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**Śrī Vedānta-sūtra.**

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Śrī Vedānta-sūtra

Adhyāya 2: No Conflict Between Vedānta and Other Vedic Scriptures

Pāda 1: Refutation of Opposing Views

duryuktika-drona-jaya-viṣatāṁ
pariśitaṁ yah sphaṭam uttarāśrayam
sudarśanena śruti-maulim avyathāṁ vyadhāt
sa kṛṣṇah prabhur astu me gatiḥ

“May Lord Śrī Kṛṣṇa, who protected His devotee Mahārāja Pārīkṣit the son of Abhimanyu in the womb of his mother Uttarā from the burning arrows of the son of Droṇa with His Sudarśana disc, be my refuge and goal.”

The First Adhyāya established that the texts of the Vedas in general, and Vedānta-sūtra in particular, teach that the Supreme Brahman, the Lord of all, is the chief objective of human life; that He is the material and operative cause of everything; that He has His own individuality, distinct from everything and everyone else; that He is the inner Self of all existence and beings; that He is free from all imperfections; that He possesses infinite inconceivable powers and a measureless abundance of auspicious transcendental qualities. This was proved by the samanvaya or harmonious contextual interpretation of the texts of Vedānta-sūtra.

This Second Adhyāya will prove elaborately that all theories attempting to establish a material cause, such as pradhāna, for the creation of the universe, are incorrect; it will show that the conflicts between the Smṛti-śāstra and such theories are due to the fallacious reasoning of those theories, and that the views of the Vedānta texts are the only possible correct view. Specifically, this Adhyāya will disprove the speculative Sāṅkhya theories of the atheistic Kapila, and others such as the various Buddhist schools; but these arguments also disprove all materialistic theories of creation, such as the theories of modern materialistic science.

Most people do not subject their beliefs to the stringent test of reason. They simply are taught a certain opinion in school, and they accept this opinion, wrongly accepting it as knowledge. Thus if you inquire, they will say that “The universe was created in the Big Bang,” but they cannot explain or defend this theory because it is not really knowledge, just an opinion that they were taught, and blindly accepted without any real understanding. Similarly, if we simply take Śrīla Vyāsadeva’s word for it that these theories are wrong, then all we have done is exchange one shallow opinion for another. We still cannot explain why we accept one theory and not another; nor do we have the power to change others’ thinking, because our so-called knowledge is merely a belief. Therefore first we must penetrate to the essence of the misunderstanding inherent in the materialistic theories, and then we will be in a position to understand the real truth.

The basic flaw in all these systems is the false assumption that matter can create or act independently. Matter is inert; it can do nothing on its own. The dynamic material creation that we observe requires not only the inert material ingredients, but also an injection of energy and intelligence. The energy animates the dull matter, filling it with light and motion, and the intelligence takes the form of the universal laws that govern matter’s behavior. This energy and intelligence must come from a source outside of the material continuum, and that source can only be the Supreme Personality of Godhead in the spiritual world. Lord Kṛṣṇa states in Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam:
aham evāsam evāgre
nānyad yat sad-asat param
paścād ahaṁ yad etac ca
yo 'vaśisyeta so 'smy aham

“Brahmā, it is I, the Personality of Godhead, who was existing before the creation, when there was nothing but Myself. Nor was there the material nature, the cause of this creation. That [material creation] which you see now is also I, the Personality of Godhead, and after annihilation what remains will also be I, the Personality of Godhead.” [Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 2.9.33]

The material nature or pradhāna [the unmanifested total material elements] is nothing but a transformation of the cosmic root substance Brahman. Brahman is completely spiritual, therefore before the Lord manifests the material creation, only Brahman and the spiritual world exist. At the time of creation, the Supreme Personality of Godhead allocates a portion of His eternal spiritual energy and transforms it into the pradhāna; but being material, pradhāna cannot do anything until He specifically animates it by His glance. This injection of the Lord’s potent creative energy animates the material elements by the force of time, setting the cosmos into motion. He also creates the rules of material interactions, the laws of nature that underlie all material transformations, with His perfect intelligence. Then He enters into His creation and superintends its operation from a hidden position within.

The Lord provides the material creation as facility for those souls who, due to the exercise of their God-given free will, do not wish to live in the spiritual world. The presence of the Lord is directly manifest everywhere in the spiritual world, but the conditioned living entities do not want His personal association: they want to enjoy His facilities without Him. This spirit of independence leads them to become offensive to the Lord and His eternal devotees, so such conditioned souls are sent to the material world for their life of so-called independent enjoyment. But actually all the facility for their so-called independent life is created by the Lord, and out of His perfect, unconditional love, He remains their constant companion, hidden within their hearts as Paramātmā, the Supersoul.

Naturally the rebellious conditioned souls are motivated to explain the creation without reference to the energy or will of the Lord, but all their atheistic theories suffer from the same flaw: they attribute to matter energy and intelligence that it does not possess. Actually matter becomes animated only in association with life, or the soul; the proof of this is that as soon as the soul leaves the material body, it immediately becomes inert and begins to disintegrate. Therefore the universe, as the cosmic body of the Supreme Personality of Godhead, displays energy and activity only because of His presence; when He withdraws His energy there is devastation, and the whole creation comes to an end [pralaya]. He is therefore the soul of the entire creation.

The importance of this topic in the process of self-realization is that as long as we remain under the illusion that matter can create independently, we cannot appreciate the presence of the Lord within the material creation. Understanding the falsity of these atheistic theories, and that the dynamic cosmos that we observe all around us is possible only by the energy and intelligence of the Lord, is an important early step on the path of spiritual awakening. Having been thoroughly convinced of this point, one becomes qualified to engage in the process of devotional service [bhakti-yoga] discussed in the Third Adhyāya, and experience its unequalled benefits as described in the Fourth Adhyāya of Śrī Vedānta-sūtra.
Adhikaraṇa 1: Vedānta Rejects the Sāṅkhya doctrine

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: First the author of the sūtras proves that atheistic Sāṅkhya is opposed to the Vedic texts, and removes the doubt that the views of Vedānta-sūtra contradict the Vedic texts that Kapila uses to establish the Sāṅkhya theory. It will be shown that that Kapila’s philosophy is not supported by the very Vedic texts he uses to establish it.

The atheistic Sāṅkhya philosopher Kapila has explained the different elementary truths given in the Vedas according to his own opinion. According to him, material nature consists of pradhāna, the equilibrium of the three material qualities: goodness, passion and ignorance. Material nature produces the material energy, known as the mahat-tattva, and mahat produces the false ego. The ego produces the five objects of sense perception, which produce the ten senses [five for acquiring knowledge and five for working], the mind and the five gross elements [space, air, fire, water and earth]. Counting the puruṣa, the soul or the enjoyer, with these twenty-four elements, there are twenty-five different tattvas [fundamental ontological categories]. The unmanifested stage of these twenty-five ontological truths is called pradhāna, and the manifested stage is called prakṛti, or material nature. The qualities of material nature are the causes of happiness, distress and illusion. The quality of goodness is the cause of material happiness, the quality of passion is the cause of material distress, and the quality of ignorance is the cause of illusion. Our material experience lies within the boundaries of these three manifestations of happiness, distress and illusion. For example, a beautiful woman is certainly a cause of material happiness for one who possesses her as a wife, but the same beautiful woman is a cause of distress to a man whom she rejects or who is the cause of her anger, and if she leaves a man she becomes the cause of illusion.

The two kinds of senses are the ten external senses and the internal sense, the mind. Thus there are eleven senses. According to Kapila, material nature is eternal and all-powerful. Originally there is no spirit, and matter has no cause. Matter itself is the chief cause of everything. It is the all-pervading cause of all causes. The Sāṅkhya philosophy regards the total material energy [mahat-tattva], the false ego and the five objects of sense perception [sound, form, touch, taste and odor] as the seven diverse manifestations of material nature, which has two features: the material cause and efficient cause. The puruṣa [soul or enjoyer] is without transformation, whereas material nature is always subject to transformation. But although material nature is inert, it is the cause of enjoyment and salvation for many living creatures. Its activities are beyond the scope of sense perception, but still one may guess at them by superior intelligence. Material nature is one, but because of the interaction of the three qualities, it can produce the total energy and the wonderful cosmic manifestation. Such transformations divide material nature into two features, namely the efficient and material causes.

The puruṣa, the soul or enjoyer, is inactive and without material qualities, although at the same time he is the master, existing separately in each and every body as the emblem of knowledge. By understanding the material cause, one can guess that the puruṣa, the enjoyer, being without activity, is aloof from all kinds of enjoyment or superintendence. Sāṅkhya philosophy, after describing the nature of prakṛti [material nature] and puruṣa [the enjoyer], asserts that the creation is only a product of their combination or proximity to one another. The living symptoms are visible in material nature because of this proximity, but one can guess that in the person of the enjoyer, the puruṣa, there are powers of control and enjoyment. When the puruṣa is in illusion because of lack of sufficient knowledge, he feels himself to be the enjoyer, and when he is in full knowledge he is liberated. The liberated puruṣa is described in the Sāṅkhya philosophy to be always indifferent to the activities of prakṛti.

The Sāṅkhya philosopher accepts three kinds of evidence: direct perception, hypothesis and traditional authority. When such evidence is complete, everything is perfect. The process of comparison is within
such perfection. Beyond such evidence there is no proof. The Sāṅkhya system of philosophy identifies three kinds of procedures—namely, parināmāt (transformation), samanvayāt (adjustment) and śaktitah (performance of energies)—as the causes of the cosmic manifestation.

Vedānta-sūtra nullifies the Sāṅkhya conclusion because it proves that the actual cause of creation is Brahman, not pradhāna. Discrediting pradhāna as the cause of the cosmic manifestation nullifies the entire Sāṅkhya philosophy. Materialistic philosophers accept matter to be the material and efficient cause of creation; for them, matter is the cause of every type of manifestation. Generally they give the example of a waterpot and clay. Clay is the cause of the waterpot, but the clay can be found as both cause and effect. The waterpot is the effect and clay is the cause, but the pot is nothing but clay. A tree is matter, but a tree produces fruit. Water is matter, but water flows. In this way, say the Sāṅkhyas, matter is the cause of movements and production. As such, matter can be considered the material and efficient cause of everything in the cosmic manifestation.

But matter is inert, therefore it cannot act as the material or efficient cause of creation. The wonderful arrangement and management of the cosmic manifestation means that a living intelligence is behind it, for such an arrangement could not exist without a sentient designer. It is impossible for any complex arrangement to exist without conscious direction. In our practical experience we never see that inert bricks can construct a big building themselves. The example of the waterpot cannot be accepted because a waterpot has no perception of pleasure and distress. Consciousness and the perception of pleasure and pain are within every living entity. Therefore symbolizing the covering body by the empty waterpot is not an acceptable analogy.

Sometimes the material scientists suggest that trees grow from the earth without the assistance of a gardener, because that is a tendency of matter. They also consider the intuition of living creatures from birth to be material. But tendencies like bodily intuition cannot be accepted as independent, for they require the existence of a spirit soul within the body. Actually, neither the tree nor any other body of a living creature has any independent tendency or intuition; the tendency and intuition exist because the soul is present within the body. As soon as the soul leaves the body, all action and intelligence cease. For example, a car has a tendency to move and turn right or left, but the car does not move or turn without the direction of a driver. A material car has neither tendencies nor intuitions independent of the intentions of the living driver within the car. The same principle applies to the automatic growth of trees in the forest. The growth takes place because of the souls present within the trees. As soon as the souls leave, the trees fall to the ground and do not reproduce further.

Sometimes foolish people take it for granted that because scorpions appear in bags of rice or flies appear in heaps of garbage, the rice has produced the scorpions or the garbage has produced the flies. But just because the scorpions and flies appear there, it does not mean that the rice gives birth to the scorpions, or the garbage creates the flies. The real fact is that the mother scorpion lays eggs within the rice, and by the proper fermentation of the rice the eggs give birth to baby scorpions, which come out in due course. Similarly the flies lay their eggs in the garbage, and as it rots it feeds the larvae of the flies. Different living creatures appear in different places, but one should not conclude that matter produces such living creatures. Thus the theory cited by the materialists that trees automatically come from the earth’s natural tendency is to produce trees is incorrect.

According to the Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad, every living being is forced by divine superintendence to take a certain type of body according to his past deeds. There are many varieties of bodies, and a living entity takes bodies of different shapes because of divine arrangement. When a person thinks “I am doing this,” the ‘I am’ does not refer to the body. It refers to something more than the body, or the soul within the body. The material body has neither tendencies nor intuition by itself; the tendencies and
intuition belong to the living soul within the body. Material scientists sometimes suggest that the tendencies of male and female bodies cause their union, and that this is the cause of the birth of the child. But since according to Sāṃkhya philosophy, the puruṣa is always unaffected, where does the tendency to give birth come from? Life manifests and growth happens only in the presence of the soul, otherwise matter remains inert.

Sometimes the Sāṃkhyas give the example that milk turns into curd automatically, and that distilled water pouring from the clouds falls down to earth, producing different kinds of trees, and enters different kinds of flowers and fruits with different fragrances and tastes. Therefore, they say, matter produces varieties of material things on its own. But the same proposition of the Brhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad—that different kinds of living creatures are put into different kinds of bodies by the management of a superior power—also rebuts this argument. Under the superintendence of spiritual authority, various souls are given the chance to take a particular type of body, such as that of a tree, animal, bird or beast, according to their past activities, and thus their different tendencies develop under these circumstances. The Bhagavad-gītā [13.22] also further affirms:

\[
\begin{align*}
puruṣah \text{ prakṛti-stho hi} \\
bhunkte \text{ prakṛti-jān gunān} \\
kāraṇah \text{ guṇa-saṅgo 'syā} \\
sad-asad-yoni-janmasu
\end{align*}
\]

“The living entity in material nature thus follows the ways of life, enjoying the three modes of nature. This is due to his association with that material nature. Thus he meets with good and evil among various species.”

The soul is given different types of bodies according to his karma. For example, were souls not given varieties of tree bodies, the different varieties of fruits and flowers could not be produced. There is distinction among the different species of trees. Each kind of tree produces a particular kind of fruit and flower; an individual tree does not produce flowers of different colors or fruits of different tastes. We can observe classes demarcated among humans, animals, birds and other species. There are innumerable living entities, and their qualities and activities according to the three material modes of nature give them the chance to have different kinds of experiences, as required by their previous activities.

Thus one should understand that pradhāna, being dull matter, cannot create the material world unless impelled by a spiritual living entity. The materialistic theory that matter acts independently cannot be accepted. Matter is called prakṛti, which refers to female energy. A woman is prakṛti, a female. A female cannot produce a child without the association of a puruṣa, a man. The puruṣa causes the birth of a child because the man injects the soul, which is sheltered in the semen, into the womb of the woman. The woman supplies the body of the soul as the material cause, and as the efficient cause she gives birth to the child; but the puruṣa, the male, is the original cause of the child. Similarly, this material world gives rise to varieties of manifestations due to the entrance of Garbhodakaśāyī Viṣṇu within the universe. He is present not only within the universe but within the bodies of all living creatures, as well as within the atom. We understand from the Brahma-saṁhitā that the Supersoul is present within the universe, within the atom and within the heart of every living creature. Therefore the atheistic theory that matter is the cause of the entire cosmic manifestation cannot be accepted by anyone with sufficient knowledge of matter and spirit.

Materialists sometimes give the argument that as straw eaten by a cow produces milk automatically, so material nature automatically produces varieties of manifestations under different circumstances. Thus matter is the original cause. To refute this argument, we may say that an animal of the same species as
the cow—namely, the bull—also eats straw like the cow, but does not produce milk. Under the circumstances, it cannot be said that straw in connection with a particular species produces milk. The conclusion should be that there is superior management, as confirmed in the Bhagavad-gītā [9.10], where the Lord says,

\[ mayādhyaśeṇa prakṛtiḥ sūyate sa-carācaram \]

“This material nature is producing all moving and unmoving beings under My direction.”

The Supreme Lord says mayādhyaśena: “Under My superintendence.” When He desires that the cow produce milk by eating straw, there is milk; and when He does not so desire it, the mixture of such straw cannot produce milk. If the way of material nature had been that straw produced milk, a stack of straw could also produce milk. But that is not possible. And the same straw given to a human female also cannot produce milk. That is the meaning of the Bhagavad-gītā’s statement that everything takes place only under the superior orders of the will of the Lord. Matter itself has no power to produce independently. The conclusion, therefore, is that insentient matter cannot be the cause of the material creation. The ultimate creator is the Supreme Personality of Godhead.

If matter were accepted as the original cause of creation, all the authorized scriptures in the world would be useless; for in every scripture, especially the Vedic scriptures like the Manu-smṛti, the Supreme Personality of Godhead is said to be the ultimate creator. The Manu-smṛti is considered the highest Vedic direction to humanity. Manu is the lawgiver to mankind, and in the Manu-smṛti it is clearly stated that before the creation the entire universal space was darkness, without information and without variety, and was in a state of complete suspension. Everything was darkness. The Supreme Personality of Godhead then entered the universal space, and although He is invisible, He created the visible cosmic manifestation. In the material world the Supreme Personality of Godhead is not manifested by His personal presence, but the presence of the cosmic manifestation in different varieties is the proof that everything has been created under His direction. He entered the universe with all creative potencies, and thus He removed the darkness of the unlimited space.

Saṁśaya [arise of doubt]: Is the view established in the First Adhyāya, that Brahman is the sole cause of the material universe, contradicted by the Sāṅkhya-smṛti?

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: If Brahman is the sole cause of the material universe, then what about those Vedic texts that establish the Sāṅkhya view that pradhāna [the unmanifested total material elements] is the material cause of the universe? According to the Vedānta texts, the Sāṅkhya-smṛti would have to be rejected. Kapila, the author of Sāṅkhya, is called a rṣi [great sage] in the following text of the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad [5.2]:

“It is the one who superintends every cause, all forms and all germs; who sustains with knowledge the Rṣi Kapila, the first born, and who saw him born.”

This sage Kapila is thus an authoritative person, because the Śruti itself calls him “Rṣi Kapila.” Kapila acknowledges the validity of fire sacrifices and other practices taught in the karma-kaṇḍa, and thus is not a heretical scoffer. He has composed the saṅkhya-smṛti as part of the jñāna-kaṇḍa to teach the nature and means of attaining liberation to those who desire it. The first sūtra of his system is:

“The highest goal for human beings is the complete cessation of the threefold miseries.”

In another aphorism he says:

“The cessation of suffering is not possible by material means, because the relief afforded by them is only temporary, and there is recurrence of pain.”
In this system the insentient pradhāna is the independent cause of the creation; pradhāna generates the creation to give the conditioned jīvas an opportunity for liberation, or for her own sake. Though insentient, pradhāna creates the world, just as insentient milk turns into curd by its own accord. If Brahmān is the sole cause of the creation, as Vedānta philosophy asserts, then there will be no scope for the Sāṅkhya philosophy. It will be invalidated, because it is entirely devoted to setting out a theoretical truth and not a practical duty, and if it is not accepted as a valid theory, it will find no use whatsoever. Therefore the texts of Vedānta should be interpreted in such way as not to contradict Kapila, who is a great authority. If we interpret the Vedānta texts in conformity with Sāṅkhya, it is not that Manu-smṛti and similar works would be contradicted. Actually there is no harm if Manu-smṛti and similar works would be contradicted on theoretical grounds, for such contradictions would not make such works useless. For Manu and similar works instruct in practical religious duties and are authoritative in the practices of karma-kaṇḍa, and thus will have a scope of their own. The Sāṅkhya-smṛti, however, is purely theoretical.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: The author replies to this objection with the following sūtra:

Sūtra 2.1.1

\[
\text{sṛtyanavakāśadosaprasaṅga iti cet na anyasmṛtyanavakāśadosaprasaṅgā}
\]

\[
\text{sṛti – the Kapila-smṛti philosophy; anavakāśa – want of application, redundancy; doṣa – fault;}
\]

\[
\text{prasaṅgāḥ – result; iti – thus; cet – if; na – not; anya – other; sṛti – the smṛti; anavakāśa –}
\]

\[
\text{non-scope or redundancy; doṣa – fault; prasaṅgāt – because of the result.}
\]

[If it is objected that the Kapila]-smṛti will find no scope [under Vedāntic interpretation] we say no; because [under Sāṅkhya interpretation] there would result the fault of want of scope for other smṛtis [like that of Manu, etc.]

The word anavakāśa means lack of scope; in other words, having no area of application and becoming totally useless. The Sāṅkhya’s objection to the Vedānta texts explaining, by force of samanvaya, the teaching that Brahmān is the sole cause of the universe is that the Sāṅkhya-smṛti does not find any scope under that interpretation; therefore, the Sāṅkhya philosophers desire the Vedāntic texts to be explained in a way opposite to their direct meaning. This objection is raised in the first part of the sūtra [sṛtyanavakāśadosaprasaṅga].

The objection is answered in the second part of the sūtra, which says anyasmṛtyanavakāśadosaprasaṅgāt: “Let it be so that the Sāṅkhya-smṛti finds no scope, for otherwise other smṛtis, such as Manu and the rest, that also declare Brahmān to be the universal cause and are in harmony with the teachings of Vedānta, would become useless.” Thus there is a choice of two evils: should the texts of Vedānta be interpreted in a distorted way to give scope to the Sāṅkhya-smṛti, or should they be interpreted in a natural way to give scope to Manu and the rest? Certainly the greater evil is to deny scope to Manu and the other smṛtis. Manu-smṛti and others like it establish that the Lord is the cause of the creation, sustenance and dissolution of the universe, and that the atheistic creation theory of Kapila is incorrect. Thus Manu-smṛti [1.5] says:

“This universe existed in the form of darkness, unperceived, destitute of distinctive marks, unattainable by reasoning, unknowable, as though it were immersed in deep sleep. Then the divine Self-existent, Svayambhū the Self-born, Himself indiscernible, but making all this—the great elements and the rest—discernible, appeared with irresistible creative power, dispelling the darkness. He who can be perceived only with the internal organ [of consciousness], who is subtle, indiscernible and eternal, who contains all created beings and is inconceivable, shone
forth of His own will. He, desiring to produce beings of many kinds from His own body, first
created the waters by His thought, and placed His seed in them. That seed became a golden egg,
equal to the sun in brilliance; in that egg He Himself was born as Brahmā, the progenitor of the
whole world.”

Similarly Parāśara says in Viṣṇu-Purāṇa:

“From Lord Viṣṇu sprang the world, and in Him it abides; He makes this world persist and He
rules it. He is the world. As a spider draws out the web from his abdomen, and again draws it
into his body, similarly the world is emitted from the body of the Lord and merges back into
Him.”

There are other smṛtis with the same purport. These find no scope in the karma-kāṇḍa section of the
Vedas, for they do not teach a particular course of action but are concerned with theoretical truth alone.
They are taught for the sake of jñāna, with the object of purifying the mind of the conditioned soul so
that knowledge of Brahmān may arise therein. Sometimes impersonalists claim that philosophical
speculations are meant for the advancement of knowledge free from the limitations of religious
ritualistic principles. But the religious ritualistic principles are actually meant for the advancement of
spiritual knowledge by accrual of pious activities. By performance of religious rituals one ultimately
reaches the supreme goal of knowledge by understanding that Vāsudeva, the Supreme Personality of
Godhead, is the cause of everything. It is clearly stated in the Bhagavad-gītā that even those who are
advocates of knowledge alone, without any religious ritualistic processes, advance in knowledge after
many, many lifetimes of speculation and thus come to the conclusion that Vāsudeva is the supreme
cause of everything that be.

 bahūnāṁ janmanāṁ ante
jñānāvān māṁ prapadyate
vāsudevaḥ sarvam iti
sa mahātmā su-durlabhah

“After many births and deaths, he who is actually in knowledge surrenders unto Me, knowing
Me to be the cause of all causes and all that is. Such a great soul is very rare.” [Bhagavad-gītā
7.19]

As a result of this God consciousness, the goal of human life, an advanced learned scholar or
philosopher surrenders unto the Supreme Personality of Godhead and achieves perfection. The
ritualistic religious performances and spiritual practices given in the Vedas are meant to cleanse the
mind of material contamination, and the special feature of this Age of Kali is that one can execute the
process of cleansing the mind of contamination simply by chanting the holy names of God. All abstract
science and philosophy are of no practical use, except insofar as they promote the general development
of intelligence and mental culture. The following text from the śruti shows that purification of the mind
is the object of the jñāna-kāṇḍa:

“...brāhmaṇas try to know Him through study of the Vedas, by sacrifice, by alms, by austerity
and by fasting.”

No doubt in some cases we would find that the performance of these things leads to results like rainfall,
begetting sons, attainment of heaven etc., but that is only a byproduct that arises occasionally. The
actual aim of scriptural study and spiritual practices is to produce faith in the conclusions of the
scriptures, and the higher aim is to attain direct transcendental knowledge and realization of Brahmān.
In fact the entire Vedic literature has this aim:
sarve veda yat padam aham anti

“Whose form and essential nature all the Vedas declare, and in order to attain Him they
prescribe austerities, desiring to know Him the great ones perform brahmācārya, that symbol I
will briefly tell you: it is om.” [Katha Upanisad 1.3.15]

nārāyaṇa-parā vedaḥ

“All the Vedas declare Nārāyaṇa alone.”

Therefore, the main purpose of understanding the Vedas, performing Vedic sacrifices and speculating
on the Vedānta-sūtra is to understand Kṛṣṇa. Accepting the impersonalist view of voidness or the
nonexistence of the Supreme Personality of Godhead negates all study of the Vedas. Impersonal
speculation aims at disproving the conclusion of the Vedas. Therefore any impersonal speculative
presentation should be understood to be against the principles of the Vedas, or the oldest, most
voluminous and consistent standard scriptures in the world. Since the speculation of the impersonalists
does not follow the principles of the Vedas, their conclusion must be considered to be against the Vedic
principles. Anything not supported by the Vedic principles must be considered imaginary and lacking
in authority and proof. Therefore no impersonalist explanation or materialistic interpretation of any
Vedic literature can be accepted.

Since our opponent raises his objection on the strength of Kapila’s Smṛti, then we shall refute him by
his own argument; namely, by the strength of other Vedic Smṛtis such as Manu, etc. For if the argument
of the objector has any force, it is that scope should be given to the Smṛtis, and the Vedānta should be
interpreted in such a way as to accommodate them. Taking our stand on this proposition of our
opponent, we conclude that we must explain the Vedānta so as to give scope to the largest number of
Smṛtis, such as Manu and the rest. We cannot interpret the meaning of the Vedānta texts by means of
the Sāṅkhya-smṛti of Kapila, because then we would have to accept an extremely undesirable
conclusion: that all the other Smṛtis are without authority. This would establish a conclusion opposed to
the unity of the sacred scriptures, the most fundamental principle of the Vedic literature. For accepting
a certain text to settle the meaning of another would show clearly the whole direction and intent of the
scriptures as a whole. The Sāṅkhya-smṛti does not possess this authority, because its conclusion is
contrary to the conclusion of the Vedas as a whole. Actually this determining role belongs to the
Vedānta-sūtra and its natural commentary Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam alone, for they are the mature verdict of
Kṛṣṇa-dvaiśāya Vyāsa, the authoritative compiler of the most important Vedic literatures. First he
divided the Vedas into four, then he explained them in the Purāṇas, and for less capable people he
wrote the Mahābhārata. In the Mahābhārata there is given the Bhagavad-gītā, the best-known and
most beloved Vedic scripture. Then all Vedic literature is summarized in the Vedānta-sūtra, and for
future guidance he gave its natural commentary, Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam.

tataḥ saptadaśe jātaḥ
satya-vatāṁ parāsārāt
cakre veda-taroḥ sākhaḥ
drṣṭvā punso 'lpa-medhasaḥ

“Thereafter, in the seventeenth incarnation of Godhead, Śrī Vyāsadeva appeared in the womb of
Satyavaflows through Parāśara Muni, and he divided the one Veda into several branches and sub-
branches, seeing that the people in general were less intelligent.” [Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 1.3.21]

Thus the Sāṅkhya-smṛti is merely the product of an individual’s mental concoction, and not the product
of an actual spiritual authority. So we do not fear the contingency that the Sāṅkhya-smṛti would find no
scope in the Vedānta. Let the Sāṅkhya-smṛti be totally discarded, when by doing so we save the
numerous other smṛtis that follow the conclusions of Vedānta. It would be improper to show undue preference to the Sāṅkhya-smṛti merely on the strength of its being composed by an authoritative person. If we did, we would have to accept many conflicting smṛtis by those who are considered authorities, such as those of Gautama. But these authors have given theories about the world, the soul and God that are in conflict with the conclusions of the Vedas. Thus we would be put into the absurd position of accepting contradictory theories simply on the strength of someone saying that their authors were persons of reliability, honesty and authority. The result of following that path is that we would never be able to reach any firm conclusion or know the real truth.

It is a well-known principle in Vedic philosophy that in case of conflict between two smṛtis, one should follow the one that agrees with the conclusions of the Vedas, and reject the other. If one tries to nullify the conclusions of the Vedas by accepting an unauthorized so-called scripture, it will be impossible for him to come to the right conclusion about the Absolute Truth. The system for adjusting two contradictory scriptures is to refer to the Vedas, for references from the Vedas are accepted as final judgments. When we refer to a particular scripture, it must be authorized, and to possess this authority it must strictly follow the Vedic injunctions. If someone presents an alternative doctrine he himself has manufactured, that doctrine will prove itself useless, for any doctrine that tries to prove that Vedic evidence is meaningless immediately proves itself meaningless, for the Vedas are the oldest scriptures and the primary spiritual authority.

The atheist Kapila is a descendant of the dynasty of Agni and is one of the conditioned souls. There are many statements directly against the Vedic principles in the doctrine of the atheist Kapila. He does not accept the Supreme Personality of Godhead; he says that the living entity is himself the Supreme Lord and that no one is greater than him; his conceptions of so-called conditioned and liberated life are materialistic, and he refuses to accept the importance of immortal time. All such statements are against the principles of the Vedānta-sūtra. Therefore the atheistic Kapila is an impostor.

