On Varieties of Dissociation: An Essay Review of Krippner and Powers' Broken Images, Broken Selves: Dissociative Narratives in Clinical Practice

by William Braud

BROKEN IMAGES, BROKEN SELVES: DISSOCIATIVE NARRATIVES IN CLINICAL PRACTICE. Edited by Stanley Krippner and Susan Marie Powers. Washington, DC: Brunner/Mazel, 1997. Pp. xi + 372. $xx.xx, cloth. L.C. 97-26048. ISBN 0-87630-851-5.

In his opening chapter for this book, "Dissociation in many times and places," Stanley Krippner presents his working definition of dissociation as a description of "reported experiences and observed behaviors that seem to exist apart from, or appear to have been disconnected from, the mainstream, or flow, of one's conscious awareness, behavioral repertoire, and/or self-identity" (p. 8). Later, he delimits the concept further, asserting that dissociation is not found in most instances of dreaming, meditating, "shamanizing," or schizophrenia (which some writers previously had considered as virtual equivalents of dissociation).

Krippner presents an organizational scheme for dissociative experiences, drawing upon features of models that "two contributors to transpersonal psychology," anthropologist Ruth-Inge Heinze and the editor of this *Journal*, Rhea White, had proposed previously for understanding alternate states of consciousness and exceptional human experiences, respectively. Krippner categorizes experiences according to their places along multiple dimensions of degree of conscious awareness or dissociation, degree of volitional control (both of these dimensions are from Heinze), whether awareness focuses upon the "ego-self" or the "All-Self" (White's terms for, respectively, the skin-encapsulated, separate ego or the oneness of all things), and whether the

experience is "life potentiating" or "life depotentiating" (again, White's terms). Krippner uses this classification scheme to describe dissociative events he has observed on five continents over four decades, giving us a cross-cultural perspective on the varieties of dissociative experiences.

Krippner's travelogue of dissociation observations helps us appreciate the vast range of dissociative and related experiences as well as the variety of functions the experiences can serve. The chronicled experiences include: a Santería mediumistic ritual in Cuba; ventriloquist Edgar Bergen hearing, with astonishment, the wisdom of his own dummy, Charlie McCarthy ("What [Charlie] says is so much more than anything I know!"; p. 5); the familiar adventures of Robert Louis Stevenson's *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde*; Chris Costner Sizemore's multiple personalities (whose initial 3 "alters," popularized in the book and movie, *The Three Faces of Eve*, later grew to 22); possession trances at folk healing centers in Puerto Rico; channeled writings of a Brazilian medium; a beautiful Patience Worth poem (channeled through Pearl Curran in the early 1900s); facilitated creative artistic and musical performances in research participants who were hypnotized by Russian neuropsychologist Vladimir Raikov and told to take on the identities of talented figures such as Raphael, Rachmaninoff, and Fritz Kreisler; out-of-body experients who report encountering the All-Self through controlled dissociation; glossolalia episodes; entranced Balinese ritual performers; an Indonesian shaman whose call to shamanize and heal came in a dream; a recounting of Gopi Krishna's kundalini awakening; Jack Schwartz's controlled dissociation for pain management; and sexually abused children who protect themselves by dissociating.

These instances of both controlled and uncontrolled dissociation are balanced by descriptions of experiences from other dimensional spaces of the model—cases of controlled and uncontrolled enhanced awareness in which there are or are not major shifts in the ego-self or encounters with the All-Self. Among these categories, Krippner finds

places for his Maimonides hypnosis and relaxation telepathy experiments and for other exceptional human experiences.

Krippner closes his chapter by pointing out that the examples he has cited demonstrate that dissociation can be sometimes life-depotentiating, maladaptive, and "negative," and sometimes life-potentiating, adaptive, and "positive." He suggests that the term "dissociation" no longer needs to be reified or pathologized; instead, it "can even be viewed as a basic skill or capacity similar to imagination and absorption" (p. 33). It can have positive uses such as tuning out boring conversations, aiding in pain control by distancing oneself from the source of the pain, fostering creativity through fantasizing and musing, and empowering its practitioners in certain cultural contexts in which the ability is socially adaptive and valued. Krippner urges that further hermeneutic and phenomenological research be applied to dissociative narratives to help clarify the various issues involved, and he calls for an increase in cross-cultural research on these phenomena.

I found this chapter to be a good introductory overview of various forms of dissociation, and I valued its frequent reminders of some of the positive uses of dissociation. The four-factor model provided a helpful organizational device for the chapter's content. I appreciated Krippner's echoing of Kenneth Gergen's useful caveat that terms such as "dissociation" and their explanations and meanings are constructed by particular cultures, at particular times, for particular purposes, and that it may be unwise to reify such constructs or impose our own understandings of them onto other persons or other cultures. Krippner approvingly cites Gergen's recognition that the term "dissociation" is a negative one as it is currently used—a term that tends to "discredit the individual, drawing attention to problems, shortcomings, or incapacities" (p. 31). In fact, I would have preferred the editors and other contributors to the book to have used a more neutral designation, such as "dissociative possibilities," rather than the pathology-suggesting label "dissociative disorders," here and throughout the book.

I was glad to find Krippner's comment that the present "revival of interest [in dissociation] may be but one blip in Ellenberger's (1970) registry of the cycles in psychotherapists' interest in dissociative disorders" (p. 31). He is referring, of course, to H. F. Ellenberger's magnificent, encyclopedic, and deliciously scholarly volume that traces the history and development of thinking about the nature of the unconscious. I enjoyed Krippner's reminders of some of the things old-timers such as Pierre Janet, William James, and others had to say about dissociation and related phenomena. However, I feel he missed an opportunity to mention how contributions of F. W. H. Myers, W. F. Prince, and Morton Prince were important and relevant to the topic at hand. How often do we find that the contemporary big ideas about topics of current interest are but footnotes and pale reflections of the even larger and richer thoughts originated by the earliest investigators of these same subjects? I frequently find myself agreeing with a sentiment that Freud once expressed to Wilhelm Fliess, "It is the oldest ideas which are the most useful, as I am belatedly finding out" (Freud, 1896/1954, p. 157).

I think there is an excellent reason for returning to the writings, thoughts, and conceptualizations of earlier investigators in the context of *psychological* topics. This is because their subject matter was readily at hand, and it was always possible for keen and thoughtful observers to make accurate and valid observations and interpretations about themselves and others. The actions and behavior patterns of others were directly observable, as were the observers' own inner experiences; the inner experiences of others were indirectly knowable through their verbal reports and through inferences from their observable actions and traces. Similarly, the earth, the sky, the animals, and the plants were ever available to naturalistic observations. Given this ready availability—and sufficient time to dwell on these things—a great deal could be learned relatively quickly. The knowledge curve, with respect to the ordinary natural world and with respect to human psychology, would have a logarithmic shape—increasing very quickly and sharply at first, then leveling off. Both as a species and as individuals, we could quickly

gain important stores of knowledge, particularly about human nature. Psychologists, philosophers, novelists, poets, artists, and the public at large could quickly penetrate to the hearts of things. It may be only with respect to what is ordinarily *invisible* (the tiny constructs of genetics or subatomic physics or the novel forces identified much later by physics) or what occurs at rarely or never experienced *extremes* (of size, temperature, speed, and so on—the realms emphasized in relativity and quantum physics) that the typically assumed linear or exponential knowledge-gain curves might apply. Unlike inanimate observational tools, such as telescopes, microscopes, particle accelerators, and electronic sensors, *the human tools* for observing the outer world and inner experience did not require centuries or millennia to be invented, developed, and used. So, whereas it may not make sense to consult Aristotle or Augustine for accurate information about the momenta of subatomic particles or the radio-spectrum of the star Sirius, it may make sense to consult Plato or Rumi for knowledge of the human condition or for wisdom of the human heart.

