Bhaskar's proponents. Whilst some respected Critical Realists cautiously supported Bhaskar's 'spiritual turn', others took the view that the development had compromised the status of CR as a serious philosophical movement.

In his Reflections on Meta-Reality, he states:

This book articulates the difference between critical realism in its development and a new philosophical standpoint which I am in the process of developing, which I have called the philosophy of Meta-Reality.
The main departure, it seems, is an emphasis on the shift away from Western dualism to a non-dual model in which emancipation entails "a breakdown, an overcoming, of the duality and separateness between things." However, this move was seen by some to undermine some of early Critical Realisms strongest aspects.

**Criticism**

Whilst his early books were 'models of clarity and rigour', Bhaskar has been criticized for the "truly appalling style" (Alex Callinicos, 1994) in which his 'dialectical' works are written.

Other criticisms have been levelled at the substance of Bhaskar's arguments at various points. One objection to Bhaskar's early Critical Realism is that it begs the question, assuming, rather than proving, the existence of the intransitive domain. Another objection, raised by Callinicos and others, is that Bhaskar's so-called 'transcendental arguments' are not really that. They are certainly not typical transcendental arguments as philosophers such as Charles Taylor have defined them, the distinguishing feature of which is the identification of some putative condition on the possibility of experience. However his arguments function in an analogous way since they try to argue that scientific practice would be unintelligible and/or inexplicable in the absence of the ontological features he identifies. It has been alleged that the dialectical phase of his philosophy proves too much, since Critical Realism was already dialectical. Bhaskar's concept of real absence has been questioned by, among others, Andrew Collier, who points out that it in fact fails to distinguish properly between real and nominal absences (in "On Real and Nominal Absences", in *After Postmodernism*, 2001). Bhaskar's most recent 'spiritual' phase has been criticised by many, perhaps most, adherents of early Critical Realism for departing from the fundamental positions which made it important and interesting, without providing philosophical support for his new ideas.

**Personal life**

Bhaskar married Hilary Wainwright, the socialist and feminist, in 1971.

**External links**

- [Roy Bhaskar Interviewed](#)
- *A Realist Theory of Science* (1975), chapters 1-3
- Centre for Critical Realism
- Journal of Critical Realism
- Web Site for Critical Realism

**References**

Structure and agency

The question over the primacy of either structure or agency in human behavior is a central debate in the social sciences. In this context, "agency" refers to the capacity of individuals to act independently and to make their own free choices. Structure, by contrast, refers to the recurrent patterned arrangements which influence or limit the choices and opportunities available. The structure versus agency debate may also be understood as an issue of socialisation against autonomy, and can be contrasted with the "nature versus nurture" debate (i.e. "the natural versus the social").

Structure, socialisation and autonomy

The debate over the primacy of structure or agency relates to an issue at the heart of both classical and contemporary sociological theory: the question of social ontology: "What is the social world made of?" "What is a cause of the social world, and what is an effect?" "Do social structures determine an individual's behaviour or does human agency?"

For functionalists such as Émile Durkheim, structure and hierarchy are essential in stabilising the very existence of society. Theorists such as Karl Marx, by contrast, emphasise that the social structure can act to the detriment of the majority of individuals in a society. In both these instances "structure" may refer to something both material (or "economic") and cultural (e.g. related to norms, customs, traditions and ideologies).

Some theorists put forward that what we know as our social existence is largely determined by the overall structure of society. The perceived agency of individuals can also mostly be explained by the operation of this structure. Theoretical systems aligned with this view include: structuralism, and some forms of functionalism and Marxism (all of which in this context can be seen as forms of holism -- the notion that "the whole is greater than the sum of its parts"). In the reverse of the first position, other theorists stress the capacity of individual "agents" to construct and reconstruct their worlds. Theoretical systems aligned with this view include: methodological individualism, social phenomenology, interactionism and ethnomethodology.

Lastly, a third option, taken by many modern social theorists (Bourdieu, 1977, 1990), is to attempt to find a point of balance between the two previous positions. They see structure and agency as complementary forces - structure influences human behaviour, and humans are capable of changing the social structures they inhabit. Structuration is one prominent example of this view.

The first approach (emphasizing the importance of societal structure) was dominant in classical sociology. Theorists saw unique aspects of the social world that could not be explained simply by the sum of the individuals present. Émile Durkheim strongly believed that the collective had emergent properties of its own and that there was a need for a science which would deal with this emergence. The second approach (methodological individualism, etc.), however, also has a well-established position in social science. Many theorists still follow this course (e.g., economists are very prone to disregarding any kind of holism).
The central debate, therefore, is between theorists committed to the notions of methodological holism and those committed to methodological individualism. The first notion, methodological holism, is the idea that actors are socialised and embedded into social structures and institutions that constrain, or enable, and generally shape the individuals' dispositions towards, and capacities for, action, and that this social structure should be taken as primary and most significant. The second notion, methodological individualism, is the idea that actors are the central theoretical and ontological elements in social systems, and social structure is an epiphenomenon, a result and consequence of the actions and activities of interacting individuals.

**Major theorists**

**Georg Simmel**

Georg Simmel (March 1, 1858 – September 28, 1918, Berlin, Germany) was one of the first generation of German nonpositivist sociologists. His studies pioneered the concepts of social structure and agency. His most famous works today include *The Metropolis and Mental Life* and *The Philosophy of Money*.

**Norbert Elias**

Norbert Elias (June 22, 1897 — August 1, 1990) was a German sociologist whose work focused on the relationship between power, behavior, emotion, and knowledge over time. He significantly shaped what is called "process sociology" or "figurational sociology."

**Talcott Parsons**

Talcott Parsons was an American sociologist and the main theorist of action theory (misleadingly called "structural functionalism") in sociology from the 1930s in the United States. His works analyze social structure but in terms of voluntary action and through pattern of normative institutionalisation by codifying its theoretical gestalt into a system-theoretical framework based on the idea of living systems and cybernetic hierarchy. For Parsons there is no "structure"- "agency" problem. It is a pseudo-problem.

**Pierre Bourdieu**

Pierre Bourdieu was a French theorist who presented his *theory of practice* on the dichotomical understanding of the relation between agency and structure in a great number of published articles, beginning with *An Outline of the Theory of Practice* in 1972, where he presented the concept of habitus. His book *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* (1979), was named as one of the 20th century's 10 most important works of sociology by the International Sociological Association.

The key concepts in Bourdieu's work are habitus, field, and capital. The agent is socialized in a "field" (an evolving set of roles and relationships in a social domain, where various forms of "capital" such as prestige or financial resources are at stake). As the agent accommodates to his or her roles and relationships in the context of his or her position in the field, the agent internalises relationships and expectations for operating in that domain. These internalised relationships and habitual expectations and relationships form, over time, the *habitus*.

Bourdieu's work attempts to reconcile structure and agency, as external structures are internalised into the habitus while the actions of the agent externalise interactions between actors into the social relationships in the field. Bourdieu's theory, therefore, is a dialectic between "externalising the internal", and "internalising the external."
Berger and Luckmann

Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann in their *Social Construction of Reality* (1966) saw the relationships between structure and agency as a dialectical one. Society forms the individuals who create society - forming a continuous loop.[2]

James Coleman

James Samuel Coleman’s Coleman boat provides a link between macrosociological phenomena and individual behavior. A macro-level phenomenon is described as instigating particular actions by individuals, which results in a subsequent macro-level phenomenon. In this way, individual action is taken in reference to a macrosociological structure, and that action (by many individuals) results in change to that macro structure.

Anthony Giddens

Contemporary sociology has generally aimed toward a reconciliation of structure and agency as concepts. Anthony Giddens's developed “Structuration Theory” in such works as *The Constitution of Society* (1984). He presents a developed attempt to move beyond the dualism of structure and agency and argues for the "duality of structure" - where social structure is both the medium and the outcome of social action.[2] For Giddens, an agents' common interaction with structure, as a system of norms, is described as “structuration”. The term “reflexivity” is used to refer to the ability of an agent to consciously alter his or her place in the social structure; thus globalization and the emergence of the 'post-traditional' society might be said to allow for "greater social reflexivity". Social and political sciences are therefore important because social knowledge, as self-knowledge, is potentially emancipatory.[3]

Recent developments

The critical realist structure/agency perspective embodied in the TMSA has been further advocated and applied in other social science fields by additional authors, for example in economics by Tony Lawson and in sociology by Margaret Archer. In 2005, the Journal of Management Studies debated the merits of critical realism.[4]

Kenneth Wilkinson in the *Community in Rural America* took an interactional/field theoretical perspective focusing on the role of community agency in contributing to the emergence of community.

With Critical Psychology as framework, the Danish psychologist Ole Dreier, proposes in his book *Psychotherapy in Everyday Life* that we may best conceptualize persons as participants in social practices (that constitute social structures) who can either reproduce or change these social practices. This indicates that neither participants, nor social practices can be understood when looked at in isolation (in fact, this undermines the very idea of trying to do so), since practice and structure is co-created by participants and since the participants can only be called so, if they participate in a social practice.[5]

The structure/agency debate continues to evolve, with contributions such as Nicos Mouzelis's *Sociological Theory: What Went Wrong?* and Margaret Archer's *Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach* continuing to push the ongoing development of structure/agency theory. Work in information systems by Mutch (2010) has emphasized Archer's Realist Social Theory.[6] In entrepreneurship a discussion between Sarason et al and Mole and Mole (2010) used Archer's theory to critique structuration view arguing that starting a new business organization needs to be understood in the context of social structure and agency. However, this depends upon one's view of structure which differs between Giddens and Archer. Hence if strata in social reality have different ontologies, then they must be viewed as a dualism. Third, agents have causal power, and ultimate concerns which they try to fallibly to put into practice. Mole and Mole propose entrepreneurship as the study of the interplay between the structures of a society and the agents within it.[7]
A European problem?

While the structure/agency debate has been a central issue in social theory, and recent theoretical reconciliation attempts have been made, structure/agency theory has tended to develop more in European countries by European theorists, while American social theorists have tended to focus instead on the issue of integration between macrosociological and microsociological perspectives. George Ritzer examines these issues (and surveys the structure agency debate) in greater detail in his book Modern Sociological Theory (2000).

Notes


References

Roy Wood Sellars

Roy Wood Sellars (1880 – September 5, 1973) was an American philosopher of critical realism and religious humanism, and a proponent of emergent evolution. His son was the philosopher Wilfrid Sellars. For much of his career he taught at the University of Michigan.

In his 1967 book, *Reflections on American Philosophy From Within*[^1] he described his views on materialism as evolutionary materialism, an extension to his 1922 groundbreaking book *Evolutionary Naturalism*.

He helped draft the Humanist Manifesto in 1933.

**External links**

- Biography[^2] at Notable American Unitarians
- Biography mirror[^3]
- Bibliography of Roy Wood Sellars[^4]

**References**

[^1]: http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/sellarsrefl-0.html
[^4]: http://ditext.com/rwsellars/bib-rws.html
George Santayana

Jorge Agustín Nicolás Ruiz de Santayana y Borrás

A drawing of George Santayana from the early 20th century.

<table>
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<th>Jorge Agustín Nicolás Ruiz de Santayana y Borrás</th>
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George Santayana (born Jorge Agustín Nicolás Ruiz de Santayana y Borrás in Madrid, December 16, 1863; died September 26, 1952, in Rome) was a Spanish American philosopher, essayist, poet, and novelist. A lifelong Spanish citizen, Santayana was raised and educated in the United States. He wrote in English and is generally considered an American man of letters. At the age of forty-eight, Santayana left his position at Harvard and returned to Europe permanently, never to return to the United States. His last will was to be buried in the Spanish Pantheon in Rome.

Santayana is known for his (often-misquoted) comments: "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to fulfill it",[1] and "[O]nly the dead have seen the end of war."[2] The latter sentence has often been falsely attributed to Plato. The philosophical system of Santayana is broadly considered Pragmatist due to his concerns shared with fellow Harvard University associates William James and Josiah Royce. But, Santayana did not accept this label for his writing and eschewed any association with a philosophical school; he declared that he stood in philosophy "exactly where [he stood] in daily life."[3]

Biography

Early life

Born Jorge Agustín Nicolás Ruiz de Santayana y Borrás on December 16, 1863 in Madrid, he spent his early childhood in Ávila. His mother Josefina Borrás was the daughter of a Spanish official in the Philippines, and Jorge was the only child of her second marriage. She was the widow of George Sturgis, a Boston merchant with whom she had five children, two of whom died in infancy. She lived in Boston for a few years following her husband's death in 1857, but in 1861 moved with her three surviving children to live in Madrid. There she encountered Agustín Ruiz de Santayana, an old friend from her years in the Philippines. They married in 1862. A colonial civil servant, Ruiz de
Santayana was also a painter and minor intellectual.

The family lived in Madrid and Ávila until 1869, when Josefina Borrás de Santayana returned to Boston with her three Sturgis children, as she had promised her first husband to raise the children in the US. She left the six-year-old Jorge with his father in Spain. Jorge and his father followed her in 1872, but his father, finding neither Boston nor his wife's attitude to his liking, soon returned alone to Ávila. He remained there the rest of his life. Jorge did not see him again until he had entered Harvard University and took his summer vacations in Spain. Sometime during this period, Jorge's first name was anglicized as George, the English equivalent.

**Education**

He attended Boston Latin School and Harvard University, where he studied under the philosophers William James and Josiah Royce. After graduating from Harvard, Phi Beta Kappa in 1886, Santayana studied for two years in Berlin. He returned to Harvard to write his dissertation on Hermann Lotze and teach philosophy, becoming part of the Golden Age of the Harvard philosophy department. Some of his Harvard students became famous in their own right, including T. S. Eliot, Robert Frost, Gertrude Stein, Walter Lippmann, W. E. B. Du Bois, and Harry Austryn Wolfson. Wallace Stevens was not among his students, but became a friend. From 1896 to 1897, he studied at King's College, Cambridge.

**Travels**

In 1912, Santayana resigned his Harvard position to spend the rest of his life in Europe. He had saved money and been aided by a legacy from his mother. After some years in Ávila, Paris and Oxford, after 1920, he began to winter in Rome, eventually living there year-round until his death. During his 40 years in Europe, he wrote nineteen books and declined several prestigious academic positions. Many of his visitors and correspondents were Americans, including his assistant and eventual literary executor, Daniel Cory. In later life, Santayana was financially comfortable, in part because his 1935 novel, *The Last Puritan*, had become an unexpected best-seller. In turn, he financially assisted a number of writers, including Bertrand Russell, with whom he was in fundamental disagreement, philosophically and politically. Santayana never married.
Philosophical work and publications

Santayana’s main philosophical work consists of The Sense of Beauty[^7] (1896), his first book-length monograph and perhaps the first major work on aesthetics written in the United States; The Life of Reason five volumes, 1905–6, the high point of his Harvard career; Scepticism and Animal Faith (1923); and The Realms of Being (4 vols., 1927–40). Although Santayana was not a pragmatist in the mold of William James, Charles Sanders Peirce, Josiah Royce, or John Dewey, The Life of Reason arguably is the first extended treatment of pragmatism written.

Like many of the classical pragmatists, and because he was also well-versed in evolutionary theory, Santayana was committed to metaphysical naturalism. He believed that human cognition, cultural practices, and social institutions have evolved so as to harmonize with the conditions present in their environment. Their value may then be adjudged by the extent to which they facilitate human happiness. The alternate title to The Life of Reason, "the Phases of Human Progress", is indicative of this metaphysical stance.

Santayana was an early adherent of epiphenomenalism, but also admired the classical materialism of Democritus and Lucretius (of the three authors on whom he wrote in Three Philosophical Poets, Santayana speaks most favorably of Lucretius). He held Spinoza's writings in high regard, without subscribing to the latter's rationalism or pantheism.

Although an agnostic, he held a fairly benign view of religion, in contrast to Bertrand Russell who held that religion was harmful. Santayana's views on religion are outlined in his books Reason in Religion, The Idea of Christ in the Gospels, and Interpretations of Poetry and Religion. Santayana described himself as an "aesthetic Catholic". He spent the last decade of his life at the Convent of the Blue Nuns of the Little Company of Mary on the Celian Hill at 6 Via Santo Stefano Rotondo in Rome, where he was cared for by the Irish sisters.
Man of letters

Santayana's one novel, The Last Puritan, is a bildungsroman, that is, a novel that centers on the personal growth of the protagonist. His Persons and Places is an autobiography. These works also contain many of his sharper opinions and bons mots. He wrote books and essays on a wide range of subjects, including philosophy of a less technical sort, literary criticism, the history of ideas, politics, human nature, morals, the subtle influence of religion on culture and social psychology, all with considerable wit and humor. While his writings on technical philosophy can be difficult, his other writings are far more accessible and have literary quality. All of his books contain quotable passages. He wrote poems and a few plays, and left an ample correspondence, much of it published only since 2000.