The actual Kapila who is the son of Kardama Muni is accepted as an incarnation of Vāsudeva. The Padma Purāṇa gives evidence that the Supreme Personality of Godhead Vāsudeva takes birth in the incarnation of Kapila and, by His expansion of theistic Sāṅkhya philosophy, teaches all the demigods and a brāhmaṇa of the name Āsuri. The followers of the Vedas unanimously accept the authority of Manu and Parāśara in the disciplic succession. Their statements do not support the atheistic Kapila, because the Kapila mentioned in the Vedas is a different Kapila, the son of Kardama and Devahūti.

Regarding the objection that the author of the Sāṅkhya-smṛti is spoken of respectfully in the Śruti itself, in the famous passage of Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad [5.2], we reply that the pūvapaksin has not properly understood that verse. It does not refer to Kapila, the founder of atheistic Sāṅkhya, but to a different person altogether. The śloka really means:

“He who before the creation of the world produced the sage Kapila [namely, the golden-colored Brahmā], in order to maintain the universe and who sustains this Brahmā with knowledge of the past, present and future, we worship that Lord God.”

The word kapila here means golden-colored, and is another name of Hiranyagarbha Brahmā, referred to in śloka 3.4 of the same Upaniṣad:

“May Rudra, the lord of all, the omniscient, who is the cause of the birth and power of the demigods, who begot Hiranyagarbha at the beginning, grant us good understanding.”

That this golden-colored first-born is Brahmā we learn from śloka 4.12 of the Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad. Thus the Upaniṣad’s reference to Kapila indicates another being altogether; it does not refer to the founder of the atheistic science, for he misinterpreted the meaning of the Śruti. Therefore if the
impostor Kapila is denied respect as an authoritative person, that does not show any disrespect to the Śruti. On the other hand, the authority of Manu is stated in unambiguous language in the Taittirīya Brahmana, where it is said: “Whatever Manu has declared is a panacea.”

Similarly, Śrī Parāśara is mentioned in the Viṣṇu Purāṇa to have obtained knowledge of the transcendental worlds and of the true nature of the devatās through the blessings of Pulastya and Vaśiṣṭha. Thus both Manu and Parāśara are undoubtedly āptas [great spiritual authorities], but not the atheist Kapila. The Kapila who wrote Sāṅkhya-smṛti and founded the philosophy opposed to the Vedic conclusions was a particular jīva, born in the family of Agni-varāṇa, and deluded by the mysterious power of the Lord, he propounded this false philosophy. Thus we find in the Padma Purāṇa:

“One Kapila also called Vāsudeva taught the philosophy of Sāṅkhya to the devas, Brahmā and the rest, to the rṣis beginning with Bhṛgu, as well as to Āsuri. His doctrine was full in harmony with teachings of the Vedas. There was another Kapila who also taught a Sāṅkhya philosophy, fully opposed to all the Vedic teachings, and he also had a disciple named Āsuri, who was other than the first Āsuri. His philosophy is full of bad reasoning and false arguments.”

namo 'vyāktāya sūkṣmāya
pradhāna-puruṣāya ca
catur-viṁśad-guṇa-jīnāya
guṇa-saṅkhyaṇā-hetave

“I offer my respectful obeisances unto You, the Supreme Person. Being very subtle, You are never visible to material eyes. You are the knower of the twenty-four elements, and You are the inaugurator of the sāṅkhya-yoga system.” [Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 8.16.30]

śrī-bhagavān uvāca
atha te sampravakṣyāmi
sāṅkhyaṁ pārvair viṁścitam
yad viṁśaḥ pumān sadyo
jāhyād vaikalpikaṁ bhramam

Lord Śrī Kṛṣṇa said: “Now I shall describe to you the science of Sāṅkhya, which has been perfectly established by ancient authorities. By understanding this science a person can immediately give up the illusion of material duality.” [Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 11.24.1]

Therefore there is no fault if the Sāṅkhya-smṛti of the atheist Kapila is rejected, because it is opposed to the Vedas and is the work of a person who is not a spiritual authority.

Sūtra 2.1.2

itaresāccānupalabdheḥ
itaresāṁ – of others, mainly the points raised in the Sāṅkhya philosophy; ca – and;
anupalabdheḥ – because of non-perception.

Many other [doctrines taught in the Sāṅkhya philosophy] also are not found [in the Vedas, hence this system is not authoritative.]

The atheistic Sāṅkhya is unacceptable, not only because it teaches that pradhāna is the cause of creation, but also because it teaches many other doctrines that have no foundation in the Vedas. For example it teaches that:

• the jīvas are pure consciousness and all-pervading
bondage and liberation are effects of *prakṛti* alone
there is no Supreme Brahman or personal God
time is not a *tattva*
the *prānas* are merely forms of the five senses, and have no separate existence of their own

and many other anomalous and heterodox ideas, as discussed in detail above and refuted in other *sūtras* of the *Vedānta*. Therefore the atheistic Sāṅkhya and all other similar philosophies must be rejected.

For example, the modern so-called scientific creation myths share the deficiency of Sāṅkhya that matter can create independently. If the universe was really created in a ‘Big Bang,’ then who set it off? Where did the material ingredients originate? Who determined the universal laws that led to the universe as we see it today? No materialistic or atheistic theory can answer these questions satisfactorily. The material scientists want to ascribe everything to ‘chance,’ which simply means that they have substituted chance for God. Just as no one would want to live in a house that was designed by throwing dice, no one could live in a universe designed by chance.

### Adhikaraṇa 2: Refutation of Yoga-*sūtras*

*Viṣaya* [thesis or statement]: The present *sūtra* opens a new Adhikaraṇa, since *yoga* differs from Sāṅkhya in admitting the existence of the Lord; so the doubt arose that the refutation of Sāṅkhya did not necessarily require the refutation of *yoga*. This Adhikaraṇa removes that doubt.

It would be difficult to find an ancient text that has been misinterpreted and exploited more thoroughly in the West than the *Yoga-sūtras* of Patañjali. The commercial teaching of so-called “*yoga*” is a multi-million-dollar business, yet very little of what they teach has anything to do with the original source literature on the subject. Instead of a process of self-realization and linking the individual soul with God, *yoga* is misrepresented as a means to superior materialistic pleasure through sense enjoyment. This is often portrayed as somehow ‘spiritual’; but if we inquire from such materialistic so-called *yogis* what is the precise definition of spiritual life according to *yoga* philosophy, they cannot give a satisfactory answer.

Perhaps the most egregious deception offered by the modern materialistic *yogis* is the impression that that the *yoga* system is of Vedic origin, or approved by the *Vedas*. This Adhikaraṇa will show that nothing could be further from the truth; in fact the philosophy of the eightfold *yoga* system is against the conclusions of the *Vedas*. Patañjali is merely the most famous recent exponent of the eightfold *yoga* system, which is very old, being mentioned in *Bhagavad-gītā* [4.27]:

```
sarvānīndriya-karmāni
prāṇa-karmāṇi cāpāre
ātma-saṁyama-yogāgnau
juhvati jñāna-dīpate
```

“Others, who are interested in achieving self-realization through control of the mind and senses, offer the functions of all the senses, and of the life breath, as oblations into the fire of the controlled mind.”

In the *Yoga-sūtras* of Patañjali, the soul is either *parāg-ātmā* or *pratyag-ātmā*. As long as the soul is attached to sense enjoyment he is called *parāg-ātmā*, but when the soul becomes detached from sense enjoyment he is called *pratyag-ātmā*. The soul is subjected to the functions of ten kinds of subtle air [*prāṇa-vāyu*] at work within the body, and this subtle internal air can be controlled through the
breathing system. The Patañjali system of *hatha-yoga* gives a technical procedure, *prānāyāma*, to control the functions of the *prāna-vāyu* so that its functions become favorable for purifying the soul of material attachment. The senses interact with the sense objects, like the ear for hearing, eyes for seeing, nose for smelling, tongue for tasting, hands for touching, etc. and all of them are thus engaged in activities outside the self. According to this yoga system, the ultimate goal of *pratyag-ātmā* is reached when the soul withdraws from activities in matter.

There are eight stages or limbs in the practice of Yoga:

1. *yama* [positive regulative injunctions]
2. *niyama* [negative regulative injunctions]
3. *āsana* [sitting postures]
4. *prānāyāma* [breath control]
5. *pratyāhāra* [withdrawal of the senses from their objects]
6. *dhāraṇā* [concentration of the mind]
7. *dhyāna* [meditation]
8. *samādhi* [ecstatic spiritual trance]

The *prāna-vāyu* has various functions: the *apāna-vāyu* goes downwards, *vyāna-vāyu* acts to shrink and expand, *samāna-vāyu* adjusts equilibrium, *udāna-vāyu* goes upwards—and when one is enlightened, one engages all these in searching for self-realization.

*Yoga* practice is supposed to be based on the principles of the Patañjali system. But the modern unauthorized commentators and teachers of *yoga*, if they are interested in spiritual matters at all, think that liberation means to identify the individual soul with the Supersoul. They do not understand the real purpose of the Patañjali system of *yoga*. There is acceptance of transcendental pleasure in the Patañjali system, but the monists do not want to accept this transcendental pleasure out of fear of jeopardizing the theory of oneness. The monists reject the duality of knowledge and knower necessary for the experience of transcendental pleasure, but actually transcendental pleasure, realized through transcendental senses, is accepted in this system. This is corroborated by Patañjali Muni, who declares in his *Yoga-sūtras* [4.34]:

\[
\text{puruṣārtha-śūnyānāṁ gunānāṁ pratiprasavaḥ kaivalyaṁ svarūpa-pratiśṭhā vā citi-śaktir iti}
\]

“Kaivalya is the state [of Enlightenment] when the primary elements involve, or resolve themselves back into that out of which they emerged because of their becoming devoid of the object of the Purusa. In this state the Purusa is established in his real nature [citi-śakti], wherein the power of pure consciousness becomes established in its true nature.”

The *citi-śakti* or internal potency mentioned in this *sūtra* is transcendental. *Puruṣārtha* means material religiosity, economic development, sense gratification and finally the futile attempt to become one with the Supreme. The monists consider *kaivalyaṁ* to be oneness with the Supreme; but according to Patañjali, *kaivalyaṁ* is an internal transcendental potency by which the living entity becomes aware of his actual constitutional position.

The theory of *nirvāṇa* also corresponds with this principle. After *nirvāṇa*, or cessation of material consciousness, there is the manifestation of spiritual activities, or devotional service to the Lord. In the words of the *Bhāgavatam*, *svarūpa-ṇa vyavasthitiḥ*: this is the “real life of the living entity.”
Māyā, or illusion, is the condition of spiritual life contaminated by material infection. Liberation from this material infection does not mean destruction of the original eternal position of the living entity. Patañjali also accepts this by his words \textit{kaivalyaṁ svarūpa-pratiṣṭhā vā cīti-ṣaktir iti}. This \textit{cīti-ṣakti}, or transcendental pleasure, is real life. This is confirmed in the \textit{Vedānta-sūtra} [1.1.12], \textit{ānanda-mayo 'bhyaśāt}. This natural transcendental pleasure is the ultimate goal of \textit{yoga}, and is easily achieved by execution of devotional service, or \textit{bhakti-yoga}. A devotee does not need to practice \textit{aṣṭāṅga-yoga} in order to transfer his soul to the spiritual planets. This is confirmed by the following verse in the \textit{Varāha Purāṇa}:

\begin{quote}
\textit{nayāmi paramaṁ sthānam arcirādi-gatiṁ vinā}
garuḍa-skandham āropya yatheccham anivāritaḥ
\end{quote}

“Just as a child is completely cared for by his parents, a devotee does not need to endeavor to transfer himself to other planets by \textit{yoga} practice. A man who has fallen in the ocean cannot save himself unless someone comes and picks him up from the water. Similarly, by His great mercy, the Supreme Lord, riding on His bird carrier Garuḍa, picks up the devotee from this material existence.”

\textit{Bhakti-yoga} will be vividly described in the Third Adhyāya of \textit{Vedānta-sūtra}.

In the \textit{yoga} system as described by Patañjali, there are two kinds of \textit{samādhi}: \textit{samprajñāta-samādhi} and \textit{asamprajñāta-samādhi}. When one becomes situated in the transcendental position by various philosophical researches, he is said to have achieved \textit{samprajñāta-samādhi}. In the \textit{asamprajñāta-samādhi} there is no longer any connection with mundane pleasure, for one is then transcendental to all sorts of happiness derived from the senses. When the \textit{yogī} is once situated in that transcendental position, he is never shaken from it. The \textit{yogī} is unsuccessful unless he is able to reach this transcendental position. Today’s so-called \textit{yoga} practice, which accepts various sense pleasures, is contradictory. A \textit{yogī} indulging in sex and intoxication is a mockery. Even those \textit{yogīs} who are attracted by the \textit{siddhis} [mystic perfections], the byproducts of the process of \textit{yoga}, are not perfectly situated. \textit{Yogīs} who are attracted by the byproducts of \textit{yoga} cannot attain the stage of perfection, because they remain attached to the subtle manifestations of the \textit{gunas} or material qualities. Those who indulge in the showy practice of gymnastic feats or mystic \textit{siddhis} as so-called \textit{yoga} have lost the real aim of \textit{yoga}.

One may sincerely accept the path of self-realization, but the process of cultivation of knowledge and the practice of the eightfold \textit{yoga} system are generally very difficult for this age. Therefore despite constant endeavor one may fail. First of all, one may not be sufficiently serious about following the process. To pursue the transcendental path is more or less equivalent to declaring war on the illusory energy. Consequently, whenever a person tries to escape the clutches of the illusory energy, she tries to defeat the practitioner by various allurements. A conditioned soul is already allured by the modes of material energy, and there is every chance of being allured again, even while performing transcendental disciplines. This is called \textit{yogāc calita-mānasah}: deviation from the transcendental path.

\begin{quote}
\textit{arjuna uvāca}
\textit{ayatiḥ śraddhayopeto}
\textit{yogāc calita-mānasah}
\end{quote}
Arjuna said: “O Kṛṣṇa, what is the destination of the unsuccessful transcendentalist, who in the beginning takes to the process of self-realization with faith but who later desists due to worldly-mindedness and thus does not attain perfection in mysticism?” [Bhagavad-gītā 6.37]

Even if the practice of mystic yogas like the Pātañjali system of hatha-yoga or aṣṭāṅga-yoga is successful, the ultimate result is temporary material perfections like birth on higher planets, mystical experiences and powers, or at best, merging into the existence of the impersonal Absolute. While these yogis are sincerely seeking a higher status of life, the actual Vedic conclusion of the highest stage of life as expressed in Vedānta-sūtra is the direct service of the Supreme Lord. This highest goal of spiritual life, transcendental consciousness, cannot be attained by any of the nondevotional yoga systems, but only by the mercy of the Lord and His bona fide devotees. The hatha-yoga or aṣṭāṅga-yoga system is actually a distraction, a deviation from the principles of Vedānta. Therefore for reasons similar to those discussed in the previous Adhikarana, the yoga-smṛti is also rejected.

Samīsaya [arise of doubt]: Perhaps there is some value to the eightfold yoga system; after all Kṛṣṇa mentions it in Bhagavad-gītā, and many famous teachers endorse it.

Pūrva-pakṣa [antithesis]: We admit that the Vedānta should not be explained on the basis of the Sānkhya philosophy, because it is opposed to the theistic philosophy of Vedānta. But the sūtras of Vedānta may be explained according to the philosophy of yoga, because it is based on the teachings of Vedānta and is not opposed to it. In fact, yoga is in complete harmony with the Vedic scriptures, and may therefore be called a Śrauta philosophy. It is mentioned in the Upaniṣads thus:

“That they hold to be yoga, which is the firm restraint of the senses. Then one becomes not heedless. Yoga should be performed with regard to the Lord, from whom is the origin and destruction of all things.” [Katha Upaniṣad 6.11]

“Nachiketas having then obtained all the knowledge and practices of yoga imparted by Yāmarāja, attained Brahma, became free from rajas [passion] and beyond death; anyone else who thus knows the Spirit certainly becomes liberated.”

Similarly, the method of postures and other limbs of yoga are taught in the Bhagavad-gītā [6.13-14]:

\[
\begin{align*}
samāṁ kāya-śiro-grīvaṁ \\
dhārayann acalaṁ sthirah \\
sampreksya nāsikāgraṁ svāṁ \\
diśaś cānavalokayan \\
praśāntātmā vigata-bhūr \\
brahmacārī-vrata sthitah \\
manah saṁyamya maṁ-citto \\
yuktā āśīta mat-parāḥ
\end{align*}
\]

“One should hold one's body, neck and head erect in a straight line and stare steadily at the tip of the nose. Thus with an unagitated, subdued mind, devoid of fear, completely free from sex life, one should meditate upon Me within the heart and make Me the ultimate goal of life.”

Therefore, Pātañjali composed the Yoga-smṛti so that men may conquer saṁsāra by crossing over the difficult ocean of the world. He is one of the best authors, and has composed his philosophy through his great Yogic powers. His aphorisms begin:
atha yogānuśāsbhanam
“Now, an explanation of yoga.” [Yoga-sūtras 1.1]

yogaścittavṛttiniruddhah
“Yoga is the cessation of the modifications of the thinking principle.” [Yoga-sūtras 1.2]

These sūtras are not opposed to Vedānta. If this Yoga-smṛti, which merely deals with the concentration of the mind, be held unauthoritative, then it will find no scope anywhere else; and if the Vedānta texts are explained by the method of samanvaya, without regard to any other smṛti, then this Yoga-smṛti becomes redundant. Therefore the Vedānta texts should be explained as to give scope to the Yoga-smṛti, and the doctrine of samanvaya should not be carried to an extreme. The Smṛtis like Manu and the rest, being concerned with the karma-kaṇḍa may be contradicted in certain parts by the Yoga-smṛti; but they will still have scope since they teach practical duties [dharma]. Therefore, the Vedānta texts should be construed by the Yoga-smṛti and not exclusively in accordance with samanvaya.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: The author replies to this objection with the following sūtra:

Sūtra 2.1.3

etena yogaḥ pratyuktaḥ
etena - by this; yogaḥ - the Yoga doctrine as to creation, etc.; pratyuktaḥ - has been refuted.

The Yoga-smṛti is also understood to have been refuted by the above refutation of the Sāṅkhya-smṛti.

The theory of yoga is also refuted on similar grounds to those employed to refute the Sāṅkhya theory of creation, for the yoga theory is at odds with the philosophy of Vedānta. If the Vedānta texts were to be explained in harmony with the Yoga-smṛti, then the other Smṛtis, like Manu and the rest that are in harmony with Vedānta, would have no scope and become useless. Therefore, the Vedānta texts about creation are not to be explained or interpreted according to the Yoga-smṛti.

It is not a fact that the yoga theory of creation is harmonious with the Vedānta theory of cosmogony, for similar to the Sāṅkhya texts, the Yoga-smṛti says that the pradhāna is the independent cause of creation. According to the Yoga-smṛti, Brahman and the jīvas are mere consciousness [citi-mātrāḥ], without attributes or potencies, and both are all-pervading [vibhu].

Yoga theory is not only opposed to Vedānta on this point, but on many others also. For example, yoga teaches that:

- Mukti is merely the cessation of pain as a result of Yoga practice.
- The threefold means of right knowledge as given in the yoga texts are not given in Vedānta.
- The five vṛttis or functions of the mind mentioned by Yoga-smṛti are not supported by Vedānta philosophy.

Yoga philosophy holds that pramāṇa or right knowledge has three divisions—perception, inference and testimony—it also holds that the citta or thinking principle has five modifications: right knowledge, false knowledge, desire, sleep and memory. All these ideas are found in the Yoga-smṛti alone; therefore being opposed to Vedānta on these matters, the Yoga-smṛti is not a valid philosophy and should be rejected. If it is objected that the Yoga philosophy would find no scope as a result, then we say, let it be
so. Since the *Yoga-smṛti* is opposed to *Vedānta*, there is no loss if there is no scope left to it. In fact, all the arguments against the *Sāṅkhya-smṛti* in the previous Adhikaraṇa also apply against the *Yoga-smṛti*.

Certain Vedic texts appear to make reference to the practices of *yoga*, for example:

“Making the three raised parts of the body steady and placing his senses into his heart with his intellect, the wise man should cross all the fearful streams of material existence on the raft of *oṁ*, the Brahman.” [*Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad* 2.8]

“The chief Eternal among all eternals, the chief conscious entity among all conscious entities, who though one, disposes to the many the objects of their desires; one who knows that Lord, the prime cause, who is knowable through *Sāṅkhya* and *yoga* is freed from all bondage.” [*Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad* 6.13]

The words *Sāṅkhya* and *yoga* here, however, mean metaphysical analysis of the material elements and deep meditation, respectively, and do not refer to the *smṛtis* with the same names. The same is true of the text from *Bhagavad-gītā* quoted earlier by the *pūrvapakṣin*.

*Mukti* cannot be obtained by the method taught by *yoga*, namely, by discrimination between *prakṛti* [material nature, or the body] and *puruṣa* [the controller of nature, or the soul], which is also the favorite method of *Sāṅkhya*. According to *Vedānta*, liberation depends on knowledge of God plus the grace of God, and not merely on discrimination between the soul and matter. That may be a necessary stage of spiritual practice, but it is certainly not sufficient by itself to award liberation from material existence. This is proved by the following texts:

“I know that Great Spirit, shining like the sun and transcending the world of darkness. It is only by knowing Him that one escapes death; there is no other path to go upon.” [*Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad* 3.8]

“Knowing Him alone, let the wise *brāhmaṇa* meditate constantly. Let him not study many books, for verily all that is a waste of energy.” [*Brhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad* 4.4.21]

“He who meditates on Him, feels joy in Him and is devoted to Him, alone gets immortality and no one else.”

*Vedānta* philosophy accepts the parts of *Sāṅkhya* and *yoga* that are not opposed to the Vedic conclusion. We do not hold any animosity against these schools, but take exception to certain doctrines and theories of theirs that are opposed to the authorized Vedic explanations of creation and liberation. We simply discard the portions of these teachings that are opposed to *Vedānta* and accept the rest.

For example, *yoga* is not atheistic like *Sāṅkhya*, for it admits the existence of God, as expressed in several *sūtras* similar to the following:

*iśvārapraṇidhānātva*

“Concentration may be obtained by complete concentration on God.”

*kleśakarmavipākāsayairapārāmrṣṭaḥ puruṣaviśeṣa iśvāraḥ*

“The Lord is a particular spiritual being untouched by sin, evil, suffering actions and the fruits of actions.”

Yet these *sūtras* are not absolutely necessary for the *yoga* system, and many of its more atheistic followers say that the author of *yoga* was not in his right mind when he wrote these particular aphorisms, and they are merely an anomaly or a mistake.
Besides the yoga and Sāṅkhya-smṛtis, the Nyāya of Gautama and the Vaiṣeṣika of Kaṇāda contain views opposed to Vedānta philosophy, especially in their theories of creation and liberation; therefore we reject them, and will refute them in later sections. No doubt the authors of these treatises are very learned and wise, but their erroneous conclusions are either the result of their own conceit, thinking they are omniscient when actually they are merely human beings, or because of some mysterious purpose of His own, the Lord willed that they should write such deluding theories. In fact, some writers speculate that the Lord had them write their works just so they could be refuted by the commentaries on Vedānta, and thus bring out its perfect symmetry and harmoniousness with the entire Vedic literature. Certainly such atheistic theories are in tune with the mood of the Kali-yuga, which perhaps explains the popularity in the West of teachings ostensibly based on them.

Adhikaraṇa 3: The Vedas are Eternal and Infallible

Viśaya [thesis or statement]: The principal, and really the sole, axiomatic truth in Vedic philosophy is that the transcendental sound vibration of the Vedic literature is perfect and infallible; everything else is understood from the original Vedic texts by a process of deductive logic. This path of acceptance is called avaroha-panthā. The word avaroha is related to the word avatāra, which means “that which descends.” This avaroha-panthā, the standard Vedic epistemological system, is the basis of the Vedic disciplic succession called the paramparā system. Therefore whatever the Vedas or Vedānta-sūtra says, we should accept without argument as Absolute Truth.

The transcendental philosophy and the principles of religion are established by the authorized explanations of Vedic literature. They cannot be ascertained merely through mundane exercises in logic. In the Puruṣa-sūkta [Ṛg Veda, maṇḍala 10, sūkta 90, mantra 9] it is stated,

\[
\text{tasmād yajñāt sarva-huta rcaḥ sāmāni jajñjire}
\]
\[
\text{chandāṃsi jajñjire tasmāt}
\]

“From Him, Yajña, came all sacrificial offerings, hymns of invocation and songs of praise. All the mantras of the Vedas come from the Lord.”

It is stated in the Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam [6.1.40]:

\[
\text{veda-praṇihito dharmaḥ}
\]
\[
\text{hy adharmaḥ tad-viparyayaḥ}
\]
\[
\text{vedo nārāyaṇah sāksāt}
\]
\[
\text{svayambhūr iti śuṣrume}
\]

“That which is prescribed in the Vedas constitutes dharma, the religious principles, and the opposite of that is irreligion. The Vedas are directly the Supreme Personality of Godhead, Nārāyaṇa, and are self-born. This we have heard from Yamarāja.”

Similarly, in Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam [6.16.51] the Lord says,

\[
\text{ahaṁ vai sarva-bhūtāni}
\]
\[
\text{bhūtātmā bhūta-bhāvanaḥ}
\]
\[
\text{śabda-brahma param brahma}
\]
\[
\text{mamohbeśāsvatī tanū}
\]

“All living entities, moving and nonmoving, are My expansions and are separate from Me. I am the Supersoul of all living beings, who exist because I manifest them. I am the form of the transcendental vibrations like omkāra and Hare Kṛṣṇa Hare Kṛṣṇa, and I am the Supreme Absolute Truth. These two forms of Mine—namely, the transcendental sound vibration of the...
Vedas and the eternally blissful spiritual form of the Deity, are My eternal forms; they are not material."

All the incarnations of the Supreme Personality of Godhead are completely transcendental and free from the four defects of conditioned life, namely mistakes, illusion, cheating and imperfect senses. So Vedic knowledge, being a plenary manifestation of the Supreme Lord, is similarly infallible and transcendental.

Materialistic people do not like the Vedic way of acceptance, because they think it limits their independence. Therefore the materialist wants to understand everything by the āroha-panthā—by speculative argument and inferential reason—but transcendental matters cannot be understood in that way, because they are beyond the range of our imperfect senses and limited intelligence. Rather, one must follow the avaroha-panthā, the process of descending knowledge or revelation because the origin of the eternal Vedic wisdom is the infallible Supreme Personality of Godhead. If not, then we must accept a constantly changing array of foolish contradictory theories that cannot adequately explain the world that we see before us, or the inner life of consciousness that we experience every day.

The rebellious nature of the materialists is mirrored by their insistence, against all logic and evidence, that matter has independent creative potency and intelligence. They want us to believe that the complex structures of living entities are developed by a process of evolution driven by chance mutation, and that the subtle qualities and experiences of mind and consciousness are due simply to electrochemical changes in our brains. They criticize the Vedas because they require faith, but they do not admit that their own theories require enormous leaps of faith against all experience and common sense.

Actually, in the end the Vedas do not require faith, for one who follows their instructions is able to realize and verify everything simply with his own purified and spiritualized consciousness. This is far more scientific than putting forward theories like the Big Bang and evolution that have not been, and can never be, verified by objective observation or experiment. The materialistic scientists’ insistence that subjective evidence is unacceptable is simply a ruse to discourage serious research into the nature of consciousness, because that would reveal the transcendental nature of the soul and ultimately, the Supreme Personality of Godhead.

Sāṁśaya [arise of doubt]: If the smṛtis like Śāṅkhya and the rest are to be set aside as invalid and anāpta [not spiritually authoritative] merely because they are opposed to the Vedas, then you must first establish that the Vedas themselves are infallible and contain nothing that is opposed to science or reason.

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: Is the Veda fallible or infallible? Is it the product of an āpta [spiritual authority] or an anāpta? If the Veda is infallible, then everything it says would turn out to be true. But that is not the case. For example it says, “Let a person who desires rain perform the Kārīri sacrifice.” Now it is seen that the performance of the Kārīri sacrifice does not inevitably produce rain. Therefore, the Veda is not infallible.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: The author replies to this objection with the following sūtra:

**Sūtra 2.1.4**

\[na \text{ vilakṣaṇatvātasya tathātvacca śabdāt}\]

\[na – not; vilakṣaṇatvāt – because of the difference in characteristics; asya – of the Veda; tathātvam – the eternity, the authority; ca – and; śabdāt – from the scripture.\]
The Veda is authoritative [unlike the Sāṅkhya-smṛti, etc.] because it is of a different character altogether, and because it is established from the scriptures.

The Veda is authoritative, unlike the Sāṅkhya-smṛti, Yoga-smṛti and others. Why? Vilakṣaṇatvāt: because it is fundamentally different in character from relative materialistic knowledge, being eternal and spoken by God. Every product of human effort is subject to four kinds of errors: ignorance leading to error, the cheating propensity, delusion due to being covered by a material body, and imperfect senses and intelligence. These errors are impossible in the case of the Veda, because it is eternal and not of human origin. These attributes are proved from the scripture itself, in both śruti- and smṛti-śāstra.

tasmāi nunaṁ abhidyave vācā virupa nityayā
vṛṣṇe codasya su-stutim

“Now, O Virupa, rouse for Him, strong God who is ever Self-satisfied, fair praise with the eternal Vedic speech.” [Rg-Veda, 7.91.6]

Thus the Śruti itself calls the mantras of the Vedas by the significant term nitya-vak, the Eternal Voice. The Smṛtis also declare the Vedas to be eternal:

“The Self-existing Lord, in the beginning of creation, sent forth the eternal, beginningless Voice, the divine Veda, from which proceeded all other scriptures.” [Mahābhārata]

The Smṛtis, like those of Manu and the rest, are authoritative simply because they are based on the Vedas, and for no other reason. The eternity of the Vedas was established in Śūtra 1.3.29 by reasoning. In the present śūtra it is established by authority; that is the difference between these two śūtras.

An objector may say, “The Vedas are non-eternal because we find in them statements to the effect that they were created at a certain time, and everything that is created necessarily ends at some time. The following śloka of the Puruṣa-Sūkta prayers shows that the Vedas were created:

“The Ricas and Sāma hymns were born from that great general sacrifice, and from them spells and charms were produced. The Yajus had its birth from Him.” [Rg-Veda 10.90.9]

To this objection we reply, it is not so. In this passage the word jan does not mean “was born” in the ordinary sense, but “was manifested.” As stated in the following verse:

“This Lord Veda is Self-existent [eternal]. You, O God, have sung it out in ancient times. The great ones, from Śiva down to the Rṣis, are its reciters only and not its authors.”