I would have welcomed, in this chapter, mention of additional phenomena related to dissociation—such as the curious forms of knowing and non-knowing observed in commissurotomized (split brain) patients, which fit Krippner's working definition rather well (see, e.g., Gazzaniga, 1970); some of this work is mentioned in passing in another chapter of this volume. Additionally, there two processes studied long ago by Pavlovian researcher and theorist W. Horsley Gantt—*autokinesis* and *schizokinesis*—in which different response systems (usually the autonomic and striate muscular or skeletal systems) within the organism become functionally dissociated, frequently as a result of stressful experiences (Gannt, 1966). These studies could, perhaps, increase our understanding of at least some of the mechanisms underlying dissociation.

Readers of this *Journal* might have wished for additional discussion of the possible interrelationships of psi and dissociation—especially, thoughts about how dissociation might be favorable to psi functioning. It is possible that psi-antagonistic

ownership resistance (Batcheldor, 1966) might be reduced in dissociation, since the latter might decrease interferences related to feelings of responsibility. It would be of interest to know how psychic skills are distributed among the alters of persons with multiple personality (dissociative identity) "disorders" (MPD/DID). (There are at least some anecdotal accounts of greater than usual psychic talent among some alters.)

In connection with the discussion of Raikov's hypnotic and suggestive enhancement of creative expression, and his work "to keep the improvement from remaining state-dependent, transferring what emerged under hypnosis into proficiencies that could be employed during wakefulness" (p. 19), it would be of interest to know more about the techniques he used and their effectiveness, since similar procedures might be used to help transfer information across dissociated states or among alters in cases of MPD/DID. Another thought that readers of this *Journal* might have, with respect to Raikov's work, might be whether it would be possible to enhance psychic functioning through using hypnosis and suggestion techniques to have research participants imagine they were historical figures known to have possessed unusual psychic talents and to act "as if" this were, in fact, the case.

In two of the features of his model (awareness/dissociation and control/noncontrol), Krippner touches upon what I have always believed to be two of the key processes involved in effective psi functioning, and in psychological functioning in general: different forms of *attention* and *intention*; I would have enjoyed a more extended treatment of these two processes. The additions mentioned in these last three paragraphs are simply personal wishes, however, and it would be too much to expect extended treatments in any introductory, survey chapter.

Next, we are treated to an elegant chapter on the "History of dissociation in Western psychology," written by Peggy Wright. She introduces her chapter by usefully indicating that she will be presenting diagnostic terms and symptoms as they were understood at the time of their occurrence—doing this to circumvent the temptation to

project current views and terms onto the past, and noting that such projections may or may not be accurate, and may obscure ways in which behaviors presumed to arise from dissociation may have been shaped by cultural beliefs and expectations. Her chapter begins with a brief history of *possession*, which she views as one of the oldest and most documented forms of dissociation. She presents Cardeña's definition of "possession" as experiences of "parts, or the whole of his or her body carrying out actions seeming on their own or at the behest of the possessing identity" (p. 42), pointing out that some forms are voluntary (as in mediumistic contexts), whereas others are involuntary and considered pathological (e.g., "demonic possessions"). Although Wright does not mention this, it is possible for one to be virtually "possessed" by ideas, aims, or motives. Historically, one of the names of such inner possessors has been the *passions*—suggesting that which we suffer or endure, assuming a passive role. Etymologically, tele*pathy* is related to this same concept. The consequences of being possessed by one's own thoughts or feelings can, of course, be helpful or harmful.

She moves quickly to a discussion of magnetism, Mesmerism, and hypnotism in general, and then to a consideration of how the existence of a *dual* or *double consciousness* was fostered by some of the phenomena observed in hypnotized individuals (e.g., automatisms, the success of posthypnotic suggestions, hypnotic amnesia, apparently nonvolitional responses). She quotes Ellenberger—upon whom she draws heavily throughout her chapter—as suggesting that

> Hypnosis provided a first model of the human mind as a double ego, a conscious but restricted ego that the individual believes to be the only one, and a subconscious, much wider ego, unknown to the conscious one, but endowed with unknown perceptive and creative powers. (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 168)

Wright notes the relevance of this observation to dissociation without mentioning that this same distinction equally could be applied to other major distinctions emphasized in psychology at large and in the various spiritual and wisdom traditions: consciousness/ unconsciousness itself, ego/self, ego-self/All-Self, rational-sensory functioning/psychic functioning, and so on.

Hysteria is treated, along with the divergent interpretations of its nature by the two major French schools of hypnosis. The Salpêtrière school in Paris, headed by Charcot, contended that hysteria and hypnosis were pathological and neurologically-based, and that only hysterics could be hypnotized. The Nancy school of Liébeault and Bernheim was of the persuasion that there was a continuum of hypnotic susceptibility, possessed by everyone, but to different degrees, and that hypnosis was due to *suggestion*—"an aptitude to transform an idea into an act" (p. 45)—and could be used for a wide variety of healing purposes. In claiming that the hysterical behaviors of Charcot's patients were simply artifacts of suggestion, Wright points out, Bernheim's approach was a kind of precursor of today's sociocognitive theory of hypnosis (as advocated by Barber, Spanos, Chaves, and others).

In an interesting section on hysteria and dissociation, Wright tells us that the first medical use of the word "dissociation" has been attributed to the American physician Benjamin Rush, who used to term to refer to individuals who were called "flighty," "harebrained," or "a little cracked"—already, we see the negative tone of the term. The *concept* of dissociation, however, was known in France in the mid 19th century, and it indicated a lack of integration or association, in which ideas were kept separate, isolated, split off from each other. Pierre Janet used hypnosis, dream information, automatic writing, and automatic talking to help neutralize the traumatic memories that he felt were responsible for dissociations and symptoms, and reestablishing a unity of consciousness (p. 47). For Janet, in contrast to Freud's view, each dissociated state was a conscious state; healthy people did not have subconscious (unconscious) processes (p. 47). For

Freud, there was no doubling of consciousness, no second consciousness. Rather, dissociated systems were simply separate groups of mental but unconscious elements, with our consciousness turning sometimes to one group and sometimes to another (p. 48).

With Freud's later triple rejection of dissociation theory as the major mechanism of defence, of sexual abuse as the originator of trauma, and of hypnosis as a useful therapeutic technique, dissociation theory declined. Wright mentions a large number of additional factors that contributed to this decline. Throughout the chapter, she not only describes occurrences and trends, but gives reasons for the various views and changes in views. She describes brief revivals of hypnotherapy and interest in dissociative possibilities during World Wars I and II, occasioned by combat trauma, and sometimes in connection with new techniques for physiological explorations.

The 1970s brought a revival of interest in dissociative phenomena, including posttraumatic stress disorders (PTSD) and multiple personality experiences. She attributes some of this growing interest to increased medical interest in PTSD in the wake of Vietnam, to the rise of the women's movement which created more female mental health practitioners and a safer climate for speaking of sexual abuse, maintenance of popular interest in MPD/DID through books and films such as *The Three Faces of Eve* and *Sybil*, and developments in hypnosis research (e.g., Hilgard's neodissociation theory of hypnosis), neuroscience, and cognitive studies that favored a rediscovery of Janet's work and theories.