In his temperament, judgments and prejudices, Santayana was very much the Castilian Platonist, cold, aristocratic and elitist, a curious blend of Mediterranean conservative (similar to Paul Valéry) and cultivated Anglo-Saxon, aloof and ironically detached. Russell Kirk discussed Santayana in his The Conservative Mind from Edmund Burke to T. S. Eliot. Like Alexis de Tocqueville, Santayana observed American culture and character from a foreigner's point of view. Like Ralph Waldo Emerson, he wrote philosophy in a literary way. Although he declined to become an American citizen and resided in fascist Italy for decades, Santayana is usually considered an American writer by Americans. But, he said that he was most comfortable, intellectually and aesthetically, at Oxford University.

His materialistic, skeptical philosophy was never in tune with the Spanish world of his time. In the post-Franco era, he is gradually being recognized and translated. Ezra Pound includes Santayana among his many cultural references in The Cantos, notably in "Canto LXXXI" and "Canto XCV". Chuck Jones used Santayana's description of fanaticism as "redoubling your effort after you've forgotten your aim" to describe his cartoons starring Wile E. Coyote and Road Runner.[6]

Awards

- Royal Society of Literature Benson Medal, 1928
- Columbia University Butler Gold Medal, 1945
- Honorary degree from the University of Wisconsin

Legacy
Santayana's famous aphorism "the one who does not remember history is bound to live through it again" is inscribed on a plaque at the Auschwitz concentration camp translated into Polish (above) and on a subway placard in Germany (below)

Santayana is remembered in large part for his aphorisms, many of which have been so frequently used as to have become clichéd. His philosophy has not fared quite as well. Although he is regarded by most as an excellent prose stylist, Professor John Lachs (who is sympathetic with much of Santayana's philosophy) writes in his book On Santayana that the latter's eloquence may ultimately be the cause of this neglect.

Santayana influenced those around him, including Bertrand Russell, who in his critical essay admits that Santayana single-handedly steered him away from the ethics of G. E. Moore. He also influenced many of his prominent students, perhaps most notably the eminent poet Wallace Stevens. Those who have studied the philosophies of naturalism or materialism in the 20th century come inevitably to Santayana, whose mark upon them has been great.

Santayana is quoted by the Canadian-American sociologist Erving Goffman as a central influence in the thesis of his famous 1959 book The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life.
Bibliography


The Santayana Edition:


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• 1990 (1900). *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion*.


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• 1915. *Egotism in German Philosophy*.


• 1920. *Little Essays, Drawn From the Writings of George Santayana* by Logan Pearsall Smith, With the Collaboration of the Author.

• 1922. *Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies*.


• 1927. *Platonism and the Spiritual Life*.


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• 1936. *Obiter Scripta: Lectures, Essays and Reviews*. Justus Buchler and Benjamin Schwartz, eds.

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**References**


**Further reading**

External links

- George Santayana (http://www.dmoz.org/Society/Philosophy/Philosophers/S/Santayana,_George/) at the Open Directory Project
- George Santayana (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/santayana) entry by Herman Saatkamp in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Includes a complete bibliography of the primary literature, and a fair selection of the secondary literature
- The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: George Santayana (http://www.iep.utm.edu/s/santayan.htm) by Matthew C. Flamm
- The Santayana Edition (http://www.iupui.edu/~santedit/index.html#quota)
- Works by George Santayana (http://www.gutenberg.org/author/George+Santayana) at Project Gutenberg
- Works by or about George Santayana at Archive.org (http://www.archive.org/search.php?query=George Santayana)
- George Santayana (http://www.findagrave.com/cgi-bin/fg.cgi?page=gr&GRid=6403085) at Find a Grave

Arthur Oncken Lovejoy

Arthur Oncken Lovejoy (October 10, 1873 – December 30, 1962) was an influential American philosopher and intellectual historian, who founded the field known as the history of ideas.

Lovejoy was born in Berlin, Germany while his father was doing medical research there. Eighteen months later, his mother committed suicide, whereupon his father gave up medicine and became a clergyman. Lovejoy studied philosophy, first at the University of California, then at Harvard under William James and Josiah Royce. In 1901, he resigned from his first job, at Stanford University, to protest the dismissal of a colleague who had offended a trustee. The President of Harvard then vetoed hiring Lovejoy on the grounds that he was a known troublemaker. Over the subsequent decade, he taught at Washington University, Columbia University, and the University of Missouri. He never married.

As a professor of philosophy at Johns Hopkins University from 1910 to 1938, Lovejoy founded and long presided over that university's History of Ideas Club, where many prominent and budding intellectual and social historians, as well as literary critics, gathered. In 1940, he founded the Journal of the History of Ideas. Lovejoy insisted that the history of ideas should focus on "unit ideas," single concepts (often with a one-word name), and study how unit ideas combine and recombine with each other over time.

In the domain of epistemology, Lovejoy is remembered for an influential critique of the pragmatic movement, especially in the essay "The Thirteen Pragmatisms", written in 1908.[1]

Lovejoy was active in the public arena. He helped found the American Association of University Professors and the Maryland chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union. However, he qualified his belief in civil liberties to exclude what he considered threats to a free system. Thus, at the height of the McCarthy Era (in the February 14, 1952 edition of the Journal of Philosophy) Lovejoy stated that, since it was a "matter of empirical fact" that membership in the Communist Party contributed "to the triumph of a world-wide organization" which was opposed to "freedom of inquiry, of opinion and of teaching," membership in the party constituted grounds for dismissal from academic positions. He also published numerous opinion pieces in the Baltimore press. He died in Baltimore on December 30, 1962.
Notes


Books

• The Revolt Against Dualism (1960). Open Court Publishing. ISBN 0-87548-107-8. This is largely a critique of the new realism of his day.

External links

• Lovejoy Papers at Johns Hopkins University. (http://www.library.jhu.edu/collections/specialcollections/manuscripts/msregisters/ms038.html) Includes a short biography.
Bernard Lonergan

Fr. Bernard J.F. Lonergan, CC, SJ (17 December 1904 – 26 November 1984) was a Canadian Jesuit Priest. He was a philosopher-theologian in the Thomist tradition and an economist from Buckingham, Quebec. He taught at Loyola College (Montreal) (now Concordia University), Regis College (now federated within the University of Toronto), the Pontifical Gregorian University, Boston College and Harvard University as Stillman Professor of Divinity. He is the author of *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (1957) and *Method in Theology* (1972), which established what he called the Generalized Empirical Method (GEM). The University of Toronto Press is in process of publishing his work in a projected 25-volume collection edited by staff at the Lonergan Research Institute at Regis College.

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**Education**

Lonergan entered the Society of Jesus in 1922, obtained his BA in Philosophy from Heythrop College in 1929, was ordained a Roman Catholic Priest in 1933, and obtained his title of Doctor of Sacred Theology from the Pontifical Gregorian University in 1940. His doctoral dissertation was advised by Charles Boyer, S.J., and later published as *Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas*. [2]

**Works**

After his return from Rome, Lonergan wrote a series of four articles for Theological Studies on the inner word in Thomas Aquinas which became highly influential in the study of St. Thomas' accounts of knowledge and cognition. The articles were later collected and published under the title *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*. [3]

While teaching at Collegium Christi Regis, now Regis College federated with the University of Toronto, Lonergan wrote *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, inaugurating the generalized empirical method (GEM). GEM belongs to the movement of "transcendental Thomism" inaugurated by Joseph Maréchal. This method begins with an analysis of human knowing as divided into three levels—experience, understanding, and judgment—and, by stressing the objectivity of judgment more than Kant had done, develops a Thomistic vision of Being as the goal of the dynamic openness of the human spirit.
In 1973, Lonergan published *Method in Theology*, which divides the discipline into eight 'functional specialties'. Method is a phenomenon which applies across the board in all disciplines and realms of consciousness. Through his work on method, Lonergan aimed, among other things, to establish a firm basis for agreement and progress in disciplines such as philosophy and theology. Lonergan believed that the lack of an agreed method among scholars in such fields has inhibited substantive agreement from being reached and progress from being made; whereas, in the natural sciences, for example, widespread agreement among scholars on the scientific method has enabled remarkable progress.

In later life while teaching at Boston College, Lonergan returned his attention to the economic interests of his younger days. The University of Toronto Press has published his two works on economics: *For a New Political Economy* and *Macroeconomic Dynamics: An Essay in Circulation Analysis*.

Lonergan contributed significantly to Christian theology, mainly in the areas of Christology and Trinity; he taught courses in these subjects every alternate year while at the Gregorian. His voluminous Latin textbooks on these topics are in the process of being published in the Collected Works.\[4\]

For more information see the Lonergan Center.

**Philosophy: Generalized Empirical Method (GEM)**

Lonergan described GEM as critical realism. By realism, he affirmed that we make true judgments of fact and of value, and by critical, he based knowing and valuing in a critique of consciousness. GEM traces to their roots in consciousness the sources of all the meanings and values that make up personality, social orders, and historical developments. A more thorough overview of Lonergan's work is available at the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.\[5\]

His ideas include Radical Unintelligibility, GEM, and Functional Specialization. Given the fact that no science can today be mastered by a single individual, Lonergan advocated sub-division of the scientific process in all fields. One of the leading voices in the effort to implement functional specialization is Philip McShane.\[6\]

**Hermeneutics**

Frederick G. Lawrence has made the claim that Lonergan's work may be seen as the culmination of the postmodern hermeneutic revolution begun by Heidegger. Heidegger replaced Husserl's phenomenology of pure perception with his own linguistic phenomenology. Gadamer worked out this seminal insight into his philosophical hermeneutics. According to Lawrence, however, Heidegger, and in a lesser way Gadamer, remained under the influence of Kant when they refused to take seriously the possibility of grace and redemption. Lawrence makes the interesting and highly suggestive observation that Heidegger - influenced also by Augustine's inability to work out a theoretical distinction between grace and freedom - conflated finitude and fallenness in his account of the human being. 'Sin' is therefore absorbed into 'fallenness,' and fallenness is simply part of the human condition. Lonergan, building on the 'theorem of the supernatural' achieved in medieval times, as well as the distinction between grace and freedom worked out by Thomas Aquinas, is able to remove all the brackets and return to the truly concrete, with his unique synthesis of 'Jerusalem and Athens.'\[7\]
Honours
In 1970 he was made a Companion of the Order of Canada.

Conferences, Journals, etc.
An annual Lonergan Workshop is held at Boston College, under the leadership of Frederick G. Lawrence. The proceedings of the Workshop are published under the same name, *Lonergan Workshop*, edited by Frederick G. Lawrence. The Workshop began in Lonergan's lifetime, and continued after his death.

Boston College has a Lonergan Institute, and also publishes the bi-annual *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies*. The *Lonergan Studies Newsletter* is put out 4 times a year by the Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto; it provides the most up-to-date bibliographical information on the Lonergan movement. Recently, Seton College has put out *The Lonergan Review*.

 Lonergan Centers have been set up in various places (see below, External Links). The Lonergan Research Institute at Toronto holds the Lonergan archives, as well as a good collection of secondary material. Much of the primary archival material is available online at the Bernard Lonergan Archive (see below, External Links), and the secondary material will also soon be available online, thanks to the work of Robert M. Doran.

References

External links
- Bernard Lonergan Archive (http://www.bernardlonergan.com)
- The Lonergan Website - Concordia University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada (http://lonergan.concordia.ca)
- Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto (http://www.lonergan-iri.ca/)
- Lonergan Institute, Boston College (http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/cas/lonergan/)
- Lonergan Centre, Saint Paul University, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada (http://www.ustpaul.ca/Lonergancentre/index_e.asp)
- Bernard Joseph Francis Lonergan (http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=A1ARTA0004754) at The Canadian Encyclopedia
- Commentary and Notes on Insight (http://www.lonergan.org/Insight_Index.htm) (includes podcast)
Samuel Alexander

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Full name</th>
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<tr>
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<td>January 6, 1859</td>
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<tr>
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Samuel Alexander OM (6 January 1859, Sydney – 13 September 1938, Manchester) was an Australian-born British philosopher. He was the first Jewish fellow of an Oxbridge college.[1]

Early life

Alexander was born at 436 George Street, in what is now the commercial heart of Sydney, Australia. He was the third son of Samuel Alexander, a prosperous saddler, and Eliza née Sloman. Both parents were Jewish. His father died just before he was born, and Eliza moved to Victoria in 1863 or 1864. They went to live at St Kilda, and Alexander was placed at a private school kept by a Mr Atkinson.

In 1871, he was sent to Wesley College, Melbourne, then under the headmastership of Professor Irving, and was always grateful for the efficiency and comprehensiveness of his schooling. He matriculated at the University of Melbourne on 22 March 1875 to do arts. He was placed in the first class in both his first and second years, was awarded the classical and mathematical exhibitions (top of year) in his first year. In his second year won the exhibitions in Greek, Latin and English, mathematics and natural philosophy; and natural science.
England

In May 1877, Alexander left for England in an attempt to win a scholarship, arriving at the end of August. Undecided whether to go to Oxford or Cambridge he chose Oxford and sat for a scholarship at Balliol College. Among the competition were George Curzon and J. W. Mackail. Though his tutor thought little of his chances Alexander achieved second place after Mackail and gained a scholarship.

At Oxford, he obtained a first class in Classical and Mathematical Moderations, a rare achievement, and a first class in Greats, his final examination for the degree of B.A., in 1881. Two of his tutors were T. H. Green and Henry Nettleship, who exercised a great influence on his early work.

Work and publications

After taking his degree, Alexander was made a Fellow of Lincoln College, where he remained as philosophy tutor from 1882 to 1893. It was during this period that he developed his interest in psychology, then a neglected subject. In 1887, he won the Green moral philosophy prize with an essay on the subject "In what direction does Moral Philosophy seem to you to admit or require advance?" This was the basis of his volume Moral Order and Progress, which was published in 1889 and went into its third edition in 1899.

By 1912, however, Alexander had altered his views to some extent and considered that the book had served its purpose, had become dated, and should be allowed to die. During the period of his fellowship at Lincoln, he had also contributed articles on philosophical subjects to Mind, the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, and the International Journal of Ethics. He did some travelling on the continent, and in the winter of 1890-1 was in Germany working at the psychological laboratory of Professor Hugo Münsterberg at Freiburg. Among his colleagues at Lincoln was Walter Baldwin Spencer.

For some time, Alexander had wanted to obtain a professorship. He made three unsuccessful attempts before he was appointed at the University of Manchester in 1893, remaining there for the rest of his life. There, he quickly became a leading figure in the University. Unconventional in his attire and his manner of conducting his classes, there was something in him that drew students and colleagues alike to him. He wrote little, and his growing deafness made it difficult for him to get much out of philosophical discussions, though he could manage conversation.

An important change in his home life occurred in 1902 when the whole of his family – his mother, an aunt, two elder brothers and his sister - came from Australia to live with him. This in some families would have been a dangerous experiment, but it worked well in Alexander's case. His sister became a most efficient hostess and on Wednesday evenings fellow members of the staff, former pupils, a few advanced students and others would drop in and spend a memorable evening. His home at that time was at 6 Mauldeth Road West in Withington (from 1904 in the City of Manchester).

He was given the Hon. LL.D. of St Andrews in 1905, and in later years he received Hon. Litt. D. degrees from Durham, Liverpool, Oxford and Cambridge. In 1908, he published Locke, a short but excellent study, which was included in the Philosophies Ancient and Modern Series. He was president of the Aristotelian Society from 1908–1911 and from 1936–1937. In 1913, was made a fellow of the British Academy. He was appointed Gifford lecturer at Glasgow in 1915, and delivered his lectures in the winters of 1917 and 1918. These he developed into his great work Space, Time, and Deity, published in two volumes in 1920, which his biographer has called the "boldest adventure in detailed speculative metaphysics attempted in so grand a manner by any English writer between 1655 and 1920." That its conclusions should be universally accepted was scarcely to be expected, but it was widely and well reviewed, and made a great impression on philosophic thinkers at the time and for many years after. His Arthur Davis Memorial Lecture on Spinoza and Time was published in 1921, and in 1924 Alexander retired from his chair.
Semi-retirement
Before he retired, Alexander had longed for leisure, but it was impossible for him to be idle. He continued to give short courses and single lectures in connection with the extramural department, he graded examinations for higher degrees and also did some reviewing. He retained until 1930 the office of presenter for honorary degrees. His short orations when presenting were models of grace and skill. He remained on many committees, always ready to give them the benefit of his help and wisdom. Alexander kept up his interest in the British Academy and the British Institute of Philosophy, as well as in Jewish communities in England and Palestine.