Nor can it validly be objected that the Vedas are unauthoritative because they do not always produce the results promised by them. The production of any particular result depends on the qualification of the person performing the act. A competent person always gets the predicted result by the proper chanting of the Vedic hymns, while an incompetent person fails to get the expected result. The failure to obtain the result proves only the incompetence of the agent, and not the defectiveness of the science. However, the Smṛtis like Sāṅkhya and Yoga are unauthoritative not because they fail to produce the results promised by them, but because they conflict with the teachings of the Vedas on the important points of creation, liberation of the soul, the nature of the Supreme Personality of Godhead, etc. because they are products of defective human intelligence. The great sage Bhṛgu Muni states in Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam [4.2.30]:

esa eva hi lokānāṁ
śivaḥ panthāḥ sanātanaḥ
yaṁ pūrve cānusantasthur
yat-pramāṇaṁ janārdanāḥ
“The Vedas give the eternal regulative principles for auspicious advancement in human civilization which have been rigidly followed in the past. The strong evidence of this principle is the Supreme Personality of Godhead, who is called Janārdana, the well-wisher of all living entities.”

In the Bhagavad-gītā the Supreme Personality of Godhead, Kṛṣṇa, claims to be the father of all living entities. Because the living entities are parts and parcels of the Supreme Personality of Godhead, they are all children of the Lord. The Lord kindly manifests the Vedas for their guidance and benefit, because they are hovering on the mental platform under the false impression that they can lord it over material nature. Therefore the Vedas are called apauruṣeya: not written by any man or demigod, including the first living creature, Brahmā. Brahmā is not the creator or author of the Vedas. He is also one of the living beings in this material world; therefore he does not have the power to write or speak the Vedas independently.

Every living entity within this material world is subject to four deficiencies: he commits mistakes, he is illusioned, he cheats, and he has imperfect senses. The Vedas, however, are not written by any living creature within this material world, but originate from the Supreme Personality of Godhead Himself. Therefore they are said to be apauruṣeya. No one can trace out the history of the Vedas. Of course, modern human civilization has no chronological history of the world or the universe older than 5,000 years, and it cannot present actual historical facts older than three thousand years. But no one has traced out when the Vedas were written, because they were never written by any living being within this material world.

All other systems of knowledge are defective because they have been written or spoken by men or demigods who are products of this material creation, but the Vedas are apauruṣeya. That is accepted by such stalwart scholars as Śaṅkaracārya, not to speak of Vaiṣṇava ācāryas such as Rāmānujācārya and Madhvācārya. Śaṅkaracārya has accepted that Nārāyaṇa and Kṛṣṇa are transcendental, and in Bhagavad-gītā [10.8] Lord Kṛṣṇa has declared,

\[
\text{ahaṁ sarvasya prabhavo mattaḥ sarvaṁ pravartate}
\]

“I am the origin of everything; everything emanates from Me.”

This material creation, including Brahmā and Śiva and all the demigods, has been created by Him, for everything has emanated from Him. He also says in Bhagavad-gītā [15.15]:

\[
\text{vedaiś ca svair aham eva vedyo}

\text{vedānta-kṛd veda-vid eva cāham}
\]

“By all the Vedas am I to be known; indeed I am the compiler of Vedānta, and I am the knower of the Vedas.”

In the beginning of Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam it is established, tene brahma hṛdā: the Supreme Absolute Truth, the Personality of Godhead, instructed Brahmā in the Vedic knowledge through his heart. Therefore the evidence that Vedic knowledge is free from the defects of mistakes, illusions, cheating and imperfection is that it is spoken by the Supreme Personality of Godhead, Janārdana, and has thus been followed from time immemorial, beginning from Brahmā. The Vedic religion or the principles of the Vedas have been followed by the highly cultured population of India since time immemorial; no one can trace out the history of Vedic religion. Therefore it is sanātana [eternal], and any blasphemy against the Vedas is calculated to be atheism. The Vedas are described as setu [a bridge]. If one wants to attain his spiritual existence, one has to cross an ocean of nescience. The Vedas are the bridge by which to cross that great ocean.
Adhikaraṇa 4: Terms like Fire, Earth etc. Denote the Superintending Devas

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: The materialistic creation theories all require that we accept an impossible assumption: that dull, inert matter somehow or other can create itself, organize itself and manifest the symptoms of life. We experience daily that matter cannot do anything without the energy and intelligence of living entities. And while we may not be able to observe consciousness in others except by its symptoms, we can certainly observe it directly in ourselves. Therefore the correct understanding is that the energy and intelligence shown by the material creation come from the Supreme Personality of Godhead, and the consciousness and other living symptoms displayed by the living entities actually indicate the presence of the jīva souls emanated from Him.

The effect [the creation] mirrors the attributes found in the cause [Brahman or the Supreme Personality of Godhead]. Unless energy, intelligence, consciousness etc. are there in the cause of the material creation, how can they be manifest in the effect? The causes that materialistic theories such as Sāṅkhya, Buddhism and material science put forward for the material creation [pradhāna, śunyata, the Big Bang, etc.] do not possess the qualities such as energy, intelligence, sentience etc. that we see displayed in the creation. So in assuming that matter can manifest these qualities independently, essentially they are asking us to believe that nonexistence can manifest existence, or that something comes from nothing.

In the Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.4.1-5.2 we read:

“The Sat was alone in the beginning, one only, without an equal. The others say about this, ‘The Asat alone existed in the beginning, one without a second. From the Asat was produced the Sat.’

“But, O child, how could it be thus?” said the father. “How should the Sat be born from Asat? Therefore the Sat existed alone in the beginning, O child, one without an equal.

“He thought, ‘I shall assume many forms and create beings.’ He created fire. The fire thought, ‘I shall assume many forms and create beings.’ That created the waters.

“The waters thought, ‘We shall assume many forms and create beings.’ That created the food.

“Then God thought, ‘These three devatās are well-created; now I shall enter into them with that aspect of Mine called the Living Self, and shall develop name and form.’”

Samśaya [arisal of doubt]: How do you reconcile these absurd statements of the Vedas, such as:

“The fire willed, ‘Let me become many’; the water willed, ‘Let me become many.’” [Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.4]

“The prāṇas, quarreling among themselves, went to Lord Brahmā and asked who was the best among them.” [Bṛhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad]

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: The elements like fire and so forth are insentient, and to say that they willed or quarreled is as reasonable as to say that “the sons of barren woman held a discussion.” Therefore, one section of the Vedas being proved unauthoritative, the portion asserting that Brahman is the cause of the world is also without authority. The cause of the world is therefore the pradhāna.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: The author replies to this objection in the following sūtra.

Sūtra 2.1.5

abhimāni vyapadeśastu viśeṣanugatibhyāṁ
abhimāni – the presiding deities of the elements, etc.; vyapadeśah – pointing out of, denotation of; tu – but; viśeṣa – on account of distinction, being so qualified; anugatibhyām – on account of their entering.

[The words fire etc. here denote] the superintending devas, because [the epithet] deva is mentioned there, and also because the statement that they entered these elements.

The word tu [but] shows that the doubt of the pūrvapakṣin is being removed.

Why do you say so? The phrases “the fire willed,” etc. clearly mean the conscious superintending devas of these elements, because the epithet devatā is expressly given in the same passage. Devatā means a conscious living being, a demigod; so they cannot be inanimate elements, but empowered cosmic intelligences.

Similarly, the passage regarding the quarrel among the prāṇas refers to the devatās, as the following quotation shows:

“Next follows the recognition of the pre-eminence of the prāṇa by the other devatās. All the devatās, contending with one another to assert their own pre-eminence, went out of the body. It lay inert like a piece of wood. Then speech entered into it. It spoke and lay down still. Then they eye entered into it. It spoke and saw, but lay down still. Then the ear entered into it, and it spoke, saw and heard, but still lay down. Then the mind entered into it, and it spoke, saw, heard and thought, but still lay down. Then the prāṇa entered into it, and it immediately got up. All these devatās, knowing the prāṇa to be pre-eminent, and fully comprehending Him as the conscious Self, went out of this world with all these.” [Kauśitakī Upaniṣad 2.9]

Here again, the term devatās is applied to the senses. Consequently the quarrel was among the devas of the senses, and not among inanimate elements. Not only is the specific term devatās applied to them, but also in other Upaniṣads we find that the devas entered into these elements and senses to regulate their activities. For example in Aitareya Ārṇayaka [2.4.2.4] it is said,

“After those devatās, Agni and others had been created, they fell into a great ocean... Then Agni becoming speech, entered into the mouth. Vāyu having becoming scent, entered into the nostrils. Āditya becoming sight, entered the eyes. The Diś, becoming hearing, entered the ears.”

This shows that the terms Agni etc. mean the the superintending devas of the senses. The entering of the devas into the senses and body is another reason for holding that sentient entities, and not insentient elements, are meant. For example, Bhavīṣya Purāṇa states:

“The superintending devatās of earth, etc. possessed of inconceivable energies and mighty powers, are actually seen by the sages.”

Similarly, apparently impossible phrases such as “the stones float,” as in the passages describing Lord Rāma’s crossing the ocean, should be understood as praises of the devatās within them. The devatās within the stones and water held up the stones and made them float. Not only do the devatās enter into the material elements; it is stated that the Supreme Personality of Godhead also enters into the elements of the creation:

\[
yathā mahānti bhūtāni  
bhūteśuccāvaceṣv anu  
praviṣṭāny apraviṣṭāni  
tathā teṣu na teṣv aham
\]
“O Brahmā, please know that the universal elements enter into the cosmos and at the same time do not enter into the cosmos; similarly, I Myself also exist within everything created, and at the same time I am outside of everything. [Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 2.9.35]

The great elements of material creation—namely earth, water, fire, air and ether—enter into the bodies of all manifested entities—the seas, mountains, aquatics, plants, reptiles, birds, beasts, human beings, demigods and everyone materially manifested—and at the same time the elements are situated outside their manifestations as the devatās or controlling deities of the elements. Human beings in the developed stage of consciousness can study physiological and physical science, but the basic principles of such sciences are nothing but the material elements. The body of the human being and the body of the mountain, as also the bodies of the demigods, including Brahmā, are all of the same ingredients—earth, water, etc.—and at the same time, the elements are beyond the body. The elements were created first, and entered into the bodily construction later, but in both circumstances they entered the cosmos and its forms, and also did not enter. Similarly the Supreme Lord, by His different internal and external energies, is within everything in the manifested cosmos, and at the same time He is outside of everything, situated in the kingdom of God, Vaikuṇṭhaloka. This is very nicely stated in the Brahma-saṁhitā [5.37] as follows:

ānanda-cinnaya-rasa-pratibhāvitābhis
tābhir ya eva nija-rūpatayā kalābhīḥ
goloka eva nivasaty akhilāma-bhūto
govindam ādi-puruṣaṁ tam ahaṁ bhajāmi

“I worship the Personality of Godhead, Govinda, who by expansion of His internal potency of transcendental existence, knowledge and bliss, enjoys in His own and expanded forms. Simultaneously He enters into every atom of the creation.”

This expansion of His plenary parts is also more definitely explained in the Brahma-saṁhitā [5.35] as follows:

eko 'py asau racayituṁ jagad-aṇḍa-koṭiṁ
yac-chaktir asti jagad-aṇḍa-cayā yad-antaḥ
aṇḍāntara-stha-paramānū-cayāntara-sthaṁ
govindam ādi-puruṣaṁ tam ahaṁ bhajāmi

“I worship the Personality of Godhead, Govinda, who, by one of His plenary portions, enters into the existence of every universe and every particle of the atoms, and thus unlimitedly manifests His infinite energy all over the material creation.”

The impersonalists such as the Sāṅkhyaśas can imagine or even perceive that the Supreme Brahman is all-pervading in His impersonal form, but then they wrongly conclude that there is no possibility of His personal form. Herein lies the mystery of Vedic transcendental knowledge. This mystery is transcendental love of Godhead, and one who is surcharged with such transcendental love of Godhead can see the Personality of Godhead in every atom and every movable or immovable object without difficulty. And at the same time he can see the Personality of Godhead in His own abode, Goloka, enjoying eternal pastimes with His eternal associates, who are also expansions of His transcendental existence. This vision is the real mystery of spiritual knowledge, as stated by the Lord to Brahmā in the beginning of creation:

śrī-bhagavān uvāca
jhānaṁ parama-guhyāṁ me
yad vijñāna-samanvitam
The Personality of Godhead said: “Knowledge about Me as described in the scriptures is very confidential, and it has to be realized in conjunction with devotional service. The necessary paraphernalia for that process is being explained by Me. You may take it up carefully.”

[Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 2.9.31]

This esoteric mystery is the most confidential part of the knowledge of the Supreme, and it is impossible for the mental speculators to discover by their intellectual gymnastics. The mystery can be revealed through the process recommended by Brahmā in his Brahma-samhitā [5.38] as follows:

premāṇjanacchurita-bhakti-vilocanena
santah sadaiva hṛdayeṣu vilokayanti
yaṁ śyāmasundaram acintya-guṇa-svarūpaṁ
govindam ādi-puruṣaṁ tām ahaṁ bhajāmi

“I worship the original Personality of Godhead, Govinda, whom the pure devotees, their eyes smeared with the ointment of love of Godhead, always observe within their hearts. This Govinda, the original Personality of Godhead, is Śyāmasundara with all transcendental qualities.”

Therefore although He is present in every atom, the Supreme Personality of Godhead is invisible to the materialistic speculators; the mystery is unfolded before the eyes of the pure devotees because their eyes are anointed with love of Godhead. And this love of Godhead can be attained by the practice of transcendental loving service of the Lord, and nothing else. The process of devotional service is summarized in the Third Adhyāya of Vedānta-sūtra. The vision of the devotees is extraordinary because it is purified by the process of devotional service. In other words, as the universal elements are both within and without, similarly the Lord's name, form, quality, pastimes, entourage, etc., as they are described in the revealed scriptures or as performed in the Vaikuṇṭhalokas, far, far beyond the material cosmic manifestation, are factually manifest in the heart of the devotee. One with a poor fund of knowledge cannot understand, but that is the mystery of knowledge of the Personality of Godhead.

There is nothing unauthoritative in the Vedas; consequently the teaching of Vedānta that the Supreme Brahmān is the sole cause of the material universe is firmly established, and the objections raised by the Sāṅkhya and other atheistic speculators are invalid.

Adhikaraṇa 5: Brahmān is the Material Cause of the Universe Established by Reason

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: So far Vedānta-sūtra has established that it is impossible for pradhāna or matter alone to be the cause of the creation. However the materialistic philosophers not only try to establish their own version, they also criticize the version of the Vedas and try to invalidate it. The chief attack of the materialist scholars is that spirit, if it exists at all, is so different from matter that it cannot possibly be the cause of the material creation. If there is any relationship at all, it must be that God created the initial conditions for material world [“Let there be light”], and the material energy created everything independently from there.

The demonic materialists conclude that this cosmic manifestation arises due to chance material actions and reactions. They do not think that the world was created by God for a certain purpose. They have their own theory: that the world has come about in its own way, and that there is no reason to believe
that there is a God behind it. For them there is no difference between spirit and matter; spirit is an
illusion, everything is matter, and the whole cosmos is just a mass of ignorance. According to them,
everything is ultimately impersonal or void, and whatever manifestation apparently exists is simply due
to our ignorance in perception. They take it for granted that all manifestation of diversity is a display of
ignorance. Such misinformed critics do not at all understand the relationship between spirit and matter.

\[ nāsato vidyate bhāvo \\
nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ \\
ubhayor api drṣṭo 'ntas \\
tv anayos tatvaa-darśibhiḥ \]

“Those who are seers of the truth have concluded that of the nonexistent there is no endurance,
and of the eternal there is no cessation. This they have concluded by studying the nature of
both.” [Bhagavad-gītā 2.16]

In other words, matter is temporary but spirit is eternal. In addition, before the creation of the material
world and after its destruction in due course of time, only spirit exists:

\[ aham evāsam evāgre \\
nānyad yat sad-asat param \\
paścād aham yad etac ca \\
yo 'vaśīyateta so 'smy aham \]

“Brahmā, it is I, the Personality of Godhead, who was existing before the creation, when there
was nothing but Myself. Nor was there the material nature, the cause of this creation. That
which you see now is also I, the Personality of Godhead, and after annihilation what remains
will also be I, the Personality of Godhead.” [Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 2.9.33]

Therefore only spirit can be the source of matter. Consequently, matter must be a transformation of
spirit.

\[ idaṁ hi viśvaṁ bhagavān ivetaro \\
yato jagat-sthāna-nirbhir-sambhavāḥ \\
tad dhi svayaṁ veda bhavāms tathāpine te \\
prādeśa-mātraṁ bhavataḥ pradarśitam \]

“The Supreme Lord Personality of Godhead is Himself this cosmos, and still He is aloof from
it. From Him only has this cosmic manifestation emanated, in Him it rests, and unto Him it
enters after annihilation. Your good self knows all about this. I have given only a synopsis.”
[Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 1.5.20]

The entire cosmic manifestation is but a transformation of the energy of the Supreme Personality of
Godhead, but because of illusion, the conditioned souls cannot appreciate that God is nondifferent from
the material world, and that this material world is simply a transformation of His different energies. It
is stated in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad [6.8]:

\[ parāsyā śaktir vividhaiva śrūyate \\
svābhāvīkti jñāna-bala-kriyā ca \]

“The Supreme Lord has multipotencies, which act so perfectly that all consciousness, strength
and activity are being directed solely by His will.”

This also supported by the Vedas: sarvaṁ khalv idaṁ brahma: “Matter and spirit are all nondifferent
from the Supreme Brahman.” Lord Śrī Kṛṣṇa confirms this statement in the Bhagavad-gītā [7.4]:
bhūmir āpo 'nalo vāyuḥ
khaṁ mano buddhir eva ca
ahaṅkāra itīyaṁ me
bhinnā prakṛtir aṣṭadhāḥ

“Earth, water, fire, air, ether, mind, intelligence and false ego—all together these eight constitute My separated material energies.”

The material energy is the Lord’s energy, but it is separated from Him. The spiritual energy is also His energy, but it is not separated from Him. When the material energy is engaged in the service of the Supreme Spirit, so-called material energy becomes transformed into spiritual energy, just as an iron rod becomes fire when placed in contact with fire. Simply understanding the transformations of different energies is partial knowledge. When we can understand by an analytical study that the Supreme Personality of Godhead is the cause of all causes, our knowledge is perfect. We must come to the ultimate cause, and this requires a bona fide spiritual master in the Vedic lineage. Otherwise we shall remain entrapped by nescience:

na te viduḥ svārtha-gatiṁ hi viṣṇuṁ
durāśayā ye bahir-artha-mānīnaḥ
andhā yathāndhair upanīyamānāṁ
te 'piśa-tantryāṁ uru-dāmmi baddhāḥ

“Persons who are strongly entrapped by the consciousness of enjoying material life, and who have therefore accepted as their leader or guru a similar blind man attached to external sense objects, cannot understand that the goal of life is to return home, back to Godhead, and engage in the service of Lord Viṣṇu. As blind men guided by another blind man miss the right path and fall into a ditch, materially attached men led by another materially attached man are bound by the ropes of fruitive labor, which are made of very strong cords, and they continue again and again in materialistic life, suffering the threefold miseries.” [Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 7.5.31]

The materialists want to be reassured that matter is independent from spirit, so they can push God far into the background, or better yet, eliminate Him entirely, and go on with their lusty program of material sense gratification in full confidence, free from the doubts of conscience. So they find some foolish lusty rascal just like themselves and elect him to the post of guru, so they can continue their material exploitation without being confronted by the Absolute Truth of the Vedas. They see the Vedic philosophy as a great challenge, not just to their religious and philosophical beliefs, but to their very existence. For if the Vedas are right, then everything they are thinking and doing is built upon a wrong platform.

Therefore even after being defeated in the preceding Adhikaraṇas, the Śaṅkhyas philosopher comes to the attack again, saying that Brahman cannot be the material cause of the universe; this time not relying on texts, but on reason alone. Normally the Śaṅkhyas admit that reason is of little help in transcendental matters, such as the true nature of the Self, cosmogony, etc. and must be abandoned in favor of the Śruti. They even have the following aphorism:

śrutivirodhaḥ na kutarkāpadasyaātmalābhah

“The attainment of the Self cannot take place by mere false reasoning [kutarka, false arguments or sophistry alone], because it is opposed to the scriptures [śruti].” [Śaṅkhyas-mṛti 6.35]

This apparent homage of the Śaṅkhyas to the Śruti is only lip service, for the Śaṅkhyas appeals to Śruti merely to find fault with Vedānta. The nature of the doubt raised is this:

Śrī Vedānta-sūtra  Adhyāya 2  Page 33
Samśaya [arising of doubt]: Is it possible for Brahman to be the material cause of the universe or not?

Pūrva-pakṣa [antithesis]: Brahman cannot be the material cause of the universe because the world is of a substantially different nature from Brahman. Brahman is understood to be omniscient, omnipotent, all-pure and possessing the highest joy as His nature. The world, on the other hand is seen to consist of ignorance, impotence, impurity and sorrow. Thus it is inarguable that the natures of Brahman and the material world are diametrically opposed. And it is a fact of daily experience that the effect of a cause has the same nature as the cause. For example, a pot or a crown or a piece of cloth have the same nature as the clay, gold or threads of which they are made. Therefore the world, having a different nature from Brahman, cannot have Him as its material cause.

We must, therefore, search out some appropriate material cause for the world, and we find that in pradhāna alone. The world consists of joy, sorrow and delusion, and for such a world, the pradhāna consisting of sattva, rajas and tamas is the most appropriate cause. The Vedānta philosopher says, “We explain this by positing the existence of two energies, spirit and matter, both dwelling in Brahman, and thus there is no difficulty understanding how this world proceeds as an effect from Brahman.” But this theory does not solve the difficulty. The world still remains of a different character from it supposed material cause, the Brahman. It is difficult to explain how this material world comes into existence from two very subtle causes such as spirit and matter. There are too many differences between this world and Brahman for Brahman to be the material cause of its existence. Therefore Brahman is not the material cause of the world, because it is essentially different from Brahman; therefore Vedānta must take help in worldly matters from reason to ascertain the truth.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: The next sūtra answers this objection.

Sūtra 2.1.6

dṛṣyate tu
dṛṣyate – is seen; tu – but.

But it is seen [that the material cause of a thing may be of totally different quality from it].

The word tu [but] removes the familiar doubt raised by the pūrva-pakṣin. The word na [not] from Sūtra 2.1.4 is understood in this sūtra also. The objection that “the world cannot have Brahman for its cause because it is of a totally different nature from Him” is not correct, because it is seen in everyday experience that things that are entirely different in their essential natures stand as material cause and effect. Thus the rise of different qualities from things of different nature is common. For example, the quality of intoxication arises from the fermentation of pure sugar; flying insects arise from crawling larvae; the origin of the different species of animals, such as elephants and horses, from the wish-fulfilling tree in the heavenly planets; gold arises from the Philosopher’s Stone, etc. Referring to matter coming out from spirit, the Ātharvanikas say:

yathorna-nābhiḥ srjate grhṇate ca
yathā prthivyām oṣadhayāḥ sambhavanti
yathā satāḥ purusāt keśa-lomāni
tathāksarāt sambhavatiḥ viśvam

“As a web is expanded and withdrawn by a spider, as herbs grow from the earth, and as hair grows from a living person’s head and body, so this universe is generated from the inexhaustible Supreme.” [Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad 1.1.7]
Ultimately everything is spiritual because everything is an expansion of Kṛṣṇa; that is, everything is an expansion either of Kṛṣṇa Himself or of His potency. Because the potency is nondifferent from the potent, the potency and the potent are one [śakti-śaktimatyor abhedah]. The Māyāvādīs, however, say, cid-acit-samanvayah: “Spirit and matter are one.” This is a wrong conception. Spirit [cit] is different from matter [acit], as explained by Kṛṣṇa Himself in Bhagavad-gītā [7.4-5]:

bhūmir āpo 'nalo vāyuḥ
khaṁ mano buddhir eva ca
ahaṅkāra iti yaṁ me
bhinnā prakṛtir aṣṭadhā
apare yāṁ parasparam
pravṛttir vidhī me parāṁ
jīva-bhūtāṁ mahā-bāho
yayedaṁ dhāryate jagat

“Earth, water, fire, air, ether, mind, intelligence and false ego—all together these eight comprise My separated material energies. But besides this inferior nature, O mighty-armed Arjuna, there is a superior energy of Mine, which consists of all living entities who are struggling with material nature and are sustaining the universe.”

Spirit and matter are superior and inferior energies, yet the Māyāvādīs and other speculators artificially try to make them one. Although spirit and matter ultimately come from the same source, they cannot be made one. There are many things that come from our bodies, but although they come from the same source, they are qualitatively different. Although the supreme source of both matter and spirit is one, the emanations from this source should be regarded separately, as inferior and superior. Vedānta philosophy recognizes this fact, and this is the main difference between it and all other speculative impersonal philosophies of the creation.

Spirit and matter emanate from the same source, exist together and interpenetrate one another. Yet they are different and cannot be artificially combined. For example, fire and heat interpenetrate and cannot be separated; where there is fire there is heat, and where there is heat there is fire. Nonetheless, although they are one, they are different. Therefore the actual Vedānta philosophy is acintya-bhedābheda: inconceivable, simultaneous qualitative oneness and difference between the Lord and His potencies.

Adhikaraṇa 6: Non-Being not the First Cause

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: The previous sūtras proved that something—namely the energy, organization and life symptoms of the material creation—cannot come from nothing; so now the speculators, refusing to admit defeat, argue the Buddhist doctrine that the material world not only comes from nothing, it is itself nothingness, just to maintain their commitment to atheism to the bitter end. This absurdist attitude is typical of the demons. My spiritual master Śrīla Prabhupāda used to tell the story of the two arguing men:

Two men were arguing about which cutting instrument is better, a knife or scissors. “Knife!” said one. “No, scissors!” said the other. Their talk became a heated fight. “If you don’t agree,” said the man who advocated the knife, “I will throw you in the river.” “No, I’ll never change my mind. It’s scissors!” So the knife advocate threw the other into the swift river. He swam for a while but became exhausted and began to sink. But he was so stubborn about holding his point of view, that even after he was sinking under the water to his death, he held up his arm and
crossed his fingers back and forth like a pair of scissors cutting. “The scientists are like that,” said Śrīla Prabhupāda. “Even after defeating them with all logic, still they will say, ‘Life comes from matter.’ But more sane and innocent people would be convinced by the Vedic presentation, that life comes from life.”

The argument about the source of life cannot be resolved, because the real intention of materialists like the scientists is not so much to prove that life comes from matter, as it is to prove that there is no God. If there is no God there are no rules, no right and wrong, no reward or punishment after death. Thus convinced, they do whatever they like, exploit and ‘enjoy’ in any way whatsoever, with full confidence that there is no moral authority to check their independence. In other words, atheism is a potent consciousness-altering drug that conveniently removes the need to listen to one’s conscience. It therefore destroys morality in human society, reducing people to the animal level of consciousness. Atheism’s habitual users are addicted far more powerfully than to any opiate. Convincing them of any sane viewpoint is most difficult because of the depth of their commitment to rebellion against God. They would rather look like fools, and waste valuable time and energy making absurd arguments, than give even an inch to the theistic point of view.

So if the atheists cannot be convinced, why does Vedānta-sūtra devote so much space to defeating their arguments? If they are so addicted to untruth, why not just let them drown in their own ignorance? The answer is that the arguments of Vedānta-sūtra are not so much directed at the atheists themselves, as to theists who lack the strength of mind to resist their seductive arguments. The real battleground of Vedānta versus atheism is not the public forum of debate, but the mind and heart of the neophyte devotee.

The devotee requires the strong medicine of Vedānta to protect himself against the atheistic poison of Kali-yuga in all its bewildering guises. By hearing the arguments of Vyāsa, anyone can defend their spiritual integrity and make their faith strong. This prophylactic is greatly needed in a time when theistic people are rare, as they are today. The faithful minority is surrounded on every side by pitchmen for materialism and atheism, and to maintain a consistent theistic temperament is most difficult.

Perhaps the most dangerous enemies of theism are the materialistic so-called religions and philosophies that superficially claim to be of God, but actually teach atheism. These are very common, especially in the materialistic West. While paying lip service to belief in God, they relegate Him to a very minor role in the creation, then keep Him far in the background while propagating atheistic ideas like the independent creative power of matter and the evolution of species by random mutation. Thus many ostensibly faithful people are recruited for the front lines of the atheists’ war against God because they have no means to protect themselves against such sophisticated disinformation, which conceals its real purpose behind a respectable front. Many become addicted to sinful pleasures of the tongue based on animal slaughter. Others fall for the appeal of mass-marketed lust in a permissive atmosphere of easy licentiousness. Thus the enemies of God convince the weak, little by little, to take up their cause.

It is well-nigh impossible to remain free from sin in a demoniac culture such as Western materialism. The only hope is that some intelligent individuals sense that they have been cheated, and research the world’s religious and philosophical literature in search of a cure, until they discover Vedānta-sūtra and allied writings, especially Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam. Then they should search out the association of advanced souls who have realized these esoteric teachings for themselves, and take up their service with enthusiasm. Such stalwart transcendentalists can recognize and defeat illusion is all its subtle disguises, for they know well the taste of Absolute Truth.
**Samśaya** [arisis of doubt]: Sāṅkhya philosophy differs from *Vedānta* in its view of the cause of creation, because it apprehends that the creation arose essentially from nothingness.

**Pūrvapakṣa** [antithesis]: If the material cause is different in its essential nature from the effect—if Brahman differs in nature from its effect, the world—then because the cause and effect being essentially different, the world before its creation was nonexistent in Brahman, the cause. In other words, the world was nothing [asat] before its origination because only the One [Brahman] existed then. But *Vedānta*, which holds that the world is a real effect of Brahman, and is real, cannot support this view.