In the 1980s, interest in dissociation grew even stronger. New dissociative "disorders" were codified in the DSM III-R and DSM-IV (revised third and fourth editions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association), the "rare" designation for MPD/DID was removed, new organizations and journals devoted to dissociation were founded, and the field burgeoned.

Wright closes her chapter with a discussion of current issues in dissociation theory. She indicates that dissociation theories are usually presented within specialized

areas and that there is no one model of dissociation theory that adequately addresses the breadth of the phenomenon. This reminds this reviewer of the state within current experimental parapsychology, in which reviews, studies, and thinking are so typically confined to narrow interest areas, fostering a losing sight of the larger issues and grander contexts of what is studied.

She points out the commonalities of hypnosis and dissociative identity disorder (DID) and the overlaps of theories of hypnosis and the etiologies of DID and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). There follows a section on theories of hypnosis which indicates the dominance of two major theoretical models—the dissociative/special/state models (represented by the neodissociation theory of Ernest Hilgard) and the nondissociative/nonspecial/nonstate models (represented by the sociocognitive model of Nicholas Spanos). Wright provides concise presentations of these two major models. I'm surprised to find so little mention of the large and impressive body of work of T. X. Barber, whose work is mentioned only once and in passing. Wright points out that these two major current views of hypnosis reflect the positions of Charcot (dissociation) and Bernheim (suggestion) that opposed one another a century ago—another reminder of how little the big ideas change through time.

The chapter concludes with a section on the relevance of hypnosis theory to DID and PTSD, in which it is noted that the (neo)dissociative theories agree more, and are more relevant to, the clinical evidence for DID and PTSD, whereas the sociocognitivists remain critical of much of this clinical literature and cite evidence, chiefly from laboratory experiments, for the role of demand characteristics in DID indicators and for the presence of similar indicators in normal research participants. This latter position has itself been criticized on the grounds that the experimental phenomena only superficially resemble DID

findings and that the dysfunctional behaviors of DID exist prior to treatments that could provide the requisite demand characteristics. The gaps between these two major views of

hypnosis (one more experimental and one more clinical) call to mind similar gaps between research and clinical practice in psychology as a whole, as well as similar differences in the emphases of the narrower experimental parapsychology and the broader psychical research areas in our own field.

The book's third chapter, by Etzel Cardeña, discusses the etiologies of dissociation. Cardeña suggests that dissociation may be a reminder of our basic nature, of our general condition as humans. The range of forms that dissociation takes make indicate that the forms are different and may obey different processes and have different etiologies. He provides a two-dimensional framework for considering etiology—whether the indications seem to have a predominantly neurological or psychological etiology, and whether they are manifestations of ordinary or pathological processes. Most of the phenomena of interest to readers of this book would seem to fall in the psychological/pathological quadrant of this four-fold mapping. The bulk of the chapter describes each of the major facets of dissociation (i.e., dissociative alterations in the sense of self and of the surrounding environment, of physical sensation and sense of agency, of memory, and of identity) in terms of what is known about their possible neurological and psychological etiology.

Dissociative alterations in sense of self—chiefly instances of depersonalization and derealization (including experiences similar to some that occur in out-of-body experiences) have been related neurologically to seizure conditions (especially temporal lobe epilepsy), damage to the central nervous system, and drug intoxication. Psychologically similar syndromes (again, including out-of-body and near-death experiences) have been related to meditation, hypnosis, shamanism, and with events that threaten the physical integrity of the self or of others. Examples of the latter include not only direct threats to one's own well-being or anticipation of one's own death, but also threats to the well-being of others—e.g., the 1989 Loma Prieta, California, earthquake; witnessing the execution of a convicted killer). Positive events may also trigger

dissociative experiences—e.g., sports, sexual encounters, prayer, contact with nature, good news, acting, music. Since many of these are similar to the exceptional human experiences (EHEs) described by Rhea White, one wonders about how dissociation might feature in various forms of EHEs. In fact, as we see in her own contribution to this book (Chapter 4), White suggests that EHEs may both represent and foster a dissociation from our ordinary ego-self and an association with the All-Self or with a Something More from which we ordinarily dissociate. Cardeña suggests that a narrow and continuous focus of attention may be a common feature of the various circumstances that trigger dissociation.

Dissociative alterations of sensation and sense of agency have been related, neurologically, to various types of nervous system damage and, psychologically, to sensory receptor overstimulation, lack of attention, and severe stress and trauma (that can be accompanied by absence of pain and absence of feeling). Hypnosis, of course, can simulate these conditions, as can somatoform disorders such as conversion or "hysterical" conditions (e.g., blindness, paralysis). Cardeña cites some studies that have found significant associations between dissociative experiences and conversion symptoms and a history of early abuse.

Neurological conditions associated with dissociative memory alterations include the syndrome of chronic alcohol abuse (Korsakoff's syndrome), physical and infectious trauma to the brain, epilepsy, and dementia. Psychological memory-affecting factors include severe stress and trauma. The "source amnesias" or "paramnesias" found in some cases may be relevant to psychical research as confounds in some instances of seemingly anomalous memory or past-life recall or in some instances of "inspiration," "revelation," or mediumistic or channeling reports.

At the neurological level, epilepsy and brain injuries can yield dissociative alterations in identity (as in the famous incident of Phineas P. Gage's personality and temperament changes following the piercing of his head by an iron rod). Psychological predisposers of dissociative identity changes include the purposive playing of different

roles, spontaneous or sought-after experiences of trance or possession, possible iatrogenic suggestions (for multiple identities) to some patients by some therapists, and early and chronic abuse (which Cardeña points out as neither a sufficient nor a necessary cause).

For readers of this *Journal*, the book chapter of greatest interest and relevance is Rhea White's contribution on dissociation, narrative, and exceptional human experiences (EHEs). White proposes that EHEs (such as mystical, psychical, and peak experiences) can help us evolve in our awareness, worldview, and meaning of life, and they can do this through fostering less identification (dissociation) with our "skin-encapsulated ego-self" and greater identification (association) with the All-Self (a short-hand term for our oneness with all things), and through encouraging a shift in the narratives we use to describe ourselves and the nature of our world. According to White, EHEs serve as windows opening onto the All-Self. They tend to occur under conditions in which we are somewhat dissociated from our ego-self—conditions of sleep, dreaming, hypnagogic and hypnopompic states, and certain altered states of consciousness. EHEs may open such windows briefly, can be considered anomalous or explained away or ignored. In these cases, it is back to business as usual. Alternatively, if EHEs are attended to more fully, honored, treasured, encouraged, and worked with, they can help bring about transformative changes in which the EHE-er can ultimately identify less with the ego-self, identify more with the All-Self, and shift from the forms of knowing, being, and doing that characterize the conventional paradigm to other ways, appropriate to a new, experiential paradigm. In the former paradigm, the phenomena of interest to readers of this *Journal* are considered unimportant or impossible and tend not to occur; the latter paradigm is a fitting home for these same exceptional phenomena. Ideally, we can partake of both paradigms and both identities (self and Self) and what they allow and disallow, as appropriate for different life purposes—thus becoming more complete and more fully human (the real meaning of the "H" in EHEs).