Honours
In 1925, he was honoured by the presentation of his bust by Epstein to the University of Manchester, where it was placed in the centre of the hall of the arts building, which is named after him. He was Herbert Spencer lecturer at Oxford in 1927, and in 1930, amid congratulations from all over the country, the Order of Merit was conferred on him, the first to an Australian-born.
In 1933, he published Beauty and other Forms of Value, mainly an essay in aesthetics, which incorporated passages from papers that had appeared in the previous 10 years. Some of the earlier parts of the book were deliberately meant to be provocative, and Alexander had hoped that artists of distinction in various mediums might be tempted to say how they worked. He had, however, not reckoned with the difficulty most artists find in explaining their methods of work and the response was comparatively meagre.

Death and legacy
He was greatly troubled by the sufferings of the Jews in Europe and gave much of his time and money in helping to alleviate them. Early in 1938, he realized that his end was approaching and he died on 13 September 1938. He was unmarried and his ashes lie in Manchester Southern cemetery (British Jewish Reform Congregation section).
His will was proved at about £16,000 of which £1,000 went to the university of Jerusalem and the bulk of the remainder to the university of Manchester. In 1939, his Philosophical and Literary Pieces was published with a memoir by his literary executor, Professor John Laird. This volume included papers on literary subjects, as well as philosophical lectures, several of which had been published separately.
When lecturing, Alexander could be quite informal, at times dropping into a kind of conversation with his class, and would follow a side track if it looked promising. He did not always give the impression that he was much interested in teaching, yet he was a great teacher whose influence was widespread. He was one of the greatest speculative thinkers of his time.
A theatre at Monash University, Melbourne, is named for him and a cast of his bust by Epstein stands in its foyer.
The building formerly known as 'Humanities Lime Grove' at the University of Manchester was renamed the 'Samuel Alexander Building' in 2007. It was given Grade II listed building status by English Heritage on 12 Feb 2010. As in Melbourne, a cast of his bust by Epstein stands in its foyer.

Philosophical ideas
Two key concepts for Alexander are those of an "emergent quality" and the idea of emergent evolution:
As existents within Space-Time, minds enter into various relations of a perfectly general character with other things and with one another. These account for the familiar features of mental life: knowing, freedom, values and the like. In the hierarchy of qualities the next higher quality to the highest attained is deity. God is the whole universe engaged in process towards the emergence of this new quality, and religion is the sentiment in us that we are drawn towards him, and caught in the movement of the world to a higher level of existence.

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Samuel Alexander

His task, as in any metaphysical theory, was to account for every aspect of existing reality in the simplest and most economical basis. Alexander's idea was to start with space and time, each of which he regarded as inconceivable without the other, in fact mutually equivalent. Out of this, pure spacetime emerges, through a process Alexander describes simply as "motion", the stuff and matter that make up our material world:

Space-Time, the universe in its primordial form, is the stuff out of which all existents are made. It is Space-Time with the characters which we have found it to reveal to experience. But it has no 'quality' save that of being spatio-temporal or motion.


Motion is not a succession of point-instants, but rather a point-instant is the limiting case of a motion.

— ibid p. 321

Point-instants are real but their separateness from one another is conceptual. They are in fact the elements of motion and in their reality are inseparable from the universe of motion; they are elements in a continuum.

— ibid p. 325

For Time makes Space distinct and Space makes Time distinct... Space or Time, may be regarded as supplying the element of diversity to the element of identity supplied by the other.

— ibid p. 195

Alexander absolutizes spacetime, and even speaks of it as a "stuff" of which things are made. At the same time he also says that spacetime can be called "Motions" – not motion in the singular, but complexes of motions with kaleidoscopic changes within a continuum. So one might say that for Alexander motion is primitive, and space and time are defined through relations between motions.

In Space, Time and Deity, Alexander held that an object may be before a consciousness, but is not in it; consciousness of an object is not the same as consciousness of one's consciousness of the object. For example, an object such as a chair may be apprehended by a consciousness, but the chair is not located within that consciousness; and, the contemplation of the chair is distinct from thinking about the act of contemplating the chair. Further, since the contemplation of an object is itself an action, in Alexander's view it cannot be "contemplated," but only subjectively experienced, or "enjoyed."

Alexander asked the question:

How far a science of order could be founded on this bare conception of ordered parts of Space-Time I do not know. But at any rate the more comprehensive theorems of speculative mathematics at the present time do not thus proceed. They appear to use the conception of Space and Time not as being stuffs, as we have taken them to be, within which there are relations of the parts of Space and Time themselves, but as relational in the sense that they are relations between things or entities. This is the antithesis between absolute and relational

— Space and Time." - ibid p. 168

The question went largely unanswered and his work is mostly ignored (or, at best, little known) these days.

Alexander was a contemporary of Alfred North Whitehead, whom he influenced, and mentored others who went on to become major figures in 20th century British philosophy.
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Books

- *Moral Order and Progress* (1889)
- *Locke* (1908)
- *Spinoza and Time* (1921)
- *Art and the Material* (1925)
- *Beauty and Other Forms of Value* (1933)
- *Philosophical and Literary Pieces* (1939), (posthumous)

External links

- Gifford Lectures biography (http://www.giffordlectures.org/Author.asp?AuthorID=5)
- Alexander papers archive (http://rylibweb.man.ac.uk/data2/spcoll/alexand/) at University Library of Manchester
- Article by recent occupier of Alexander's chair at the University of Manchester discussing the legacy of Whitehead and Alexander (http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=2834).
- "Samuel Alexander and Zionism" (http://www.art.man.ac.uk/RELTHEOL/JEWISH/EXHIBITION/11Alexander.html)
John Cook Wilson (born Nottingham 6 June 1849, died 1915) was an English philosopher. The only son of a Methodist minister, after Derby School he went up to Balliol College, Oxford in 1868, where he read both Classics and Mathematics, gaining a double First in both. Wilson became a Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford in 1873. He was Wykeham Professor of Logic and a Fellow of New College, Oxford, from 1889 until his death. H. A. Prichard and W.D. Ross were among his students. Belonging to a generation brought up in the atmosphere of British idealism, he espoused the cause of direct realism. His posthumous collected papers, Statement and Inference, were influential on a generation of Oxford philosophers, including H. H. Price and Gilbert Ryle. He also features prominently in the work of J.L. Austin, John McDowell, and Timothy Williamson. P.F. Strawson's expression, 'the attributive tie', in Individuals, 1959, 168, is named 'in memory of Cook Wilson'.

Cook Wilson often argued the existence of God as an experiential reality, quoted saying "We don't want merely inferred friends, could we be satisfied with an inferred God?" He also had a long running dispute with Lewis Carroll over the Barber Shop Paradox. He was, along with H. A. Prichard, one of Oxford's few early twentieth-century philosophers, to have a mathematical background. He obtained 1sts in mathematics, classics and philosophy (1st Mathematical Moderations, 1869; 1st Classical Moderations, 1870; 1st Math. Finals, 1871; and 1st Literae Humaniiores, 1872). Mathematics, he said, is the best preparation for logic Statement and Inference, I : xxxviii). There is an amusing story of how he introduced calculus in a lecture to classically trained undergraduates. At the end of the lecture he walked smartly to the door, locked, or pretended to lock, it, and then standing there with his back to it said with decision: 'No one shall leave this room until you all grasp the essentials of this simple matter': Statement and Inference, I : xv. He had, however, little sympathy with the mathematical logic developed by Bertrand Russell.

Cook Wilson's classical contributions should not be overlooked: 'On rearrangements of the Fifth Books of the Ethics' (1879), 'On the Structure of the Seventh Book of the Nicomachean Ethics, ch. i - x (1879); 'On the Interpretation of Plato's Timaeus' (1889); 'On the Geometrical Problem in Plato's Meno' (1903) and others listed at lxvi-lxxii of Statement and Inference, I. The latest discussion of Cook Wilson's classical work - on the Meno - is to be found in David Wolfsdorf, Trials of Reason, Oxford: 2008, 164-9, 172.

Wilson married a German wife, Charlotte Schneider, in 1876. They had no children.

Writings

- Statement and Inference by John Cook Wilson, edited from the manuscripts by A.S.L. Farquharson (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1926)
- On Military Cycling or Amenities of Controversy (1889)
- Aristotelian Studies I (1879)

Wilson married a German wife, Charlotte Schneider, in 1876. They had no children.
References

- *La notion de connaissance chez Cook Wilson* by N. Baladi (Le Caire, Imprimerie de l'Institut français d'archéologie orientale, 1939)
- *Portraits by inference* by Humbert Wolfe (London : Methuen, 1934). Cook Wilson is gently satirised as 'Prof. Cooke-Wilson' in the chapter, 'Jones's wedding'.

External links

- John Cook Wilson at amazon.co.uk[^2]
- John Cook Wilson at philosophypages.com[^3]
- JSTOR[^4]

References

[^1]: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wilson/
[^2]: http://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/185506958X
[^3]: http://www.philosophypages.com/du/w9.htm#wilj

Harold Arthur Prichard

Harold Arthur Prichard, (1871-1947), often H. A. Prichard, was an English philosopher. He was born in London in 1871, the eldest child of Walter Stennett Prichard (a solicitor) and his wife Lucy. Harold Prichard was a scholar of Clifton College from where he won a scholarship to New College, Oxford to study mathematics. But after taking First Class honours in mathematical moderations (preliminary examinations) in 1891, he studied Greats (ancient history and philosophy) taking First Class Honours in 1894. He also played tennis for Oxford against Cambridge. On leaving Oxford he spent a brief period working for a firm of solicitors in London, before returning to Oxford where he spent the rest of his life, first as Fellow of Hertford College (1895–8) and then of Trinity College (1898–1924). He took early retirement from Trinity in 1924 on grounds of temporary ill-health, but recovered and was elected White's Professor of Moral Philosophy in 1928 and became a fellow of Corpus Christi College. He retired in 1937.

Prichard gave an influential defense of ethical intuitionism in his "Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?" (1912), wherein he contended that moral philosophy rested chiefly on the desire to provide arguments, starting from non-normative premises, for the principles of obligation that we pre-philosophically accept, such as the principle that one ought to keep one's promises or that one ought not steal. This is a mistake, he argued, both because it is impossible to derive any statement about what one ought to do from statements not concerning obligation (even statements about what is good), and because there is no need to do so since common sense principles of moral obligation are self-evident.
Writings

- *Kant's Theory of Knowledge*, (1909)
- *Knowledge and Perception, Essays and Lectures* (London, 1950)

References


External links

- Reflections on Harold Prichard [1], paper about Prichard's theory of ethics.

References


H. H. Price

Henry Habberley Price (17 May 1899 – 26 November 1984) was a Welsh philosopher, known for his work on perception. He also wrote on parapsychology.

Born in Neath, Glamorganshire, Wales, Price was educated at Winchester College and New College, Oxford. He became Wykeham Professor of Logic, and Fellow of New College, in 1935. Price was president of the Aristotelian Society from 1943 to 1944.

Price is perhaps best known for his work on the philosophy of perception. He argues for a sophisticated sense-datum account, although he rejects phenomenalism. In his book *Thinking and Experience*, he moves from perception to thought and argues for a dispositionalist account of conceptual cognition. Concepts are held to be a kind of intellectual capacity, manifested in perceptual contexts as recognitional capacities. For Price, concepts are not some kind of mental entity or representation. The ultimate appeal is to a species of memory distinct from event recollection.

He died in Oxford.

Quotes

"When I see a tomato there is much that I can doubt. I can doubt whether it is a tomato that I am seeing, and not a cleverly painted piece of wax. I can doubt whether there is any material thing there at all. Perhaps what I took for a tomato was really a reflection; perhaps I am even the victim of some hallucination. One thing however I cannot doubt: that there exists a red patch of a round and somewhat bulgy shape, standing out from a background of other colour-patches, and having a certain visual depth, and that this whole field of colour is directly present to my consciousness."

Works

- *Perception* (1932)
- *Truth and Corrigibility* (1936)
- *Hume’s Theory of the External World* (1940)
- *Thinking and Representation* (1946) Hertz Trust Philosophical lecture, British Academy
- *Belief* (1969) (1959-61 Gifford Lectures, online) [1]
- *Essays in the Philosophy of Religion*, based on the Sarum lectures 1971 (1972)

References

C. D. Broad

Charlie Dunbar Broad

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C. D. Broad (full name Charlie Dunbar Broad; 30 December 1887 - 11 March 1971) was an English epistemologist, historian of philosophy, philosopher of science, moral philosopher, and writer on the philosophical aspects of psychical research. He was known for his thorough and dispassionate examinations of arguments in such works as The Mind and Its Place in Nature, published in 1925, Scientific Thought, published in 1930, and Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy, published in 1933.

Broad's essay on "Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism" in "Ethics and the History of Philosophy" in 1952 introduced the philosophical terms "occurrent causation" and "non-occurrent causation", which became the basis for today's "agent causal" and "event causal" distinctions in the debates on Libertarian Free Will.

Life

Broad was born in Harlesden, in Middlesex, England[1] He was educated at Dulwich College from 1900 until 1906.[2] He gained a scholarship to study at Trinity College, Cambridge in 1906. In 1910 he graduated with First-Class Honours, with distinction.

In 1911, he became a Fellow of Trinity College. This was a non-residential position, which enabled him to also accept a position he had applied for as an assistant lecturer at St Andrews University. He was later made a lecturer at St Andrews University, and remained there until 1920. He was appointed professor at Bristol University in 1920, and worked there until 1923, when he returned to Trinity College as a College lecturer. He was a lecturer in 'moral science' in the Faculty of philosophy at Cambridge University from 1926 until 1931. In 1931, he was appointed 'Sidgwick Lecturer' at Cambridge University. He kept this role until 1933, when he was appointed Knightbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy at Cambridge University, a position he held for twenty years, until 1953.

Broad was President of the Aristotelian Society from 1927–1928, and again from 1954-1955. He was also President of the Society for Psychical Research in 1935 and 1958.

Broad was openly homosexual at a time when homosexual acts were illegal. (In 1952, the mathematician, logician and philosopher Alan Turing was convicted of 'gross indecency' for admitting to a sexual relationship with another man[3] ) In March 1958, Broad along with fellow philosophers A.J. Ayer and Bertrand Russell, writer J.B. Priestley, and 27 others, sent a letter to The Times which urged the acceptance of the Wolfenden Report's recommendation that homosexual acts should 'no longer be a criminal offence'.[4]
Psychical research

Broad argued that if research showed that psychic events occur, this would challenge philosophical theories in at least five ways:

1. Backward causation, the future affecting the past, is rejected by many philosophers, but would be shown to occur if, for example, people could predict the future.
2. One common argument against dualism, that is the belief that minds are non-physical, and bodies physical, is that physical and non-physical things cannot interact. However, this would be shown to be possible if people can move physical objects by thought (telekinesis).
3. Similarly, philosophers tend to be skeptical about claims that non-physical 'stuff' could interact with anything. This would also be challenged if minds are shown to be able to communicate with each other, as would be the case if mind-reading is possible.
4. Philosophers generally accept that we can only learn about the world through reason and perception. This belief would be challenged if people were able to psychically perceive events in other places.
5. Physicalist philosophers believe that there cannot be persons without bodies. If ghosts were shown to exist, this view would be challenged.\[5\]

Free Will

Broad argued for "non-occurrent causation" as "literally determined by the agent or self." The agent could be considered as a substance or continuant, and not by a total cause which contains as factors events in and dispositions of the agent. Thus our efforts would be completely determined, but their causes would not be prior events.

New series of events would then originate which he called "continuants." These are essentially causa sui.

Peter van Inwagen says that Broad formulated an excellent version of what van Inwagen has called the "Consequence Argument" in defense of incompatibilism.