**Siddhānta** [Vedic conclusion]: To this objection the author of the śūtras replies:

**Śūtra 2.1.7**

*asaditī cet na pratisedhamātratvāt*

*asad* – nonexistence, absolute nothing; *iti* – thus; *na* – not; *pratisedha* – denial, prohibition; *mātratvāt* – because, merely.

If it thus [be objected that the world is then an] absolute unreality, we say no, because [in the previous śūtra there was] merely a denial [of the sameness in nature between the cause and the effect, and not that the two are substantially different.]

The objection raised by the *pūrvapakṣin* is insubstantial, because the denial in the previous śūtra was was only with regard to the assumption that the cause and effect must be of the same essential nature. It was not intended to mean that the substances of the two are different. For example, liquid water is qualitatively different from the gases hydrogen and oxygen, but there is no substantial difference between the cause and the effect. Our position is that Brahman Himself becomes modified into the world, and then manifests different characteristics.

The meaning is this: when you say that there is a difference in nature between the cause—Brahman—and the effect—the world, and that therefore Brahman cannot be the cause of the world, do you mean to say that because all the attributes of Brahman do not reappear in the effect, therefore the effect is not due to Brahman? Or do you intend to say that because only some characteristics appear and others do not, therefore Brahman is not the cause? You cannot mean the first, for then there would be no such thing as cause and effect, because the cause and the effect are never identical in all characteristics. The very relationship of cause and effect implies that there is some difference between them. For example, although the lump of clay is the material cause of the jar that you make out of it, the jar does not possess lumpiness, but has a different form altogether. If however you mean the second, and try to say that no characteristics of Brahman appear in the world, then you are evidently wrong. For Brahman is *Sat* or being, and the quality of beingness or existence certainly appears in the world. Nor can you say that, because particular aspects of Brahman, such as His joyousness, etc., do not appear in the world therefore the world is not His effect. You cannot pick and choose the qualities at random, for then any thing may become the cause of any other thing; everything will be the cause of everything else, and the law of causation will be reduced to absurdity.

Says the objector, “We do not hold any such absurd position. But we demand that the particular attributes that differentiate the cause from other objects should reappear in the effect, for the relation of cause and effect is constituted by the persistence or inheritance of those characteristic things that differentiate the cause from other things. For example, the characteristics that distinguish a thread from gold persist in the cloth manufactured from the thread and the bracelet made from gold.”
To this, we reply that this is not an invariable rule, for this rule is violated in the production of herbs from earth, and so on. Nor is the gold in every respect the same as the bracelet; there is a difference in condition between the two. Though the world and Brahman are different, as the Philosopher’s Stone is different from gold, yet they have this in common, that both are essentially one in substance, as the gold and the bracelet. Therefore the world, though an effect, is not unreal, because it is an emanation from Brahman, or absolute reality.

The modern atheistic scientists propound a variation on this same argument: “If you think that God created the world, how is it possible because even if God exists, He is spiritual, and spiritual things are insubstantial. It is not possible that an insubstantial spiritual entity created the manifested material creation, because something [matter or the universal creation] cannot come from nothing [God or the spiritual existence].”

This argument is invalid because it rests upon several false assumptions. The scientists’ favorite trick is to deny subjective evidence that is revealed directly to consciousness, and accept only objective evidence that is visible to the material senses or their technological extensions. By doing so, they conveniently eliminate all manifestations of spiritual truth, because consciousness and its corollaries like personality, individuality, mind, intelligence and so on are always purely subjective. We will ignore for now the hypocrisy that the scientists’ own consciousness and intelligence, of which they are so proud, fall among the subjective phenomena they refuse to accept when it suits their purposes. But the phenomenon of consciousness itself is completely subjective because it is a symptom of the soul. The existence of God and other spiritual entities can be realized only by consciousness purified of material contamination. So the scientists cleverly eliminate the only possibility of observing the existence of God or the spiritual world by limiting the domain of acceptable evidence to objectively verifiable material facts. They refuse to follow the process of purification of consciousness that would allow them to verify the existence of God subjectively, in their own consciousness, and go so far as to argue that consciousness itself is unreal and simply an epiphenomenon of the electrochemical functions of the brain.

The argument that “The material world is objective and substantial, and God or spirit is only subjective and insubstantial” is also misleading. They are trying to establish that only the material existence is real, and the spiritual world is more or less imagination. In reality it is the other way around, because the existence of all material things is relative and impermanent, but the existence of spiritual entities is eternal and absolute.

\[
\begin{align*}
nāsato \text{ vidyate bhāvo} \\
nābhāvo \text{ vidyate satah} \\
ubhayor \text{ api } drṣṭo \ 'ntas \\
\text{tv anayos tattva-darśibhiḥ}
\end{align*}
\]

“Those who are seers of the truth have concluded that of the nonexistent there is no endurance, and of the existent there is no cessation. This seers have concluded by studying the nature of both.” [Bhagavad-gītā 2.16]

Brahman or God is not nothing; conversely, He is the source of everything. Dull matter has no way of bringing itself into existence; it must be created, energized and organized by an outside force. That force is the Supreme Personality of Godhead, who exists before the material world is created and after it is destroyed.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{aham evāsam evāgre} \\
nānyad \text{ yat sad-asat param}
\end{align*}
\]
paścād aham yad etac ca
yo 'vaśiṣyeta so 'smy aham

“Brahmā, it is I, the Personality of Godhead, who was existing before the creation, when there was nothing but Myself. Nor was there the material nature, the cause of this creation. That which you see now is also I, the Personality of Godhead, and after annihilation what remains will also be I, the Personality of Godhead.” [Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 2.9.33]

The reality of God and the transcendental world can be known only by the revelation of the Vedānta-sūtra and other scriptures, and the direct perception of the self-realized soul. Anyone can verify this spiritual existence, but to do so requires enough faith in the words of the scriptures to follow the process of self-realization to completion. The scientists and other materialists will uselessly labor in the obscurity of material illusion until they recognize this fact and perform the process of self-realization in their own consciousness. Then no more proof will be needed, for they will see for themselves that the statements of the scriptures are correct.

The Sāṅkhya opponent comes forward now with another objection:

Sūtra 2.1.8

apitau tadvat prasaṅgādasamarjanam

apitau - at the time of pralaya; tadvat - like that; prasaṅgāt - on account of the consequences; asamarjanam – inappropriate.

[If Brahman is the material cause of the universe, then] when the world is re-absorbed in Him, Brahman would have all the consequences of the world [tainted with all its defects, and thus the Vedānta texts would become] inappropriate.

If Brahman, with His subtle energies of spirit and matter, is the material cause of the world—a world full of misery and many defects, injurious to the progress of the human soul—then when it is reabsorbed into Brahman at the time of pralaya, Brahman would become tainted with all the concomitant consequences of matter. The force of vat in the sūtra is similar to iva [like]. As because of its imperfections the world is not the final object of man, so the Brahman tainted with the defects of the world would not be the final object, for in the state of pralaya Brahman would become tainted with all the defects of the material existence. That being so, inappropriateness would arise because the texts of the Upaniṣads that declare Brahman to be omniscient, pure, etc. would be contradicted. This is an additional reason why Brahman is not the material cause of the world.

The author sets aside this objection in the next sūtra:

Sūtra 2.1.9

na tu dṛṣṭāntabhāvāt

na - not; tu - but; dṛṣṭānta - instances, illustrations; bhāvāt - because of the existence of.

But this is not so, as there are instances of this effect.

The validity of the objection is set aside with the word tu [but].

There is no inappropriateness in Brahman being the material cause of the universe, for there are many instances to show that the cause is not tainted by the defects of the effect. Though the world is full of misery, yet the Lord is all-pure. He remains always untouched by evil. As in one picture, the different
colors do not overlap one another, but remain in their proper places, so the qualities of the world
remain in their proper place and do not affect Brahman. Similarly childhood, youth and old age are
attributes belonging to the body only, therefore they do not affect the embodied being; or as the defects
of blindness, deafness, etc. belong to the senses and not to the embodied being himself. The Vedas say,
asaṅgo 'yam puruṣah: “The soul is untouched by any material contamination.” So the defects of the
world do not appertain to Brahman. All those modifications of Brahman belonging to matter and
antagonistic to the highest goal of man appertain to the energies of Brahman, are energies of His śakti
and remain with His śakti, and do not pervade the pure Brahman.

nātaḥ param parama yad bhavatāḥ svarūpam
ānanda-mātram avikalpam aviddha-varcaḥ
paśyāmi viśva-sṛjam ekam aviśvam ātman
bhūtendriyātmaka-madas ta upāśrito 'smi

“O my Lord, I do not see a form superior to Your present form of eternal bliss and knowledge.
In Your impersonal Brahman effulgence in the spiritual sky, there is no occasional change and
no deterioration of internal potency. I surrender unto You because whereas I am proud of my
material body and senses, Your Lordship is the cause of the cosmic manifestation and yet You
are untouched by matter.” [Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 3.9.3]

We therefore hold that Brahman is the material cause of the world. This theory is not only free from all
objections, but the opposing theory of the Sāṅkhya that pradhāna is the cause of the world is open to
the following objection:

Sūtra 2.1.10

svapakṣe doṣāt ca

svapakṣe - in his own side; doṣāt - because of the fault or objection; ca - and.

The objections [to the Vedānta theory raised by the Sāṅkhya] apply with equal force to the
Sāṅkhya theory itself.

“O Sāṅkhya, the faults that you find with our theory are to be found in your theory as well. These have
been pointed out in another place.” One fault found is that the upādana or cause is different from the
effect. The same objection applies to the Sāṅkhya. Pradhāna is conceived to be devoid of sense
objects, like sound and the rest; but the world generated by pradhāna has the attributes of sound, etc.
Thus the cause is different from the effect in the Sāṅkhya theory also. The effect thus being different
from the cause, the objection that the effect is nonexistent and unreal also remains. Similarly, in the
state of reabsorption, when all objects merge with the pradhāna and become one with it, there will be
pervasion of pradhāna of all the effects of the world, so the objection raised in Sūtra 2.1.8 applies to
the Sāṅkhya theory also. All the objections raised by the Sāṅkhya against the Vedānta theory apply to
the Sāṅkhya theory as well. The Brahman theory deduces the creation from a conscious Being or spirit;
the pradhāna theory adduces it from unconscious matter. Moreover in the pradhāna theory of creation,
the very motive for creation is unclear, for the pradhāna being inanimate and unconscious, can possess
no motive at all. This will be examined in detail later on.

The author now shows that the scriptures, when supported by reason, are the cause of ascertaining the
truth, and consequently reason has its place in this system.
If it be said that there is no finality about reasoning, for it is always possible to infer the truth of the opposite; we say no, for then the undesirable consequence would follow that there would be no final liberation.

Owing to the differences in the brains of men, their reasoning powers are also different. There is no finality about reasoning; a position established by one man may be demolished the next day by a man with a stronger intellect. There is no conclusive certainty or definite finality about reasoning, even with regard to the acknowledged great intellects of the world; great thinkers like Kapila, Kaṇāda etc. are seen to contradict and refute one another. Therefore without relying upon defective human reason, we must accept that Brahman is the material cause of the world, simply because the Vedas and Upaniṣads declare it. Everything else follows by simple deduction.

It cannot be said that any human reasoning is absolute and unassailable, for then the reasoning by which a particular argument is held to be inconclusive would itself become invalid, leading to a logical paradox. On the other hand, if all reasoning is held to be inconclusive, then all worldly activities would come to an end. Human activities are all based upon inference, as we predict the future from the experiences of past and present. The actions that have been found to yield pleasant or painful results in the past are repeated or avoided by reason alone, for it is inferred that they would produce the same consequences in the future as well. Indeed, this is one of the most important and useful functions of the mind and intelligence.

This view that all reason is inconclusive also leads to the undesirable consequence that the existence of spiritual liberation cannot be established. A proposition established purely by human intellect, unaided by intuition or experience, is always liable to be set aside by a higher intellect born in another time or place. Thus over time, great confusion develops around the teachings of the scriptures as various commentators refute each others’ arguments. Such speculative arguments are too unreliable to engender the firm faith required for genuine spiritual advancement. Therefore spiritual liberation can never be attained by methods evolved by human intelligence, but must be attained by the methods given by direct Upaniṣadic revelation alone. The Mahābhārata [Bhīṣma-parva 5.22] therefore says,

acintyāḥ khalu ye bhāvā na tāṁs tarkeṇa yojayet

“How can that which is beyond the imagination or sensory speculation of mundane creatures be approached simply by logic?”

Logic and argument are always imperfect when applied to spiritual understanding. By utilizing mundane logic, one frequently comes to the wrong conclusion regarding the Absolute Truth, and as a result of such a conclusion one may fall down into a hellish condition of life. Nevertheless reason can be useful in analyzing the instructions of the scriptures and applying them to various circumstances. Those who are actually inquisitive to understand the philosophy of Vedānta through logic and argument are welcome to put the Vedānta-sūtras to the test, and those who actually know how to apply logic will come to the right conclusion that there is no philosophy more powerful than Vedānta.

It is perfectly true that within the scope of secular matters, such as mathematics, reason is absolute; but in transcendental matters, such as the existence of God, His role in the creation, the afterlife, the...
spiritual world, final liberation from material existence, etc., the conclusions of human intellect can never be perfectly free from doubt, because these matters are outside the scope of the mind and senses. For Brahman is inconceivable, and consequently unarguable. If you allow reasoning in the matter of Brahman, then you not only contradict the Śruti, but also your own assertions become incongruous. The Śruti itself says:

“O Nāciketā, this faith that you have got cannot be brought about nor destroyed by argument. The Self becomes easily attained when one is taught by a true teacher. O dearest disciple, your determination is strong. Inquirers like you are very rare.” [Kaṭha Upaniṣad 1.2.9]

The Smṛti also supports this:

“O Rṣis! The sages realize that Truth with tranquil bodies, senses and minds, but when that realization is overwhelmed with dry reasoning, it vanishes.”

Therefore, as Śruti is the highest authority in matter of religious law [dharma], it is the only authority in theological matters [Brahman]. Of course, reasoning auxiliary to Śruti is always allowed, because the word mantavya [reasoned about] shows that Brahman should be reasoned about. Smṛti also says that one should interpret a scriptural passage by looking into and reasoning about all that precedes and follow it. This is the very process of samanvaya by which this commentary is written.

**Adhikaraṇa 7: Kaṇāda and Gautama Refuted**

*Viṣaya* [thesis or statement]: Once we understand the Vedic view that the Supreme Brahman is both the efficient and material cause of creation, and that His multifarious potencies, internal and external, are responsible for the creation, we are faced with the surprising conclusion that all other philosophies, religions and theories of the creation are incorrect, because they all ascribe some degree of independent creative power and intelligence to dull, inert matter. This view is surprising because many of these philosophies are ostensibly religious or spiritual, yet directly or indirectly, they promote the atheistic view that the personal intelligence, will and energy of the Supreme Personality of Godhead are not required to explain the creation. Therefore all such illusory theories, having been refuted by the clear arguments of Vedānta-sūtra, are rejected.

All these theories are merely covered atheism, masquerading as knowledge. None of them can be proven, and none are supported by the Vedic literature. There may be some residual material attachment to such theories due to material education, childhood religious training or simple ignorance, but this attachment must be given up to make continued spiritual progress, because all such notions are actually offensive to the Supreme Brahman, the Lord. He is the source of everything, and in one sense, He is everything. He is the creator, controller and the proprietor of everything and everyone.

*mayā tatam idaṁ sarvaṁ
jagad avyakta-mūrtinā
mat-sthāṁi sarva-bhūtāṁ
na cāhaṁ tasy avasthitah

na ca mat-sthāṁi bhūtāṁ
paśya me yogam aśvaram
bhūta-bhrn na ca bhūta-stho
mamātmā bhūta-bhāvanah*

“By Me, in My unmanifested form, this entire universe is pervaded. All beings are in Me, but I am not in them. And yet everything that is created does not rest in Me. Behold My mystic
opulence! Although I am the maintainer of all living entities, and although I am everywhere, still My Self is the very source of creation.” [Bhagavad-gītā 9.4-5]

The idea that ‘all religious beliefs are somehow correct, at least for the believer’ is another sentimental attachment that must be rejected to make real spiritual progress. Actually it is a vestige of impersonalism; for all non-Vedic theories try to remove the Lord from the center stage of creation and diminish His importance. Vedānta-sūtra is very clear about its rejection of other theories and sole support of the Vedic version. This is because, of all the systems of knowledge in the world, only the Vedas are of divine origin; all others are unapologetically originated by defective human intelligence. Therefore, following the example of Vedānta-sūtra, no authentic self-realized soul will accept such factually erroneous, nonsensical and spiritually crippling theories.

The author has refuted the arguments of the Sāṅkhya and Yoga philosophers as regards Brahman being only the operative cause and not the material cause of the creation. Now he refutes all non-Vedic theories in general, and the Smṛtis of Kaṇāda and Gautama in particular, and answers the objections brought forward by their followers.

**Samśaya** [arising of doubt]: According to Kaṇāda and others, if Brahman is accepted as the material cause of the world, then those philosophies would find no scope at all.

**Pūrvapakṣa** [antithesis]: According to Kaṇāda and Gautama, bigger atoms are formed by the aggregation of smaller atoms. When two smaller atoms unite, they form a molecule called a dvianu or dyad, a triad, etc. The whole world is made up of atoms, which are the ultimate material cause of the universe, and not the Brahman or prakṛiti. Brahman, being all-pervading, cannot be the material cause of the world because it is limited.

**Siddhānta** [Vedic conclusion]: The author replies to this with the following sūtra:

**Sūtra 2.1.12**

\[
\text{etena śiṣṭā parigrahā api vyākhyātaḥ}
\]

\[
\text{etena – by this; śiṣṭā – the remaining systems; aparigrahāḥ – not accepted by the Vedas; api – also; vyākhyātaḥ – are refuted.}
\]

**Hereby other systems not in harmony with the Vedas are also refuted.**

The word śiṣṭā means the remaining. The word aparigrahāḥ means those philosophical systems that do not acknowledge or accept the Vedas as authoritative, but which rely on reason alone, and which therefore are not accepted by Vedānta philosophy. This sūtra teaches that by the refutation of the Sāṅkhya doctrine above, the remaining similar theories such as the atomic theories of Kaṇāda and Gautama are also refuted, for they are opposed to the Vedas on the same points. Vedānta-sūtra will specifically refute the various atomic theories later on.

In the next sūtra the author raises another objection and disposes of it.

**Sūtra 2.1.13**

\[
bhoktrāpatteravibhāgaścet syāllokavat
\]

\[
bhoktrā – with the enjoyer; āpatteḥ – from becoming; avibhāgaḥ – non-distinction; cet – if; syāt – it may be; lokavat – as in the world.
\]
[Someone may object that] if Brahman is accepted as the material cause of the world, then there would be no difference between the ātman and the Lord. To this we reply, it need not be so, as we see in ordinary life.

The objector says, “The Vedic opinion is that Brahman as possessing the subtle energy of spirit is Himself the material cause of the creation, and as possessing the gross energy He is also the effect. Let us see whether this view is sound or not. Now energy is not different from the substance of which it is the energy; therefore the ātman is not different from Brahmā. Thus your theory of two energies of Brahman lands you into contradiction, for it follows that Brahman and the ātman are one. Therefore the texts like ‘two birds,’ ‘when it sees the other as the Lord’ etc. become null and void when the difference established by them is ignored.”

To this objection we reply, it is not so. Even in ordinary life, we see that energy is different from the person possessing it. Thus a man armed with a sword is a single man, but the sword is different from the man, though it represents the energy of the man. Therefore, Brahman possessing śakti is still nothing more than Brahman, but the śakti is different from Brahman. Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad [1.10] says:

\[
\text{haraḥ kṣarātmānāv iśate deva ekaḥ}
\]

“Although the living entities are inexhaustible, being proud by considering themselves the enjoyers of material objects, they are prone to be conditioned by māyā. Both material nature and the living entities are energies of and controlled by the Supreme Lord. The Supreme Lord is one without a second.”

\[
\text{samāne vrksē puruṣo nimagno}
\text{niśayā śocati muhyamānāḥ}
\text{juṣṭam yadā paśyaty anyam iśam}
\text{asya mahimānam eti viṭa-śokāḥ}
\]

“Although the two birds are in the same tree, the enjoying bird is full of anxiety and morose; but if somehow he turns to his friend, the Lord, and knows His glories, at once he is freed from all anxiety. [Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad Chapter 4]

\[
\text{tam ātmasthaṁ ye' nupaśyanti dhīras-teśāṁ sukhaṁ śāśvataṁ [śānti śāśvati] netareśāṁ}
\]

“Only the wise person who can see that Supreme Soul within his heart becomes peaceful and enjoys transcendental bliss.” [Kaṭha Upaniṣad 2.2.12-13]

\[
\text{sarvaṁ khalv idaṁ brahma taj jalāniti śānta upāśita}
\]

“Whatever we see is a manifestation of Brahman. Everything is created, maintained, and annihilated by Brahman. Therefore one should peacefully worship Him.” [Chāndogya Upaniṣad 3.14]

\[
\text{bhūya eva vivitsāmi}
\text{bhagavān ātma-māyayā}
\text{yathedaṁ srjate viśvaṁ}
\text{durvibhāvyam adhīśvaraiḥ}
\]

“I beg to know from you how the Personality of Godhead, by His personal energies, creates these phenomenal universes as they are, which are inconceivable even to the great demigods.” [Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 2.4.6]
nimitta-mātraṁ tatrāsīṁ
nirṛtāṁ puruṣarśabhaḥ
vyaktāvyaktam idaṁ viśvaṁ
yatra bhramatī lohavat

“My dear Dhruva, the Supreme Personality of Godhead is uncontaminated by the material
modes of nature. He is the remote cause of the creation of this material cosmic manifestation.
When He gives the impetus, many other causes and effects are produced, and thus the whole
universe moves, just as iron moves by the integrated force of a magnet.” [Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam
4.11.7]

Thus there is no fault in the Vedāṇta theory of Brahman and His two śaktis. This theory will be
discussed in more detail in Adhikaraṇas 8 and 9 below.

Adhikaraṇa 8: The World is Nondifferent from Brahman

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: Originally the path of self-realization was established by the standard
direction of the Vedas. Śrīla Vyāsadeva divided the original Veda into the Sāma, Atharva, Rg and Yajur-
Vedas, the eighteen Purāṇas (supplements) and the Mahābhārata, and then the same author
summarized them in the Vedānta-sūtras. The purpose of all these Vedic literatures is to realize oneself
to be a spiritual being, eternally related with the Supreme Personality of Godhead, the all-attractive
spiritual fountainhead, Śrī Kṛṣṇa.

But all these different Vedic literatures were deliberately and systematically distorted by the onslaught
of the age of Kali, as the walls of the paddy field and the strand of the river are distorted by heavy
monsoon rains. These distorting attacks are offered by atheistic philosophers concerned only with
eating, drinking, making merry and enjoying. These atheists are intimately attached to sense pleasures
and gross materialism. Others do not believe in the soul or the eternity of existence. Some of them
propose that life is ultimately annihilated, and that only the material energy is conserved. Others are
less concerned with physical laws, but do not believe anything beyond their experience. And still others
equate spirit and matter, declaring the distinction between them to be illusory, and that even
consciousness itself is a myth. Therefore all of them are against the revelations of the Vedas.

There is no doubt that from every angle of vision, the Vedas stand as the oldest and most universally
recognized books of knowledge. But over the course of time the Vedic path has been attacked by
atheistic, materialistic and impersonalist philosophers like Cārvāka, Buddha, Arhat, Kapila, Patañjali,
Śaṅkara, Vaikāraṇa, Jaimini, the Nyāyakas, the Vaiśeṣikas, the Saṅghists, the empiricists, the
epicureans, the Pāśupata Śaivas, the Saṅgha Śaivas, the Brāhmaṇas, Āryas, Brahma-kumaris, Muslims,
Christians, material scientists and many others; the list of non-Vedic speculators grows daily, without
restriction. While some are openly Godless and others hide their atheism behind a veneer of
conventional religion, all of them without exception want to create the illusion that the Supreme
Personality of Godhead is separate from His creation, and that the Lord is not omnipresent or
omnipotent. These overt and covert attacks on the very basis of theism and morality have weakened
people’s intelligence and degraded the moral fabric of human civilization until it resembles the vicious
activities of animals.

The path of the Vedas does not accept any philosophy lacking the concepts of an eternal relationship of
the soul with God and attainment of His devotional service, culminating in transcendental ecstatic love
for Him. It is the only spiritual teaching that fully recognizes and explains that the Supreme Personality
of Godhead is the ultimate cause of everything; that His spiritual and material energies are source of the
living entities and the material creation; that since nothing but Him actually exists, whatever we see is simply a transformation of His energy and substance; that He creates this material existence as a means of fulfilling the desires of the living entities who wish to be apart from His personal association; and that self-realization, or the direct perception of the Absolute Truth by individual consciousness as described in the Vedas, is the ultimate solution to all the problems and suffering of human life.

The two great pillars of Vedānta philosophy are explained in this Adhikaraṇa and the following one: that because the material energy is simply a transformation of Brahman, the creation is nondifferent from Him; and that Brahman is both the operative and material cause of the creation. All the principal concepts of Vedic philosophy derive from these two most important revelations by a simple process of deduction. If these two ideas are firmly and clearly established in one’s mind, then the complete cosmic conception of Vedānta is easily understood; without them it is inconceivable.

Although in a previous Adhikaraṇa it was proved that Brahman is the material cause of the world, yet it does not automatically follow that the creation is nondifferent from Him. Therefore in this Adhikaraṇa the author of the sūtras wishes to establish that the world is nondifferent from its cause, Brahman. In Sūtra 2.1.7 and subsequent sūtras, the non-difference of the world from Brahman was assumed, and the proof that Brahman is the material cause of the world was given on that assumption. The present sūtra raises an objection against that non-difference and then refutes it, making the doctrine that Brahman is nondifferent from His creation explicit.

Saṁśaya [arisel of doubt]: The question is whether this world, which is an effect, is different from its cause, Brahman, or not?

Pūrvpakṣa [antithesis]: The followers of Kaṇāda hold the view that the effect is always different from the cause. Their reasons are as follows:

1. The difference of ideas: cause and effect are objects of different ideas; a lump of clay, which is the material cause, is different from the jar which is its effect.

2. The difference of words: the word ‘jar’ applied to the effect, is never applied to the lump of clay which is its material cause. Thus the cause and effect are not only represented by different ideas in our minds, but also by different words.

3. The difference of applications: a jar is useful for fetching water from a well, but the lump of clay has no such use.

4. The difference of forms: the cause, clay, is merely a lump in shape; the jar, the effect, has a different shape with a neck, etc.

5. The difference of time: the cause is prior in time, the effect is posterior.

Thus for all these reasons, the effect is different from the cause. If it were not different, then the work of the person producing the effect would be useless. If a jar is the same as a lump of clay, then the labor of the potter is useless; for the jar would come into existence automatically. If it is said that the effect is always existing, but simply unmanifest in the beginning, so the activity of the agent is necessary, this view is also incorrect. For the questions arise, “Does the effect exist before manifestation or not? Or is the manifestation existent or nonexistent prior to the activity of the agent?” The manifestation cannot exist prior to the action of the agent, for then such activity would be purposeless, and it would follow that the effect should be always perceptible. Moreover, this would result in removing the distinction between eternal and non-eternal things. If it is assumed that one manifestation requires another manifestation to account for it, then we are driven into an infinite regression. If it is held that manifestation is unreal [asat] then we lapse into the theory of the asat-kāryavāda, according to which
the effect does not exist before its origination. Therefore the *pūrvapakṣa* is that the effect is always
different from the cause, and that activity of the agent is not necessary for the production of an unreal
effect. Therefore the Nyāyikās hold that in the creation, a material cause which is *sat* produces an effect
that is *asat*.

*Siddhānta* [Vedic conclusion]: This view of the Vaiśeṣikās is refuted by the author in the following
*sūtra*:

**Sūtra 2.1.14**

\[tadananyatvamārmbhaṇaśabdādibhyah\]

*tat* – from that; *ananyatvam* – the identity; *ārmbhaniṇa* – *ārmbhaṇa*; *śabdādibhyah* – from the
words beginning with.

**The non-difference [of the world from Brahman is established in the verses of the
Chāndogya Upaniṣad] beginning with the word *ārmbhaṇa*.**

The word *tat* means ‘from that,’ namely from Brahman, the material cause of the world who possesses
two *śaktis* called *jīva* and *prakṛti*, spirit and matter. This world is certainly an effect, but it is not
different from its cause, namely Brahman. How do we know this? We learn it from the passage
of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* beginning with the word *ārmbhaṇa* [in the beginning], as quoted below.

*Hariḥ oṁ*. There once lived Śvetaketu Āruṇeya, the grandson of Āruṇa. His father Uddālaka said to him, “My dear Śvetaketu, go to school, for there is none in our family who has not
studied the *Vedas* and is therefore a *brāhmaṇa* only by birth.”

Having begun his apprenticeship with a teacher when he was twelve years old, Śvetaketu
returned to his father when he was twenty-four, having studied all the *Vedas*, conceited and
stern, considering himself well-read.

His father said to him, “My dear Śvetaketu, as you are so conceited and stern, considering
yourself well-read; have you ever asked for that instruction by which we hear what cannot be
heard, by which we perceive what cannot be perceived, by which we know what cannot be
known?”

“What is that instruction, Sir?” he asked. The father replied, “My dear boy, as by one clod of
clay all that is made of clay is known, the difference being only in name arising from speech,
but the truth being that all is clay;

“And my dear boy, as by one nugget of gold all that is made of gold is known, the difference
being only a name arising from speech, but the truth being that all is gold;

“And my dear boy, as by one pair of nail-scissors all that is made of iron is known, the
difference being only a name arising from speech, but the truth being that all is iron; thus, my
dear boy, is that instruction.”

The son said, “Surely those venerable men, my teachers, did not know that. For if they had
known it, why should they have not told it to me? Therefore Sir, do tell me that.” “Be it so, said
the father.