Exceptional human experience is a term White introduced when she sought to expand the range of experiences she was studying beyond the narrow forms of experience that usually command the interest of parapsychologists and psychical researchers—i.e., beyond the psychic experiences of telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition, and psychokinesis. These were retained as but one of five classes of EHEs—the other four classes being mystical or unitive experiences, unusual death-related experiences, encounter experiences ("encounters" can be with any beings or realms considered "other"—e.g., with other, little-acknowledged aspects of oneself, with the divine, with the angelic, with apparitions, and so on), and exceptional normal experiences (more familiar experiences such as peak experiences, strong feelings of love or empathy, extraordinary performances, and so on). Such experiences initially are considered anomalous, and they may remain nothing more than anomalies. However, any of these may be transformed into an exceptional human experience if (a) the experiencer feels singled out by the experience in a personal way (or, at least, if the experience seems personally very special and meaningful), (b) the experiencer applies various ordinary explanations, but these attempts fail, (c) the experiencer concludes that the experience is genuine and real, (d) the experiencer resolves to include the experience in her or his life narrative, even though the dominant culture or subculture does not do this, and (e) if we do not dissociate from it, the newly included experience begins to act as yeast or a seed to alter the daily life and consciousness of the experiencer. As a result of attention to the exceptional experience, and as a result of the experience itself, a potentially long-term transformative process can be initiated—in the manner of a calling or vocation—and sustained, the outcome of which is more dissociation from a limited, isolated, separate ego-self and a greater association with a more inclusive All-Self (of a similar concept, William James, 1902/1985, p. 508, wrote, "[One] becomes conscious that this higher part is conterminous and continuous with a MORE of the same quality, which is operative in the universe outside of [one], and which [one] can keep in working touch with . . . ."). As one works

with one's EHEs, one constructs a new, and more inclusive, narrative or story about oneself and the world at large. We can develop this new narrative through associating to and amplifying our EHE history through journaling and through the use of analogies, metaphors, and symbols. The narratives we construct may be life-depotentiating (as when we attempt to devalue, explain away, or view EHEs in a continuing anomalous or pathological context) or life-potentiating (as when we affirm the EHEs and use them in stories in which they are more meaningful and in which we have a more meaningful place). EHE counseling—e.g., services provided by the Spiritual Emergence Network and similar groups or individuals—may help in the conversion of life-depotentiating to life-potentiating narratives. The nature of the narrative can be known through its everyday life fruits—the life-potentiating ones yielding a more productive, happier, healthier, zestier, and more exciting life.

Multiple sets of dissociative and associative activities are implicated in White's views of EHEs. The occurrence of EHEs facilitates dissociation from an overly narrow and limiting narrative, from the ego-self, from cultural narratives that exclude EHEs, and from life-depotentiating assumptions and ways of knowing. EHEs facilitate association with a larger, more complete narrative, with the All-Self, with life-potentialing assumptions and ways of knowing, being, and doing, and with still other EHEs.

White does not mention some of the bodies of research that add further empirical support to her claims about the values of honoring EHEs. Studies have identified the energy loss and low-level stress that occur when one denies EHEs, and the healthful benefits of disclosing and assimilating these previously excluded experiences (as shown, for example, in the work of Pennebaker, 1995 and Wickramasakera, 1989).

Thomas Greening contributes a brief chapter on an existential-humanistic perspective on posttraumatic stress disorder. Greening argues that an exclusive emphasis on conventional approaches to PTSD (interventions based on catharsis, deconditioning, support, and medication) may cause us to overlook additional roles of political, cultural,

and ontological factors in these episodes. He echoes a suggestion by Krippner and Colodzin that Vietnam veterans' flashbacks might represent unsuccessful attempts to make sense of a difficult experience. Greening suggests that such PTSD experiences may not be just "post" but reflect ongoing reactions to an ever-present stress of life. A key point of his chapter is that PTSD "disorders" may not be only disorders of individuals, but of the social and political context of which the experiencing individuals are part. They point to larger patterns of society that are in need of recognition, change, or creative transformation. He mentions ways in which ongoing, dehumanizing, life-negative societal, political, and cultural influences may contribute to episodes of the types found in PTSD and dissociation, and how discovering meaning and "ontological relatedness" can help in reducing such difficulties and promoting well-being. He illustrates his approach by describing two cases—one from his own psychotherapy practice, the other involving Primo Levi, a Holocaust survivor and author who jumped to his death in Italy in 1987. He suggests that existential questions and ultimate concerns play important roles in such cases—that an existential lack of meaning and connectedness may be underlying influences. He recommends that existential-humanistic approaches to PTSD and related concerns that take into account the loss and restoration of meaning and human connectedness may play key roles in therapeutic interventions in such cases. Dissociations from one's body, emotions, feelings, or past memories and experiences can predispose one to stress and postpone therapeutic resolutions. An important contribution of this chapter is its pointing to cultural conditions that may foster the types of dissociations that can compromise psychological and spiritual well-being.

Roger Levin contributes a chapter on the body and modernity in MPD/DID. He argues that a faithful description of MPD/DID incidents would portray the individuals as having multiple experiential bodies, but that typically such "bodily" features are either ignored or treated as epiphenomena of cognitive dissociation. He presents two cases of dissociation, from his own practice, which he feels illustrates the role of multiple

experiential bodies. One case features "dissociation as malevolent possession in a case of multiple personality." It involves a woman with "seven well-formed alters," in which the alters have "separate, concrete bodily/spatial presences" and sets of "characteristics distinct from her own embodiment" (p. 138). The case has characteristics of "possession" and various spiritistic features. The intercession of a healer trained in Amazonian shamanic curing methods is reported to have helped the patient, along with the therapist's assistance with integrative work. A second case presents "dissociation as self-designed healing ritual in a case of multiple personality" in which bodily characteristics (spatial separation or proximity, perceived solidity or transparency of the "alters") feature in both the presenting problem and in the patient's self-designed rituals of integration.

These two case presentations are followed by materials on multiple selves or multiple bodies, implications for diagnosis and treatment, a review of the historical MPD/DID controversy (featuring accounts of the modern "epidemic" of such cases, the social historical context, the skeptical position, and a consideration of current issues in the modern scientific exploration of these cases). In the course of these discussions, we are reminded of the widely reported hypermnesia, of persons who present these symptoms, for very early events, often from preverbal developmental phases. The exploration of this alleged hypermnesia might yield useful information relevant to psi and to exceptional human abilities and experiences. Levin usefully points out the shaping influences of culture and family in these syndromes. He cites Colin Ross's thoughts about the presence of widespread, benign forms of multiplicity in the general population. He raises the forensic issue of responsibility in cases of multiplicity. He points to possible influences of the privileging, in Western epistemology, of mind over body, of cognition over affect, as opposed to the absence of these tendencies in non-Western and premodern cultures. He concludes with potential beneficial aspects of dissociation—extraordinary degrees of control of somatic function and possible spontaneous remissions of malignancies that may have crucial dissociative components.