Works

- *Perception, physics and reality. An Enquiry into the Information that Physical Science can Supply about the Real.* \[6\] London: Cambridge University Press, 1914 (PDF \[7\]; 54,07 MB)
- *Scientific thought.* \[8\] New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1923
- *The Philosophy of Francis Bacon.* \[10\] Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1926
- *War Thoughts in Peace Time.* \[12\] London: Humphrey Milford, 1931
- *An examination of McTaggart's philosophy.* \[13\] Vol. 1. Cambridge University Press, 1933
- *Determinism, interdeterminism and libertarianism.* \[14\] Cambridge University Press, 1934
- *An examination of McTaggart's philosophy.* \[13\] Vol. 2. Cambridge University Press, 1938
• Berkeley's Argument. Haskell House Pub Ltd., 1976

Further reading

External links
• C. D. Broad on Digital Text International [16]
• Information Philosopher on C. D. Broad on Free Will [17]
• Biography [18] by Renée Haynes on SurvivalAfterDeath.org.uk with links to several articles on psychical research
• "How to think about the problem of free will" by Peter van Inwagen [19]

References
[1] Harlesden was part of Middlesex until 1965; today it is part of the London Borough of Brent in Greater London.
David Rolfe Graeber (born 12 February 1961) is an American anthropologist and anarchist who currently holds the position of Reader in Social Anthropology at Goldsmiths, University of London. He was an associate professor of anthropology at Yale University, although Yale controversially declined to rehire him, and his term there ended in June 2007. Graeber has a history of social and political activism, including his role in protests against the World Economic Forum in New York City (2002) and membership in the labor union Industrial Workers of the World. His father, Kenneth Graeber, participated in the Spanish Revolution in Barcelona and fought in the Spanish Civil War and his mother, then Ruth Rubinstein, was part of the original cast of the 1930s labor stage review Pins & Needles, performed entirely by garment workers. Graeber's father ultimately found work as a plate stripper and Graeber has sometimes suggested his working class upbringing might have played at least as large a role in the problems he later encountered in academic life as his political activities.

Education and writings

Graeber received his BA from the State University of New York at Purchase in 1984. He gained his Masters degree and Doctorate at the University of Chicago.

Dismissal from Yale

In May 2005, the Yale anthropology department decided not to renew Graeber's contract, preventing him from coming up for consideration for tenure as he would otherwise have been scheduled to do in 2008. Pointing to Graeber's highly regarded anthropological scholarship, his supporters (including fellow anthropologists, former students, and anarchists) have accused the dismissal decision of being politically motivated. The Yale administration argued that Graeber's dismissal was in keeping with Yale's policy of granting tenure to few junior faculty and Yale has given no formal explanation for its actions. Graeber has suggested that his support of a student of his targeted for expulsion because of her membership in GESO, Yale's graduate student union, may have played a role in Yale's decision. [2] [3] [4]

In December 2005, Graeber agreed to leave the university after a one-year paid sabbatical. That spring he taught two final classes: an introduction to cultural anthropology (attended by over 200 students) and a course entitled "Direct Action and Radical Social Theory" – the only explicitly radical-themed course at Yale he ever taught.

On 25 May 2006, Graeber was invited to give the Malinowski Lecture [5] at the London School of Economics. Maurice Bloch, Professor of Anthropology (retired) at the LSE and European Professor at the Collège de France, and world renowned scholar on Madagascar, made the following statement about Graeber in a letter [6] to Yale University: "His writings on anthropological theory are outstanding. I consider him the best anthropological theorist of his generation from anywhere in the world." The Anthropology Department at the LSE [7] honors an anthropologist at a relatively early stage of his or her career to give The Malinowski Lecture [8] each year, and only invite those who are considered to have made a significant contribution to anthropological theory. That same year, was asked to present the keynote address in the 100th anniversary Diamond Jubilee meetings of the Association of Social Anthropologists [9]. In April 2011 he presented the Anthropology Department's annual Distinguished Lecture at Berkeley. [10]

Publications

Books

- Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology [12]
- Constituent Imagination [13] (Editor)
- Lost People: Magic and the Legacy of Slavery in Madagascar [14]
- Possibilities: Essays on Hierarchy, Rebellion, and Desire [15]
- Direct Action: An Ethnography [16]
- Debt: The First 5,000 Years [17]

Articles

- "To Have Is to Owe" [18] - An illustrated essay in Triple Canopy (online magazine) on the history of debt, which contains excerpts from his forthcoming book, Debt: The First 5,000 Years [19].
- "The New Anarchists" [21]
- "Give it Away" [22] – An article about the French intellectual Marcel Mauss.
- "Army of Altruists" [23] – An attempt to solve the riddle of why so many working class Americans vote for the Right.
- The Twilight of Vanguardism [24]
- "Turning Modes of Production Inside Out, or, Why Capitalism is a Transformation of Slavery" [25]
- On the phenomenology of giant puppets: broken windows, imaginary jars of urine, and the cosmological role of the police in American culture [26]
• Rebel Without A God[27] – A meditation on the anti-authoritarian elements of Buffy the Vampire Slayer, reprinted from the December 27, 1998 issue of In These Times
• “Hope in Common”[29]
• “The Shock of Victory”[30]
• “Revolution in Reverse”[31]
• “Debt: The First Five Thousand Years”[32]
• “Against Kamikaze Capitalism: Oil, Climate Change and the French refinery blockades”[33]

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[8] http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/anthropology/MalinowskiLectures1959-
[18] http://www.canopycanopycanopy.com/to_have_is_to_owe
[20] http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=41&ItemID=4796
[27] http://members.tripod.com/~MikeHolt/buffy.html
[32] http://www.metamute.org/en/content/debt_the_first_five_thousand_years
[33] http://shiftmag.co.uk/?p=389
External links

- Graeber's page at Goldsmiths (http://www.goldsmiths.ac.uk/anthropology/staff/d-graeber.php)
- Without Cause: Yale Fires An Acclaimed Anarchist Scholar, an interview with David Graeber (http://CounterPunch.org/frank05132005.html) by CounterPunch author Joshua Frank

Interviews

- Audio interview (http://www.radio4all.net/pub/archive/04.01.05/agitkid@killradio.org/710-1-20041122-Indymedia_On_Air_112204.mp3) by Indymedia on air radio with David Graeber on anarchism and anthropology, April 1, 2005
- “Take it From the Top” (http://www.villagevoice.com/people/0523,interview,64691,24.html) A Village Voice interview with David Graeber, June 6, 2005
- “Teach Me if You Can” (http://www.towardfreedom.com/home/content/view/672/) An interview with David Graeber on the Toward Freedom website, November 21, 2005
- “OxMag Interview” (http://community.muohio.edu/oxmag/node/89) on anarchy, capitalism, technology, and consensus process, July 1, 2008
- “Korea Indymedia: Struggle News #9.5" (http://korea.indymedia.org/drupal/?q=zh-hans/node/1816&page=1) on being an anarchist anthropologist, July 22, 2009
- "History is made up of those events that couldn’t have been predicted before they happened" (http://www.revolutionbythebook.akpress.org/history-is-made-up-of-those-events-that-couldnt-have-been-predicted-before-they-happened.html) Interview of David Graeber by Yiannis Aktimon from Void Network for the Bfest issue of anti-authoritarian newspaper Babylonia, May 18, 2010
- "David Graeber interviewed on CBC's Connect with Mark Kelley" (http://vimeo.com/12814644) on black block tactics prior to Toronto G20 Summit, June 23, 2010
- "talking with Brian Lehr on NYC (http://www.wnyc.org/shows/bl/2011/jul/19/debt-first-5000-years/), on debt jubilees - July 19, 2011
Margaret Archer

Margaret Archer (born January 20, 1943) is Professor of Sociology at the University of Warwick, UK, since 1973. She is best known for coining the term elisionism in her 1995 book Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach.

She studied at the University of London, graduating B.Sc. in 1964 and Ph.D. in 1967 with a thesis on The Educational Aspirations of English Working Class Parents. She was a lecturer at the University of Reading from 1966 to 1973.

She is one of the most influential theorists in the critical realist tradition. At the 12th World Congress of Sociology, she was elected as the first woman President of the International Sociological Association, is a founder member of both the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences and the Academy of Learned Societies in the Social Sciences. She is a Trustee of the Centre for Critical Realism.

She has supervised many PhD students, many of whom have gone on to contribute towards the substantive development of critical realism in the social sciences. Notably, Dr Robert Willmott, author of Education Policy and Realist Social Theory and Dr Justin Cruickshank, senior lecturer at the University of Birmingham.

Analytical Dualism

Archer argues that much social theory suffers from the generic defect of conflation where, due to a reluctance or inability to theorize emergent relationships between social phenomena, causal autonomy is denied to one side of the relation. This can take the form of autonomy being denied to agency with causal efficacy only granted to structure (downwards conflation). Alternatively it can take the form of autonomy being denied to structure with causal efficacy only granted to agency (upwards conflation). Finally it may take the form of central conflation where structure and agency are seen as being co-constitutive i.e. structure is reproduced through agency which is simultaneously constrained and enabled by structure. The most prominent example of central conflation is the structuration theory of Anthony Giddens. While not objecting to this approach on philosophical grounds, Archer does object to it on analytical grounds: by conflating structure and agency into unspecified movements of co-constitution, central conflationary approaches preclude the possibility of sociological exploration of the relative influence of each aspect.

In contradistinction Archer offers the approach of analytical dualism.[1] While recognizing the interdependence of structure and agency (i.e. without people there would be no structures) she argues that they operate on different timescales. At any particular moment, antecedently existing structures constrain and enable agents, whose interactions produce intended and unintended consequences, which leads to structural elaboration and the reproduction or transformation of the initial structure. The resulting structure then provides a similar context of action for future agents. Likewise the initial antecedently existing structure was itself the outcome of structural elaboration resulting from the action of prior agents. So while structure and agency are interdependent, Archer argues that it is possible to unpick them analytically. By isolating structural and/or cultural factors which provide a context of action for agents, it is possible to investigate how those factors shape the subsequent interactions of agents and how those interactions in turn reproduce or transform the initial context. Archer calls this a morphogenetic sequence. Social processes are constituted through an endless array of such sequences but, as a consequence of their temporal ordering, it is possible to disengage any such sequence in order to investigate its internal causal dynamics. Through doing so, argues Archer, it's possible to give empirical accounts of how structural and agential phenomena
interlink over time rather than merely stating their theoretical interdependence.

**Bibliography**


**References**


**External links**

- Margaret Archer's page at the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences (http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_academies/acdscien/own/documents/archer.html)
Michael Polanyi

Michael Polanyi FRs\(^{[1]}\) (March 11, 1891 – February 22, 1976) was a Hungarian–British polymath, who made important theoretical contributions to physical chemistry, economics, and the theory of knowledge. In his philosophical writings he argued that positivism not only gives a false account of the practice of science, it also, if taken seriously, undermines our highest achievements as human beings.

**Background**

**Early life**

Polanyi, born Polányi Mihály in Vienna, was the fourth child of Michael and Cecilia Pollacsek, secular Jews from Ungvár (then in Hungary but now in the Ukraine) and Vilnius in Lithuania, respectively. His father's family were entrepreneurs, while his mother's father was the chief rabbi of Vilnius. The family moved to Budapest and Magyarized their surname to Polányi. His father built much of the Hungarian railway system, but lost most of his fortune in 1899 when bad weather caused a railway building project to go over budget. He died in 1905. Cecilia Polanyi established a salon that was well known amongst Budapest's intellectuals, and which continued until her death in 1939. His older brother was Karl Polanyi, the political economist.
Education

In 1909 after leaving the famous Budapest teacher-training secondary school (Mintagymnasium) he trained as a physician, obtaining a medical diploma in 1914. He was an active member of the Galileo Society. With the support of Ignác Pfeifer, professor of chemistry at the József Technical University of Budapest, he obtained a scholarship to study chemistry at the Technische Hochschule in Karlsruhe in Germany. In the First World War, he served in the Austro-Hungarian army as a medical officer, and was sent to the Serbian front. While on sick-leave in 1916, he wrote a PhD thesis on adsorption. His research, which was encouraged by Albert Einstein, was supervised by Gusztáv Buchböck, and in 1919 the University of Budapest awarded him a doctorate.

Career

In October 1918, Mihály Károlyi established the Hungarian Democratic Republic, and Polanyi became Secretary to the Minister of Health. In March 1919 when Communists took power, Polanyi returned to medicine. After the Hungarian Soviet Republic was overthrown, Polanyi, although he had refused to serve in the Red Army, incurred the disfavour of the new Admiral Horthy régime. In 1920 he returned to Karlsruhe, and was invited by Fritz Haber to join the Kaiser Wilhelm Institut für Faserstoffchemie in Berlin. In 1923 Polanyi converted to Christianity, and in a Roman Catholic ceremony married Magda Elizabeth Kemeny. In 1926 he became the professorial head of department of the Institut für Physikalische Chemie und Elektrochemie. In 1929, Magda gave birth to their son John, who in later life settled in Canada, and was awarded a Nobel Prize in chemistry. Their other son, George Polanyi, became a well known British economist.

As a consequence of his experience of runaway inflation and high unemployment in Weimar Germany Polanyi began to study economics. With the coming to power in 1933 of the Nazi party, he accepted an offer of the chair in physical chemistry at the University of Manchester. Two of his pupils, Eugene Wigner and Melvin Calvin, went on to win a Nobel Prize. As a consequence of a shift in his interests the university created a new chair for him in Social Science (1948–58).

In 1944 Polanyi was elected a member of the Royal Society,[1] and on his retirement from the University of Manchester in 1958 he was elected a Senior Research Fellow at Merton College, Oxford. In 1962 he was elected a Foreign Honorary Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.[2]

Research and writings

Physical chemistry

Polanyi's scientific interests were extremely diverse, including work in chemical kinetics, x-ray diffraction, and the adsorption of gases at solid surfaces. In 1921, he laid the mathematical foundation of fiber diffraction analysis. In 1934, Polanyi, at about the same time as G. I. Taylor and Egon Orowan, he realised that the plastic deformation of ductile materials could be explained in terms of the theory of dislocations which had been developed by Vito Volterra in 1905. The insight was critical in developing the field of solid mechanics.

Philosophy of science

In 1936, while on a visit to the USSR to give lectures for the Ministry of Heavy Industry, Polanyi was told by Bukharin that the distinction between pure and applied science was mistaken, and that in a socialist society all scientific research would be in accordance with the needs of the latest Five Year Plan. Polanyi observed what happened to the study of genetics in the Soviet Union once the doctrines of Trofim Lysenko gained the backing of the State. Demands in Britain, amongst people such as the Marxist John Desmond Bernal, for centrally planned scientific research, led Polanyi to argue that truth seeking generates communities of specialists whose conclusions should be the outcome of free debate not central direction. Together with John Baker, he founded the influential Society for Freedom in Science to defend this view.
In a series of articles, re-published in *The Contempt of Freedom* (1940) and *The Logic of Liberty* (1951), Polanyi argued that co-operation amongst scientists is analogous to the way in which agents co-ordinate themselves within a free market. Just as consumers in a free market determine the value of products, so, without central direction, scientists validate theories by endorsing them as true. The spontaneous order that arises within the scientific community, arises within the context of a commitment to truth. He argued that because truth, goodness, and beauty, are ends that transcend our ability to articulate them, specialist communities, such as scientists, lawyers, and artists, ought to be given the freedom to pursue them. Polanyi argued that scientists, like entrepreneurs, require the freedom to both pursue discoveries and respond to their peers. Whereas John Desmond Bernal argued that science ought to be directed by the State in the pursuit of practical ends, Polanyi claimed that if science is to flourish scientists ought to have the freedom to pursue truth as an end in itself:

"[S]cientists, freely making their own choice of problems and pursuing them in the light of their own personal judgment, are in fact co-operating as members of a closely knit organization."

"Such self-co-ordination of independent initiatives leads to a joint result which is unpremeditated by any of those who bring it about."

"Any attempt to organize the group ... under a single authority would eliminate their independent initiatives and thus reduce their joint effectiveness to that of the single person directing them from the centre. It would, in effect, paralyse their cooperation."