“That which is manifested, which owing to the distinctions of names and forms, bears a
manifold shape, was in the beginning one only, owing to the absence of the distinction of names
and forms. He thought, ‘May I be many, may I grow forth.’ ” [*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.2.1-3]
Thus we see that the cause of the creation Brahman is nondifferent from the effect, the chief differences being only a matter of forms and names. So it is perfectly possible for a cause and its effect to be nondifferent. If it is held that the pot is different from the clay, the objection would arise that they should have double weight. The weight of a lump of clay being one unit, and the weight of the pot another; if the cause and effect were two different things, when the pot is weighed in the balance, the weight ought to be double. But the pot does not show any increase in weight over the lump of clay from which it is made; thus the substance of the clay and the pot is one. The clay and the pot are the same in other respects as well; for example, chemical analysis of the pot shows the same materials as in the clay. Chāndogya Upaniṣad [6.1.4] states:

> vācārāmbhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyaṃ mṛttikā iti eva satyam

> “All transformation is a mere matter of words, and is nothing but name. Therefore, the truth is that it is only clay.”

Pots of various shapes and sizes are made out of clay and given different names, but they are all nothing but clay, and do not have any reality apart from clay. Similarly, the world consisting of various forms and names is in reality nothing but Brahman, and has no existence apart from Brahman. The pot is not an illusory effect, like the illusion of silver in the seashell. Although silver exists as a real substance, there is no silver in mother of pearl; however, the pot consists wholly of the clay from which it is made. Similarly, the universe is nothing but Brahman, although Brahman has transformed Himself into the various forms and names of the manifested creation.

Nor can you say that the theory of manifestation has no Vedic authority for it. For we find in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa [7.3.26]:

> kalpānte kāla-srṣtena
> yo 'ndhena tamasāvṛtam
> abhivyānaṃ jagad idaṁ
> svayañjyotiḥ sva-rociśā

> “At the end of each Kalpa, the universe is fully covered with dense darkness by the influence of time; and then again, during his next day, that self-effulgent lord, by his own effulgence, manifests, maintains and destroys the entire cosmic manifestation through the material energy, which is invested with the three modes of material nature.”

> ātma-māyāṃ samāviśya
> so 'haṁ gunamayūṁ dvija
> srjan rakṣan haran viśvaṁ
> dadhre samjñāṁ kriyocitāṁ

The Lord continued: “My dear Dakṣa Dvija, I am the original Personality of Godhead, but in order to create, maintain and annihilate this cosmic manifestation, I act through My material energy, and My representations are differently named according to the different grades of activity.” [Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 4.7.51]

Nor is this theory open to the objections of accomplishing a thing that is already accomplished, or infinite regression. For we do not acknowledge that the manifestation existed prior to the activity of the agent; nor do we accept that one manifestation requires another to manifest it, and so on.

Says an objector, “If so, then you are open to the objection of maintaining the theory of asat-kāryavāda [the effect does not exist before its origination]. For the activity of the agent manifests the effect, which did not exist before; thus the activity of the agent creates the effect.”
To this we reply, it is not so. The activity of the agent, material nature [prakṛti], produces manifestation, but does not produce the effect. For the manifestation of the material creation is not the effect; the effect of the Lord’s creative potency is the material nature, which under the proper circumstances has the power of self-manifestation. Manifestation is characterized by the substratum of which it is the manifestation. In other words, the manifestation of the substratum of material nature—its basic elements, energies and laws—constitutes the manifestation of the world. But the manifestation in the form of saṁsthāna-yoga [integration of atoms] or material transformations is an ongoing manifestation, and thus there is no fault in the theory set out by Vedānta philosophy, because this potential power of material manifestation resides eternally in Brahman.

On the other hand, those who maintain that an effect is the result of a cause which is asat or nonexistent (in other words, that an effect is completely different from its cause) are wrong, because it is impossible to prove and is self-contradictory. For if it were so, then the result would be as follows: the effect will be nonexistent before the cause that manifests it, and consequently, anything would be the effect of any other thing, and everything would produce the same effect and every thing would come out of everything else. Since nonexistence is present everywhere, and according to you, an effect is nonexistent before its manifestation, therefore any effect can be produced from anything. Thus not only could oil be extracted from sesame, but we would also get milk from the same seeds. Because the oil [the effect] is nonexistent in the seed, being the result of the activity of the agent, milk could also be extracted from the seed by the same activity. Moreover your theory is open to another objection. If the effect were totally nonexistent prior to its manifestation, then the production of an effect would be agentless. Nor can you say that some energy inherent in the cause would regulate the particular effect that cause would produce, because there can be no relationship between an existent cause and a nonexistent effect.

Moreover we have the following dilemma also: does the origination originate itself or not? If so, then we have an infinite regression; for one origination we require another origination to originate it, and so on. In the second alternative, the effect being nonexistent and non-eternal, the origination becomes impossible. Thus both these alternatives are wrong. It would follow that we must perceive an effect always, or not at all. If you say “Origination being itself an origin, there is no necessity of imagining another origin for it,” then it is the same thing as the Vedic theory of manifestation; and in that case the theory of origination and the theory of manifestation become identical.

sa eṣa ādyaḥ puruṣaḥ
kalpe kalpe srjaty ajah
ātmātmanyā tātmanātmānaṁ
sa sānyacchatī pāti ca

“That supreme original Personality of Godhead, Lord Śrī Kṛṣṇa, expanding His plenary portion as Mahā-Viṣṇu, the first incarnation, creates this manifested cosmos, but He is unborn. The creation, however, takes place in Him, and the material substance and manifestations are all Himself. He maintains them for some time and absorbs them into Himself again.” [Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 2.6.39]

The author now shows through further arguments that the effect is nondifferent from the cause, by the following aphorism:

**Sūtra 2.1.15**

bhavecopalabdheḥ
bhave – in the existence; ca – and; upalabdheḥ – because of the perception.

And because the cause is perceived in the effect.

We perceive the existence of the clay or gold that are the material causes of the pot or crown in their effects. In fact, the perception of the clay or gold in the pot of crown would not have been possible if the effect were completely different from the cause.

An objector may say, “But we do not recognize the cause in the elephants and other animals produced from the wish-fulfilling tree [kalpa-vṛkṣa], for there is nothing in common between the tree and its effects, the animals that are produced.”

To this we reply that there is no force in the objection, for here also there is recognition of the cause in the effect. The kalpa-vṛkṣa tree is a physical object, and so are the animals produced from it; therefore, recognition is possible on the basis of both being physical matter.

An objector says, “But there is no recognition of fire in smoke; and smoke, being an effect of fire, ought to show fire in it.”

To this we reply that smoke is really an effect of damp fuel, which when coming in contact with fire, throws off its earthy particles in the form of smoke. That the smoke is an effect of the damp fuel is proved by the fact that the aromas of the fuel and the smoke are similar.

tenaikam ātmānam aśeṣa-dehināṁ
kālaṁ pradhānāṁ puruṣam pāreśam
sva-tejasā dvivasta-guṇa-pravāham
āmaika-bhāvena bhajadhvam addhā

“Because the Supreme Lord is the cause of all causes, He is the Supersoul of all individual living entities, and He exists as both the remote and immediate cause. Since He is aloof from the material emanations, He is free from their interactions and is Lord of material nature. You should therefore engage in His devotional service, thinking yourself qualitatively one with Him.” [Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 4.31.18]

Sūtra 2.1.16

sattvāccāvarasya
sattvāt – because of the existence; ca – and; avarasya – of the posterior.

[The effect is nondifferent from the cause,] because it is existent in the cause [prior to its manifestation,] though it is posterior [in time].

The effect is nondifferent from its cause for this additional reason: before its manifestation it exists in latency in the cause. Thus the Śruti says, “Only Being existed in the beginning.” Also Smṛti says:

“As in the seed of barley there exists in latency the root, the stem, the leaf, the bud, the carpels, the ovary, the flower, the milk, the rice, the husk and the seeds; they manifest out of the seed when they get the proper conditions and materials to manifest them. O best of the sages, similarly, the bodies of devas and others exist in innumerable karmas. When they get context with the Viṣṇu energy they come into manifestation. Certainly that Viṣṇu is the Supreme Brahman, who is the sustenance and dissolution of this universe.
We can get oil from sesame because the oil exists in latency in the seed; but we cannot get oil from sand because it has no oil in it. Existence is the same both in Brahman and in the world, and because everything exists in Brahman so it can come out of Him.

\[
tvam vā idam sad-asad īṣa bhavāṁs tato 'nyo
māyā yad ātma-para-buddhir iyaṁ hy apārthaḥ
yad yasya janma nidhanain sthitir īkṣaṇaṁ ca
tad vaistad eva vasukālavad aṣṭi-tarvoh
\]

“My dear Lord, O Supreme Personality of Godhead, the entire cosmic creation is caused by You, and the cosmic manifestation is an effect of Your energy. Although the entire cosmos is but You alone, You keep Yourself aloof from it. The conception of ‘mine and yours’ is certainly a type of illusion [māyā] because everything is an emanation from You and is therefore not different from You. Indeed, the cosmic manifestation is nondifferent from You, and the annihilation is also caused by You. This relationship between Your Lordship and the cosmos is illustrated by the example of the seed and the tree, or the subtle cause and the gross manifestation.” [Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 7.9.31]

Previously we established the identity of the effect with the cause, even after origination. The next two aphorisms establish the same identity of the effect with the cause, even after the destruction of the effect and its merging into the cause.

**Śūtra 2.1.17**

\[
\text{asatvyapadeśānneticenna dhammāntareṇa vākyadesāt}
\]

\[
asat – nonexistent; vyapadeśāt – because of the designation; na – not; iti – thus; cet – if; na – not; dharma-antareṇa – on account of another attribute; vākyadesāt – because of the complimentary passage.
\]

[If it be said that the effect does not exist in the cause after dissolution,] because there is a text designating it as non-being, we reply that it not so, since the word *asat* [non-being] refers to another attribute of the effect, as would appear from the complimentary passage of that text.

An objector declares, “Let it be so. But we find the following passage in *Taittiriya Upaniṣad* [2.7.1]:

\[
\text{asad vā idaṁ agra āṣīt}
\]

“In the beginning of this creation, only *asad* was present.”

Here we see that the effect is called *asad* or non-existing, consequently the effect vanishes completely at the time of pralaya, and therefore does not exist in the cause.”

To this objection we reply that it is not so, for the word *asad* used in that passage does not refer to absolute nonexistence, as you take it to mean, but it refers to another attribute of the effect, namely non-manifestation. The words *sat* and *asad* should be understood as referring to two attributes of the same object; namely to its gross or manifested condition, and its subtle or unmanifested condition. An object existing as cause is in subtle condition, and existing as effect it is in gross condition; therefore the word *sat* means the gross condition of an object, and *asad* means the subtle condition. Thus the word *asad* here refers to the subtle condition of the object, and is the designation due to another attribute of the object as different from the gross condition.
Objector: “But how do you explain the word asat, which literally means nonexistence, as meaning here the subtle condition?”

We do so in order to make sense of the passage consistent with follows in the same text; for further on we find the following:

“Asat verily was this in the beginning; from it verily proceeded the sat. That made itself its Self, therefore it is said to be self-made.”

The words “Asat made itself its Self” clears up any doubt as to the real meaning of asat. For if the word asat meant absolute nonexistence, then there will be a contradiction, for a non-existing thing can never make itself the Self of anything. Similarly, the word āsīt [was] becomes absurd when applied to asat, in the sense of absolute nonexistence, for absolute nonexistence can never be said to exist, and ‘was’ means existence. An absolute nonexistence can have no relation with time, either past or present, nor can it have any agency as we find in the sentence, “It made itself its Self.” Therefore the word asat here should be explained as the subtle state of an object.

In general, asat does not mean absolute nonexistence, but refers to that which does not posses absolute existence. Similarly, sat generally refers to real existence, which is eternal and absolute.

nāsato vidyate bhāvo
nābḥāvo vidyate sataḥ
ubhayor api drṣṭo ‘ntas
tv anyos tattva-darśibhiḥ

“Those who are seers of the truth have concluded that of the nonexistent [asat] there is no endurance, and of the existent [sat] there is no cessation. This seers have concluded by studying the nature of both.” [Bhagavad-gītā 2.16]

We do not say that the material world is unreal or that it does not exist, but that its existence is relative to the existence of Brahman. The principle of material energy [pradhāna] is eternal, being the external energy of Brahman, so it is real and existent in the full sense of the words. But the manifestation of the material creation [prakṛti], with its temporary names and forms, is both relative and temporary, therefore its existence is merely conditional. The Lord [puruṣa] is the origin, master and controller of both.

tvam eka ādyah puruṣah supta-śaktis
tayā rajah-sattva-tamo vibhidyate
mahān aham kham marud agni-vār-dharāḥ
surarṣayo bhūta-gaṇa idāṁ yataḥ

“My dear Lord, You are the only Supreme Person, the cause of all causes. Before the creation of this material world, Your material energy remains in a dormant condition. When Your material energy is agitated, the three qualities—namely goodness, passion and ignorance—act, and as a result the total material energy—egotism, ether, air, fire, water, earth and all the various demigods and saintly persons—becomes manifest. Thus the material world is created.” [Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 4.24.63]

Sūtra 2.1.18

yukteśabdāntarāccca
yukteḥ - from reasoning; śabda-antarāt - from another text of the Vedas; ca – and.
[Being and non-being are attributes of things, as is proved] by reasoning and other texts of the Vedas.

The cause of our thinking that ‘the pot exists’ is the fact that the lump of clay assumes a particular form with a neck, hollow belly etc., while the actual material remains simply clay. On the other hand, we think and say ‘the pot does not exist’ when the clay takes a condition different from a pot, for example when it is broken into pieces. Therefore existence and nonexistence, when they are applied to objects, show their different conditions only, therefore nonexistence in this connection does not mean absolute nonexistence. The Smṛti declares the same fact, as discussed in the Viṣṇu Purāṇa:

“The clay assumes the form of a pot, the pot [after being broken] becomes a potshard, which in time may be reduced to powder or dust, but the clay remains the same in all phases and conditions of the pot’s existence. Further analysis of the dust would reveal atoms of physical matter, but the matter never vanishes.”

Therefore the reason that we do not perceive the absolute nonexistence of the pot is that when we say ‘the pot does not exist,’ we mean only that the pot has been reduced into pieces. Thus there is no absolute annihilation of the pot; it has simply changed its condition from manifested to unmanifested. This is the proof by reasoning or yukti. As regards the other text, we find it in the well-known passage of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad [6.2.1]:

sad eva saumyedam agra āśīd ekam evādviṭīyam

“My dear boy, the Absolute Truth alone existed prior to this creation, one without a second.”

Thus both through reason and the authority of the Vedic texts, we come to the conclusion that the word asat used in the passage of the Taittirīya Upaniṣad quoted above does not mean absolute nonexistence, like the nonexistence of the horn of a rabbit; it means a subtle condition, the state of unmanifestation into which all objects enter at the time of pralaya or devastation. When this world merges into the Supreme Brahman, that very subtle condition of the universe is called asat [non-being], on account of its extreme subtleness. Therefore we come to the conclusion that even prior to its origination the world existed, and thus the effect is nondifferent from the cause, but is simply the cause in a different form.

The statement “Non-being can never come into existence because of the impossibility of such a thing, nor can being be the result of the activity of an agent, because of the futility of such agency; therefore the whole process of creation is an inscrutable mystery,” is incorrect, and proceeds from misunderstanding the significance of the words sat and asat as applied in the Upaniṣads. The Māyāvādīs hold the theory that māyā is neither being nor non-being, but different from both and utterly inconceivable. But there does not and cannot exist something unexplainable, different from sat and asat; therefore the only real māyā in the sense the Māyāvādīs conceive of it is their own nonsensical theory.

kālam karma svabhāvaṁ ca
māyeśo māyayā svayā
ātman yadṛcchayā prāptaṁ
vibhūṣūr upādade

“The Lord, who is the controller of all energies, thus creates, by His own potency, eternal time, the fate of all living entities, and their particular nature, for which they were created, and He again merges them into Himself at the time of devastation.” [Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 2.5.21]

The author now gives some illustrations to confirm the doctrine that the effect is something real and nondifferent from the cause.
Sūtra 2.1.19

paṭavacca

paṭavat - like a piece of cloth; ca – and.

And as a piece of cloth is not different from its threads, so the effect is not different from its cause.

As the materials of a piece of cloth existed before its manifestation in the form of threads, and as these threads, when arranged in a particular way lengthwise and crosswise, manifest the cloth, similarly this whole universe existed as the subtle energy of Brahmān, and when Brahmān desires to create, it assumes manifestation of the material world. The word ca [and] in the sūtra shows that other illustrations, like the seed and the tree, may be given here also.

sa sarva-dhī-vṛtty-anubhūta-sarva
ātmā yathā svapna-janekṣitaikāh
tāṁ satyam āṅganda-nidhīṁ bhajeta
nānyatra sajjed yata ātma-pātaḥ

“One should concentrate his mind upon the Supreme Personality of Godhead, who alone distributes Himself in so many manifestations just as ordinary persons create thousands of manifestations in dreams. One must concentrate the mind on Him, the only all-blissful Absolute Truth. Otherwise one will be misled and will cause his own degradation.” [Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 2.1.39]

Sūtra 2.1.20

yathā ca prāṇādīḥ
yathā – as; ca – and; prāṇādī – the vital airs called prāṇa, apāṇa, vyāna, samāna and udāna.

And as the different vital airs [are modifications of the chief prāṇa, so the effect is not different from the cause.]

In yogic trance induced by prāṇāyāma, or breath control, all the various life functions such as respiration, digestion, etc. cease for the time being; and the separated functions of apāṇa, vyāna, etc. merge in the main prāṇa and exist in latent in it. But when the yogī comes out of the trance, these other functions come out of the main prāṇa, manifest themselves, take possession of the various organs and manifest their different functions. Similarly, at the time of pralaya the universe loses all its specific differentiation and merges in the subtle energy of Brahmān, but continues to exist in Brahmān in that subtle aspect. Then at the time of new creation it emerges from Him because He desires to create, and then assumes different forms such as the pradhāna, mahāt-tattva etc.

The word ca [and] in the sūtra indicates that the illustrations of the piece of cloth in the previous sūtra and the example of the life functions in the present sūtra should be read together as one illustration. In fact, there are no illustrations anywhere of the theory that the effect is something non-real and different from the cause [asat-kāryavāda]. No one has ever seen the birth of the son of a barren woman, nor the flower in the sky, because such things are contradictions in terms.

Therefore Brahmān, although one without a second, has two energies, the subtle and the gross, one consisting of the aggregation of all living entities [jīvas], and the other of all the aggregates of matter [prakṛti]. In other words, Brahmān’s two energies are spirit and matter, and possessing these two energies, Brahmān is the material cause of the universe, and consequently the universe is nondifferent
from Brahman, but also has Brahman for its Self. Thus the proposition that the effect is nondifferent from the cause has been established. But Brahman, manifesting as an effect, through His inconceivable potencies, retains all His powers in their fullness. The manifestation of the material creation does not cause any decrease in Brahman. As it is said in Viṣṇu Purāṇa [1.19.78]:

\[
\text{om namo vāsudevāya tasmai bhagavate sadā}
\]
\[
vyatiriktaṁ na yasyāsti vyatirikto’khilasya yaḥ
\]

“I offer my respectful obeisances unto the adorable Lord Vāsudeva; He is above the entire universe, and there is nothing greater than Him.”

And Lord Vāsudeva Himself declares:

\[
\text{mayā tatam idam sarvāṁ}
\]
\[
\text{jąnad avyakta-mūrtinā}
\]
\[
\text{maï-sthāni sarva-bhūtāni}
\]
\[
\text{na cāhaṁ tēṣv avasthitāḥ}
\]

“And Lord Vāsudeva Himself declares: “By Me, in My unmanifested form, this entire universe is pervaded. All beings are in Me, but I am not in them.” [Bhagavad-gītā 9.4]

**Adhikaraṇa 9: Brahman, the Operative Cause**

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: Modern so-called scientific doctrine not only assumes that matter can act independently, it also assumes that the natural laws of physics and so forth sprang into being and are enforced without any cause. This is extremely illogical. When they attempt to explain the origin of the laws of nature at all, the scientists simply say that they are due to chance. But the universe is too finely structured, and its laws too delicately balanced to be the result of chance. There must be a superhuman intelligence who not only plans and designs the universe and its natural laws, but also is a potent creator who sets the creation into motion and enforces those laws. Then there are ubiquitous phenomena like time and gravity that the scientists cannot explain at all. Where do they come from, how do they work, and from where does their power to compel all material things originate? The scientists cannot answer these questions, so they simply refuse to discuss them with religious people.

This Adhikaraṇa presents the second great pillar of Vedānta philosophy: that the Lord is not only the material cause of the creation, but also the operative cause; and that He does not create for any material motive, but out of His unlimited transcendental bliss. Śūtra 1.4.23 asserted that Brahman is the material as well as the operative cause of the universe. Śūtras 2.1.6-20 have answered objections to the view that Brahman is the material cause of the universe, and by answering these objections the author has strengthened this view. Now he confirms the second view, that Brahman is the operative cause of the universe, by showing that none but Brahman could be the operative cause, and he answers the objections of those who hold that mukta jīvas are the creators of universes.

Vedānta philosophy holds that Brahman is the operative cause of the universe because of texts like Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad [3.1.3]:

\[
kartāram īśāṁ
\]

“He is the agent, the Lord, and the creator.”

Saṃśaya [arisal of doubt]: Is God the creator of the universe, or is some highly developed mukta jīva its cause? We find texts supporting both positions.
Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: Those who hold the view that mukta jīva is the creator of the universe quote a different text in support of their position:

>jīvād bhavanti bhūtānī

“All beings arise from the jīva.”

They maintain that if Brahman were the creator of the universe, it would detract from His perfection, because the world is full of imperfections. Therefore, they maintain that mukta jīvas create the universe.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: The author removes this doubt by showing that no jīva, however high, can ever produce the universe.

Sūtra 2.1.21

itārayaśadhiśāddhitakaranādidośaprasaktiḥ

 Itara – of the others; vyapadeśāt – from the designation; hita – beneficial; akaranādi – not creating, etc.; doṣa – imperfection; prasaktiḥ – consequence.

If the other view be held, [that the jīva is the creator of the universe,] then the result would be that [the creation would be liable to the objection that] the jīva intentionally creates that which is not beneficial for him.

Those who hold the view that the jīva is the creator of the universe must answer the objection, “Why does he create a world that is not beneficial for him?” If a man creates the world, why does he create it full of imperfections that cause him to suffer? If man would be the master of his destiny, and there were no Lord to award the result of good and bad actions, and if man alone were the creator of his world, then he certainly would not intentionally create a world that he knows would be painful for him.

The world, therefore, is not the creation of man, because we find that it has the fault of not doing that which is beneficial for man; on the contrary, it does what is non-beneficial for him. No man willingly wants to labor, but the conditions of the world are such than no one can live without laboring and undergoing troubles. The world, therefore, is not the creation of any man. No wise and independent person is ever seen to act like the silkworm; to create his own prison, and then enter into it and suffer all the miseries of confinement by his own will. Nor does any human being, being a pure soul, voluntarily enter into a material body which is full of impurities.

You want us to believe that the jīva, supposed to be free and pure prior to the creation, voluntarily confines himself to a mortal body of flesh, full of impurities, and enters into a self-created world where his freedom of action is severely restricted. That is absurd. Nor has anyone ever seen any jīva create the cosmic matter of pradhāna, or the subtle matter of intelligence and false ego, nor even ordinary physical matter. Earth, water, fire, air, ākāśa etc. are not the creation of any man. In fact, limited human intelligence reels just from contemplating the wonderful organization of this universe. Therefore, the theory that the universe is man-made is wrong. On the other hand, God alone is the creator of the universe, and the objection that He has created the world full of imperfection, when He Himself is perfect, will be answered later on.

Although Lord Brahmā, a jīva, is commonly understood to be the creator of the universe, his creative activity is only secondary to that of the Supreme Personality of Godhead, the Supreme Brahman. Lord Brahmā admits:
tasyāpi draṣṭur īśasya
kūṭa-sthāsayākhilātmanah
srjyam srjāmi srsto 'ham
īkṣayaivābhicoditaḥ

“Inspired by Him only, I discover what is already created by Him [Nārāyaṇa] under His vision as the all-pervading Supersoul, and I also am created by Him only.” [Bhagavad-gītā 2.5.17]

The same argument refutes the modern New-Age philosophy that the jīva is the creator, if not of the universe, at least of his own reality. They say, “Each of us is a godlike spiritual being, therefore we create our own reality. This is true even for people who do not understand this truth; therefore they create so many undesired effects because, not realizing their creative power, they do not control their minds and intentions. Because the mind creates whatever is placed into it, if they worry or think in a negative way, their mind automatically creates based on those negative ideas. Therefore one should keep his mind controlled and think only positively of the things that one wants to happen, and then the mind will automatically create it.”

Even accepting this theory for the sake of argument, it does not answer the question, “Who gave the mind its power to create?” Because certainly the living entity’s creative power is very limited. We do not have the power to empower our minds to create reality; therefore the power to do this must have come from some superior entity. If they answer that God gives the power, then they have to explain how He does so; and if they say that God is present within every living being, then it is the same as Vedānta philosophy. If they reply that the creative power is innate in the living entity, then again they have to explain where it comes from. Either way they have to accept the ultimate authority of the Lord. And we see in practice that undesired, unbeneﬁcial events occur even to people who believe this theory. So actually the Lord as the Supersoul is the real creator, and all events occur by His power and authority. He may delegate some of His power to His servants, but if they misbehave He can easily withdraw it again. So the Lord alone is the original creator.

An objector may say, “If Brahman is the creator, then He also is liable to the objection of creating a world full of misery, and after creating it with great effort, enters into it as the Universal Form and Paramātmā. Thus He also voluntarily creates a world of misery and then enters into it and lives in it.”

The author replies to this objection in the following sūtra:

Sūtra 2.1.22

adhikāṁ tu bhedanirdeśāt
adhikāṁ – greater than the jīva; tu – but; bheda – difference; nirdeśāt – because of pointing out.

But [Brahman is] greater than jīva, because the scriptures declare His difference [from the jīva].

The word tu [but] in this sūtra sets aside the doubt raised above. Brahman is greater than man, because He possesses vast power and is therefore something infinitely superior to man. When Brahman enters into the world that He creates, it cannot bind Him or limit His power, while the jīva entering into a self-created world would certainly be a cause of bondage to him. The difference between man and God is expressly taught in the scriptures. The Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad [3.1.2] declares:

samāne vrkṣe puruṣo nimagno
'nīśayā śocati muhyamānaḥ
“Although the two birds are in the same tree, the eating bird is fully engrossed with anxiety and moroseness as the enjoyer of the fruits of the tree. But if in some way or other he turns his face to his friend who is the Lord and knows His glories—at once the suffering bird becomes free from all anxieties.”

This verse clearly shows the difference between the ājīva, full of sorrow and delusion, and the Supreme Self, full of lordliness and glory. So also in Bhagavad-gītā [15.16-17]:

dvāv imau puruṣau loke kṣaraś cāksara eva ca
kṣaraḥ sarvāṇi bhūtāni kūta-stho 'kṣara ucyate
uttamaḥ puruṣas tv anyaḥ paramātmety udāḥṛtaḥ
yo loka-trayam āviśya bibharty avyaya īśvaraḥ

“There are two classes of beings: the fallible and the infallible. In the material world every entity is fallible, and in the spiritual world every entity is called infallible. Besides these two, there is the greatest living personality, the Lord Himself, who has entered into these worlds and is maintaining them.”

The Viṣṇu Purāṇa [1.2.16 and 24] declares:

“He who is higher than matter, pradhāna, jīvas, unmanifested world and time, He is the highest Viṣṇu, about whom the scriptures declare, ‘The wise see the highest pure form of that Lord Viṣṇu.’ Matter and the jīvas are distinct from Viṣṇu, though they are two aspects of Him. That aspect by which the Lord brings about the union of spirit with matter at the time of creation, and their separation from each other during pralaya, is called time. Thus the Supreme Viṣṇu has four aspects: the root of matter called pradhāna, the root of spirit called puruṣa, the manifested universe called vyakta and time called kāla.”

Similarly, in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa [1.11.38]:

etad īśanam īśasya
prakṛti-stho 'pi tad-guṇaiḥ
na yuyyate sadāma-sthair
yathā buddhis tad-āśrayā

“This is the divinity of the Personality of Godhead: He is not affected by the qualities of material nature, even though He is in contact with them. Similarly, the devotees who have taken shelter of the Lord do not become influenced by the material qualities.”

The Lord’s transcendental body is so powerful that even the limbs of His body are capable of the actions of the whole:

aṅgāni yasya sakalendriya-vṛtti-manti
paśyanti pāṇi kalayanti ciraṁ jaganti
ānanda-cimmaya-sad-ujjvala-vigrahasya
govindam ādi-puruṣaṁ tam aham bhajāmi

“I worship Govinda, the primeval Lord, whose transcendental form is full of bliss, truth, substantiality and is thus full of the most dazzling splendor. Each of the limbs of that transcendental figure possesses in Himself, the full-fledged functions of all the organs, and
eternally sees, maintains and manifests the infinite universes, both spiritual and mundane.”
[Brahma-saṁhitā 5.32]

Moreover in Sūtra 1.2.8 it has been shown that the Lord, though living in the world and in the jīvas, is not tainted by that contact. Thus the Lord, possessed of inconceivable infinite power, creates the world by His mere will, enters into it to sport in it and with it, and when it starts to decay, He destroys and rejuvenates it, just as a spider destroys its web and spins it again. Not the slightest taint of materialism accrues to the Lord as a result.

namah samaya suddhaya
puruṣaya parāya ca
vāsudevaya sattvaya
tubhyaiṁ bhagavate namah

“Dear Lord, You have no enemies or friends. Therefore You are equal to everyone. You cannot be contaminated by sinful activities, and Your transcendental form is always beyond the material creation. You are the Supreme Personality of Godhead because You remain everywhere within all existence. You are consequently known as Vāsudeva. We offer You our respectful obeisances.” [Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 4.30.42]

An objector says: “Man and God are however one in essence, and the difference between them is that of degree alone, just as the difference between the limited space confined within a pot and the infinite space outside it. Space is one and not different.”

To this we reply, it cannot be so, because we do not admit that the Supreme Brahman is liable to division or limitation like space. We cannot cut off a portion of Brahman and say that it is a jīva and the rest is the Lord. Nor are the jīva and Brahman related like the moon and its reflection in the water of a pot.