In a chapter on near-death narratives, Bruce Greyson offers a concise summary of what has been learned in that area. He supports the importance of this work by reporting that at least a third of people who come close to death have near-death experiences (NDEs), and that a 1982 poll estimated that about 5 percent of the American population have had NDEs. NDEs are relevant to dissociation (and vice versa) because NDEs "are disconnected from the mainstream of conscious awareness and involve a shifting of attention from the physical environment to an alternate reality and back again. As such, they typify a type of dissociation that is a normal response to intolerable trauma" and "demonstrate partial or complete disconnections of perception, cognitive functioning, emotional states, and sense of identity from normal awareness" (p. 179). The nature of the experience is well-known to readers of this *Journal*. Greyson presents two first-hand accounts of NDEs—both from physicians. He next includes a section on how dissociation—including feelings of depersonalization, derealization, and detachment from the environment—can occur under conditions of stress, but then goes on to differentiate the NDE from the only partially overlapping experiences involved in those more common forms of depersonalization. NDEs tend to include features of hyperalertness, lucidity, pleasant feeling tone, distinctive perceptual content, and spiritual, mystical, and noetic aspects that are not present in depersonalization. Some (e.g., Kenneth Ring and Christopher Evans) have suggested, however, that dissociative tendencies do help NDE-ers contact alternative realities during their NDEs. In addition to dissociation from the conventional world, there must be a concomitant attention to and absorption in internal states in order to register and recall such alternate realities. Ring has posited an "encounter-prone personality" in whom a traumatic childhood may have fostered the development of these joint dissociative and absorptive tendencies which come into play during NDEs. As with MPD/DID, traumatic childhoods are neither necessary nor sufficient to the occurrence of NDEs: There are other paths to such experiences (e.g., encouraged imaginative involvement in childhood).

In discussing therapeutic implications of NDEs, Greyson points out that NDEs are usually regarded as positive experiences and that most NDE-ers gradually adjust on their own to their experience-engendered distress. This adjustment, however, often involves shifts in values, attitudes, interests, and behaviors that family and friends may have difficulty understanding. NDE-ers may experience anger and depression at having been "returned" to this life and at the requisite readjustments. They may identify too strongly with the experience, and think of themselves exclusively as NDE-ers. They may feel distancing from those who have not had or understand their intense experience. They have difficulties communicating their experiences to those who have not had them. Greyson outlines what might be useful therapeutic hints for those working with NDE-ers. These wise suggestions include exploring one's own prejudices about NDEs and NDE-ers, respecting the NDE as a powerful catalyst for transformation, encouraging the NDE-er to describe the experience (which tends to be accompanied by relief) and their feelings about the experience, avoiding premature interpretations, sharing factual information in a nonjudgmental way, avoiding trivializing the experience, helping the NDE-er appreciate her or his active role in creating or unfolding the NDE, encouraging grief work for parts of the ego that have been abandoned or transcended in the experience, encouraging multiple-level interpretations of the NDE imagery, using nonverbal means of expressing the experience, addressing the practical issues that arise as consequences of the experiences, and helping the experiencer in not overemphasizing possible paranormal accompaniments to the neglect of more important aspects of the experience that can foster psychospiritual growth. Interactions with cohorts of other people who have had similar experience can obviously be useful, but include risks of clanishness and alienation from those who have not had the experience. Greyson suggests that the therapist's ultimate value to an NDE-er might be in helping the latter channel what was learned in the experience into constructive actions in the service of others.

Michael Grosso addresses the more benign and useful aspects of dissociation in a chapter on inspiration, mediumship, surrealism, and creative dissociation. His major theme is that dissociative processes that appear to be fragmentations or disconnections may in fact be preludes to greater wholeness or higher integration—that it may be necessary to dissociate from certain aspects of lower selfhood or ordinary reality in order to reassociate at a higher level. Such "creative dissociation" is simultaneously destructive and reconstructive. Although Grosso does not mention this, this idea calls to mind the familiar patterns of transformation—described, most notably, by anthropologists Arnold van Gennep and Victor Turner—in which one moves (e.g., in rites of passage) from separation from the old to a transitional, marginal, or liminal phase, to one of reaggregation or incorporation into the new (see, for example, Schwartz-Salant & Stein, 1991). It also reminds this reviewer of the sequences of identification, disidentification, and reidentification that occur in personal and in transpersonal development. If there are, indeed, profound connections between these liminal and transitional phenomena and what occurs in dissociative syndromes, then a fuller acquaintance with the former may help illuminate heretofore unrecognized concomitants of the latter. For example, McMahon (1998) has pointed out connections between psi and liminality, and to the role of *communitas*, structure, and anti-structure involved in the various stages of these transitional processes. Herein may lie clues that may be helpful to the psi researcher and to the experiencers and investigators of exceptional human experiences. This reviewer is also reminded of the concept of *kenosis* or emptying—found in many spiritual traditions—in which one most first empty oneself of certain content or ways of being in order to make room for new forms of knowing and for transformative change. What one must lose in order to gain, what is lost and gained, the areas in which such loses and gains occur, and the factors that facilitate or interfere with these gains and losses—all of these may greatly repay the attentions of researchers and theoreticians interesting in exploring the processes that might underlie psychic functioning and EHEs.

Grosso illustrates creative dissociation by rich accounts of inspiration (giving examples from philosophy and from the creative arts), mediumship (featuring cases of Pearl Curran's channeling of Patience Worth, Joan of Arc, Eusapia Palladino, and Lenore Piper—the latter being the famous "white crow" of William James), and the Surrealism movement (of André Breton and Giorgio de Chirico). These have in common a mixture of ordinary and extraordinary realities (akin to waking and dream awarenesses) in which one dissociates from ordinary thinking and from one realm in order to associate with and access qualities of another realm. In each of these, one is possessed, controlled, or overtaken by something outside of the ordinary ego-self. Each of the areas reviewed by Grosso contains clues about factors that facilitate or inhibit creative dissociation—including techniques of voluntary dissociation that might be practiced deliberately by those who wish to leave behind, temporarily, the ordinary in order to explore and profit from the extraordinary. Grosso's chapter itself is rich in creative inclusions and juxtapositions that might serve to introduce useful novel inputs and ways of thinking that can help free, enliven, and inspire our usual ways of thinking about dissociation, psi research, and other topics in which we tend, too often, to sink into conceptual ruts.

Susan Powers explores the possible relationship between alien abduction accounts and dissociation in her chapter on alien abduction narratives. After describing the typical sequence of events reported in such accounts, and after a short description of the categories of "close encounters of the third kind," she presents two alien abduction narratives from her own collection and lets these "speak for themselves." As is the case for narratives presented in most chapters of this book, there is a balance of one "positive" and one "negative" account. Both accounts are from persons scoring highly on PTSD and dissociation inventories. Before interpreting these two narratives, Powers gives some background that informed her study. A thematic content analysis of two popular "abduction" books yielded major themes of amnesia, bodily intrusions, and being chosen.

These themes led her to wonder whether some form of human abuse might have been the source for some alien abduction stories. This suspicion led her to study possible PTSD and dissociation concomitants in persons reported such stories. She collected 20 abduction accounts and found that 45 percent of these persons revealed PTSD symptomology and 70 percent demonstrated dissociative characteristics (as indicated by standardized inventories). The same three themes (being chosen, bodily violations, and missing time or amnesia) emerged in the narratives of her participants. She suggests that a subset of such reporters may experience a form of temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE) (following a similar suggestion by Michael Persinger). In the first of her two cases, "being chosen" and the possibility of TLE stand out; in the second case, there are themes of early sexual abuse and of being chosen. The chapter ends with a section on suggestions for therapeutic interventions for persons reporting such experiences. Some of these cases may be cover stories for unacceptable early memories of childhood sexual abuse. Factors (initially suggested by Kluft) of a dissociative predisposition, traumatic events that overwhelm nondissociative resources, familial or cultural shaping influences (in these cases, perhaps, from the popular media), and inadequate restorative influences by significant others may combine to yield these particular kinds of "fantasies" (p. 208). The fact that Powers uses the term "this particular delusion" (p. 212) suggests an interpretive bias that she has not been able to "bracket." She recommends nonconfrontational interventions (similar to those used by David Spiegel for dissociation) in working with such persons, except in cases in which such support might be destructive. She recommends augmenting these interventions with others that attend to sociological and existential concerns. Her closing sentence: "After all, the narratives, no matter how fantastic they may be, are imbued with meaning and may lead both therapist and patient to a deeper understanding of poorly understood trauma" (p. 214).