Polanyi notes that utilitarian and sceptical arguments in defence of free scientific inquiry undercut what they are invoked to defend. His general defence of a free society is not a negative appeal to the importance of "private liberties", but a positive appeal to the role which "public liberties" play in facilitating our pursuit of transcendent ideals. Polanyi claims that ends such as truth, goodness, and beauty, transcend our ability to wholly articulate them; and therefore communities of specialists, require the freedom to pursue them. His concept of spontaneous order, a term he derived from Gestalt psychology, although a concept whose origins can be traced back to at least Adam Smith, influenced the classical liberal economist Frederick Hayek. Unlike Hayek however Polanyi argued that value commitments render possible higher or lower forms of spontaneous order. In *Full Employment and Free Trade* (1948) Polanyi analysed the way in which money circulates around an economy, and argued that a strict/loose monetary policy is an economically neutral way for a central bank to moderate the booms/busts of a free market.

**Theory of knowledge**

In his book *Science, Faith and Society* (1946), Polanyi set out his opposition to a positivist account of science, noting that it fails to recognise the role which personal commitments play in the practice of science. While teaching at Manchester, Polanyi was invited to give the prestigious Gifford Lectures in 1951-2 at Aberdeen. A revised version of his lectures were later published as *Personal Knowledge* (1958). In this book Polanyi claims that absolute objectivity (objectivism) is a false ideal, because all knowledge claims (including those which are derived from rules) rely on personal judgements. He denies that a scientific method can yield truth mechanically. All knowing, no matter how formalised, relies upon commitments. Polanyi argued that the assumption which motivate critical philosophy are not only false, they serve to undermine the commitments which motivate our highest achievements. He advocates a fiduciary post-critical approach, in which we recognise that we believe more than we can prove, and know more than we can say.

A knower does not stand apart from the universe, they participate personally within it. Our intellectual skills are driven by passionate commitments which motivate discovery and validation. Polanyi suggests that a great scientist not only identify patterns, they pick the significant questions which are likely to lead to a successful resolution. An innovator risks their reputation by committing to a hypothesis. He gives the example of Copernicus, who declared that, contrary to our experience, the Earth revolves around the Sun. He claims that Copernicus arrived at the Earth's true relation to the Sun not as a consequence of following a method, but via "the greater intellectual satisfaction he derived from the celestial panorama as seen from the Sun instead of the Earth." What saves this approach from the
charge of relativism is his conviction that our tacit awareness connects us with objective realities.

Polanyi rejected the claim by British Empiricists that experience can be reduced into sense data. Our experience is interpreted, and our interpretations often rely upon acquired practices. Knowing more than we can say explains how apprentices acquire non-explicit knowledge i.e. pupils improve their skills by observing a master. His writings about science influenced Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, although he denies that "indwelling" within (sometimes incompatible) interpretative frameworks traps us within them. Our shared tacit awareness connects us with objective realities. All articulation becomes meaningful by evoking our tacit awareness. Contrary to the views of his colleague and friend Alan Turing, whose work at The University of Manchester prepared the way for the first modern computer, he denied that minds are reducible to collections of rules. His work influenced the critique by Hubert Dreyfus of "First Generation" Artificial Intelligence.

Polanyi's concept of tacit knowledge was first articulated in Personal Knowledge. It was while writing this book that he discovered what he calls the "structure of tacit knowing". He viewed it as his most important discovery. He claimed that we experience the world by integrating our subsidiary awareness into a focal awareness. In his later work, for example his Terry Lectures, later published as "The Tacit Dimension" (1966) he seeks to distinguish between the phenomenological, instrumental, semantic, and ontological aspects of tacit knowing, as discussed (but not necessarily identified as such) in his previous writing.

**Critique of reductionism**

In "Life's irreducible structure" (1968), Polanyi argues that the information contained in the DNA molecule is irreducible to physics and chemistry. Although a DNA molecule cannot exist without physical properties, these properties are constrained by higher level ordering principles. In "Transcendence and Self-transcendence" (1970), Polanyi criticizes the mechanistic world view that modern science has inherited from Galileo.

Polanyi advocates emergence i.e. the claim that there are several levels of reality, and causality. His argument relies on the assumption that boundary conditions supply degrees of freedom that instead of being random are determined by higher level realities whose properties are dependent, but distinct, from the lower level from which they emerge. The process by which meanings are generated shows us that intentions are downward causal forces.

Mind is a higher level expression of our capacity for discrimination. Our pursuit of self-set ideals such as truth and justice expands our awareness of the world. The reductionistic attempt to reduce higher level realities into lower level realities generates a moral inversion, in which the higher is rejected in favour of the lower. This inversion is pursued with moral passion. Polanyi identifies it as a pathology of the modern mind, and traces its origins to a false conception of knowledge.

**Notes**


[3] *Personal Knowledge*, p. 18

[4] Personal Knowledge p. 3


Bibliography


Further reading


External links

- Biography (http://www.hyle.org/journal/issues/8-2/bio_nye.html) by Mary Jo Nye
- Polanyi Society (http://www.missouriwestern.edu/orgs/polanyi/) home page
• Polanyi resources (http://www.erraticimpact.com/~20thcentury/html/polanyi_michael.htm) at erraticimpact.com
• Polanyiana, (http://www.kfki.hu/chemonet/polanyi/9912/contents.html) Vol. 8, Number 1-2
• Smith, M. K., 2003, "Michael Polanyi and tacit knowledge. (http://www.infed.org/thinkers/polanyi.htm)"
  The encyclopedia of informal education
• (French) Presentation of The Logic of Liberty (http://www.wikiberal.org/wiki/La_Logique_de_la_liberté)©
Thomas Forsyth Torrance (30 August 1913 – 2 December 2007) was a 20th century Protestant Christian theologian who served for 27 years as Professor of Christian Dogmatics at New College, Edinburgh in the University of Edinburgh, during which time he was a leader in Protestant Christian theology. While he wrote many books and articles advancing his own study of theology, he also translated several hundred theological writings into English from other languages. Torrance edited the English translation of the thirteen-volume, six-million-word *Church Dogmatics* (Germ. *Die Kirchliche Dogmatik*) of celebrated Swiss theologian Karl Barth. Torrance's work has been influential in the paleo-orthodox movement, and he is widely considered to be one of the most important Reformed theologians of his era. His work influenced many Christian theologians, especially some aspects of Alister McGrath's theology.

**Early life and education**

Torrance was born to Scottish missionary parents while they were serving in Chengdu, Szechuan, China. He first studied Classics at the University of Edinburgh and University of Oxford before receiving an academic scholarship that brought him to the University of Basel in Basel, Switzerland. There, Torrance studied under theologian Karl Barth -- whom he had long admired -- and the experience made him a life-long Barthian.

**Professorship and work**

Torrance initially served as a professor at Auburn Theological Seminary in New York City, U.S., but resigned the post two years later with the outbreak of World War II. He served as a chaplain during the war, and then after the war moved to Scotland and served as a Church of Scotland parish minister for a decade. Torrance was then offered a professorship at New College, Edinburgh in the University of Edinburgh to teach church history. Because of his thorough understanding of theology he was later installed as Professor of Christian Dogmatics, a position that he held from 1952 to 1979.

He was elected Moderator of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in 1976 (his son Iain held the same post in 2003).
In 1978, he won the Templeton Prize for Progress in Religion for his contributions to theology and the relationship between it and science.

He was influential in work on theological method and the relationship between theology and science. Opposed to dualistic thought, he argued that modern science is similar to theology in that it is developed in terms of relation and integration: each has its distinctive method, and each is fully rational.

**Bibliography**

References


External links

- The Boston Collaborative Encyclopedia of Modern Western Theology [4]
- TF Torrance Theological Fellowship [5]
- TF Torrance Audio Lectures (mp3) [6]

References

[3] http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/obituaries/article3030568.ece
John Polkinghorne

John Polkinghorne KBE FRS (born 16 October 1930) is an English theoretical physicist, theologian, writer, and Anglican priest. He was professor of Mathematical physics at the University of Cambridge from 1968 to 1979, when he resigned his chair to study for the priesthood, becoming an ordained Anglican priest in 1982. He served as the president of Queens’ College, Cambridge from 1988 until 1996.

Polkinghorne is the author of five books on physics, and 26 on the relationship between science and religion; his publications include *The Quantum World* (1989), *Quantum Physics and Theology: An Unexpected Kinship* (2005) and *Exploring Reality: The Intertwining of Science and Religion* (2007). *The Polkinghorne Reader* (edited by Thomas Jay Oord) provides key excerpts from Polkinghorne’s most influential books. He was knighted in 1997 and in 2002 received the £1 million Templeton Prize, awarded for exceptional contributions to affirming life’s spiritual dimension.\[1\]
Early life and education

Polkinghorne was born in Weston-super-Mare to George Polkinghorne, who worked for the post office, and Dorothy Charlton, the daughter of a groom. John was the couple's third child. There was a brother, Peter, and a sister, Ann, who died when she was six, one month before John's birth. Peter died in 1942 while flying for the Royal Air Force during the Second World War.[2]

He was educated at the local primary school in Street, Somerset, then was taught by a friend of the family at home, and later at a Quaker school. When he was 11 he went to Elmhurst Grammar School in Street, and when his father was promoted to head postmaster in Ely in 1945, Polkinghorne was transferred to The Perse School, Cambridge.[2] Following National Service in the Royal Army Educational Corps from 1948 to 1949, he read Mathematics at Trinity College, Cambridge, graduating in 1952, then earned his PhD in physics in 1955, supervised by Abdus Salam in the group led by Paul Dirac.[3]

Career

Physics

He joined the Christian Union while at Cambridge and met his future wife, Ruth Martin, another member of the Union and also a mathematics student. They married on 26 March 1955, and at the end of that year sailed from Liverpool to New York. Polkinghorne accepted a postdoctoral Harkness Fellowship with the California Institute of Technology, where he worked with Murray Gell-Mann. Toward the end of the fellowship he was offered a position as lecturer at the University of Edinburgh, which he took up in 1956.[2]

After two years in Scotland, he returned to teach at Cambridge in 1958. He was promoted to reader in 1965, and in 1968 was offered a professorship in mathematical physics, a position he held until 1979,[2] his students including Brian Josephson and Martin Rees.[4] For 25 years, he worked on theories about elementary particles, played a role in the discovery of the quark,[1] and researched the analytic and high-energy properties of Feynman integrals and the foundations of S-Matrix theory.[5] While employed by Cambridge, he also spent time at Princeton, Berkeley, Stanford, and at CERN in Geneva. He was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society in 1974.[2]

Priesthood and Queens' College

He decided to train for the priesthood in 1977.[6] He said in an interview that he felt he had done his bit for science after 25 years, and that his best mathematical work was probably behind him; Christianity had always been central to his life, so ordination offered an attractive second career.[2] He resigned his chair in 1979 to study at Westcott House, Cambridge, an Anglican theological college, becoming an ordained priest on 6 June 1982 (Trinity Sunday). The ceremony was held at Trinity College, Cambridge and presided over by Bishop John A. T. Robinson. He worked for five years as a curate in south Bristol, then as vicar in Blean, Kent, before returning to Cambridge in 1986 as dean of chapel at Trinity Hall.[1] [7] He became the president of Queens’ College that year, a position he held until his retirement in 1996.[7] He served as canon theologian of Liverpool Cathedral from 1994 to 2005.[8]

Awards

In 1997 he was made a Knight Commander of the Order of the British Empire (KBE) - though since he is an ordained priest in the Church of England it is technically incorrect to call him “Sir John Polkinghorne”. He was made an honorary fellow of St Chad's College, Durham and awarded an honorary doctorate by the University of Durham in 1998; and in 2002 was awarded the Templeton Prize for his contributions to research at the interface between science and religion.[10]

He has been a member of the BMA Medical Ethics Committee, the General Synod of the Church of England, the Doctrine Commission, and the Human Genetics Commission. He served as chairman of the governors of The Perse
School from 1972 to 1981. He is a fellow of Queens' College, Cambridge and was for 10 years a canon theologian of Liverpool Cathedral. He is a founding member of the Society of Ordained Scientists and also of the International Society for Science and Religion, of which he was the first president. He was selected to give the prestigious Gifford Lectures in 1993–1994, which he later published as *The Faith of a Physicist*.

In 2006 he was awarded an honorary doctorate by the Hong Kong Baptist University as part of their 50-year celebrations. This included giving a public lecture on "The Dialogue between Science and Religion and Its Significance for the Academy" and an "East-West Dialogue" with Yang Chen-ning, a nobel laureate in physics. He is a member of staff of the Psychology and Religion Research Group at Cambridge University.

**Ideas**

Polkinghorne said in an interview that he believes his move from science to religion has given him binocular vision, though he understands that it has aroused the kind of suspicion "that might follow the claim to be a vegetarian butcher." He describes his position as critical realism and believes that science and religion address aspects of the same reality. It is a consistent theme of his work that when he "turned his collar around" he did not stop seeking truth. He believes the philosopher of science who has most helpfully struck the balance between the "critical" and "realism" aspects of this is Michael Polanyi. He argues that there are five points of comparison between the ways in which science and theology pursue truth: moments of enforced radical revision, a period of unresolved confusion, new synthesis and understanding, continued wrestling with unresolved problems, deeper implications. Because scientific experiments try to eliminate extraneous influences, he believes they are atypical of what goes on in nature. He suggests that the mechanistic explanations of the world that have continued from Laplace to Richard Dawkins should be replaced by an understanding that most of nature is cloud-like rather than clock-like. He regards the mind, soul and body as different aspects of the same underlying reality—"dual aspect monism"—writing that "there is only one stuff in the world (not two—the material and the mental) but it can occur in two contrasting states (material and mental phases, a physicist might say) which explain our perception of the difference between mind and matter." He believes that standard physical causation cannot adequately describe the manifold ways in which things and people interact, and uses the phrase "active information" to describe how, when several outcomes are possible, there may be higher levels of causation that choose which one occurs.

Sometimes Christianity seems to him to be just too good to be true, but when this sort of doubt arises he says to himself, "All right then, deny it," and writes that he knows this is something he could never do.

**On the existence of God**

Polkinghorne considers that "the question of the existence of God is the single most important question we face about the nature of reality" and quotes with approval Anthony Kenny: "After all, if there is no God, then God is incalculably the greatest single creation of the human imagination." He addresses the questions of "Does the concept of God make sense? If so, do we have reason for believing in such a thing?" He is "cautious about our powers to assess coherence," pointing out that in 1900 a "competent ... undergraduate could have demonstrated the 'incoherence'" of quantum ideas. He suggests that "the nearest analogy in the physical world [to God] would be ... the Quantum Vacuum." He suggests that God is the ultimate answer to Leibniz's great question "why is there something rather than nothing?" The atheist's "plain assertion of the world's existence" is a "grossly impoverished view of reality," he says, arguing that "theism explains more than a reductionist atheism can ever address." He is very doubtful of St Anselm's Ontological Argument. Referring to Gödel's incompleteness theory, he said: "If we cannot prove the consistency of arithmetic it seems a bit much to hope that God's existence is easier to deal with," concluding that God is "ontologically necessary, but not logically necessary." He "does not assert that God's existence can be demonstrated in a logically coercive way (any more than God's non-existence can) but that theism makes more sense of the world, and of human experience, than does atheism." He cites in particular:
• **The intelligibility of the universe:** One would anticipate that evolutionary selection would produce hominid minds apt for coping with everyday experience, but that these minds should also be able to understand the subatomic world and general relativity goes far beyond anything of relevance to survival fitness. The mystery deepens when one recognises the proven fruitfulness of mathematical beauty as a guide to successful theory choice.[22]

• **The anthropic fine tuning of the universe:** He quotes with approval Freeman Dyson, who said "the more I examine the universe and the details of its architecture, the more evidence I find that the universe in some sense must have known we were coming"[23] and suggests there is a wide consensus amongst physicists that either there are a very large number of other universes in the Multiverse or that "there is just one universe which is the way it is in its anthropic fruitfulness because it is the expression of the purposive design of a Creator, who has endowed it with the finely tuned potentiality for life."[24]

• **A wider humane reality:** He considers that theism offers a more persuasive account of ethical and aesthetic perceptions. He argues that it is difficult to accommodate the idea that "we have real moral knowledge" and that statements such as 'torturing children is wrong' are more than "simply social conventions of the societies within which they are uttered" within an atheistic or naturalistic world view. He also believes such a world view finds it hard to explain how "Something of lasting significance is glimpsed in the beauty of the natural world and the beauty of the fruits of human creativity."[25]

**On free will**

Polkinghorne regards the problem of evil as the most serious intellectual objection to the existence of God. He believes that "The well-known free will defence in relation to moral evil asserts that a world with a possibility of sinful people is better than one with perfectly programmed machines. The tale of human evil is such that one cannot make that assertion without a quiver, but I believe that it is true nevertheless. I have added to it the free-process defence, that a world allowed to make itself is better than a puppet theatre with a Cosmic Tyrant. I think that these two defences are opposite sides of the same coin, that our nature is inextricably linked with that of the physical world which has given us birth."[26]