The objector replies, “Reflection no doubt does not possess all the glory and perfection of the original, and man being a reflection of God is certainly lower than God, but essentially the same.”

But we do not admit this, because the Lord being materially formless, it is impossible to have a reflection of Him. Reflection, being a material phenomenon, can affect only matter; no one has ever seen a reflection of spirit. The Vedānta philosophy of the relationship between the Lord and the living entities is not reflection, but the theory of emanation. Brhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad [2.1] states:
yathāgneḥ kṣudrā visphulingā vyuuccaranty evam evāsmād ātmanah sarve prānāh sarve lokāḥ sarve devāh sarvāḥ bhūtānī vyuuccaranti. tasyopaniṣat satyasya satyam iti.

“Just as small sparks emanate from a big fire, similarly all living entities, all planets, all the demigods, and all material elements such as the earth emanate from the supreme soul, Śrī Govinda. His instructions are the Supreme Truth.”

The third illustration given by the Advaitins is also inapt. “A king’s son brought up by shepherds considered himself one of them and never knew his lineage. A wise man passing that way recognized him, and told him that he was not a shepherd’s child but the son of the King. As soon as he heard this, his delusion vanished and he realized his own greatness. Similarly, as long as a man is overcome with ignorance, he thinks himself man, but as soon as he gets knowledge, he knows that he is actually God.”

To this we reply that according to this theory, God being one, and man being essentially equal to God, the delusion that a man is under must affect God, and thus it would detract from the omnipotence and omniscience of God. Since according to this theory no other being but God actually exists, the ignorance that makes a man think himself separate from God must be an ignorance dwelling in God.
Himself. God then would be imperfect, subject to delusion and illusion, therefore this theory is impossible. In his commentary on Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam [10.88.5], Śrīla Śrīdhara Svāmī cites the following passage from the Vedic literature:

\[
\begin{align*}
nāti-bheda & \bhaved \bheda \\
guṇa-dharmair & \īhaṁśataḥ \\
sattvasya & \sāntyā no jātu \\
\vīṣṇu \vīkṣepa-mūḍhate \\
\end{align*}
\]

“Lord Viṣṇu's peaceful mode of goodness does not differ substantially from His original, spiritual qualities, although it is only a partial manifestation of them within this world. Thus Lord Viṣṇu's mode of goodness is never tainted by agitation [in passion] or delusion [in ignorance].”

\[
\begin{align*}
nirmāṇa-mohā & jīta-saṅga-doṣā \\
adhyātma-nityā & \vinivṛttā-kāmāḥ \\
dvandvair & \vimuktāḥ sukha-duḥkha-saṁjñāir \\
gacchanty & \amūḍhāḥ padam avyayaṁ tat \\
\end{align*}
\]

“If the perfected souls become free from illusion by hearing the instructions of the Lord or meditating on Him, then how could the Lord Himself be subject to illusion? Therefore the Lord is always in a superior transcendental position, and never comes under the influence of His illusory energy.

Sūtra 2.1.23

\[
\begin{align*}
asmādivacca & \ tadanupapattiḥ \\
asmādivat & – like stone, etc.; ca – and; tat – of that; anupapattiḥ – impossibility. \\
\end{align*}
\]

And as stones, etc. [are not creators of the universe, so the jīvās, which are equally finite, have no power to create the world.] for it is impossible [for the jīva to create the world, just as it is impossible for a piece of iron, wood, etc.]
The jīvas, though sentient, have as little independence as a piece of stone, wood, or other inanimate object; consequently it is impossible for such a jīva to be the creator of the world. The Śruti also says that the Lord is the creator in the following text:

“He is the ruler of all beings; He is in every body.”

Similarly Bhagavad-gītā [18.61] says:

īśvarah sarva-bhūtānāṁ hṛd-deśe 'ṛjuna tiṣṭhati
bhrāmayan sarva-bhūtānī yantrārūḍhāni māyahā

“The Supreme Lord is situated in everyone’s heart, O Arjuna, and is directing the wanderings of all living entities, who are seated as on a machine, made of the material energy.”

**Sūtra 2.1.24**

> upasamāḥāradarśanānneti cet kṣīraravaddhi
> upasamāhāra – completion; darśanāt – because of the seeing; na – not; iti – thus; cet – if; kṣīraravat – like milk; hi – because.

[If it be said that the jīva is the creator] because we see him bringing many acts to conclusion, we say it is not so, as in the case with milk.

An objector may say, “The jīva is not perfectly inert like a piece of stone, etc.; he has the power of action, because we see him bringing various actions to their conclusions and getting the results. Nor is this agency of the jīva a delusion, because there is nothing to show that the jīva is not the real agent in the acts that he does. If it be said ‘Let the jīva be an agent, but he is an agent only subject to the will of God,’ we reply it is not so, for we have first to imagine a God, who we do not see in this world, and next to add that He is the mover of all other sentient beings in this world; the theory that God is the inciter of the souls to action therefore is wrong, on account of its very clumsiness. Therefore the jīva himself is the agent through his own self-initiated activity, and not because he is impelled to action by any external force.”

To this objection the author replies by saying that it is not so, as in the case of milk, for the jīva has the power of agency only as far as the cow produces milk. The cow has no power of her own to produce milk, for the production of milk is not a voluntary act by the cow. The primary agent in the production of milk is the force of prāṇa, as the Smṛti says, “It is the prāṇa that changes the food into the various humors of the body such as chyle, milk, etc.” Similarly, though we see the jīva apparently producing some effect, yet he is not acting independently; the primary agent is the Supreme Lord. This will be explained further in Sūtra 2.3.39, where it will be shown that the activity of every jīva proceeds from the Highest Self as the cause.

> sa eṣa yarhi prakṛter
> guṇeṣv abhiviṣajjate
> ahaṅkriyā-vimūḍhātmā
> kartāṃśīy abhimanyate

“When the soul is under the spell of material nature and false ego, identifying the body as his self, he becomes absorbed in material activities, and by the influence of false ego he thinks that he is the proprietor of everything.” [Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 3.27.2]
Thus the living being is not at all free to act, but is fully under the control of material nature, which is fully under the control of the Supreme Personality of Godhead.

If it be said that we do not see the hand of God in the acts of men, the author answers this by the next sūtra.

Sūtra 2.1.25

devādivaditi loke

deva-adi-vat – like devas and the rest; iti – thus; loke – in the world.

[God, though invisible, is the creator of the world,] just as the devas, [although invisible,] are seen to work in the world.

Devas like Indra and the rest are invisible, yet we see their activities, such as the production of rain, etc. in the world. Similarly, though God is not perceptible in the world, He is the unseen creator of it.

yaṁ vai na gobhir manasāsubhir vā
hṛdā girā vāsu-bhrto vicaksate
ātmānam antar-hṛdi santam ātmanāṁ
caksur yathai vakrtayasy tataḥ param

“As the different limbs of the body cannot see the eyes, the living entities cannot see the Supreme Lord, who is situated as the Supersoul in everyone's heart. Not by the senses, by the mind, by the life air, by thoughts within the heart, or by the vibration of words can the living entities ascertain the real situation of the Supreme Lord.” [Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 6.3.16]

The author now gives another reason to show the absurdity of holding the view that a jīva can be the author of the universe.

Sūtra 2.1.26

kṛtsnapraśaktiniravayavatvaśabdavyākopo vā
kṛtsna – entire; praśaktih – activity; niravayavatva – indivisible; śabda – text; vyākopah – contradiction; vā – or.

[The jīva is] entirely absorbed in every activity, or else there would be a contradiction of the text [that the jīva is without parts.]

He who holds the theory that the jīva is the creator must accept the conclusion that inasmuch as the jīva is without parts, his entire self is present in every act. But this cannot be said, because in lifting a light thing like grass, we do not see the employment of the entire force of the jīva. When the jīva puts his entire self into any action, all his power is manifested therein. As in raising a heavy stone, the jīva puts in all his power, but he does not do so in raising a light straw, and so the exertion is infinitely less. Nor can one say that in the latter case, the entire jīva is not active, but only a portion; because it is an admitted fact that the jīva is without parts. Therefore we cannot say that the entire jīva is present in the
act of lifting a stone but only a portion in lifting a straw. You may say, “What is the harm in admitting that the jīva has parts?” To this we reply that then you will be contradicting all those texts of the scriptures that declare that the jīva is without parts, for example:

“This self is atomic and is to be known by the mind alone, in which the chief prāṇa has completely withdrawn his five-fold activities. The mind of all beings is entirely interwoven by these five prāṇas and is consequently never quiet. But when the mind is perfectly pure, then the soul manifests his powers.”

.randnaṁ chindanti śastrāṇi

“The soul can never be cut into pieces by any weapon.” [Bhagavad-gītā 2.23]

Thus the soul is atomic, and consequently partless and indivisible. As regards those texts that say that the world is produced by the jīva, we have already explained that the word jīva in those texts does not mean the individual soul, but the living Lord. Therefore, the theory that the jīva is the creator of the world is untenable.

Now we shall consider whether the above two objections apply to the agency of Brahman. The objector may say that Brahman is also entire and indivisible, therefore if in all acts He puts His entirety then in lifting straw, etc., He would employ His entire powers, but that is not possible because it is done by a fraction of His power, or rather it is possible to be accomplished by a portion of His power. On the other hand, if He puts in a only a portion of His power in any activity, then this does violence to those texts that declare Brahman to be partless and actionless. Thus the same two objections as in the case of the jīva being the agent also apply in the case of Brahman. To this the author replies in the next sūtra:

Sūtra 2.1.27

śrutestu śabdamūlatvāt

śrutēḥ – from the scripture; tu – but; śabda – word; mūlatvāt – because of the root.

But [the above defects do not apply in the case of Brahman,] because the scriptures so declare it, and the revelation of God is the root [by which we learn anything about these transcendental subjects.]

The word tu [but] removes the above doubt. The word na [not] is to be understood in this sūtra, and is drawn from Sūtra 2.1.24. In the case of Brahman being the agent, the above imperfections do not apply. Why do we say so? Because scripture declares it to be so, such as:

“Brahman is transcendental, inconceivable pure consciousness and yet He has a form and possesses knowledge; and though He is partless He has parts, and though He is immeasurable He is yet measured. He is the creator of all, yet unmodified Himself.”

Similarly, in Munḍaka Upaniṣad [3.1.7]:

“The Lord shines forth as great, divine and inconceivable. He appears as smaller than the smallest, He is far off as well as near, and to the discerning, He is present in the cavity of the heart.”

This text also shows the paradoxical and transcendental powers of Brahman. Similarly, another text says:

“Lord Govinda is one, without parts, His form is existence, knowledge and bliss.”
In the *Gopala Upaniṣad* we read, “Though one, He shines forth as many.” In the *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad* we find Him described as partless and yet having parts.

> “He who knows the Lord as partless and yet full of an infinity of parts, as the destroyer of all false knowledge and blissful, is verily a sage and no one else; he is verily a sage and no one else.”

Similarly in the *Kathopaniṣad* [2.21] we find Him described as measured though immeasurable:

> “Sitting, He goes afar; resting, He moves everywhere; who other than myself is able to know that God who is the dispenser of pleasure and pain?”

So also in the *Rg Veda* [10.81.3]:

> “That one God, having His eyes, faces, arms and feet everywhere, when producing heaven and earth, forges them together with His arms and His wings.”

And in *Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad* [4.17]

> “This God is the creator of all, is the Highest Self, He is always present in the hearts of men; the wise, who know Him with concentrated mind and heart full of love, become immortal. He is the creator of all, He is in the heart of all, the source of Ātman, omniscient, the creator of time, possessing all auspicious attributes and knowing all, He is the Lord of all matter and spirits, He is the Lord of all guṇas, He is the cause of transmigratory existence and liberation, bondage and freedom.”

> “He is partless and actionless, pure and taintless, all peace. He is the supreme bridge of immortality, He is like fire that remains when all fuel is burnt.” *Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad* [6.19]

These texts of *Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad* show very distinctly that the Lord possesses powers that appear to us to be self-contradictory, and hence impossible. But in transcendental matters we must be guided by scripture and not by mere human reason.

Says an objector, “But are we to renounce our reason in favor of scripture, when there is pure contradiction such as the statement, ‘The fire has drenched the cloth’? Is not such a statement a logical absurdity?”

To this the śūtra replies, śabdamūlatvā: “The revelation of God is the root.” The knowledge of Brahman and His attributes being founded on the revelation of scripture, and scripture alone, we have no right to say that the scriptures are illogical, even if they describe God as having attributes that seem paradoxical from a material point of view. We must accept these inconceivable attributes of Brahman, because the only proof is the words of the scripture. Nor is it altogether mysterious. We see some distant analogy in the power of modern technology to produce apparently magical effects. Just because something is inexplicable or inconceivable to our tiny brains, there is no reason to hold that it is impossible.

There are three kinds of proofs: sense perception [pratyakṣa], inference [anumāna] and authority or the words of the scriptures [śabda]. In the first two cases, there is always room for error and illusion. A sensory perception may be a pure hallucination, caused by either hypnotic suggestion or a defect of the senses. Thus pratyakṣa or sensory experience is not absolutely reliable. Similarly, knowledge based on inference is also liable to error. We are all acquainted with the fragility of human reason. The only proof that is free from all these defects is the words of the scriptures, whether they are the words of God Himself, or those of an inspired sage or Āpta, meaning the perfect knowledge of one who is enlightened, competent and honest. Statements like “The Lord is omnipotent” and “the soul is eternal”
are always true, even though we may be unable to verify them by our blunt sense perception. The scriptures not only corroborate reason and perception; they are sometimes independent of both, and often declare that which neither reason nor perception could ever tell us.

The scriptures are the voice of God, giving us wisdom for our own benefit. As an instrument of proof, they support and corroborate perception and inference. Thus a man may have a jeweled necklace on his throat, but having forgotten it may be searching for it everywhere. But when he is told “The necklace is on your throat,” he is saved all further trouble and anxiety. So also the scripture is the only means of knowing that which cannot be known either by perception or reason, or at least, cannot be known by the perception or reason of an ordinary man. For example, the movements of the heavenly bodies and their influences have been declared to us by the expert astronomers and astrologers. Therefore the words of these persons are the only means that we have of knowing when certain astronomical phenomena, such as eclipses or the equinoxes, will take place. We consult a physician and accept his advice in matters of health, and seek the expertise of lawyers, mechanics and other specialists. Thus even in such mundane matters, the words of experts are a means of higher knowledge than our own perception or inference. All the more so in transcendental matters, where we have to depend on the testimony of seers and saints, and the highest testimony of all, the words of God or scripture. As the Śruti says,

“One who does not know the Vedas cannot even think of the Supreme.”

vedaiś ca sarvair aham eva vedyo
vedānta-krd veda-vid eva cāham

“By all the Vedas am I to be known; indeed I am the compiler of Vedānta, and I am the knower of the Vedas.”[Bhagavad-gītā 15.15]

Therefore, the scripture being self-evident and self-manifest, is not open to any objections.

Sūtra 2.1.28

ātmani caivaṁ vicitrāśca hi

ātmani – in the Lord; ca – and; evam – thus; vicitrāḥ – variegated; ca – and; hi – because.

[And thus is the power] of the Lord, because manifold objects [are seen to be produced from the tree of all desires.]

As from the kalpa-vṛkṣa [desire tree] or the Philosopher’s Stone, possessing inconceivable powers and energy, there come out animals and gold, and as these wonderful and mysterious creations are credible simply on the authority of the scriptures, similarly the inconceivable power of the Lord to create the world is understandable and believable by scriptural authority alone. The scriptures tell us that He creates the devas, men and lower animals by His power. If we believe in the wonderful powers of the desire tree or the Philosopher’s Stone simply on the authority of the scriptures, then why should we not believe in the inconceivable power of the Lord on the same authority?

The knowledge of these mysterious things comes from the scripture alone. When we hear that animals come out of the desire tree, we do not question whether they are created by the entire tree or a portion of it, or whether any particular part of the tree has the power to produce a particular animal. We accept the information and classify it as a mystery, admitting that it leaves no scope for reason. The case of the Lord’s creative agency is similar. It is useless to question whether the Lord is active in His entirety in any particular creative act, or whether it is done by a portion of His energy; we must simply accept the statement as we find it.
The word *ātmani* in the *sūtra* appears in the locative case to show that the Lord is the receptacle or support of all effects. The second *ca* [and] indicates that when we believe such wonderful things as the desire tree or the Philosopher’s Stone, why should we hesitate to believe in the mysterious power of the Lord? The word *hi* [because] implies that the facts mentioned above are well-known in the *Purāṇas* and other scriptures. Therefore the conclusion is that the theory that Brahman is the agent of creation is far more reasonable than any *jīva* being the agent. The next *sūtra* strengthens this view.

**Sūtra 2.1.29**

*svapakṣe doṣacca*

*sva-pakṣe* – in the opponent's view; *doṣat* – because of the defect; *ca* – and

And because all these objections are similarly applicable to your own view, therefore it is not accepted.

The objections raised by the opponent equally apply to his own theory. If the *jīva* is the agent of creation, does he create with a portion of his energy or his entire energy? In the case of Brahman, we already answered the objection, but in the case if the *jīva* being the agent, there is no possibility of getting out of the difficulty.

Now the author raises another objection and answers it. The doubt arises whether Brahman shows any partiality to any *jīva*, and if so, whether it is possible for such a Brahman to be the creator. The text says that Brahman is pure truth, knowledge and infinity. He is pure being, knowledge and bliss. In these texts we do not find any energy attributed to Him. It is seen that only beings possessing energy or power [*śakti*] have the capacity to produce wonderful results, such as a carpenter or others. A man may have the whole knowledge of the art of carpentry, but if he has no energy, he cannot accomplish anything. To this objection, the author answers in the next *sūtra*.

**Sūtra 2.1.30**

*sarvopetā ca taddarśanāt*

*sarva* – all powers; *upetā* – endowed with; *ca* – and, alone; *tat* – that; *darśanāt* – because it is seen.

The Lord alone possesses all powers, because it is so seen [in the text.]

The Supreme Lord is endowed with all kinds of energies [*śaktis*] because we find many Vedic texts to that effect:

*te dhīyāṇa-yogāṇugatā apaśyan devātmā-śaktim sva-gunair nigūḍām yaḥ kāraṇāni nikhilāni tāni kālātmā-yuktāny adhi tiṣṭhayā ekaḥ*

“One Supremely Energetic Personality is present within the time factor and the *jīvas*, and is the sum total cause of this material universe, which is regulated by His own desire. The Brahman realized souls meditate on the energy that is generated by the Energetic’s own will, possessing His selfsame qualities and influence. They perceive this energy as the cause of this material cosmos.” [*Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 1.3]
“The Supreme Lord is the one, non-dual Absolute Truth endowed with immense unlimited potencies equal only to Him. Although He does not have any tinge of material qualities, He gives birth to the material modes of nature through the agency of His multifarious potencies.”

[Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 4.1]

Similarly, in the Śrī Viṣṇu-śāstra we find Him described as possessing all kinds of powers, such as viṣṇu-śakti which is said to be the highest. No doubt these powers are all inconceivable as says the Smṛti:

“He is without hands and feet, yet He can walk faster than anyone. His power is inconceivable, He is the Lord of Self, not to be found by reasoning, possessing thousands of śaktis.”

Therefore it follows that Brahman is the agent in the act of creation, etc., because of His being endowed with wonderful and inconceivable powers. The texts declaring that Brahman is true knowledge, bliss, etc. reveal His essential nature, texts like Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad [1.3] quoted above declare His manifold powers. Consequently the nature of Brahman is one who is endowed with powers. Thus when the texts use expressions like ‘He willed,’ ‘He saw,’ etc. we find Him possessing the power of will and the rest. Both kinds of texts—those declaring Brahman to be pure existence, knowledge and bliss, and those declaring Him as willing, thinking, creating, etc.—are of equal value and authority because both are Śruti, and there is thus no difference between them.

The author raises and answers another objection: “Brahman cannot be the creator or agent, because He has no sense organs. Devas and others possess powers, and they are seen to be active agents in creation because they not only have powers, they also have sense organs. But Brahman is without sense organs, so how can He be capable of worldly activity? Even the verse [Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 3.19] that you quoted to prove the possession of all powers by Brahman, declares definitely that He has no sense organs:

apāṇi-pādo javano grahītā
apāṣyaty acakṣuḥ sa śṛṇoty akarṇaḥ
sa vetti vedyām na ca tasyāsti vettā
tam āhur agrām puṛuṣaṁ mahāntam

Although the Supreme Lord is described as having no hands and legs, He nonetheless accepts all sacrificial offerings. He has no eyes, yet He sees everything. He has no ears, yet He hears everything.”
To this objection the author replies:

**Sūtra 2.1.31**

vikaraṇatvānneti cettaduktam

vikaraṇatvāt – on account of the absence of instruments of action and perception; na – not; iti – thus; cet – if; tat – that objection; uktam – answered.

[If it be objected that Brahman cannot be the agent of creation] because He does not possess sense organs, then we reply that this objection has already been met by the scripture.

The objection that Brahman cannot be the agent of creation because He has no sense organs is answered in the very text quoted by the objector to show that He possesses no sense organs. Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad [6.7-8] asserts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>诗句</th>
<th>释意</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>tam īśvarāṁ paramaṁ maheśvaraṁ</td>
<td>O Supreme Lord, You are the Supreme Maheśvara, the worshipable Deity of all the demigods and the Supreme Lord of all lords. You are the controller of all controllers, the Personality of Godhead, the Lord of everything worshipable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>na tasya kāryaṁ karaṇaṁ ca vidyate</td>
<td>“Nārāyaṇa, the Supreme Personality of Godhead, is almighty, omnipotent. He has multifarious energies, and therefore He is able to remain in His own abode and without endeavor supervise and manipulate the entire cosmic manifestation through the interaction of the three modes of material nature—sattva-guṇa, rajo-guṇa and tamo-guṇa. These interactions create different forms, bodies, activities and changes, which all occur perfectly. Because the Lord is perfect, everything works as if He were directly supervising and taking part in it. Atheistic men, however, being covered by the three modes of material nature, cannot see Nārāyaṇa to be the supreme cause behind all activities.”</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

In the verse beginning, “He has neither hands nor feet...” [Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad 3.19] it was mentioned that the Supreme Brahman can perform any action without the instrumentality of material sense organs, and the above-quoted verses clear up any remaining doubt how the Lord can be active without material sense organs. The Supreme Brahman is called pūruṣam mahāntam, the Great Spirit, because He is the ruler of all living entities. When it is said that He has no activity or sense organs in His body, it is meant that His body is not made of ordinary matter, nor are His sense organs. Consequently His activity is also not material, but transcendental. Thus when the scriptures say that He has no activities, it only denies physical activity, because He does perform activities of the highest order through His parāśakti. That parāśakti is natural to Him, and therefore it is called svābhāvikī; in fact this supreme potency is the very essence of His Self. He manifests His threefold powers of knowledge [jñāna], strength [bala] and activity [kriyā] through this parāśakti. Since no one else possesses this transcendental attribute, parāśakti, therefore no one is equal to Him. It follows from this
that no one can be superior to Him. So although He is devoid of material sense organs, He possesses transcendental organs as essential parts of His nature, therefore there is the possibility of action for Him.

Other commentators say that the above-quoted text about His grasping without hands and walking without feet does not prohibit His possessing sense organs; it only prohibits the exclusive use of a particular sense organ for a particular purpose. Ordinary beings grasp only with the hands and run only with the feet. But for the Lord there is no such restriction; every one of His senses can perform the activities of every other organ. In fact the same Upaniṣad later says that sarvataḥ pāṇi-pādam: all His sense organs are universal in their activity.

"He does not possess bodily form like that of an ordinary living entity. There is no difference between His body and His soul. He is absolute. All His senses are transcendental. Any one of His senses can perform the action of any other sense. Therefore, no one is greater than Him or equal to Him. His potencies are multifarious, and thus His deeds are automatically performed as a natural sequence." [Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 6.7-8]

So also in the Brahma-saṁhitā, it is declared that every limb of His is endowed with the power of performing the functions of all the senses.

aṅgāni yasya sakārendriya-vṛtti-manti
paśyanti pāṇī kalayanti ciraṁ jaganti
ānanda-cinmaya-sad-ujjvala-vigrahasya
govindam ādi-puruṣaṁ tam aham bhajāmi

“I worship Govinda, the primeval Lord, whose transcendental form is full of bliss, truth, substantiality and is thus full of the most dazzling splendor. Each of the limbs of that transcendental figure possesses in Himself, the full-fledged functions of all the organs, and eternally sees, maintains and manifests the infinite universes, both spiritual and mundane.” [Brahma-saṁhitā 5.32]

This extraordinary power of the sense organs of the Lord was manifested in the forest picnic in Vṛndāvana among His boyhood companions. In the view of the above verses, the word kāryam should be explained as ‘to be accomplished.’ In other words, when Śruti-śāstra says there is no kārya for Him, it means there is nothing to be accomplished by Him, because He is already perfect and full. In this interpretation the word karana [sense organs] may also be explained as something to be done. The rest is the same as the first explanation.

In the next sūtra, the question is raised whether Brahman has any motive to create the universe. The prima facie view is that He has no motive because He is perfect, and this view is set forth in the next sūtra.

Sūtra 2.1.32

na prayojanavattvāt
na – not; prayojana-vattvāt – being endowed with a motive.

[The Lord has no inclination towards creation, because] He has no motive.

The word na [not] is understood in this sūtra from the preceding one. The word na-prayojana-vattvāt is a compound word meaning “because of being without motive.” The usual form would have been a-prayojana-vattvāt. The Lord has no urge to create, because being perfect, He has no motive to create.
Every activity in the world is seen to exist on a motive beneficial either to one’s self or for the sake of another. The motive of benefiting His own self cannot exist in the case of the Lord, because being perfect, His wishes are automatically fulfilled, as the scriptures repeatedly declare. The Lord tells Prahlāda in the Hari-bhakti-sudhodaya [14.32]:

\[
\begin{align*}
nityaṁ ca pūrṇa-kāmasya \\
janmāṁ vividhāṁ me \\
bhakta-sarveṣa-dānāya \\
tasmāṁ kiṁ te priyam vada
\end{align*}
\]

“My desires are always automatically fulfilled, but I take various births in this world just to bestow on My devotees the satisfaction of all their desires. So please tell Me what you would like from Me."

An objector may say, “Nor is His motive to do something beneficial to others, because the creation evidently is for the sake of punishing the conditioned souls, making them suffer the pains of birth and death. An all-compassionate Lord would not create such a universe, merely to punish the erring jīvas for their misdeeds. And no one creates anything without a motive. Therefore, it follows that the Lord has nothing to urge Him to creation.”

This objection is answered in the next sūtra.

**Sūtra 2.1.33**

lokavattu līlākaivalyam

\[ loka-vat – as in the world; tu – but; līlā – pastimes; kaivalyam – merely. \]

[The motive of the Lord in creating the world is] to display His pastimes, as we see in ordinary life.

The word *tu* [but] removes the above doubt. Though all-full, complete and desiring nothing, the motive that impels the Lord toward the creation of this wonderful world is mere sport, which has nothing beneficial for Him in view. As in ordinary life, men in good spirit, full of cheerfulness, when awakening from sound sleep, begin to dance around without any object, but merely from exuberance of spirit, such is the case with the Lord. This *līlā* or sport of the Lord is natural to Him, because He is full of Self-bliss. Says the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad [1.9]:

“Some think that the creation is for the enjoyment of the creator, while others think that it is for the sake of recreation, to shake off the lethargy of *yoga-nidrā* or the solitude of *pralaya*. Actually, God’s act of creation is simply His nature, without any motive. What motive can there be for one who has all His desires satisfied?”

The Smṛti-sāstra confirms [Nārāyaṇa Saṁhitā]

“The creation, etc. of Hari does not depend on any motive; He creates out of sheer joy, as a drunkard dances because of intoxication. He who is full of bliss can have no motive whatsoever. When even the Muktas have got all their desires fulfilled through Him, what unfulfilled desire can there be for the Lord, who is the Self of the universe?”

But a man intoxicated with drink has no consciousness of what he is doing. Is the Lord also devoid of consciousness, like the drunkard? We say no, for then He would not be omniscient. All that we say is that as man plays and becomes sportive through sheer exuberance of spirit and joy of life, such is the case with Brahman. The Advaitins explain the words “as we see in ordinary life” in this sūtra as

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**Adhyāya 2**

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referring to the well-known example of respiration that goes on even in deep sleep, and which is therefore involuntary and motiveless. However, this analogy is open to the objection that the Lord is not subject to deep sleep and losing consciousness as a man does. The example given by the Viṣiṣṭādvaiteins is that of a young prince, who amuses himself by playing games with a ball without any motive. However, this analogy is open to the objection that playing games with a ball is not altogether without motive, as the prince gets some pleasure by playing the game.

Therefore the conclusion is that the Supreme Brahman is the sole operative, efficient and material cause of the creation, and that He creates the material world as a pastime to satisfy the desires of the materially conditioned living entities. He then enters within the creation to support and maintain it, controlling the actions and reactions of the modes of material nature by His potency of time. He does this in such a way that the conditioned living entities eventually grow weary of suffering the imperfections of this world, and begin to inquire as to why they are suffering, and how they may be permanently relieved from it. At this time the merciful Lord makes the path of pious activities leading to devotional service available to them through Vedānta-sūtra and other scriptures. Those who are fortunate take it up and attain the completion of all their desires.

**Adhikaraṇa 10: The Lord is Neither Partial nor Cruel**

**Viśaya** [thesis or statement]: We see that some people are born into favorable situations, while others are born into difficult situations. We also observe that sometimes an apparently innocent person is punished, or a blameworthy person prospers. Some philosophers and theologians interpret this to mean that God is either not omnipotent or is partial and unfair. If God were equal to everyone, then He is not omnipotent, because He is incapable of creating a situation where everyone is offered an equal opportunity to prosper and enjoy life; and if He is omnipotent then He is unfair, because although all souls are inherently equal, we see that some are more fortunate and others less fortunate, and sometimes there is injustice.

**Saṁśaya** [arising of doubt]: The author raises this objection and then goes on to remove the doubt.

**Pūrva-pakṣa** [antithesis]: The theory that Brahman is the omnipotent creator is open to the objection that the Lord is either partial or cruel; for He creates devas and men, some of whom enjoy happiness and others suffer misery. This theory is therefore not congruous, for the texts say that the Lord is neither partial nor cruel. How then can such a Lord be the creator?