Deirdre Barrett examines the relationship of dissociative conditions to sleep and dreaming. Some persons experience dissociation arising from sleep, some dissociative

accounts may be misperceived dreams, and other dissociative episodes display an affinity for times bordering sleep (hypnagogic and hypnopompic conditions). Additionally, there are similarities in the characteristics of dissociative conditions and dreaming—these commonalities may serve to foster or trigger dissociative episodes, from sleep, dreaming, or sleep-like states, in persons who are suitable predisposed. As usual, two cases are presented—one "pathological, with dangerous elements" and one "innocuous, experienced as positive" (p. 216). The first involved engaging in violent behavior during sleep or sleep-like conditions, accompanied by amnesia for these actions. Hypnotherapy brought "memories" that might have been influential or connected with these aggressive acts, increased recall of both traumatic and positive early events involving his father (and the latter's own violent episodes), and progress in dealing with these symptoms and with early abuse issues. In the second case, a woman, of Celtic heritage, experienced "visitations" from fairies, "little people," and the deceased during her "dissociative" episodes. She reported that the visitors often gave her helpful advice or warnings. She did not unduly emphasize these encounters, and they seemed to be an enriching part of her life. The remainder of the chapter describes various overlaps and connections between dissociation and sleep and dreaming. Because of these similarities, this reviewer wondered whether many efforts had been made to use dreaming as a state-similar recall strategy for dissociative amnesia? An interesting observation was presented in which Barrett reports that 26 percent of her sample of DID patients had at least one personality able to design dreams to be experienced by other personalities; the "dreammaker" appeared to be frequently lucid whereas the host experienced a nonlucid dream (p. 224). The dreammaker claimed to design dreams for the purpose of introducing memories that the alter wanted the host to begin dealing with, but knew the host could not face while awake (p. 224). Barrett suggests that the affinity of dissociation for near-sleep conditions may be due to the lowering of psychological vigilance and defenses as one relaxes into

sleep and to physiological mechanisms that facilitate hallucinations and unusual conditions of consciousness during near-sleep conditions (p. 227).

In a chapter on "Good Trips, Bad Trips: Psychedelic Drugs and Dissociation," Gary Greenberg suggests that psychedelic experience is inherently dissociative. After providing a brief history of the use of psychedelic drugs in clinical settings, he provides two case histories—one of a "bad trip" and one of a "good trip." The aim of all of this is to help set the stage for a discussion of therapeutic interventions with psychedelic drug users. Greenberg recommends setting the client enough at ease to discuss the meaning of a bad trip, and assessing whether or how emotional or spiritual residual effects of a bad trip might affect the client in a therapy session. The therapist points out how psychedelic drugs may act as amplifiers that can intensify whatever experiences and issues are already present. If the drugs prompt dissociative experiences, the therapist can help the client integrate the dissociative experience into the rest of his or her life. Portions of the content of the "bad trip" may be metaphors for pre-existing issues or concerns. Understanding psychedelics as amplifiers can prompt persons to be more attentive to set and setting factors that could results in future bad trips.

Many of the helpful suggestions that Greenberg gives with respect to working with persons' psychedelic adventures can be applied to dissociation itself. For example, he suggests that, in some drug experiences, the client may find unacceptable or unfamiliar materials before these find the client. One asks what it means that the client encountered what he or she did, why that material was in hiding, and how it can be integrated into the client's life (p. 244). The environment must be sufficiently caring and nonjudgmental for the client to feel safe in exploring challenging material. Suggesting to a client that exploring the meaning of a psychedelic experience is like interpreting a dream may help reduce discomfort in returning to the materials (p. 245). Exploring the pre-exisiting set and setting is important. Both drug-induced and other dissociative experiences may function as wake-up calls, forceful encounters with one's moral world

(p. 245). A helpful question, for both drug user and dissociative client, could be "What are you trying to tell yourself about your life [by means of this trip or dissociative experience]?" (p. 245).

To this reviewer, the power of some psychedelic agents in promoting feelings of intimacy and empathy suggests possible ways in which some psychedelic experiences could be explored as facilitators of certain forms of psi and exceptional human experiences that seem to be fostered under intimate and empathic conditions.

In a chapter entitled, "Dissociation in Terror of Death: The 'Hypnoid State' Revisited," Daniel Lapin describes a form of dissociative response to trauma that used to be called the "hypnoid state" by early psychoanalysts. He gives two cases examples of this condition of dissociative trance—describing its character and the conditions that might provoke it. Lapin identifies the terror of death, involuntary surrender, a false sense of being in control, analgesia, and posttraumatic amnesia as essential features of this state. He suggests "thralldom" as a fitting term for the state. He includes materials in which the state is distinguished from hypnosis and autohypnosis, and provide a model of the defenses and other processes that may be involved in dissociative thralldom. According to Lapin, a danger of dissociative thralldom is identifying with one's abuser and reenacting abuse as a perpetrator. He suggests examining the dissociative experiences of abusers as well as those of the abused (p. 269). While dissociative thralldom may originate as a defense against the experience of anticipated re-abuse and against recall of past trauma, it is "a cruel irony that the defense renders the victim more vulnerable to reenactment" (p. 270).

Lapin sprinkles the chapter with frequent references to similar processes described in fictional accounts of the vampire—especially Bram Stoker's work. It struck this reviewer as interesting that Lapin cites anecdotes from fictional accounts just as readily as he cites nonfictional cases as he sketches the qualities of the thralldom experience. I am reminded of the comments of one of the Expert Outsider Readers for

one of our Institute's doctoral dissertation students who reprimanded the student for not citing a particular response pattern of Sherlock Holmes in his review of relevant literature. This is somewhat humorous. However, it also suggests that it may indeed be profitable to mine the psychological and spiritual wisdom of fiction, poetry, art, and music, rather than seeking information only in conventional, nonfiction reports in the "primary professional literature."

In their contribution, Steven Lynn, Judith Pintar, and Judith Rhue describe "fantasy proneness, dissociation, and narrative construction." As usual, the chapter begins with two short case studies of fantasy-prone individuals—one positive, one negative. The first person had always been encouraged by her parents to fantasize and fantasy had always been an integral and prized part of her life. The second person had a history of severe abuse (a theme which runs through so many of these narratives and chapters), and her fantasy life was chaotic, uncontrolled, and sometimes terrifying. The authors claim that most fantasy-prone persons are happy and well adjusted; however, a subset of such persons experience difficulties and serious emotional problems.