**On creationism**

Following the resignation of Michael Reiss, the director of education at the Royal Society—who had controversially argued that school pupils who believed in creationism should be used by science teachers to start discussions, rather than be rejected *per se*[27] —Polkinghorne argued in *The Times* that there is a distinction between believing in the mind and purpose of a divine creator, and what he calls creationism "in that curious North American sense," with a literal interpretation of Genesis 1 and the belief that evolution is wrong, a position he rejects.[28]

**Critical reception**

Nancy Frankenberry, Professor of Religion at Dartmouth College, has described Polkinghorne as the finest British theologian/scientist of our time, citing his work on the possible relationship between chaos theory and natural theology.[29] Owen Gingerich, an astronomer and former Harvard professor, has called him a leading voice on the relationship between science and religion.[30]

The British philosopher Simon Blackburn has criticized Polkinghorne for using primitive thinking and rhetorical devices instead of engaging in philosophy. When Polkinghorne argues that the minute adjustments of cosmological constants for life points towards an explanation beyond the scientific realm, Blackburn argues that this relies on a natural preference for explanation in terms of agency. Blackburn writes that he finished Polkinghorne's books in "despair at humanity's capacity for self-deception."[31] Against this, Freeman J. Dyson called Polkinghorne's arguments on theology and natural science "polished and logically coherent."[32] The novelist Simon Ings, writing in the *New Scientist*, said Polkinghorne's argument for the proposition that God is real is cogent and his evidence
John Polkinghorne, formerly Professor for Public Understanding of Science at Oxford, writes that the same three names of British scientists who are also sincerely religious crop up with the "likable familiarity of senior partners in a firm of Dickensian lawyers": Arthur Peacocke, Russell Stannard, and John Polkinghorne, all of whom have either won the Templeton Prize or are on its board of trustees. Dawkins writes that he is not so much bewildered by their belief in a cosmic lawyer, but by their beliefs in the minutiae of Christianity, such as the resurrection and forgiveness of sins, and that such scientists, in Britain and in the U.S., are the subject of bemused bafflement among their peers.\[34\] Polkinghorne responded that "debating with Dawkins is hopeless, because there's no give and take. He doesn't give you an inch. He just says no when you say yes\[37\]" and writes in *Questions of Truth* that he hopes Dawkins will be a bit less baffled once he reads it.\[35\]

The philosopher A.C. Grayling criticized the Royal Society for allowing its premises to be used in connection with the launch of *Questions of Truth*, describing it as a scandal, and arguing that Polkinghorne had exploited his fellowship there to publicize a "weak, casuistical and tendentious pamphlet." After implying that the book's publisher, Westminster John Knox, was a self-publisher, Grayling went on to write that Polkinghorne and others were eager to see the credibility accorded to scientific research extended to religious perspectives through association—perspectives Grayling labeled "the superstitious lucubrations of illiterate goatherds living several thousand years ago".\[36\]

**Bibliography**

Polkinghorne has written 34 books, translated into 18 languages; 26 concern science and religion, often for a popular audience.

Science and religion

- *Searching for Truth* (Bible Reading Fellowship/Crossroad, 1996)


- The Archbishop’s School of Christianity and Science (York Courses, 2003)

Science
- The Analytic S-Matrix (CUP 1966, jointly with RJ Eden, PV Landshoff and DI Olive)
- The Particle Play (W.H. Freeman, 1979)
- Meaning in Mathematics (2011) OUP (edited, with contributions from Timothy Gowers, Roger Penrose, Marcus du Sautoy and others) ISBN 978-0199605057

Chapters

Notes
[9] Official Website (http://www.polkinghorne.net) This is a strange quirk of British Forms of address
Further reading

- Some Polkinghorne quotes (http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/j/john_polkinghorne.html)


**External links**

• Polkinghorne website (http://www.polkinghorne.net)
Ian Graeme Barbour, born 5 October 1923, is an American scholar on the relationship between science and religion. According to the Public Broadcasting Service his mid-1960s Issues in Science and Religion "has been credited with literally creating the contemporary field of science and religion."[1]

In the citation nominating Barbour for the 1999 Templeton Prize, John B. Cobb wrote "No contemporary has made a more original, deep and lasting contribution toward the needed integration of scientific and religious knowledge and values than Ian Barbour. With respect to the breadth of topics and fields brought into this integration, Barbour has no equal."[2]

Biography

Barbour was born in Beijing China the second of three sons of an American Episcopalian mother and a Scottish Presbyterian father.[3] He spent his childhood in China, the United States, and England. He received his B.Sc. in physics from Swarthmore College,[1] his M.Sc. in physics from Duke University in 1946,[1] and a Ph.D. in physics from the University of Chicago in 1950.[1] He earned a B.Div. in 1956 from Yale University's Divinity School.[1] Barbour taught for many years at Carleton College with appointments as professor of religion and as Winifred and Atherton Bean Professor Emeritus of Science, Technology and Society. He has held emeritus honors there since 1986.

Barbour gave the Gifford lectures from 1989 – 1991 at the University of Aberdeen. These lectures led to the book Religion in an Age of Science. He was awarded the Templeton Prize in 1999[1] for Progress in Religion in recognition of his efforts to create a dialogue between the worlds of science and religion.
Philosophy and theology

In his efforts to link science and religion in *Issues in Science and Religion*, Barbour coined the term ‘critical realism’. This has been adopted by other scholars. He claimed the basic structure of religion is similar to that of science in some ways but also differs on some crucial points. They are part of the same spectrum in which both display subjective as well as objective features. The subjective include the theory on data, the resistance of comprehensive theories to falsification, and the absence of rules for choice among paradigms. Objective features include the presence of common data, evidence for or against a theory, and criteria which are not paradigm-dependent. The presence of subjective and objective features in both science and religion makes his thinking valuable and original. Barbour’s arguments have been developed in significant and diverse ways by a variety of scholars, including Arthur Peacocke, John Polkinghorne, Sallie McFague and Robert John Russell. His subjective / objective approach is prominent in the evolving paradigm of Religious Naturalism.

Barbour considered critical realism an alternative to the competing interpretations of scientific theories: classical or naive realism, instrumentalism and idealism. A critical realist perspective sees scientific theories yielding partial, revisable, abstract, but referential knowledge of the world that can be expressed through metaphors and models. During the 1970s Barbour presented a program of interdisciplinary courses that dealt with ethical issues in the applications of science, exploring the social and environmental consequences of a variety of technologies. In 2000 in *When Science Meets Religion* (2000) he used a fourfold typology (Conflict, Independence, Dialogue, Integration) to relate religion and science that he had developed in his earlier writings. In his works, Barbour writes from a Christian perspective.

Barbour compares methods of inquiry in science and religion, and has explored the theological implications of the Big Bang theory, quantum physics, evolutionary biology and genetics. He also has lectured widely on ethical issues in such fields as technology policy, energy, agriculture, computers and cloning.

Forrest Clingerman ties Barbour to the Religious Naturalism movement via his theology of nature. His subjective/objective approach to religious is prominent in this evolving paradigm. Michael Dowd calls Barbour the granddaddy of the evolutionary Christianity movement.

Bibliography

- *Christianity & the Scientists* (1960)
- *Science & Religion* (1968)

  Review of *Science & Secularity* with discussion of other books from Journal of Religion
References


External links

• His biography (http://www.pbs.org/newshour/forum/june99/barbour_bio.html) at PBS online with links to:

  • May 28, 1999 Elizabeth Farnsworth interview

  • Templeton Prize press release (http://www.carleton.edu/campus/newsbureau/pr/barbour.html) on Carleton College website.

• Ian Barbour -Introduction to the Teleseries on Evolutionary Christianity, Followed by, "God and Evolution" (http://evolutionarychristianity.com/blog/audio-downloads/)
The Reverend Canon Arthur Robert Peacocke MBE (29 November 1924 - 21 October 2006) was a British theologian and biochemist.

**Biography**

Arthur Robert Peacocke was born at Watford in on 29 November 1924. He was educated at Watford Grammar School for Boys, Exeter College, Oxford (BA 1945, MA 1948, BSc 1947, DPhil 1948, DSc 1962, DD 1982), and the University of Birmingham (DipTh 1960, BD 1971).

He taught at the University of Birmingham from 1948 until 1959 when he was appointed University Lecturer in Biochemistry in the University of Oxford and Fellow and Tutor of St Peter's College. In 1960 he was licensed as a Lay Reader for the Diocese of Oxford and he held this position until 1971, when he was ordained deacon and priest, unusually, both in the same year.

From 1973 until 1984 he was Dean, Fellow, and Tutor and Director of Studies in Theology of Clare College, Cambridge, becoming a Doctor of Science (ScD) by incorporation of the University of Cambridge.

In 1984 he spent one year as Professor of Judeo-Christian Studies at Tulane University. He returned to Oxford the following year, becoming Director of the Ian Ramsey Centre [1], 1988 and again from 1995 until 1999. He was appointed Honorary Chaplain of Christ Church, Oxford in 1988 and Honorary Canon in 1994. Apart from one year during which he was Royden B. Davis Professor of Interdisciplinary Studies at Georgetown University (1994), he spent the rest of his life in Oxford, living in St John Street, just across the road from another eminent theologian, Henry Chadwick.

He had been Select Preacher before the University of Oxford in 1973 and 1975 and was Bampton Lecturer in 1978. He was Hulsean Preacher at Cambridge in 1976 and Gifford Lecturer at St Andrew's in 1993.

Among Peacocke's numerous subsidiary appointments he was the President of the Science and Religion Forum from 1995 until his death, having previous been Chairman (1972–78) and Vice President (1978–92). He was an Academic Fellow of the Institute on Religion in an Age of Science in 1986. He was Warden of the Society of Ordained Scientists 1987-92 and Warden Emeritus from 1992 until his death. He was also a sometime Vice President of the Modern Church People's Union and member of the council of the European Society for the Study of Science and Theology (Esssat).

Peacocke was awarded the Lecomte du Noüy Prize in 1983. He received honorary doctorates from DePauw University (DSc 1983) and Georgetown University (DLittHum 1991). He was appointed Member of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire by HM The Queen in 1993. In 2001 he was awarded the Templeton Prize.

Arthur Peacocke married Rosemary Mann on 7 August 1948. They had a daughter, Jane (born 1953), and a son who is the distinguished philosopher Christopher Peacocke. They also have five grandchildren and three great-grandchildren.
Peacocke's views

Peacocke self-identified as a panentheist, which he was careful to distinguish from being a pantheist.[2] He is perhaps best known for his attempts to rigorously argue that evolution and Christianity need not be at odds (see Creation-evolution controversy). He may be the most well-known theological advocate of theistic evolution as author of the essay "Evolution: The Disguised Friend of Faith?".

Arthur Peacocke describes a position which is referred to elsewhere as "front-loading", after the fact that it suggests that evolution is entirely consistent with an all-knowing, all-powerful God who exists throughout time, sets initial conditions and natural laws, and knows what the result will be. An implication of Peacocke's particular stance is that all scientific analyses of physical processes reveal God's actions. All scientific propositions are thus necessarily coherent with religious ones.

According to Peacocke, Darwinism is not an enemy to religion, but a friend (thus the title of his piece, "The Disguised Friend"). Peacocke offers five basic arguments in support of his position outlined below.

Process as immanence

The process-as-immanence argument is meant to deal with Phillip Johnson's contention that naturalism reduces God to a distant entity. According to Peacocke, God continuously creates the world and sustains it in its general order and structure; He makes things make themselves. Biological evolution is an example of this and, according to Peacocke, should be taken as a reminder of God's immanence. It shows us that "God is the Immanent Creator creating in and through the processes of natural order." (473, original italics) Evolution is the continuous action of God in the world. All "the processes revealed by the sciences, especially evolutionary biology, are in themselves God-acting-as-Creator". (474)

Chance optimizing initial conditions

The chance-optimizing-initial-conditions argument runs as follows: the role of chance in biological evolution can be reconciled with a purposive creator because "there is a creative interplay of 'chance' and law apparent in the evolution of living matter by natural selection." (475) There is no metaphysical implication of the physical fact of "chance"; randomness in mutation of DNA "does not, in itself, preclude these events from displaying regular trends of manifesting inbuilt propensities at the higher levels of organisms, populations and eco-systems." (476) Chance is to be seen as "eliciting the potentialities that the physical cosmos possessed ab initio." (477)

Random process of evolution as purposive

The random-process-of-evolution-as-purposive argument is perhaps best considered an adjunct to the process-as-immanence argument, and a direct response to Johnson's continued references to evolution as "purposeless." Peacocke suggests that the evolutionary process is characterized by propensities towards increase in complexity, information-processing and storage, consciousness, sensitivity to pain, and even self-consciousness… the actual physical form of the organisms in which these propensities are actualized and instantiated is contingent on the history of the confluence of disparate chains of events, including the survival of the mass extinctions that have occurred. (478)

Natural evil as necessity

The natural-evil-as-necessity argument is meant to be a response to the classic philosophical argument of the Problem of Evil, which contends that an all-powerful, all-knowing and beneficent God cannot exist as such because natural evil (mudslides which crush the legs of innocent children, for instance) occurs. Peacocke contends that the capacities necessary for consciousness and thus a relationship with God also enable their possessors to experience pain, as necessary for identifying injury and disease. Preventing the experience of pain would prevent the possibility
of consciousness. Peacocke also takes an eastern argument for natural evil of that which made must be unmade for a new making to occur; there is no creation without destruction. To Peacocke, it is necessary that organisms go out of existence for others to come into it. Thus, pain, suffering and death are necessary evils in a universe which will result in beings capable of having a relationship with God. God is said to suffer with His creation because He loves creation, conforming the deity to be consistent with the Christian God.

**Jesus as pinnacle of human evolution**

The Jesus-as-pinnacle-of-human-evolution argument proposed by Peacocke is that Jesus Christ is

> the actualization of [evolutionary] potentiality can properly be regarded as the consummation of the purposes of God already incompletely manifested in evolving humanity…. The paradigm of what God intends for all human beings, now revealed as having the potentiality of responding to, of being open to, of becoming united with, God. (484-5)

Similar propositions had previously been put by writers such as C. S. Lewis (in *Mere Christianity*) and Teilhard de Chardin.

**Relationship between theology and science typology**

In the introduction to *The Sciences and Theology in the Twentieth Century*,³ Peacocke lists a set of eight relationships that could fall upon a two-dimensional grid. This list is in part a survey of deliberations that occurred at the World Council of Churches Conference on "Faith, Science and the Future", Cambridge, Mass., 1979.

1. **Science and theology are concerned with two distinct realms**
   - Reality is thought of as a duality, operating within the human world, in terms of natural/supernatural, spatio-temporal/the eternal, the order of nature/the realm of faith, the natural(or physical)/the historical, the physical-and-biological/mind-and-spirit.

2. **Science and theology are interacting approaches to the same reality**
   - Accuracy of this view is widely and strongly resisted among those who otherwise differ in their theologies

3. **Science and theology are two distinct non-interacting approaches to the same reality**
   - The idea that theology tries to answer the question why, while science tries to answer the question how

4. **Science and theology constitute two different language systems**
   - Each are two distinct "language games" whose logical pre-conditions can have no bearing upon each other according to late-Wittgensteinian theory

5. **Science and theology are generated by quite different attitudes (in their practitioners)**
   - the attitude of science is that of objectivity and logical neutrality; that of theology personal involvement and commitment.

6. **Science and theology are both subservient to their objects and can only be defined in relation to them**
   - Both are intellectual disciplines shaped by their object (nature or God) to which they direct their attention. Both include a confessional and a rational factor.⁴

7. **Science and theology may be integrated**

8. **Science generates a metaphysic in terms of which theology is then formulated**
   - For example Alfred North Whitehead's metaphysics forms the basis of process theology
Implications of Peacocke's theology

This framework, and particular aspects of Peacocke's argument, are at work in a number of positions actually taken by various Christian denominations. The mainstream Evangelical Lutheran Church in America made the following statement in correlation with many of Peacocke's arguments:

The ELCA doesn't have an official position on creation vs. evolution, but we subscribe to the historical-critical method of biblical interpretation, so we believe God created the universe and all that is therein, only not necessarily in six 24-hour days, and that he may actually have used evolution in the process of creation.