**Siddhānta** [Vedic conclusion]: The author answers this objection with the following sūtra:

**Sūtra 2.1.34**

\[\text{vaśamyanaighṛnyena na sāpekṣatvāt tathā hi darśayati} \]

\[\text{vaśamya} – partiality; naighṛnyena – cruelty; na – not; sāpekṣatvāt – because of having regard for karma; tathā – so; hi – because; darśayati – the scriptures declare.\]

Partiality and cruelty do not [exist in the Lord; the pleasure and pain experienced by beings is] in regard to their karma, and so the scriptures declare.

No fault of partiality or cruelty exists in Brahman the creator. The different conditions into which creatures are born and the pleasures and pains they suffer depend entirely on their own karma. The Lord creates the environment in which the creatures are placed with the strictest regard to their karma. The proof of this is in the scripture itself. In the Kauṣṭukī Upaniṣad [3.8] we find the following:
“He makes one who He wishes to lead up from these worlds do good deeds, and He makes one who He wishes to lead down from these worlds do bad deeds, according to the tendencies generated by their past karma. By the will of the Supreme he can go to heaven or hell, as a cloud is driven by the air. The living entity is completely dependent in his distress and happiness.”

The Lord is the operative cause of the enjoyment or suffering of the jīvas. They get promotion to the heavenly planets through the will of the Lord, and similarly they are degraded into hellish condition of life through the will of the Lord. But His will is always in regard to the karma of the jīva.

Sūtra 2.1.35

na karmāvibhāgātiti cennādītvāt
na – not; karma – karma; avibhāgāt – because of non-distinction; iti – thus; cet – if; na – not; anādītvāt – because of beginninglessness.

[The theory of karma] cannot [explain the inequality and cruelty seen in this universe, because when the creation first started] there was no distinction [of souls, and consequently] of karmas. This [objection, however] is invalid, because there was no beginning of creation.

An objector may say, “Your theory of karma only pushes the difficulty one step back. No doubt, it explains the inequalities and sufferings of the jīvas in their present life, to some extent. That may indeed be due to the results of acts performed in a past life. But since in the beginning of creation there were no jīvas, nor their acts, they must have been created with inequalities in order to play different roles in the creation, such as the devas and demons. If they had been created all equal, there is no reason to hold that their acts would have been different. Śruti-śāstra also says,

sad eva saumyedam agra āśīd ekam evādvitiyām

“My dear boy, the Absolute Truth alone existed prior to this creation, one without a second.”

[Chāndogya Upanisad 6.2.1]

This shows that when the creation started, there were no jīvas or karma distinguishable from Brahman. He alone existed, and nothing else.”

To this objection raised in the first half of the sūtra, the next half gives the answer by saying, “This is not so, because of the beginninglessness of the jīvas and creation.” The their karmas are beginningless, just like Brahman, and this is the theory adopted by the author. Thus there is no fault, for every subsequent action is motivated by the tendencies generated by past karmas. The good and bad karmas of the jīvas are not completely destroyed by pralaya; in the next kalpa, they are conditioned by the karmas of the previous creation. The Bhaviṣya Purāṇa states:

“The Lord makes the jīvas do good or bad deeds according to their past karma; nor is there any conflict in this position, because the karmas have no beginning.”

If an objector says, “If you say that karmas are beginningless, then your theory is tainted with an infinite regression,” we say it is not so, because we find authority for it in reason also. In point the
well-known case of the seed and the tree. Does the seed come first, or the tree? Nor is there any objection that God loses His independence by being bound to create by the past karma of the jīvas. The Lord is certainly independent, but He is not capricious or whimsical. If He would create the world with total disregard to the past karmas of the jīvas, He might demonstrate His omnipotence to some minds, but to the majority His act would appear capricious, arbitrary and unjust. In fact, the authorities show that substance, karma and time are co-eternal with the Lord, and He creates the universe with full regard to these three. The universe is conditioned not only by the karma of the jīvas; its substance and time are also important factors in the creation. Of course these three are subordinate to the will of Iśvara, but He never disregards them in His act of creation. The Lord is not partial or cruel, not is He lacking in omnipotence. In fact, the theory of the beginninglessness of karma and creation reconciles all the difficulties. You cannot say that this theory is open to the same objections as the theory of specific creation; you cannot say it is the unwitting falling of the smugglers into the hands of the tax-collectors.

“Certain merchants went by a roundabout way to avoid the customs-house and evade customs duties. In the dark of night, they missed their path and after wandering for some time, took shelter in a roadside house. in the morning it was found that the same house in which they had taken shelter was the customs-house they were trying to avoid. Thus they not only had to pay the duty, but were punished for trying to cheat the customs. This maxim is called ‘Morning in the customs-house.’ ”

Our theory is not open to this objection of “morning in the customs house,” but yours certainly is. To avoid the imputation of cruelty and inequality to the Lord, we have explained the eternity of creation. But if you say that since the Lord is not bound to regard the karmas of the living entities because of His independence, He creates a world of misery just to punish the errant souls, that brings you back around to the same difficulty that you were trying to avoid. The Lord, being perfectly independent, could just as easily have created a world of perfect joy, with complete disregard to the karmas of the jīvas. But then in either case His action, instead of being regulated by any law or justice, would have been lawless and unfair, and these are not credible attributes of the Lord. Therefore his creation of a world with regard to the karmas of the jīvas, and to time and substance, does not detract from His omnipotence. Though He certainly can act against all the laws of matter, spirit and karma, nevertheless He does not do so, and thus His making the jīvas act according to the tendencies of their beginningless previous karmas is a matter for His glory, and not an instance of His partiality.

**Adhikāraṇa 11: The Grace of the Lord is not Partiality**

**Viśaya** [thesis or statement]: The previous Adhikāraṇa showed that Brahman is neither partial nor cruel. Now the author takes up the question of whether the Lord is open to the objection of partiality by showing special grace to His devotees. It is a fact that the Lord shows special grace to His devotees, for He especially protects them and specifically fulfills their desires.

**Saṁśaya** [arival of doubt]: Is this special protection of the devotees by the Lord and fulfilling their desires a mark of partiality by the Lord?

**Pūrvapakṣa** [antithesis]: He will protect His devotees even from the mouth of the lion, but allow ordinary men to be devoured by the beast.

**Siddhānta** [Vedic conclusion]: The author answers this objection by saying that it is not so.
Sūtra 2.1.36

upapadyate cā'pyupalabhyate ca
upa-padyate – it is reasonable that it should be so; ca – and; api – even; upalabhyate – is found; ca – and.

[Such partiality to His devotees by the Lord] is reasonable, and is also observed in the scriptures.

The special grace shown by the Lord to His devotees is no doubt ‘partiality,’ but the Lord, the kind lover of His devotees, has such ‘partiality,’ and it is reasonable that it should be so. It is the natural, inherent power of the Lord to show forth His grace on those who have bhakti or devotion for Him. This special grace is not an arbitrary function of the Lord’s will, but it also has regard to the factor of bhakti or devotion of the jīva on whom such special grace is shown. Nor does this favor contradict the statement that the Lord is free from partiality. For this sort of ‘partiality’ to the devotees, instead of being a fault with the Lord, has been praised in the scriptures as adding to His glory. For the scripture says that this grace upon His devotees is the highest jewel among the perfections of the Lord. If the Lord did not have this quality of showing special grace, then then all His other attributes, however great, would not have been attractive to the jīvas, and would not have evoked devotional love towards Him. This shows the reasonableness of the existence of this ‘partiality’ of the Lord. Not only is it reasonable, but revelation and tradition also declare it [Mūnḍaka Upaniṣad 3.2.3]:

nāyam ātmā pravacanena labhyo
na medhasā na bahunā śrutena
yam evaiṣa vṛṇute tena labhyas
tasyaiṣa ātmā vṛṇute tavan svām

“The Supreme Lord is not obtained by expert explanations, by vast intelligence, or even by much hearing. He is obtained only by one whom He Himself chooses. To such a person, He manifests His own form.”
teṣāṁ jñānī nitya-yukta
eka-bhaktir viśisyate
priyo hi jñānino 'tyartham
ahaṁ sa ca mama priyāḥ

“Of these, the wise one who is in full knowledge in union with Me through pure devotional service is the best. For I am very dear to him, and he is dear to Me.” [Bhagavad-gītā 7.17]
samo 'haṁ sarva-bhūteṣu
na me dveṣyo 'sti na priyāḥ
ye bhajanti tu māṁ bhaktyā
mayi te teṣu cāpy aham

“I envy no one, nor am I partial to anyone. I am equal to all. But whoever renders service unto Me in devotion is a friend, is in Me, and I am also a friend to him.” [Bhagavad-gītā 9.29]

ksipraṁ bhavati dharmātmā
śaśvac-chāntiṁ nīgacchati
kaunteya pratijānīhi
na me bhaktaḥ praṇaśyati
“He quickly becomes righteous and attains lasting peace. O son of Kuntī, declare it boldly that My devotee never perishes.” [Bhagavad-gītā 9.31]

Sūtra 2.1.37

sarvadharmopapatteśca

sarva – all; dharma – qualities; upapatteḥ – because of the reasonableness; ca – and.

And because it is reasonable that all attributes are present in Brahman, [however contradictory they may be, therefore He is just to all, and ‘partial’ to His devotees.]

In has been proved above that all attributes exist in the Supreme Lord, whose essential nature is inconceivable, whether they are harmonious among themselves or contradictory with each other. It follows that along with His perfect justice and equality, He shows favor and partiality to His devotees. The wise, therefore, do not find any greater difficulty in reconciling the existence of these two heterogeneous qualities in Him than in any other pair of opposites that also exist in Him. For example, He is all-knowledge or unlimited consciousness, and yet He possesses knowledge of His individual identity and form, and consciousness of His difference from other beings; He is essentially formless and colorless, and yet possessing the most ravishing form that enchants the hearts of His devotees; similarly although He is perfectly just and equal to all, yet He does show special favor and grace to his devotees. Not only do all pairs of opposite qualities exist in Him, but also all harmonious qualities are found in Him, such as He is forgiving, kind, compassionate and merciful to all. The Smṛti-śāstra also says [Kūrma Purāṇa]:

asthūlaś cāṇauṇuś caiva sthūlo 'nuś caiva sarvataḥ
avarmah sarvataḥ proktah śyāmo raktanta-locanaḥ

“The Lord is personal although impersonal, He is atomic although great, and He is blackish and has red eyes although He is colorless. Although He is described as possessing self-contradictory and opposite attributes, no evil or falsehood should ever be attributed to Him. On the contrary, all these conflicting attributes are reconciled by His supreme power.”

Thus it has been proved that the Lord, though equal to all, is yet the eternal Friend of His devotees.

Thus ends the First Pāda of the Second Adhyāya of Vedānta-sūtra. All glories to Śrīla Prabhupāda!

Śrī Vedānta-sūtra

Adhyāya 2: No Conflict Between Vedānta and Other Vedic Scriptures

Pāda 2: Refutation of Opposing Views (continued)

kṛṣṇa-dvaipāyanaiś naumi yāḥ sāṅkhya-yuktī-kaṇṭakān
chīttvā yukty-asinā viśvaiḥ kṛṣṇa-krīḍā-sthalam vyadhāt

“I offer my respectful obeisances unto Lord Kṛṣṇa-dvaipāyana Vyāsa, who has removed the thorny bushes of heterodox philosophical systems, such as Sāṅkhya and the rest, with the sharp sword of his reason, thus making this world a plain ground for Lord Kṛṣṇa to play upon.”
Kapila the author of atheistic Sāṅkhya philosophy, as well as the Buddhists and Jainas, maintain that there is no God in this world. Kapila says that the world originates from matter [pradhāna]. The Buddhists and Jainas claim that atoms are the cause of creation. One class of Buddhists hold the view that the whole world is void, while all major schools of Buddhism are united in the view that there is no creator of this world, in the sense of a conscious and intelligent being. Philosophers like Kaṇāda [the author of Vaiśeṣika-sūtra] and Patañjali ostensibly admit the existence of God, but practically they are as atheistic in their tendencies as the Sāṅkhya and the rest, because they do not accept the Personality of Godhead as taught in the Vedas. Vyāsa, seeing the world full of the thorns of the false philosophies of Kapila and the rest, and finding it intolerable that the Lord should tread on them with His soft lotus feet, prepared the way for His coming by cutting away these wild growths with the sharp sword of His reasoning. Then once Vyāsa prepared the world His coming, Lord Kṛṣṇa manifested His pastimes at the end of Daṇpara-yuga.

Similarly, in modern times there has been no dearth of speculative atheistic and impersonalist philosophies, but actually their basic arguments are very similar to those of the ancient authors mentioned above. Most modern materialistic philosophies hold that matter is the independent cause of the creation. Even the churches nowadays accept Darwin’s theory of evolution or one of its variants. Physics speculates that atoms are the only things that really exist, and their combination and reactions are the cause of everything else, even consciousness. Highly-educated scientists labor their whole lives in well-equipped laboratories, spending huge research budgets trying to prove this nonsense. Most people spend a large proportion of their formative years imprisoned in state-run schools, force-fed the materialistic dogma of materialism and evolution. They are not given actual knowledge nor taught how to learn and think for themselves, but simply trained to repeat the opinions of others upon demand. This behavior is rewarded with opulence and material enjoyment, but they remain as confused as ever.

Before such bewildered people can come to the platform of real knowledge, all this nonsense must be swept away and the Absolute Truth revealed, so that the actual Lord of the Heart can claim His throne.

In the First Pāda of the Second Adhyāya, the author has answered the objections raised by his opponents to the system of philosophy propounded in his sūtras. He was on the defensive in the last Pāda. This was necessary to prevent the weak-minded from from going astray, abandoning the ancient highway of the Vedas, and from being attacked by the fallacious arguments of these plausible systems, wandering in the pleasant labyrinths of these philosophies, losing their way and being destroyed. Now taking an aggressive attitude, He attacks the positions of His opponents, refuting their systems by proving the uncritical and unphilosophical nature of their doctrines. The author first takes up the atheistic Sāṅkhya philosophy and refutes it. Previous sūtras have proved only that the Vedic texts do not set forth the Sāṅkhya view, while the task of the present Pāda is to demolish that view itself; therefore the Vedānta-sūtra cannot therefore be charged with needless repetition.

**Adhikaraṇa 1: Pradhāna Cannot be the Cause of the Creation**

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: Kapila the author of Sāṅkhya wrote a collection of sūtras in which he enumerated various tattvas [ontological categories]. According to him, pradhāna is the name given to the original root of matter, and it is defined by him as the state of equilibrium of the three guṇas [modes of material nature], namely sattva [goodness], rajas [passion] and tamas [ignorance]. From this prakṛti emerges puruṣa [souls] the mahat-tattva [great principle], from the mahat-tattva proceeds ahaṁkāra [false ego], and from ahaṁkāra come the five tan-matras [subtle sense objects], the five knowledge-acquiring senses and the five active senses, and the gross elements. Thus according to Sāṅkhya philosophy the 25 tattvas of the material creation are as follows:
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pada</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>prakṛti</td>
<td>Material nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>puruṣa</td>
<td>Soul</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>mahat-tattva</td>
<td>Great principle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>ahaṅkāra</td>
<td>False ego</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>manas</td>
<td>Mind</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>śravāmsi</td>
<td>Sound</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>ākṛti</td>
<td>Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>tan-mātrā (subtle sense objects)</td>
<td>Sparśa</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>rasa</td>
<td>Flavor</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>gandha</td>
<td>Aroma</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>śrotram</td>
<td>Hearing</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>tvak</td>
<td>Touch</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>dṛk</td>
<td>Sight</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>rasana</td>
<td>Taste</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>nāsikāh</td>
<td>Smell</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>rasanām</td>
<td>Tongue</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>karau</td>
<td>Hands</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>pādau</td>
<td>Feet</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>prajananaṁ</td>
<td>Genital</td>
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</table>
Prakṛti is the state of equilibrium of the three guṇas [modes of material nature], namely sattva [goodness], rājas [passion] and tamas [ignorance]. The essential nature [dharma] of sattva is joy, of rājas is pain and of tamas is delusion. The whole world is the effect of these qualities, and therefore we find joy, pain and inertia in it. Such is the nature of this world.

According to the Sāṅkhyas, prakṛti is eternal and all-pervading. It is the root or primeval cause, and there is no need to inquire into a further cause of it, as we find in Sūtra 1.67 of the Sāṅkhya-smṛti:

“Since the root has no root, the root of all is rootless. That is to say, there is no other cause of prakṛti, because there would be an infinite regression of the cause of all required another cause, which by parity of reasoning would require another cause, and so on.”

Prakṛti is unlimited and is the material cause of all. It is all-pervading as asserted in Sūtra 6.36 of the Sāṅkhya-smṛti:

“She is all-pervading because her products are seen everywhere.”

This prakṛti, eternally producing everything, is herself insentient, but is the cause of the enjoyment and liberation of countless sentient beings; and although she is super-sensuous and imperceptible, yet she is to be inferred from her effects. Though one, she has many heterogeneous attributes, and she produces this wonderful creation through her power of modification, beginning with the mahat-tattva and the rest; thus she is the operative and material cause of the universe. Puruṣa, on the other hand, is attributeless, all-pervading consciousness, individual and separate for each body. Its existence is to be inferred from the existence of organized life, because no organized life can exist but for the sake of something else. As stated in Sūtra 1.66 of the Sāṅkhya-smṛti:

“The existence of soul is inferred from the fact that the combination of the principles of prakṛti into their various effects is for the sake of another besides the insentient prakṛti or her various insentient products.”

Since puruṣa is free from all action and modification, nor produced by anything, it follows that it is agentless and without enjoyment. But people mistake puruṣa as agent or enjoyer through illusion.
When prakṛti and puruṣa come together, their very juxtaposition produces an apparent exchange of attributes: namely, consciousness appears in matter, and agency and enjoyment in spirit. This adhyāsa [superimposition] falsely attributes the qualities of one to the other. Nature is really unconscious, but the presence of spirit make it appear as if conscious; spirit is neither the agent nor the enjoyer, but its presence in matter makes it appear to be so. All the suffering of the soul arises from lack of discrimination between prakṛti and puruṣa, while liberation consists of realizing the difference. A person who has become indifferent to prakṛti has attained mokṣa.

This summarizes the Sāṅkhya theory, which bears a striking similarity to modern so-called scientific arguments about the process of creation. If we simply eliminate the Sāṅkhya teachings about the soul, add a few more chemical elements and substitute “universe” for pradhāna, Sāṅkhya would become indistinguishable from the modern theories. The false assumption in both theories is that matter can create independently without an intelligent designer. This assumption is embedded so deeply in modern culture, language and thinking that most people are completely incapable of thinking rationally about alternative theories.

In this system there are three means of right knowledge [pramāṇa]: sensory perception, inference and testimony, as stated in Śūtra 1.88 of the Sāṅkhya-smṛti:

“Proof is of three kinds; there is no need for more, for if these three are established, then all that is true can be established by one or the other of them: sensory perception [pratyakṣa], inference [anumāṇa] and testimony [śabda], to the exclusion of comparison, which is a distinct source of knowledge in Nyāya, and others.”

We do not have much difference with the Sāṅkhyas regarding perception and testimony, because these two proofs deal with established objects; our difference with them is in regards to certain inferences they have drawn. They have inferred by reasoning that pradhāna is the cause of the universe; it is this reasoning and its conclusion that are erroneous. If we refute their arguments about pradhāna being the cause of the universe, we practically refute their whole philosophy, because this is the major point of their system.

Saṁśaya [arising of doubt]: Is pradhāna both the operative and material cause of creation or not?

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: Pradhāna is the operative and material cause of creation, because the world consists of three modes of material nature—sattva, rajas and tamas—and so we infer that the principal cause must also have these three attributes, for nothing that is in the effect that is not in the cause. As we see in the case of pots, their material cause of clay belongs to the same category, earth, as the pot. Moreover, inert objects can become agents, for we use active verbs in connection with those objects: “The tree brings forth fruit;” “The water is moving.” Therefore pradhāna alone is the material cause of the universe and the creator as well.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: The author replies to this view in the following śūtra:

**Śūtra 2.2.1**

\[
\text{racanānupapateśca nānumāṇam}
\]

racanā – construction; anupapatteḥ – on account of the impossibility; ca – and; na – not; ānumāṇam – that which is inferred.

That which is inferred [pradhāna] [is not the cause of the world, because being insentient,] it is impossible [for her to have created the universe.]
Pradhāna is called ānumānam, that which is inferred, because her existence is purely hypothetical. This hypothetical pradhāna is neither the operative nor the material cause of the universe. The world shows wonderful design and construction, therefore it is impossible for unintelligent matter to have produced this universe without the direction of an intelligent agent. No one has ever seen a beautiful palace constructed by the fortuitous coming together of bricks, mortar, and other material without the active cooperation of intelligent agents like the architect, masons and so on. Then how is it possible for the extremely great and complex construction of the universe to have come about by the independent action of matter? No one ever builds a house by calculating its measurements with a roll of dice; similarly, it is impossible for the finely-tuned design of the universe to come about by chance.

The word ca [and] in the sūtra implies that the argument in the Sāṅkhya-smṛti based upon the logic of anvaya [undistributed middle] has no probative force, because it is a logical fallacy. This central argument is contained in Sūtras 1.130-132 of the Sāṅkhya-smṛti:

“Because of their measure, prakṛti and puruṣa are unlimited because they are uncaused, while mind and the rest are limited, being products. Because they conform to pradhāna, mind and the rest are products, thus they follow and correspond with pradhāna; because the qualities of pradhāna are seen in all things, and it is a maxim that the effect is derived from the cause and implies the cause. And finally because it is through the power of the cause that the effect can do anything, as a chain restrains an elephant only by the force of the iron that it is made of.”

The logical fallacy of anvaya [undistributed middle] is displayed in the following syllogism:

All Xs are Zs; all Ys are Zs. Therefore, all Xs are Ys.

This is the general form; now here are some examples:

Penguins are black and white; newspapers are black and white. Therefore, penguins are newspapers.

All Communists believe in heavy taxation; Senator Jones believes in heavy taxation. Therefore, Senator Jones is a Communist.

The color of goodness is white; these cows are white. Therefore, all cows are white.

To infer that all cows must be white because some cows are observed to be white is a similar fallacious argument. Whiteness is merely an accidental attribute; it is not the cause of the class characteristics of cows. Similarly the Sāṅkhya philosophy, as quoted in the sūtra above, reasons like this: “Physical objects like the mind and senses give pleasure; pradhāna also has the attribute of giving pleasure. Therefore the mind, senses and so on are produced by pradhāna.” The supposition of pradhāna is never really proved; it is simply assumed, and all creation deemed to be its effect.

Physical objects like flowers, beautiful jars, etc. no doubt possess the quality of producing pleasure. But the feeling of pleasure is internal and subjective, and though they may induce pleasure in us, we cannot say that the attribute of pleasure belongs to the objects themselves. Pleasure is an attribute of the soul or consciousness, and not of inanimate objects. So matter cannot be said to have the qualities of sattva, rajas and tamas, because these are attributes of consciousness. The proof is that the guṇas are relative to the perceiver; thus the same object may manifest all three guṇas to three different persons, or to the same person at different times. The beautiful girl is an object of joy to the accepted lover, an object of pain to the rejected lover, and an object of indifference to the ascetic. A wife, when in good humor, is a source of joy; when in anger, is a source of pain; and when away from her husband, a source of delusion.
There is a fuller discussion of this point in Śrī Rāmānuja’s commentary on this sūtra:

“...The ca [and] in the sūtra is meant to add as a further argument that anvaya [presence] has no proving force. For whiteness present in cows and so on is not invariably accompanied by the quality of being the cause of the class characteristics of cows. Nor must it be said that qualities such as whiteness, although present in the effect, may not indeed be causes, but that substances such as gold and the like which are present in certain effects are invariably accompanied by the quality of being causes, and that hence also the substances called sattva, rājas and tamas, which are found present in all effects, are proved to be the causes of all those effects. For sattva and so on are attributes of substances, but not themselves substances. Sattva and so on are the causes of the lightness, weight, etc. belonging to substances such as earth and the like, and hence distinctive attributes of the essential nature of those substances; but they are not observed to be present in any effects in a substantial form, as clay, gold, and other substances are. It is for this reason that they are known as guṇas [qualities]. You have further said that the world's having one cause only must be postulated in order that an ultimate cause may be reached. But as the sattva, rājas, and tamas are not one but three, you yourself do not assume one cause, and hence do not manage to arrive at an ultimate cause. For your pradhāna consists in the equipoise of the three guṇas; there are thus several causes, and you have no more an ultimate cause than others. Nor can you say that this end is accomplished through the three guṇas being unlimited. For if the three guṇas are all alike unlimited, and therefore omnipresent, there is nowhere a plus or minus of any of them, and as thus no inequality can result, effects cannot originate. In order to explain the origination of results it is therefore necessary to assume limitation of the guṇas. Nor is your view confirmed by those cases only in which it is clearly perceived that matter produces effects only when guided by an intelligent principle; other cases also (where the fact is not perceived with equal clearness) are in favor of our view. This the next sūtra declares.”

Similarly, modern science assumes that because today we see matter apparently organizing itself without the guidance of a superior intelligence or creative energy, the creation must have occurred in a similar manner. Not only is this theory a classic logical fallacy of the undistributed middle as described above, it fails to answer the questions: “How does dull, inert matter initiate the process of creation? Where does the original impulse of energy to bring matter into motion come from? What is the origin of time, which is required for all material reactions and transformations; and what is the origin of the universal laws of physics, chemistry, etc.?”

\[
\text{ōṁ nama bhagavate vāsudevāya} \\
\text{janmādy asya yato 'nvayād itarataś cārtheśv abhijñāḥ svārāṭ}
\]

“O my Lord, Śrī Kṛṣṇa, son of Vasudeva, O all-pervading Personality of Godhead, I offer my respectful obeisances unto You. I meditate upon Lord Śrī Kṛṣṇa because He is the Absolute Truth and the primeval cause of all causes of the creation, sustenance and destruction of the manifested universes. He is directly and indirectly conscious of all manifestations, and He is independent because there is no other cause beyond Him.” [Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 1.1.1]

\[\text{Sūtra 2.2.2}\]

\[pravṛtteśca\]

\[pravṛtteḥ - because of the activity; ca – and, only.\]

And because [inert matter] becomes active only [when there is the directive action of intelligence upon it.]
It is a fact of daily experience that inert matter becomes active only when there is the directive action of intelligence upon it. The activity, therefore, must be attributed to the directive intelligence rather than to the inert matter. The intelligence that sets matter into motion is the real agent. We do not say that a chariot moves by itself, but that the real mover of the chariot is the charioteer, by directing the movements of the horse. Therefore phrases like “the tree brings forth fruits” really mean that the Supersoul directs the activity of the tree, making it bring forth fruits. The fruit is actually produced by the indwelling Lord through the instrumentality of the tree. We learn this from scriptural passages describing the Supersoul, such as Brhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad 2.7.3-23. This will become clearer later on.

pañcaitāṇi mahā-bāho kāraṇāni nibodha me
sāṅkhye kṛtante proktāni siddhayē sarva-karmanāṁ

adhiṣṭhānaṁ tathā kartā karaṇāṁ ca prthag-vidham
vividhāś ca prthak ceśṭā daivaṁ caivaṁ pañcamam

“O mighty-armed Arjuna, learn from Me of the five factors which bring about the accomplishment of all action. These are the place of action, the performer, the senses, the endeavor, and ultimately the Supersoul.” [Bhagavad-gītā 18.13-14]

The force of ca in the sūtra is that of ‘only.’ “I do” can be asserted only by an intelligent being. Every activity is seen as the result of an intelligent agent. Therefore inert matter has no agency; pradhāna or matter can have no self-initiated activity of its own.

If an objector says, “It is possible for the world to have been created by the mere coming together of spirit and matter, prakṛti and puruṣa, and by the mutual superimposition of their qualities on one another,” then we ask the following question. What is the cause of this superimposition which supposedly takes place by the mere coming together of spirit and matter? Does it inhere in them as a substance, or is it a modification of spirit and matter? It cannot be the first, because it would be an innate quality of spirit, and in that case the liberated souls would also have this superimposition. Nor can it be the second, because if superimposition be a modification of prakṛti, then it itself being an effect, it cannot be the cause of its own self. Nor can it be a modification of spirit, for according to the Sāṅkhya system, spirit is changeless. The question of the cause of the adhyāsa or superimposition therefore remains unresolved.

Modern science also assumes that the creation began by itself. Instead of prakṛti and puruṣa, science theorizes that time drives all material transformations. But physics attributes the force of time to the expansion of the space of the universe; that expansion supposedly began in the Big Bang, so before the Big Bang there was no time. Then how did the Big Bang begin? What force could have set off this gigantic explosion if there were no material space or time prior to it? If we pursue any materialistic creation theory to its roots, we find similar logical conundrums and unanswerable questions. The agency of an intelligent being external to the material universe is an unavoidable requirement for any explanation of the creation.

An objector says, “Milk is changed into curd by its own inherent quality; water falling from the clouds becomes bitter, sweet or acid according to the fruit it enters. Similarly pradhāna, although homogenous like water, becomes modified into different kinds as it comes into contact with the different karmas of the jīvas. The differences in the bodies and environments, etc. of the souls are the effects of the past karmas of these beings.” The author replies to this in the next sūtra.
Sūtra 2.2.3

payo'ṃbuvaccettatrāpi

payas – milk; ambu – water; vat – like; cet – if; tatra – there; api – also.

If it be said that the pradhāna modifies into her various products without the guidance of any intelligence, like milk or water, then we reply that the intelligence guides the change there also.

Even in the case of the change of pure water into different saps and juices of plants and fruits or the change of milk into curd, the directive action of intelligence produces the change. We may not directly see the driver of the chariot, but we can infer his existence from the motion of the chariot. Similarly, though we may not see the intelligence working in the tree or the milk, we can infer its existence from the fact of changes in dull matter. Not only do we have this inference as proof, but also the sacred authority of the scriptures: see the Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa of the Brhad-Āranyaka Upaniṣad, where it is stated that that different kinds of living creatures are put into different kinds of bodies by the management of a superior power.