Fantasy-proneness was first addressed by Sheryl Wilson and T. X. Barber in the early 1980s; they suggested that as much as 4 percent of the population had this trait, which they had identified in their excellent hypnotic subjects. Fantasy-prone individuals evidenced profound involvements in fantasy—many spending more than half of their waking life fantasizing, generating vivid imagery and hallucinating objects and events realistically enough to produce strong physical and emotional reactions through these images. They also reported great sensitivity to, for example, televised violence, had frequent psychic and out-of-body experiences, and occasional difficulty distinguishing their fantasies from "reality" (p. 278). In pursuing this syndrome more deeply, the authors of this chapter have, over the past 13 years, screened more than 10,000 college students in order to study more than 250 fantasy-prone individuals. They were able to confirm Wilson and Barber's finding that fantasy-proneness was correlated with high

hypnotizability (although the correlation was not as high as Wilson and Barber had suggested). There seemed to be two major paths to fantasy-proneness in later life: (a) encouragement to fantasize, in childhood, by a significant adult; and (b) fantasizing and involvement in imaginative activities in coping with or escaping loneliness, isolation, or punishment (p. 279). Nearly 30 percent of their fantasizer participants—compared to none of the less fantasy-prone participants—reported severe physical abuse as children. To the present reviewer, it is unclear whether actual abuse was higher for these fantasizers or whether their greater sensitivity and fantasies resulted in magnifying or exaggerating physical injuries that really were comparable to those of non-fantasizers. Fantasizers also reported greater loneliness, greater enjoyment of imaginary games and solitary play, and less enjoyment of playing with friends, compared with non-fantasizers. Fantasizers had more unconventional thinking. They generally were well-adjusted. A subset of fantasizers, however, was at risk for serious psychological problems. The incidences of physical abuse and, to a lesser degree, sexual abuse, were greater in fantasizers than in non-fantasizers. The authors conclude that fantasy proneness and abuse, when both present, may combine to increase the risk of psychopathology. Through reviewing published literature and through their own work, the authors suggest a connection between fantasy proneness and various dissociative features and syndromes, and they suggest that "fantasy might be an important substrate of dissociative symptoms" (p. 282). The authors suggest that the imaginative skills of fantasizers may have been used "deliberately" to help them escape unpleasant circumstances in the past (typically, as children). Some continue to be able to control their imaginative departures from the present, whereas, for others, such dissociations may become uncontrollable and lead to the recognized dissociative syndromes.

The authors report moving toward viewing the vivid imaginings of fantasizers in narrative terms. "What fantasy-prone persons do best is create absorbing narratives" (p. 288). They "create convincing scripts" (p. 288) that they are no longer in their bodies and

that they can travel outside and inside themselves in various ways. Some of these "goings away" can result in missing time and in memory losses (in many of which, absorption in imaginative content may be so deep that it prevents initial registration of external information; memories that are never formed, obviously, cannot be retrieved). Social dimensions (e.g., other shared social narratives from those around us, from books, from movies, and so on) inform the creation of new narratives. Persons (especially strong fantasizers) who experience discontinuous life events or inconsistent treatments from significant others (e.g., abuse from a parent who is "supposed" to act otherwise) may create, and live according to, similarly discontinuous, inconsistent, or multiple scripts. Various dissociative "disorders" may be new narratives created to provide the best possible fit with what is observed to be a fractured and inconsistent world—part of "the innate tendency to organize the self and represent reality in narrative terms" (p. 299). Thus, multiplicity may be an accurate reflection of lived experience (p. 296). The therapeutic implication of all of this is that " if narratives can be written, they can be re-written along more adaptive, self-serving lines. Hence, we work with clients to engender a sense of possibility that they can create a different, hopefully better, or at least more functional, cohesive, and empowered self" (p. 297). This view closely resembles Rhea White's view (described earlier) of life-depotentiating and life-potentiative narrative accounts of EHEs, and how the former might be converted into the latter. The authors suggest the possibility of deautomatizing dissociative reactions by identifying relevant internal and external triggers, and teaching clients self-control and grounding techniques. Gestalt and role-playing techniques may be used to identify and integrate conflicting narratives. They point out that because fantasy-prone persons are often highly suggestible, they are at risk for iatrogenic creation of DID by therapists who are insufficiently careful or thoughtful.

In reading this chapter, I found myself wondering whether a re-framing of experiences in narrative terms really adds anything new or profound, or whether this is

simply another (and currently popular) way of simply describing what happens and what we already know? What advantage is there in speaking of "narrative themes" rather than, simply, "behaviors"? One answer to this question is that narratives can more directly address issues of meanings and interpretations. On the other hand, if "behavior" is more broadly construed, if attention is given to subjective reactions, and if larger contexts and associative nets are considered, even "behavioral" considerations could be expanded to address, albeit more indirectly, the important issues of meaning and interpretation.

Although it is admitted that most fantasy-prone (an awkward term, since it has negative connotations) individuals are well-adjusted, happy, and, perhaps, unusually creative, the authors devote most of their chapter to describing the difficulties of the smaller subset of fantasizers who are at risk for serious psychological disorders. This is but another illustration of how bad news shouts out louder for our attention than does good news, and how psychologists—and even transpersonal psychologists—continue to emphasize deficits and difficulties, rather than growth and exceptional positive experiences.

Michael Barclay contributes a chapter on metaphoric truth and narrative structure, focusing on metaphor in narratives produced by dissociative patients. This theme fits nicely with papers published recently in the *Journal* on common metaphors used by professionals and by the public in "explaining" psi functioning (Williams, 1996; Williams & Dutton, 1998). Barclay suggests that the "kernel of truth" within a story is a metaphor and that key metaphors can be the "focal points of therapeutic interventions" (pp. 306, 307). He illustrates the possibilities of "metaphorical truth" (as distinguished from "historical truth") through examples of dissociative narratives (e.g., alien abductions, channeling). In the former, for example, an alien abduction metaphor can describe an event accurately, albeit in metaphorical accuracy, and also can defend against additional anxiety. In a possible instance of early childhood sexual abuse, a metaphorical cover story/narrative ("My abuser is an alien") can address one of the meanings of "alien" (from

the culture, from the family, from the child's expectations) in a curious, yet adaptive, manner. The metaphor "has value both as a dissociative defense against anxiety and as a poetic description of the alienation at the root of the sexual abuse experience" (p. 309). Similarly, "a patient with dissociative tendencies is ripe for the discourse and practice of channeling" (p. 315). Barclay usefully points to *personifications* as metaphors that allow us to understand a wide variety of experiences in terms of familiar qualities that we associate with humans.

Of course, Barclay does not make this connection, but the psi researcher may do well in appreciating the relevance of personification in connection with various psi incidents. This is most obvious in cases of poltergeists, hauntings, mediumistic communications, and other forms of survival-suggesting evidence in which information or events are not taken in simple, descriptive forms, but are contextualized as instances of human or discarnate agency. Personification or, more generally, *dramatization* may provide important keys to our understanding of particular psi incidents or in understanding psi in general. Perhaps apparent transfer of information or transfer of energy are incidental to the greater "lessons" of interconnectivity or of limitations of our conventional apprehensions of space and time that psi episodes can provide. Psi itself, in forms of telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition, and psychokinesis, may simply be metaphors, personifications, or dramatizations of a "something else" which we attempt to grasp, however imperfectly, through the application of more familiar labels and processes. This suggests that there may be degrees or layers of metaphorical truth, and that our very conceptualizations of psi and of posited psi processes may themselves be metaphors of certain types—albeit subtle and often unrecognized.

A downside of metaphorical "explanation"—which Barclay does not address—is that the heart of metaphor is explaining one thing in terms of another thing. Ultimately, this involves an explanation of *x* in terms of what *x* is not. Whereas this provides certain feelings of understanding, the metaphorical approach loses the unique features of what is

to be understood, in the service of an explanation in terms of something else that does not possess those unique features. Important aspects of the value, meaning, and nature of the unique case are neglected in such explanations.