Similarly, the Presbyterian Church of the U.S.A., in a 2002 resolution by the 214th assembly of the church, stated:

"...the universe, as God's free creation, has a genuine autonomy given to it, within the providence of God, so that the structure and the history of the universe can only be known by means of an empirical inquiry of nature itself... Therefore, for Christians the affirmation of God as Creator can be understood as compatible with a fully natural explanation of the history of nature."

Styles and Honours

• Mr Arthur Peacocke (1924–1948)
• Dr Arthur Peacocke (1948–1971)
• The Revd. Dr Arthur Peacocke (1971–1993)
• The Revd. Dr Arthur Peacocke MBE (1993–1994)

References

• *Debrett's People of Today* (12th edn, London: Debrett's Peerage, 1999), p. 1522

[1] http://users.ox.ac.uk/~theo0038/

External links

• Arthur Peacocke and Humanity's Place in Cosmic Evolution (http://www.faithnet.org.uk/AS Subjects/Philosophyofreligion/peacocke.htm)
• "Evolution: The Disguised Friend of Faith?" (http://www.templetonpress.org/pdf/Evolution.pdf)
• Society of Ordained Scientists article by him (http://home.earthlink.net/~jkeggi/SOSC/22_Peacocke.html)
Alister Edgar McGrath (born 23 January 1953) is an Anglican priest, theologian, and Christian apologist, currently Professor of Theology, Ministry, and Education at Kings College London and Head of the Centre for Theology, Religion and Culture. He was previously Professor of Historical Theology at the University of Oxford, and was principal of Wycliffe Hall, Oxford until 2005.

McGrath is noted for his work in historical, systematic, and scientific theology, as well as his writings on apologetics and his opposition to antireligionism. He holds both a DPhil (in molecular biophysics) and an earned Doctor of Divinity degree from the University of Oxford.

**Biography**

McGrath was born in Belfast, Northern Ireland, and grew up in Downpatrick, County Down, where he attended Down High School. In September 1966 he became a pupil at the Methodist College Belfast, where his studies focused on mathematics, physics and chemistry. He went up to Wadham College, Oxford in 1971 and gained first class honours in chemistry in 1975. He began research in molecular biophysics in the Oxford University Department of Biochemistry under the supervision of Professor Sir George Radda, FRS and was elected to an E.P.A. Cephalosporin Research Studentship at Linacre College, Oxford, for the academic year 1975-6, and to a Domus Senior Scholarship at Merton College, Oxford, for the period 1976-8. During these three years, he carried out scientific research while studying for the Oxford University Final Honour School of Theology. He was awarded an Oxford D.Phil. for his research in molecular biophysics (December 1977), and gained first class honours in Theology in June 1978.[1]

McGrath then left Oxford to work at Cambridge University, where he also studied for ordination into the Church of England. In September 1980, he was ordained deacon, and began work as a curate at St Leonard’s Parish Church, Wollaton, Nottingham, in the English East Midlands. He was ordained priest at Southwell Minster in September 1981. In 1983, he was appointed lecturer in Christian doctrine and ethics at Wycliffe Hall, Oxford, and a member of the Oxford University Faculty of Theology. McGrath spent the fall semester of 1990 as the Ezra Squire Tipple
Visiting Professor of Historical Theology at the Divinity School of Drew University, Madison, New Jersey.[1]

McGrath was elected University Research Lecturer in Theology at Oxford University in 1993 and also served as research professor of theology at Regent College, Vancouver, from 1993-1999. In 1995, he was elected Principal of Wycliffe Hall, and in 1999, was awarded a personal chair in theology by Oxford University, with the title "Professor of Historical Theology". He was awarded the Oxford degree of Doctor of Divinity in 2001 for his research in historical and systematic theology,[1] and was a founding member of the International Society for Science and Religion[2] On 1 September 2008 McGrath took up the Chair of Theology, Ministry and Education in the Department of Education and Professional Studies at King's College London.[3]

Views

McGrath espouses evolutionary creation.[4] [5] McGrath was formerly an atheist.[6] [7]

In 2004 McGrath suggested in The Twilight of Atheism that atheism was in decline though the standard of scholarship in that book is disputed. He has been highly critical of Richard Dawkins, calling him "embarrassingly ignorant of Christian theology". His book: The Dawkins Delusion? – a response to Dawkins's The God Delusion – was published by SPCK in February 2007, and the two had public debate on the topic, "Does religious belief damage the health of a society, or is it necessary to provide the moral and ethical foundations of a healthy society?"[8]

McGrath has also debated with Daniel Dennett, at the Greer-Heard Point-Counterpoint Forum (February 2007) in New Orleans.[9] He was interviewed by Richard Dawkins about his book Dawkins' God and faith in general for the television documentary The Root of All Evil? McGrath's interview was not included in the final cut, but the unedited footage is available online.[10] He states that he is not opposed to atheism itself, but rather the views of atheism held by people such as Dawkins.[11]

Writings

Among McGrath's more notable works are:


References
[1] Biography on official website (http://users.ox.ac.uk/~mcgrath/biography.html)
[4] Nigel Bovey. "Alister McGrath talks of God, science and Richard Dawkins" (http://www.christianevidencesociety.org.uk/article/articles/25/). Christian Evidence Society. Retrieved 13 November 2010. "All I can say is that, with complete integrity, there are many Christians who see evolution as illuminating the way in which we understand Genesis and as giving us an enhanced vision of how God brought the world and humankind into being. People can make evolution atheistic but it doesn't have to be."
[6] Nigel Bovey. "Alister McGrath talks of God, science and Richard Dawkins" (http://www.christianevidencesociety.org.uk/article/articles/25/). Christian Evidence Society. Retrieved 13 November 2010. "As a child I never had any interest in Christianity,' he says. 'I went through the motions of going to church with my parents but neither my heart nor my head was in it. It was while I was at the Methodist College, probably aged around 15 or 16, that I became an atheist - somebody who deliberately and intentionally does not believe in God and thinks that anyone who does believe in God is mentally deficient or seriously screwed up.'"
Bibliography


External links

- Alister McGrath homepage (http://users.ox.ac.uk/~mcgrath/)
- Open Forum with Alister McGrath - 'Is God a Delusion? Atheism and the Meaning of Life' (http://www.citychurchsf.org/openforum.htm)
- Alister McGrath on The Hour (CBC television) (http://www.cbc.ca/thishour/video.php?id=1589)
- Richard Dawkins Interviews Alister McGrath Video (http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-6609671681098320091)
- Christopher Hitchens debates (with) Alister McGrath (http://fora.tv/2007/10/11/Christopher_Hitchens_Debates_Alister_McGrath)
- Alister McGrath debates with Peter Atkins at Edinburgh University (http://atheistdebate.org)
- Alister McGrath debates [[Sue Blackmore (http://richarddawkins.net/article,2395,Sue-Blackmore-debates-Alister-McGrath,Bristol-University)] at Bristol University on the motion that "belief in God is a dangerous delusion". November 13. 2007.]
- Full texts of McGrath's 2009 Gifford Lectures on natural theology (http://www.abdn.ac.uk/gifford/lecture-texts/)
N. T. Wright is a leading New Testament scholar and former Bishop of Durham in the Church of England. His academic work has usually been published under the name N. T. Wright but works such as *What St Paul Really Said* and *Simply Christian*, which are aimed at a more popular readership, are published under the less formal name of Tom Wright.
Among modern New Testament scholars, Wright is an important representative of more conservative Christian views, compared to more liberal Christians, such as his friend Marcus Borg. In particular, he is associated with Open Evangelicalism, the New Perspective on Paul, and the historical Jesus. He has promoted more traditional views about Jesus’ bodily resurrection, about Jesus’ Second Coming, and about homosexuality.

**Early life and credentials**

Wright was born in Morpeth, Northumberland. Raised in the context of middle Anglicanism, he felt called to go into Christian ministry before the age of 7 or 8.

In addition to his Doctor of Divinity from Oxford University, he also has been awarded several honorary doctoral degrees, including from Durham University in July 2007, the John Leland Center for Theological Studies in April 2008, University of St Andrews in 2009, and Heythrop College, University of London in 2010.

**Career**

Educated at Sedbergh School, then in Yorkshire, Wright specialised in Classics.

From 1968 to 1971, he studied *literae humaniores* (or "classics", i.e. classical literature, philosophy and history) at Exeter College, Oxford, receiving his BA with First Class Honours in 1971. During that time he was president of the undergraduate Oxford Inter-Collegiate Christian Union. In 1973 he received a BA in theology with first class honours from Exeter.

From 1971 to 1975 he studied for the Anglican ministry at Wycliffe Hall, Oxford, receiving his (Oxford) MA at the end of this period.

In 1975 he became a junior research fellow at Merton College, Oxford and later also junior chaplain. From 1978 to 1981 he was a fellow and chaplain at Downing College, Cambridge. In 1981 he received his DPhil from Merton College, Oxford, his thesis topic being "The Messiah and the People of God: A Study in Pauline Theology with Particular Reference to the Argument of the Epistle to the Romans".


He moved from Oxford to be Dean of Lichfield Cathedral (1994–1999) and then returned briefly to Oxford as Visiting Fellow of Merton College, before taking up his appointment as Canon Theologian of Westminster Abbey in 2000.

In 2003, he became the Bishop of Durham.

On 4 August 2006 he was appointed to the Court of Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved for a period of five years.

On 27 April 2010 it was announced that he would retire from the See of Durham on 31 August 2010 to take up a new appointment as Research Professor of New Testament and Early Christianity at the University of St Andrews in Scotland, which will enable him to concentrate on his academic and broadcasting work.

**Views**

**New Testament doctrine**

N. T. Wright’s views on New Testament doctrine are expressed in his commentaries on the New Testament epistles. In *Surprised by Hope: Rethinking Heaven, the Resurrection, and the Mission of the Church*, Wright suggests a non-dogmatic case for Christian mortalism and the union of soteriology and ecclesiology that he perceives is often neglected in Protestantism, and he questions some popular theological ideas, such as the dispensationalist doctrine of the rapture.
Scholarly work

Wright is considered an important representative of the open evangelical perspective and is associated with the Third Quest for the Historical Jesus and the New Perspective on Paul, a complex movement with many unique positions (originating from the works of James Dunn and E.P. Sanders). He argues that the current understanding of Jesus must be connected with what is known to be true about him from the historical perspective of first-century Judaism and Christianity.

Wright's work has been praised by many scholars of varying views, including Professor James D.G. Dunn, Gordon Fee, Richard B. Hays and Rowan Williams, the Archbishop of Canterbury. Critics of his work are also found across the broad range of theological camps. Although Wright describes himself as a Reformed Calvinist, some Reformed theologians such as John Piper have sought to question Wright's theology, particularly over whether or not he denies the Protestant doctrine of justification by faith alone. Although Piper considers Wright's presentation confusing, he does not dismiss Wright's view as false. Wright has since addressed the issue in his book *Justification: God's Plan and Paul's Vision* (Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 2009). He has sought to clarify this further in an interview with InterVarsity Press. Others have questioned whether Wright denies penal substitution, but Wright has stated that he denies only its caricature but affirms this doctrine, especially within the overall framework of the *Christus Victor* model of atonement. Despite criticism of some of his work by Reformed theologians, other Reformed leaders have embraced his contribution in other areas, such as Tim Keller who praised Wright's work on the resurrection.

Secular utopianism

In 2008, Wright criticized "...secular utopianism," accusing it of advocating "the right to kill unborn children and surplus old people..." Times columnist David Aaronovitch challenged Wright specifically to substantiate his claim that any secular group does indeed advocate the killing of elderly people, leading to an ongoing exchange in which Wright held to his main point.

Historical Jesus

Regarding the Historical Jesus, Wright stands broadly in the tradition of Albert Schweitzer (thoroughgoing eschatology), against what he sees as the thoroughgoing skepticism of William Wrede (famous for his thesis on the Messianic Secret in the Gospel of Mark as an apologetic and ahistorical device) and the Jesus Seminar, Wrede's modern-day counterparts. He tends to agree with and laud such scholars as E.P. Sanders and the lesser-known Ben F. Meyer (whom Wright calls "the unsung hero" of New Testament studies), although he thinks Sanders and others go too far in their use of form criticism. He also thinks it is a mistake to say that Jesus expected the imminence of the end of history, as Schweitzer thought, but rather thinks that Jesus spoke of the Kingdom of God as something both present and future. He has also defended a literal belief in the Second Coming and the resurrection of the dead as central to Christianity.

Jesus Seminar

Wright has also received heavy criticism in some decidedly more liberal circles, e.g. by Robert J. Miller. In contrast, the Jesus Seminar's Marcus Borg, with whom Wright shares mutual admiration and respect, has co-authored with Wright the book *The Meaning of Jesus: Two Visions*. In 2005, at the Greer-Heard Point-Counterpoint Forum, Wright also conversed with Jesus Seminar co-founder John Dominic Crossan as to the historicity of Jesus' resurrection. Wright and Crossan, who also hold mutual admiration for one another, hold very different opinions on this foundational Christian doctrine. For Crossan, the resurrection of Jesus is a theological interpretation of events by the writers of the New Testament. For Wright, however, the resurrection is a historic event—coherent with the worldview of Second Temple Judaism—fundamental to the New Testament.
Homosexuality in the Anglican Communion

Wright was the senior member from the Church of England of the Lambeth Commission set up to deal with controversies that emerged following Episcopal Church in the United States of America's ordination of a practising homosexual as bishop. In 2009 the Episcopal Church authorized consecration to the clergy of individuals in committed same-sex relationships. Wright described the action as a “clear break with the rest of the Anglican Communion” in a Times opinion piece.

Wright attracted media attention in December 2005 when he announced to the press, on the day that the first civil partnership ceremonies took place in England, that he would likely take disciplinary action against any clergy registering as civil partners or any clergy blessing such partnerships. However, in a letter to clergy in Durham diocese at this time he said: “I shall be very sorry if members of the clergy, by holding services of blessing or near equivalent, force me to make disciplinary enquiries”. He has argued that “Justice never means ‘treating everybody the same way’, but ‘treating people appropriately’.”

In August 2009, he issued a statement saying:

...someone, sooner or later, needs to spell out further (wearisome though it will be) the difference between (a) the "human dignity and civil liberty" of those with homosexual and similar instincts and (b) their "rights", as practising let alone ordained Christians, to give physical expression to those instincts. As the Pope has pointed out, the language of "human rights" has now been downgraded in public discourse to the special pleading of every interest-group.

Selected works

- Following Jesus: Biblical Reflections on Discipleship. Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1997 / SPCK (Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge), 1994
- The Last Word: Beyond the Bible Wars to a New Understanding of the Authority of Scripture. Harper SanFrancisco, 2005.
- Justification: God's Plan and Paul's Vision. SPCK, 2009
Christian Origins and the Question of God series

Six volumes expected:

- Paul and the Faithfulness of God. - A full-dress study of Paul, currently in progress.
- The Gospels and the Story of God. - The four gospel writers as theologians in their own right.
- The Early Christians and the Purpose of God. - The practical, hermeneutical and theological implications of all of the above.

For Everyone series


References

[12] Times article (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/faith/article7109559.ece)
When Paul speaks of ‘meeting’ the Lord ‘in the air,’ the point is precisely not—as in the popular rapture theology—that the saved believers would then stay up in the air somewhere. The point is that, having gone out to meet their returning Lord, they will escort him royally into his domain, that is, back to the place they have come from. Even when we realize that this is highly charged metaphor, not literal description, the meaning is the same as in the parallel in Philippians 3:20. Being citizens of heaven, as the Philippians would know, doesn’t mean that one is expecting to go back to the mother city but rather means that one is expecting the emperor to come from the mother city to give the colony its full dignity, to rescue it if need be, to subdue local enemies and put everything to rights.\(^\text{13}\)

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External links

- N. T. Wright Page (http://www.ntwrightpage.com/) contains a large amount of material by N. T. Wright
James Dunn (theologian)

James D. G. ("Jimmy") Dunn (born 1939) was for many years the Lightfoot Professor of Divinity in the Department of Theology at the University of Durham. Since his retirement he has been made Emeritus Lightfoot Professor. He is a leading British New Testament scholar, broadly in the Protestant tradition. Dunn is especially associated with the New Perspective on Paul, along with N. T. (Tom) Wright and E. P. Sanders. He is credited with coining this phrase during his 1982 Manson Memorial Lecture.

Dunn has an MA and BD from the University of Glasgow and a PhD and DD from the University of Cambridge. For 2002, Dunn was the President of the Studiorum Novi Testamenti Societas, the leading international body for New Testament study. Only three other British scholars had been made President in the preceding 25 years.


Dunn has taken up E. P. Sanders' project of redefining Palestinian Judaism in order to correct the Christian view of Judaism as a religion of works-righteousness. One of the most important differences to Sanders is that Dunn perceives a fundamental coherence and consistency to Paul's thought. He furthermore criticizes Sanders' understanding of the term "justification", arguing that Sanders' understanding suffers from an "individualizing exegesis".

He is a Methodist Local Preacher.

Writing

Dunn has written or edited numerous books and papers, including:


**External links**

• [The New Perspective on Paul](#)

**References**

Geoffrey M. Hodgson (born 28 July 1946) is a Research Professor of Business Studies in the University of Hertfordshire, and also the editor-in-chief of the Journal of Institutional Economics. Prof. Hodgson is recognized as one of the leading figures of modern critical institutionalism which carries forth the critical spirit and intellectual tradition of the founders of institutional economics, particularly that of Thorstein Veblen. His broad research interests span from evolutionary economics and history of economic thought to Marxism and theoretical biology. He first became known for his book Economics and Institutions: A Manifesto for a Modern Institutional Economics (1988), in which modern 'mainstream' economics is criticized, and the call is made to revise economic theory on the new grounds of institutionalism. His reputation has become enhanced owing to the trilogy of more recent books - Economics and Utopia (1999), How Economics Forgot History (2001) and The Evolution of Institutional Economics (2004) all of which built Hodgson's arguments into a more rounded and powerful critique of mainstream economic theory.

In 2000 Hodgson co-founded The Other Canon, a center and network for heterodox economics research, with - amongst others - main founder and executive chairman Erik Reinert. [1]

Institutions according to Hodgson

According to Hodgson, institutions are the stuff of social life. He defines them in a 2006 article by saying that institutions are "the systems of established and prevalent social rules that structure social interaction". Examples of institutions may be language, money, law, systems of weights and measures, table manners and organizations (for example firms). Conventions, that may be included in law, can be regarded to be institutions as well (Hodgson, 2006, p. 2).

What Hodgson considers important about institutions is the way that they structure social life and frame our perceptions and preferences. They also create stable expectations. He argues that: "Generally, institutions enable ordered thought, expectation, and action by imposing form and consistency on human activities." Consequently, institutions enable as well as constrain action.

Hodgson regards institutions as systems of rules. Broadly understood a rule is "a socially transmitted and customary normative injunction or immanently normative disposition, that in circumstances X do Y" (Hodgson, 2006, p. 3). This means that to be effective a rule has to be embedded in dispositions or habits. Mere decrees are not necessarily rules in this sense. Habits and customs help to give a normative status to a legal rule that can help a new law to become effective. In the process of social interaction norms are constantly changed (Hodgson, 2006, pp. 3–4)
Books


- *Socialism and Parliamentary Democracy* (Spokesman, Nottingham, 1977. Also in Italian, Spanish, Turkish and Japanese editions) ISBN 0851242073

References

- Hodgson, G.M., 'What are institutions?', *Journal of Economic Issues* 2006 vol. 40 no.1, p. 2-4 (on the internet: [2])


External links

- Geoffrey Hodgson's homepage (http://www.geoffrey-hodgson.info)
- Journal of Institutional Economics (http://journals.cambridge.org/jid_JOI)
- Group for Research into Organisational Evolution (GROE) (http://www.uhbs-groe.org/p1.htm)
- How Did Economics Get into Such a State? (http://www.paecon.net/PAEtexts/Hodgson1.htm)
Transcendental realism

Transcendental realism is a concept stemming from the philosophy of Immanuel Kant that implies individuals have a perfect understanding of the limitations of their own minds.

Kantian roots

Transcendental realism arguably has its roots in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant and refers to a form of transcendentalism that permits the subject to be fully cognizant of all limitations of their mind, and adjust their cognition accordingly as one seeks to understand the noumenon (or the world as it actually exists—things-in-themselves). In this way, the subject is able to know the world of things-in-themselves, and, presumably, is able to scientifically test such noumena.

It is important to note that Kant was himself not a transcendental realist, but rather a transcendental idealist. That is to say, he did not believe one could ever understand the noumenal realm.

Transcendental realism in contemporary research methodology

It might be argued that a latent form of transcendental realism has permeated branches of contemporary perspectives on phenomenological research methodology within the social sciences, humanities, education and medicine. Some writers, in particular the economist Tony Lawson of the critical realist school, have suggested that researchers are capable of "bracketing-out" their own subjectivity within phenomenological research. Such claims, while not explicitly characteristic of transcendental realism, tend to overlook problems that are inherently shared (such as those discussed in the section below).

Problems with transcendental realism

A central problem with transcendental realism is the requirement of the individual to fully understand their own mind—to the degree that one is able to identify with perfect certainty each and every limitation inherent and manifest within. This understanding would further need to be perpetually reevaluated given the developmental nature of mind and, presumably, the developmental nature of its limitations. While this is not theoretically impossible, it is, for all intents and purposes, a serious practical limitation of the transcendental realist position.

References

[1] Phenomenology Online (http://www.phenomenologyonline.com)

External links

- A Total Awareness (http://www.atotalawarness.com)
Alexander Theodore Callinicos (born 24 July 1950, Southern Rhodesia - now Zimbabwe) is a Trotskyist political theorist, a member of the Central Committee of the Socialist Workers Party and its International Secretary, and is Director of the Centre for European Studies at King's College London. He is also editor of *International Socialism*, the Socialist Workers Party's theoretical journal.

**Biography**

Callinicos is a descendant, through his mother, of the 19th century English historian Lord Acton. During World War II his Greek father was active in the Greek Resistance to Nazi occupation, whilst his mother, the Hon. Ædgyth Bertha Milburg Mary Antonia Frances Lyon-Dalberg-Acton, was the daughter of the 2nd Lord Acton.\(^1\) He was educated at St George's College, Harare.

Callinicos himself first became involved in revolutionary politics as a student at Balliol College, Oxford, from which he received his BA. His first writings for the International Socialists (forerunners of the SWP) were an analysis of the student movement of the period. In 1977, Callinicos married Joanna Seddon,\(^1\) a fellow Oxford doctoral student. He received his DPhil at Oxford.

His early writings focused on southern Africa and the French structuralist-Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser. In the 1980s, Callinicos was elected to the central committee of the SWP, a position he still retains.

Callinicos participated in the Counter-Summit to the IMF/World Bank Meeting in Prague, September 2000 and the demonstration against the G8 in Genoa, June 2001. He has also been involved in organising the Social Forum movement in Europe. He was a contributor to *Dictionnaire Marx Contemporain* (2001),\(^2\) and has written a number of articles in *New Left Review*.

He was Professor of Politics at the University of York before being appointed Professor of European Studies at King's College London in September 2005. He succeeded the late Chris Harman as editor of *International Socialism* in January 2010 and is a British correspondent for *Actuel Marx*. 
Works

Books

Articles

• "The Anti-Capitalist Movement And The Revolutionary Left" [5]
• "The 'New Middle Class' and socialists" [6] (1983)
• "The grand strategy of the American Empire" [7]
• "Plumbing the depths: Marxism and the Holocaust" [8]
• "Interview with Alex Callinicos: The Imperial Assault on the Middle East" [9]
• "Where is the radical left going?" [11], International Socialism, 120, Autumn 2008.

References


External links

• Alex Callinicos Internet Archive (http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/writers/callinicos/index.htm)
Göran Therborn

Göran Therborn (23 September 1941, Kalmar, Sweden) is a professor of sociology at Cambridge University and is amongst the most highly cited contemporary Marxian-influenced sociologists. He has published widely in journals such as the New Left Review, and is notable for his writing on topics that fall within the general political and sociological framework of post-Marxism. Topics on which he has written extensively include the intersection between the class structure of society and the function of the state apparatus, the formation of ideology within subjects, and the future of the Marxist tradition.

Education

Therborn attended Lund University in Sweden, where he received a Fil. Dr. in 1974.[1]

Works

In his book The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology (1980) Therborn departs from Louis Althusser's writings on the formation of ideology by addressing ideological change, the ideological constitution of classes, and ideological domination. He develops a material matrix of ideologies, and a general outline of how ideologies are formed from a post-Marxist perspective.

From Marxism to Post Marxism? (2008), attempts to convey in a relatively small amount of space a comprehensive history of the development of Marxist theory and the trajectory of Marxist thought in the 21st century.

References

[1] Department of Sociology, Cambridge University (http://www.sociology.cam.ac.uk/contacts/staff/profiles/gtherborn.html), Academic page

Bibliography

• The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology (1980)(Reprinted as Verso Classic (1999))
• Why Some Peoples are More Unemployed than Others (1986)
• European Modernity and Beyond: The Trajectory of European Societies, 1945-2000 (1995)
• From Marxism to Post-Marxism? (2008)
• Handbook of European Societies: Social Transformations in the 21 Century (2010)

External links

• Cambridge University Department of Sociology: Academic Profile of Göran Therborn (http://www.sociology.cam.ac.uk/contacts/staff/profiles/gtherborn.html)
Transformative Studies Institute

The Transformative Studies Institute (TSI) is an independent 501(c)(3) nonprofit educational think tank based in the United States.[1] It “was created to provide an inclusive educational space for research and practice for social justice by academics, community organizers, activists, and political leaders.”[2] TSI is managed and operated by fully volunteer academics, activists, and the concerned public.[3] It has been noted by Korgen, Kathleen et al. in Sociologists in Action (2010) as a model for engaging college students with public sociology and increased civic engagement[4].

History

The Transformative Studies Institute was established in 2007 by Dr. John Asimakopoulos and Dr. Ali Zaidi, two scholar-activists, who wanted to create an academic environment free of the corporate university’s restrictions, reprisals, and attacks against progressive academics and scholarship.[5] They were inspired by their own political firings from the Bronx campus of the City University of New York which brought the two together in 2006.[6] Dr. Asimakopoulos describes the birth of TSI: Once I gathered myself I decided to fight back in a meaningful way. As I explained to my poor parents, the problem was not this or some other employer, but the system itself, which permitted and encouraged these unethical preindustrial labor practices to occur. Academe was the guilty one, not CUNY, which was a specific instance of a general institution flawed to its core.[7] Dr. Asimakopoulos took his case to arbitration winning a rare victory in 2008.[8] He subsequently obtained tenure and promotion to Associate Professor of Sociology with CUNY-Bronx. Dr. Ali Zaidi due to lack of funds for a private attorney and pressured by his own union accepted a settlement and moved on to the State University of New York-Canton.[9] Both continue to operate TSI together with an international team of scholar-activists.

Overview

TSI applies the principles of Transformative learning to improve society and obtain social justice. It is an anti-capitalist and anti-authoritarian educational institution that counter-balances conservative pro-capitalist think tanks and policy institutes that enjoy generous funding from corporations and wealthy individuals and has been criticized on the conservative website of David Horowitz, author of The Professors: The 101 Most Dangerous Academics in America.[10] TSI is opposed to the privatization of public resources and social services.[12] Instead, it seeks to promote social justice through direct democracy in both politics and the economy.[13] TSI believes that this is achievable primarily through societal education, based on critical pedagogy, than through revolutionary direct action alone.[14] To this end the long-term goal of TSI is to establish a tuition-free accredited graduate school.[15] The institute also publishes independent peer-reviewed journals including Theory in Action[16], operates a speakers’ bureau, the independent TSI Press, a fellowship program, various community outreach projects, and provides consulting services and custom policy papers. TSI also launched Transformative Radio in 2010 which includes interviews of significant figures from the progressive Left[17].

TSI scholars come from a wide variety of disciplines and fields including anthropology, art, critical race theory, disability studies, economics, environmental studies, feminist theory, film studies, geography, history, journalism, media studies, peace and conflict studies, philosophy, political science, queer theory, religious studies, social work, and sociology.
Approach
The Transformative Studies Institute applies a grassroots organizing approach through social media. In addition, TSI’s approach to social change includes coalition building with academic and activist organizations such as Sociologists Without Borders[^18], Project Censored[^19], and the Association for Humanist Sociology[^20]. As an educational and activist organization TSI is committed to the social and ecological transformation of society through a global movement for total liberation and freedom based on the following principles of social justice:[^21]
- The supremacy of community decision making over corporate governance
- Free and equal public education at all levels and the nationalization of all private educational institutions
- No corporate governance/involvement in news media and the creation of an independent public foundation with tax funds to finance free and independent journalism
- All laws providing full and equal treatment to all individuals and groups regardless of any and all characteristics
- Sustainable development and the use of renewable resources for the protection of the environment
- Family planning and a woman’s right to make her own reproductive decisions with the availability of the required services
- Zero tolerance policies for conflicts of interests for government positions at all levels
- Zero political patronage positions at all levels of government
- Direct Political and Economic Democracy
- Free not for profit universal quality comprehensive health care as a human right
- A minimum living/family wage and job security laws
- Fair Trade with democracies / No trade with authoritarian regimes
- Guaranteed universal quality housing free of any taxation
- Direct action to foster meaningful change and social justice

Current activities
TSI has been active in presentation of research, as co-sponsor, and exhibitor at various academic and activist conferences including the Eastern Sociological Society[^22][^23], North American Anarchist Studies Network Conference, and the Institute for Critical Animal Studies[^24]. In 2010 TSI participated in a conference unveiling a first of its kind collaborative program with the Anarchist Studies Initiative of the State University of New York Cortland to house TSI’s Sacco and Vanzetti Foundation[^25][^26]. In addition, TSI’s Political Media Review (PMR) has been given attention by AK Press[^27] and PM Press[^28] two of the most respected progressive publishing houses. In June 2010 TSI also launched a new video e-journal titled Crushing Capitalism with Dr. Asimakopoulos.[^29] The journal “analyzes current events and scholarly topics such as imperialism, censorship, propaganda, political corruption, and corporate power.”[^30] TSI is currently in the process of developing an accredited graduate school. The graduate school will offer an interdisciplinary Ph.D. and Master’s degree based on the principle of Transformative Learning and Paulo Freire’s critical pedagogy through which peoples’ perceptions can be changed allowing them to see possibilities of social organization beyond that of capitalism and free markets.[^31][^32] The interdisciplinary curriculum will bridge theory with praxis to alleviate social problems. The positions of TSI’s graduate school include:[^33]
- The pursuit of social justice, human and labor rights, and respect for all species and the environment.
- Tuition-free degrees, as education is essential for a good standard of living, global citizenship, and human rights.
- An accredited, interdisciplinary Master’s and Doctoral Degree in real classrooms with real facilities.
- An egalitarian atmosphere where faculty have equal rank and salary with tenure after six years, based on equally weighted effectiveness in teaching, research, and activism.
• Full-time faculty as the sole instructors, thereby eliminating the exploitative use of graduate students and adjunct instructors.

• Mandating theory-to-practice components stressing community service and global responsibility in all programs and courses.

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• Dr. Carl Boggs, National University, Los Angeles
• Dr. Marc Bousquet, Santa Clara University
• Dr. Eric Buck, Montana State University
• Dr. Ward Churchill
• Dr. Abraham DeLeon, University of Rochester
• Dr. Jason Del Gandio, Temple University
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• Dr. Corey Dolgon, Stonehill College
• Dr. Luis Fernandez, Northern Arizona University
• Dr. Victoria Fontan, University of Peace, Costa Rica
• Dr. Carol Gigliotti, Emily Carr Institute
• Dr. Henry Giroux, McMaster University, CA
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• Prof. Jose Palafox, AK Press
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• Dr. Stephen Sheehi, University of South Carolina
• Prof. Stevphen Shukaitis, University of Leicester Centre for Philosophy & Political Economy, UK
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• Dr. Ali Shehzad Zaidi, SUNY, Canton
• Dr. Michael Parenti, Independent Progressive Politics network, New Jersey

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[29] Crushing Capitalism with Dr. Asimakopoulos (http://www.youtube.com/user/TSIMedia1)
[32] Mission & Graduate School (http://www.transformativestudies.org/graduate-school/)
[33] Mission & Graduate School (http://www.transformativestudies.org/graduate-school/)

Further reading
External links

- Official website (http://www.transformativestudies.org/)
- TSI facebook group (http://www.facebook.com/#!/group.php?gid=33059690070)
- scribd (http://www.scribd.com/TSIMedia)
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