I found the writing in this chapter to be abstract and difficult, at times, with minimal help from what could have been clarifying examples. The chapter did, however, serve to trigger thoughts that may be valuable far outside the immediate domain of narrative and dissociation that was being addressed. Metaphors can supply a particular type of understanding or explanation. Beyond this, it is possible to begin *acting* on the basis of one's metaphors. Such actions can deepen the reality of the metaphor. Depending upon the nature of the metaphors and the nature of the prompted actions, such acting out of metaphors can be adaptive or dangerous. Further, like narratives themselves, metaphors can be changed, with resulting positive or negative consequences.

Susan Marie Powers provides a penultimate chapter on dissociative narratives and veracity. Powers points to different forms of "truth." Historical or veridical truth is the form that is typically privileged—by ourselves in our everyday interactions with the world and with others, by the clinical psychology perspective, by those engaged in legal or forensic work, and by parapsychologists in our continuing quest for "proofs" of the psi processes we investigate. However, the self-perceived "truths" of narratives and of experiences that must be expressed in metaphorical words or other words (even if they fit poorly or not at all) in order to be communicated to others—these, too, can have profound impacts as great as—or greater than—the historical truths that may or may under underlie such narratives. Hermeneutical approaches can be helpful in exploring the insights that may be latent within even the most outrageous narratives.

Powers discusses the roles of others in the co-construction of narratives. She gives excerpts of a therapy transcript that indicates how therapists can exceed the bounds of helpful co-construction of narratives and actually implant ideas, interpretations, and false memories into vulnerable patients. Here, "cautious coconstruction [can become]

irresponsible contamination" (p. 331). Powers continues to supply views on possible ways in which narratives are formed, as well as useful thoughts on possible side effects and aftereffects of narratives.

The chapter contains what to this reviewer are two especially profound statements regarding narratives. The first is a quote from Donald Spence:

> [For the patient] language is particularly ill-suited to the task of describing visual stimuli; and how often the need to express an idea or scene in words takes precedence over the need to be truthful. What is sayable may preempt what is really remembered . . . . The patient may be lulled by the demand to be verbal in place of being accurate. (Spence, 1982, p. 280)

The second quote is from Powers herself:

> As the patients struggle to articulate important ideas or recollections, they may find that descriptions of emotions and sensations prove to be inadequate. Yet, the truth of an experience could be approximated by telling of a story, perhaps a fantastic story of a poorly understood trauma. Dissociative narratives then may be vehicles conveying extraordinarily upsetting experiences certain persons may have undergone. (p. 332)

If the context is expanded to include not only upsetting or traumatic experiences, but unusual experiences of any kind, I feel these comments can be usefully taken to heart by anyone studying spontaneous psychical experiences, laboratory-facilitated psi experiences, or other forms of exceptional human experiences. We may profit from being willing to seek and recognize the languages of the experiences themselves, rather than demand that those experiences speak an only somewhat appropriate language of our own that does not remain sufficiently faithful to the experience or adequately express its essential core.

In the book's final chapter, Stanley Krippner discusses "The Varieties of Dissociative Experience"—the title suggested, perhaps, by William James' classic *The*

Varieties of Religious Experience. Krippner reprises his three-part model of dissociation, described in the book's first chapter. The chapter emphasizes the great variety of forms that dissociation may take—in its various manifestations, in the ways these forms are expected or not or valued or not in different cultures, in how different cultures do or do not provide sanctioned ways of expressing dissociation, and in how the forms may be adaptive or maladaptive.

Krippner points out that Western psychology and psychiatry take the integrated self for granted and, therefore, treat dissociation as a pathological condition to be overcome. He reminds us that struggles for such an integrated identity are not as necessary "in societies where personal identify is more closely associated with that of the group, and where alternative identities are encouraged for spiritual, artistic, or ceremonial purposes. In these instances, alternative identities often enhance the individual and his or her social group" (p. 338). There follow sections that present some of the instances in which dissociation may be adaptive—certainly in other cultures wherein the individual self and its integration are not as privileged as they are in our own culture, but even in many cases within our culture. Dissociation need not be uncontrolled or dysfunctional. Other chapters within this work, as well as many observations not treated in this book, point to the deliberate fostering of various forms of dissociation, and many forms of dissociation—whether deliberate or spontaneous—may take the form of exceptional, rather than pathological, human experience. Krippner suggests that the widespread prevalence of dissociation is, itself, evidence for its survival value, and he mentions several ways in which such adaptive functions may be served.

In a section on diagnosis, Krippner reminds us of the dangers of imposing our own Western culture-bound interpretations and nomenclature upon forms of "dissociation" in other cultures that may or may not be the same things observed here, and certainly may not be interpreted or valued in similar ways. It is important that "diagnoses" reflect the experiences and views of other cultures, and reflect the larger

contexts in which the experiences occur. In this, cultural psychology—which would honor cultural differences as well as commonalities—would have much to offer, in helping us appreciate a great variety of dissociative experiences—both inside and outside of our own culture—on their own terms.

Following sections on psychotherapeutic implications, on the values of schemas, personal myths, and mythic narratives, and on the value of dissociation as a way of revealing and fostering our human potentials in greater ways, Krippner ends his chapter with this challenge, which serves as a fitting conclusion for both the chapter and the book:

> Now is the time for the wisdom of imagination, intuition, fantasy, visions, dreams, and other properties of life-potentiating dissociative experience to join intellect and reason in constructing cooperative and collaborative lifestyles for a pluralistic world. (p. 356)

The book, as a whole, hints at the great variety of dissociative experiences, their possible functions, and their challenges. The book's title—which echoes the title of a book by J. M. Glass, *Shattered Selves: Multiple Personality in a Postmodern World*—is, for this reviewer at least, unfortunate. *Broken images, broken selves* seems to have a negative valence. To me, broken implies something that was once intact, and it may imply a departure from an alternative "unbroken" condition or state that is normatively "good." The book's title and its cover illustration (featuring a small child in a bottom compartment of a wardrobe, amidst items of clothing in other compartments—all done in a faded, purple monochrome) certainly do not convey a positive feeling. With the exception of the chapters by Michael Grosso and by Rhea White, sections of Krippner's own chapters, and other mentions here and there, most of the book chapters dwell on the dysfunctional aspects of dissociation, deemphasizing the possible positive and healing aspects of these experiences. Referring to a section of T. S. Eliot's *The Waste Land*

mentioned in the book's Introduction [". . . for you know only / a heap of broken images . . ."], the editors state:

> Dissociation not only resembles the "handful of dust" and "stony rubbish" written about by Eliot; in some times and places it enhances rather than reduces the human condition, just as some "branches grow" from the wasted land following a rain the "restores life" to the parched earth. (p. x)

Although the editors and many of the contributors allude to the life-potentiating possibilities of dissociation, the "default mode" of many of the chapters tends toward the maladaptive aspects of dissociation and toward the value of integration of the diversity of aspects within us. Perhaps if *differentiation* of our qualities and characteristics were emphasized, rather than the *dissociation* of these same qualities, there would not be as great a tendency to think of them as broken pieces in need of reassembly or melding. Differentiation need not imply dissociation, and dissociation need not suggest pathology.

Technically, I found the organization and layout of the book to be good. To me, the index was sketchy and was not particularly helpful as I tried to re-locate certain topics. The copyediting of some of the chapters was not as careful as it could have been.

I did not gain any special or especially profound insights from reading this book. It did, however, provide a broad and useful survey of the territory of dissociation, some views of dissociation other than the usual culture-bound and pathology-driven ones, and the individual chapters provided rich sets of references that promise to be helpful in more thorough scrutinies of this particular terrain. We can be indebted to the editors for providing this useful service.

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