Śrīmad-Bhagavatam 3.5.50

kṣetra-jñān cāpi māṁ viddhi
sarva-kṣetresu bhārata
kṣetra-kṣetrajñayor jñānaiṁ
yat taj jñānaiṁ mataṁ mama

“O scion of Bharata, you should understand that I am also the knower in all bodies, and to understand this body and its knower is called knowledge. That is My opinion.” [Bhagavad-gītā 13.3]

Sūtra 2.2.4

vyatirekānavasthiteścānapekṣattvāt

vyatireka – in the absence of anything else; anavasthīteḥ – because of the nonexistence; ca – and also; anapekṣattvāt – because of the independence.

[As before creation] there existed no other cause but pradhāna, so there would be no necessity of any other [cause than the pradhāna herself to produce her changes.]

This additional argument is to be adduced against the Sāṅkhya theory: According to the Sāṅkhya philosophy, pradhāna can produce the whole creation independently. Before the beginning of creation, there existed no other cause than pradhāna. Nor was there the necessity for the existence of any other
cause, for all the changes that pradhāna undergoes are self-initiated. There is no cause for the actions of pradhāna except for pradhāna herself. This argument is to be rejected because the actual Sāṅkhya theory is that it is the presence of puruṣa or spirit that starts the changes in pradhāna. Thus even according to Sāṅkhya theory, the pradhāna is not the sole creator, but just by proximity the presence of puruṣa initiates the changes in some mysterious way. This contradicts the theory that the pure inert matter or pradhāna produces this change.

The Sāṅkhyas therefore do not consistently say that pradhāna produces all changes without extraneous help. Their theory of proximity is also open to objection. If the proximity produces the change, then the puruṣa is always in proximity with prakṛti, even in the state of pralaya. The result would be that creation would start spontaneously and pralaya could not be maintained. The Sāṅkhyas may say that the karmas of the jīvas lie dormant during pralaya, so creation cannot start then. But what is preventing the awakening of karma in pralaya? Thus the theory of the Sāṅkhyas is self-contradictory.

The same is true of the theories of modern science. For example, materialistic science says that matter can create and organize itself, and there is no need for any outside force. But science also recognizes the influence of time and the laws of material nature; therefore their theory is self-contradictory. They ascribe the complex structure and transformations of matter to evolution driven by chance, but at the same time insist that nature has inviolable laws that are completely deterministic. This is also contradictory; if the laws of nature are perfect, then what is the need for chance? Actually, chance takes the place of the will of God in their theories. So in all the time since the theory of the Sāṅkhyas was first presented, nothing has really changed; the materialists’ theories are still defective.

The Sāṅkhya philosopher says, “We see that when eaten by a cow, grass, creepers, leaves etc. transform themselves into milk through their inherent nature, without the help of any other cause. Similarly, pradhāna also transforms herself into the mahat-tattva without the guidance of an intelligent principle.” The author replies to this in the next sūtra.

Sūtra 2.2.5

anyatā’bhāvācca na tṛṇādivat

anyatā – elsewhere; abhāvāt – because of the absence; ca – and only; na – not; tṛṇa-adi-vat – like grass, etc.

It is not like the transformation of grass, etc. [into milk when eaten by a cow] because there is absence of such transformation [when eaten by a bull.]

The Sāṅkhyas argue their doctrine of the self-transformation of matter using the example that plain rainwater transforms automatically into the differently flavored juices of various fruits and vegetables, and grass is transformed automatically into milk when eaten by a cow. The argument of the Sāṅkhyas is not sound, because it is not natural for grass to transform itself into milk when eaten by an animal; it only when eaten by a female herbivore that the grass is transformed into milk. No such change is visible when eaten by a male animal. If it were natural for grass to transform into milk, then we would see such changes happening spontaneously, even when the grass is not eaten by an animal. But we do not see any such change. Therefore, it is not the natural quality of the grass to change itself into milk, but only when it comes into relationship with a female of particular kinds of animals does this change occur. And here also it is the will of the Supreme Personality of Godhead that brings about the change, not just because an animal has eaten it.
It has been sufficiently proved that pradhāna, being inert, has no self-initiated activity of her own. Similarly, the theory of the scientists that chance is responsible for evolving the various species and their qualities and behavior, is fatally flawed. But even if we admit, for argument’s sake, that pradhāna has such an activity, it will not help the cause of the Sāṅkhya. The author shows this in the next sūtra.

Sūtra 2.2.6

abhupagame'pyarthābhāvāt
abhya-upagamepi – even if it be accepted; artha – purpose; abhāvāt – because of the absence.

Even if it be accepted [that pradhāna has self-initiated activity, yet it is a useless theory,] because it serves no purpose.

The word na [not] is understood in this and the next three sūtras. The theory of the Sāṅkhya is that pradhāna is moved to activity to cause experience and liberation for the jīva. Her object is that after enjoying her, and finding her full of evil, the jīva should become indifferent to her, and thus attain liberation. The activity of the pradhāna is purely altruistic, with the object of giving experience and joy to the soul. She has no purpose of her own to be served by her activity. In the Sāṅkhya-sūtras [3.58] it is stated:

“Pradhāna creates for the sake of another, and though it be spontaneous, for she is not the enjoyer, just like a camel that carries the saffron for the sake of his master and not for himself.”

The Sāṅkhya believe that the jīva is actionless, though the experiencer. They say that the jīva can be a non-agent and yet experience the fruits of activity, just like a person who may not cook food for himself but eat it when it is cooked by another. But such an activity of prakṛti is not a reasonable proposition. Even if such an activity is accepted, it serves no purpose. What is the aim of such activity? It is either to produce experience for the jīva by showing him the various qualities of prakṛti, or to produce liberation for the puruṣa by making him indifferent to her charms.

The first, namely to produce experience for the jīva, cannot be the cause of activity by prakṛti, for it is admitted that before there was any such activity in the prakṛti, the puruṣa existed as pure intelligence—actionless, changeless and self-satisfied. Why should such a puruṣa leave his bliss of isolation to see the enchanting play of prakṛti? Merely because prakṛti is active is no reason for holding that the puruṣa must undergo change in the shape of looking at her. It therefore follows that the activity of prakṛti cannot be the cause of the experience of the puruṣa. Nor can such activity be the cause of the liberation of the puruṣa, because before such activity, the puruṣa was already in a liberated state. Why should the prakṛti make herself active to produce the liberation of the puruṣa, when he is already liberated?

If it is said that wherever the prakṛti is active she is bound to produce some change in the consciousness of the puruṣa, for he is in proximity to the prakṛti and thus the mere activity of the
prakṛti is the cause of experience to the puruṣa, then we reply that your proposition is rather too large. Merely because a soul is in proximity to matter is no reason why he should be affected by the activity of such matter; for then since matter is all-pervading, and the proximity of spirit to matter is eternal and impossible to remove, even the mukta souls would be affected by such activity, and fall into bondage again.

The Sāṅkhya reply, “Even if the prakṛti is not active by her own inherent power, then we have another theory. The correlation between spirit and matter is like that of the blind and the lame. One has no power of motion, the other has no power of vision. The spirit is lame and has no power of motion, and prakṛti is blind, though possessing all power to move. Each is incapable of achieving any result independently. But when the lame spirit comes into contact with the blind but moving matter, it makes this blind matter become active and directs all her movements. Or to take another illustration, the magnet itself without moving, can set into motion the iron in its proximity; similarly the spirit, itself changeless and motionless, sets the prakṛti into motion when they come into contact. Thus this reflection of spirit in matter makes the matter appear intelligent, and sets in motion her creative activity.”

The author replies to this theory of the Sāṅkhya in the following sūtra:

Sūtra 2.2.7

puruṣāśmavaditī cet tathāpi

puruṣa – man; āśma – magnet; vat – like; iti – thus; cet – if; tathāpi – so also.

If [it be said that prakṛti creates] like [the lame] man [directing the blind, or] like the magnet [moving the iron,] even then [the theory is open to objection.]

Insentient matter has no power of self-initiated activity, and the examples of the lame man and the blind man or the magnet do not remove the difficulty; the inability of the pradhāna to act independently remains. The lame man, although incapable of walking, retains the ability to see the road and guide the blind man. The blind man, though sightless, does have the capacity to understand those instructions and act on them. They are both intelligent entities. Similarly, some entity must bring the magnet into proximity to the iron before the magnet can act on it. But according to the Sāṅkhya, the soul is ever actionless, without any attributes and incapable of change. If it is said that the soul undergoes no change, but his mere proximity produces changes in prakṛti, then the soul always being near the pradhāna, it would follow that the creation is eternal, and there would never be any emancipation for the soul. Moreover the prakṛti is insentient, and the puruṣa is conscious; but in both examples, both entities are the same type: in the example of the lame and blind man, both are conscious beings, and in the example of the magnet, both and the iron are insentient. Consequently the instances given are not similar to the point they are supposed to support.

The Sāṅkhya hold that the creation depends upon the superiority and inferiority of the guṇas, and the world results from a certain relation between the tattvas and their subordinate entities, as a consequence of such difference of guṇas. This view is refuted by the author in the next sūtra:

Sūtra 2.2.8

āṅgivānupapatteśca
It is impossible [that any one of the guṇas] may be the principal [in the state of pralaya, and hence the world would not originate.]

Pradhāna is defined in Śāṅkhya philosophy as the equilibrium of the three modes of material nature: sattva, rajas and tamas. In the unmanifest state of pradhāna, none of the guṇas is superior or inferior; consequently the relation of principal and subordinate could not exist then. Nor can they say that Iśvara [the Lord] or kāla [time] brings about a disturbance in the equilibrium, making one of the guṇas superior to the others, because the Śāṅkhyas hold that God does not exist, nor do they admit the separate existence of time. Thus Śāṅkha-sūtras [1.92-93] says:

“It is not proved that there is a God. And further it is not proved that He exists, because whatever exists must be either free or bound, and He can be neither one nor the other, because either way He would be inefficient. Since if He were free, He would have no desires which as compulsory motives would instigate Him to create; and if He were bound, He would be under delusion. He must be on either alternative unequal to the creation, etc. of the world.”

And, in Śāṅkha-sūtras [2.12] Kapila denies the separate existence of time:

“Space and time arise from the ether [ākāśa].”

Nor can the Śāṅkhyas say that the soul is the creator, because according to their theory, the very nature of the soul is indifference to everything. The puruṣas therefore being perfectly detached, have no interest to break the equipoise of the pradhāna and make one of the guṇas superior to the others. Hence the creation is not caused by the relative superiority and inferiority of the guṇas. Even admitting that in every successive creation and in pralaya, the guṇas will always be unequal in their force, there would be nothing to bring about this inequality in the first creation. Even admitting for argument’s sake that there is inequality among the guṇas in the ordinary state of creation, and that such inequality may have come about without any reason, it would follow that in pralaya also the inequality would occur without any reason, and no pralaya will be possible, for creation would start up then also. And even if it can be established that the inequality, once established, continues without any further cause, you cannot explain how it can be brought about without any cause in the beginning.

Similarly in the modern scientific Big Bang theory, no source is given for the material elements, and no mechanism for setting off the explosion Big Bang, because both would require the existence of a potent, intelligent Creator pre-existent to the material creation. So there is nothing in either theory to explain how the inert material energy acquires the initial energy of creation.

“But,” says the Śāṅkhya, “we must infer that the guṇas are of various nature and wonderful attributes because we see their effect in this world, and therefore your objections do not apply.” The author replies to this in the next sūtra:

Sūtra 2.2.9

anyathānumitau ca jñaśaktiviyogāt

anyathā – otherwise; anumitau – in case of inference; ca – and; jña – intelligence; śakti – power; viyogāt – because of being destitute of.
Even if it be inferred otherwise, [yet the pradhāna cannot create,] because it does not possess the power of being a conscious entity.

Even if the inference that the gunās must have different attributes and mysterious powers is accepted, it still does not answer the difficulty we have raised. Being insentient, pradhāna has no power of self-consciousness. Being thus destitute, it has no idea of any plan or change. It cannot say, “Let me create the world in such a way.” Creation never proceeds from dead matter without the impetus of intelligence. Without the directive action of intelligence, the gunās, no matter how wonderful their powers and attributes, cannot create the universe by themselves.

The same objection applies to the creation theory of modern science. Matter has no power to initiate its own creation, because prior to the creation, nothing exists. Without a mechanism to initiate the creation, science cannot explain how it began. Even if we accept the ‘steady-state’ theory of a chain of Big Bangs followed by a ‘Big Crunch,’ this still does not explain how this state of affairs came to be in the first place.

The author concludes his refutation of Sāṅkhya philosophy with this sūtra:

Sūtra 2.2.10

vipratiśedhāccāsamañjasam
vipratiśedhā - because of contradiction; ca - and; asamañjasam - untenable.

Because the theory of the Sāṅkhya is full of internal contradictions, hence not being a consistent theory, it is untenable.

There are internal contradictions in this philosophy propounded by Kapila, hence it is inconsistent and untenable, and should be rejected by those who desire the highest good and the Absolute Truth. For example, it holds that prakṛti is for the sake of the puruṣa alone, who is the experiencer, the seer and the supervising agent. It holds the soul to be something different from all bodies, and vehicles. Thus in Sāṅkhya-sūtras [1.139-140] Kapila declares,

“Soul is something different from the body, etc. Nature is a compound and a combination because that which is combined is for the sake of the other.”

Thus spirit and matter are contrasted in these two sūtras. The spirit is single, indivisible and nonmaterial, and matter is composite and divisible, and exists only for the sake of the soul. But later on this same soul is defined to be actionless, changeless, attributeless, devoid of all agency, fruition and sentiency. It is said to be pure isolation. In one place it says that matter is non-luminous and luminosity belongs to the soul. But in the next sūtra it contradicts itself when it says that the soul does not have the attribute of intelligence. Thus intelligence belongs neither to soul nor to matter. In Sāṅkhya-sūtras [1.140-146] we find:

“And soul is something else from the body, etc. because in a soul there is the absence of the three gunās and because they are not seen in it. And soul is not material because of its superintendence over nature. for a superintendent is an intelligent being, and nature is unintelligent. And soul is not material because of its being the experient. It is for soul and not for nature, because the exertions are with a view to isolation from all qualities, a condition to which the soul is competent, but not nature. Since light does not pertain to the unintelligent,
which must pertain to something or other, is the essence of the soul which, self-manifesting, manifests whatever else is manifest. Soul has not intelligence for its attribute, because it is without quality.”

The Sāṅkhyas are further inconsistent, inasmuch as that in one place they say that it is the soul that undergoes bondage, owing to its want of discrimination, and that it attains release when it discriminates between the guṇas and itself; while in another place it says that bondage and release belong to the guṇas and not to the soul, which is eternally free. For example in Sāṅkhyā-sūtras [3.71-72] we find:

“Bondage and liberation do not belong actually to soul, and would not even appear to be but for non-discrimination. But in reality the aforesaid bondage and liberation belong to nature alone: so he asserts. It really belongs to nature, through association; like a beast, though being hampered by habits which are a cause of pain: just as a beast, through being hampered by a rope, experiences bondage and liberation. Such is the meaning.”

Thus there are many internal contradictions in the Sāṅkhya system, and anyone who studies it carefully can easily find them out. Similarly there are many inconsistencies and contradictions in the modern scientific theories, which are startlingly similar to atheistic Sāṅkhya philosophy. The reader should study these theories deeply and find out their faults, then uproot these crippled theories from his mind and consciousness. Only Vedānta-sūtra’s theory of emanation from the Supreme Personality of Godhead adequately explains the creation is all its details.

**Adhikarāṇa 2: Refutation of the Atomic System**

*Viṣaya* [thesis or statement]: The author now refutes the atomic system of the Vaiśeṣikas. They hold that there are four kinds of atoms: earthy [physical], watery [astral], fiery [mental] and aerial [buddhic]. These atoms are partless, but possess the qualities of color, touch, taste and smell, and are spherical in form. At the time of pralaya, they exist in a latent state, without originating any effect, but at the time of creation, they originate this world by combining together and forming binary and ternary compounds, owing to their being in contact with souls, which have a mysterious quality called *adṛṣṭa* [literally, unseen]. In this theory, two atoms are brought into activity by the action of the *adṛṣṭa* of the souls residing in them. The souls in the atoms set them in motion, and thus there takes place the union of two atoms, and a binary is formed which is called *anu*. Thus three causes operate to produce a binary: two atoms, the *samavāyi* [aggregate] cause; their union, the *asamavāyi* [separated] cause; and the *adṛṣṭa* of the souls residing in them, the *nimitta* [operative] cause. Similarly, from three binary molecules, set in motion by the *adṛṣṭa* of the souls residing in them, there is produced the *mahat* or ternary. Two atoms cannot produce a ternary, because it requires a bigger cause and larger number of atoms. Similarly, four ternaries give rise to a quaternary, and so on to produce bigger and bigger things. Thus by conglomeration of the molecules are produced the big earth, the big water, the big fire and the big air. The color, taste, scent etc. seen in the big effect depend on the particular atoms that are the *samavāyi* [aggregate] cause. The qualities latent in the cause produce the qualities in the effects which are manifest. Thus the world comes into existence.

When the Lord wishes to destroy the world, He withdraws the active force of affinity that brought about the union of two atoms from the binaries. When this affinity is destroyed, the binary falls apart, and ceases to exist. The binaries being destroyed, the ternaries and so forth are also destroyed and the creation ceases to exist, just as when the thread is destroyed the cloth is also destroyed. The qualities of color, etc. also cease with the destruction of their substrate, the binaries. This is the method of the dissolution of the world.
In this system, the atoms are called *parimāṇḍala* or spherical. The size of an ‘ultimate atom’ is called *pārimāṇḍalāyam*. A binary is called in this system *anu* [atom], while the name *paramāṇu* is given to the ‘ultimate atoms.’ The size of a binary is called *hrasva* [short], while the size of the ternary is called *mahat* [big], meaning which has a perceptible magnitude, macroscopic.

Modern science also rests on an atomic theory of matter, in which the atoms themselves are the cause and ingredient of everything. Science recognizes many types of atomic elements and compounds, as well as subatomic particles and reactions. While *Vedānta-sūtra* does admit that atoms are the building blocks of manifested matter, it denies them the important role granted by both the Vaiśeṣikas and the scientists. Like all material things, atoms cannot act without the influence of some outside energy and intelligence. This was proved in the previous Adhikāraṇa. Therefore this Adhikāraṇa will also refute the materialistic scientific atomic theory.

**Samśaya** [arisel of doubt]: Is the theory that the word is produced by atoms without the guidance of the Lord consistent?

**Pūrvapakṣa** [antithesis]: The adṛṣṭa of the souls sets the two atoms in motion. Being thus set in motion, the atoms come into union, and thus produce a binary, and so on. There is no inconsistency about this view, and it is the right view.

**Siddhānta** [Vedic conclusion]: The creation is not brought about simply by the combination of atoms. The next sūtra shows this.

**Sūtra 2.2.11**

\[
\text{mahat dīrghavad vā hrasvaparimāṇḍalābhyyām}
\]

*Mahat* – macroscopic; *dīrgha* – extensible, which is perceptible to the senses; *vāt* – like; *vā* – and; *hrasva* – microscopic; *parimāṇḍalābhyyām* – from the atomic.

And as origination of the macroscopic and extensible from the dimensionless [is untenable, so is the rest of the Vaiśeṣika system.]

The word ‘untenable’ is to be supplied from the previous sūtra to complete the sense. The theory of the Vaiśeṣikas is untenable in its entirety, as their view of the origination of the macroscopic from the dimensionless atomic particles without the aid of the Lord is untenable. The other parts of their system, such as the origination of the earth, etc. are equally untenable along with their theory of the dimensionless sub-atoms giving rise to the ternary, having magnitude and dimension, and those combining to form macroscopic objects. Thus the theory is self-contradictory and unreasonable. No amount of combining dimensionless parts can yield a molecule with magnitude and dimension. A piece of cloth is produced by combining threads which themselves have parts. If the threads were partless or dimensionless, they could not have joined to form the cloth. Therefore it must be admitted that even an atom has magnitude and occupies space and dimension. Otherwise the union of any number of atoms could not give rise to macroscopic objects. Therefore to say that the ternary, which has length and dimension, is produced by a combination of dimensionless atoms, is to assert something which is void of sense. It may be consistent with reason to say that an object of larger bulk must have a larger number of constituent atoms. But even if this be admitted, then the atoms themselves must be admitted to have parts, and those parts will have further parts, and thus there will be an infinite regression.

This is exactly the situation that modern science has got itself into; the more they explore and catalog the subatomic particles, the more seem to crop up out of nowhere. So far, every single subatomic particle predicted by quantum theory has been discovered experimentally, with the exception (at the
time of this writing) of the Higgs boson, and confirmation of its discovery is expected soon. This fact alone should raise an alarm, for how is it possible for any theory of such subtle matter to be so accurate? The answer has to do with the nature of quantum effects, which depend on the intention and methodology of the observer. Such subtle matter begins to assume many of the qualities of spirit, therefore every time the scientists go looking for another subatomic particle, they find it. It is very likely that they are creating the particles simply by the design of their experiments. Since the scientists are clueless about the qualities of consciousness, naturally they do not notice this. So we can expect this foolish dance to continue as long as the scientists can demand more money for bigger particle accelerators from the demoniac leaders, in the hope that such arcane research will yield more powerful and destructive weapons.

This sūtra should not be explained, as some have done, as refuting an objection to the Vedānta theory of Brahman being the general cause; for the theme of this Adhyāya is refuting the systems of the opponents, and not in supporting our own theory. The theory of the Vaiśeṣikas is open to further objections, as shown in the next sūtras.

**Śūtra 2.2.12**

\textit{ubhayathāpi na karmātastadabhāvaḥ}

\textit{ubhayathāpi} – on both assumptions; \textit{na} – not; \textit{karma} – motion; \textit{atah} – therefore; \textit{tat-abhāvah} – the absence of that.

On both assumptions, [whether the \textit{adrśta} is in the atom or the soul,] there is no motion, and consequently there is absence [of the origination of the world.]

The argumentative Vaiśeṣikas hold that the world is produced by the successive formations of compounds like binary, ternary, etc. of the union of atoms. Now arises the question, “How is this primal motion brought about?” Is it caused by the \textit{adrśta} residing in the atoms or in the souls? It cannot be the first, because the \textit{adrśta}, which itself is the result of the good and bad actions done by the soul, cannot possibly reside in the atoms. It must inhere in the soul. However, the \textit{adrśta} residing in the soul cannot possibly produce motion in the atoms. Thus the motion of the atoms cannot be explained by either of these views. A third possibility may be advanced by the Vaiśeṣikas, that the motion originates in the atoms, as soon as they come into the proximity of souls charged with \textit{adrśta}. But this also is an unreasonable view. There can be no proximity or contact between the souls which are partless, and the atoms, which are also partless; for there can be no contact between two objects, both of which have no parts by which they can come into contact. Thus the \textit{adrśta} hypothesized by the Vaiśeṣikas cannot be the cause of the first motion of the atoms in any of these ways.

We have already proven that because of the inertness of dull matter, one insentient object cannot move another without being set in motion by a sentient being. We have seen that all motion of objects is initiated, guided and directed by intelligence and intelligent beings. Nor can the soul be the cause of the primal motion of the atoms at the beginning of a creative period, because according to the Vaiśeṣikas, during pralaya the soul lies dormant without possessing any intelligence, and thus is in no way superior to the atoms. Nor can it be said that the primal motion of the atoms is caused by the will of the Lord in conformity with the \textit{adrśta} of the ātman, because His will is eternal, and therefore the creation would be eternal. The Vaiśeṣikas say that during pralaya there is no creation because the \textit{adrśta} of the ātman does not mature and is not awakened, and consequently the will of the Lord is inactive. This view is also wrong, because all the materials being present, the creation ought to take place, irrespective of the
maturity. If the adṛṣṭa of the jīvas were the cause of the primal motion of the atoms, there is nothing to prove that the adṛṣṭa, which springs from the actions of the souls performed during many previous lives, should remain in latency without maturity during the full duration of pralaya. If the adṛṣṭa has any power of its own, irrespective of the will of the Lord, why should it remain dormant for such a long period of time? The atomic theory, therefore, is bound to fall back on the Vedānta philosophy that the will of the Lord is necessary, both to begin the creation and to keep the creation from occurring during pralaya.

Consequently there is no definite cause found that can explain the primal motion of the atoms, for neither the adṛṣṭa residing in the jīvas or in the atoms, nor the will of the Lord is a determined cause. The atoms thus being without motion in the beginning of creation, cannot come together and form aggregates. Since they cannot form aggregates, the binary, ternary etc. molecules cannot be produced, and consequently there can be no creation. By a similar line of reasoning, there can be no pralaya also. This refutation of the Vaiśeṣika system is only in regard to the first cause of the motion of the atoms. Vedānta philosophy does not deny the existence of atoms, but it denies the Vaiśeṣika theory of the karma of the souls being the first cause of the primal motions of the atoms. Vedānta philosophy holds that the creation depends entirely on the will of the Lord, and that will is not influenced by the karma of the jīvas.

The materialistic scientists today theorize that the primal motion of the atoms is begun by the Big Bang, a primordial explosion supposed by them to answer this same objection. But there is no way to travel back in time to verify this theory, nor any way to explain how the conditions necessary for the Big Bang came into existence. For the Big Bang would require space to be compressed into a tiny singularity containing all matter, an unimaginably dense condition. Science also theorizes the existence of black holes, compressed matter whose density is so high that no light or other energy can escape. These black holes appear to be stable, so why would a black hole containing all the mass in the universe explode? How would such a huge black hole come to exist in the first place? The scientists cannot answer these questions, because their whole theory is just a rationalization of how the initial creative energy was injected into the material universe. Why not simply admit that it was emanated by God?

Sūtra 2.2.13

\[ \text{samavāyābhuyamacca śamyādanavasthiteh} \]

\[ \text{samavāya} – \text{concomitant cause; abhyupamāt – because of the acceptance; ca – and; śamyāt – from equality because of equality, by parity; anavasthiteh – because there results an infinite regress.} \]

The Vaiśeṣika doctrine is untenable because of its acceptance of the fictitious relation called samavāya, from which an infinite regression results by parity of reasoning.

The Vaiśeṣika theory admits the relation called samavāya [not to be confused with samanvaya, the sixfold principle of Vedic interpretation according to context] and hence their doctrine in untenable. Why? Because the samavāya relation is equal to any other relation, thus it requires another samavāya to explain it, and that samavāya requires another samavāya to explain it and so on, causing an infinite regression of reasoning. The atoms come together to form a binary molecule through the relationship called samavāya. If there were no samavāya relationship, there would be no conjunction of atoms. But this samavāya relationship is a mere assumption, for it is inexplicable. If two atoms come together
through a samavāya relationship, it requires another samavāya to bring about this relationship. Thus there would be an infinite regress. The samavāya relationship has the notion of quality, action and general characteristics. Thus it is an unspecified causal relation. As such it would require another causal relation to explain it, and this produces the fault of anavasthā, infinite regression.

If it is objected that a relationship must be assumed to account for the connection between two things, and that this relationship is the essential nature of the thing, then it must be assumed everywhere. It cannot be said that the nature of samavāya is inseparable connection, for that also is open to the same objection. For then every quality would be found everywhere, and the holders of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine would have to admit that the consequence of their philosophy would be that the quality of smell would be found in air, the quality of sound in earth, the quality of form in the ātman and the quality of intelligence in light. Every quality would be found everywhere, because the samavāya being a unity, it would be present everywhere. But this is not a fact, therefore samavāya relationship is an incongruous assumption.

Similarly, the modern scientists are caught in an endless regression of one nonsensical theory on top of another, trying to explain the initial conditions of the material creation. Since matter is dull and inert, even for the simplest material reaction to take place, some source of energy has to supply the impetus to raise matter above absolute zero temperature. Every chemical reaction requires some Brownian motion due to temperature; so how did the ingredients of the universe gain their initial motion and heat? And where did those ingredients originate? Just like the atomic theory of the Vaiśeṣikas, material science cannot answer these questions, therefore it is to be rejected.

**Sūtra 2.2.14**

*nityameva ca bhāvāt*

*nityam* – eternal; *eva* – even; *ca* – and; *bhāvāt* – because of the existence.

The world would be eternal because samavāya is eternal.

If the samavāya is admitted to be eternal, then the creation, of which it is the relation, would be eternal. But this is untenable, for even the Vaiśeṣikas do not believe the world to be eternal. If samavāya, which might be described in modern terms as chemical affinity, is considered an eternal cause, then creation would be eternal, because the affinity of the atoms to combine together would be eternal. If samavāya is considered as the destructive cause that separates the atoms, then pralaya would be eternal. Both interpretations of samavāya are untenable, because they lead to the absurdity of an eternal creation or eternal dissolution of the world.

The modern scientific atomic theory is also open to the same objection. Because they do not recognize the existence of anything outside of the material world, the scientists cannot imagine how the universe began, neither can they imagine how it will end. Since the universe is created by a superior power, it is also destroyed by the same superior power.

**Sūtra 2.2.15**

*rupādimmattvāc ca viparyayo darśanāt*

*rupā-ādi-mattvāt* – because of possessing color, etc.; *ca* – and; *viparyayaḥ* – the opposite; *darśanāt* – because it is observed.
The Vaiśeṣika theory is further untenable because its atoms have color, etc. and because the reverse is also observed in them.

The Vaiśeṣikas admit that the atoms of earth, water, fire and air possess the attributes of color, taste, smell and touch and that they are eternal and partless. But the logical result of their assumption should be the reverse: that the atoms are temporary and have parts, because it is observed in ordinary life that anything possessing color, etc. is liable to destruction, such as a pot. The atoms of the Vaiśeṣikas therefore must have the seed of destruction in them, and they must be made of parts, like the pot. Thus this doctrine is full of inherent contradictions.

Modern science also holds that objects derive their qualities from the properties of their component atoms. However, we now know that attributes such as color are actually due to objects selectively reflecting various portions of the spectrum of visible light. We also know that atoms and their parts can be converted into energy and back. Atoms are thus simply a stable form of vibrations of energy. We experience that all energy without exception has a source; light comes from the sun, water from the ocean, electricity from the powerhouse. But the scientists do not admit that the original energy of the universe must have a source that pre-exists the material creation; hence that source must be spiritual in nature. Therefore their theories are also full of contradictions.

Sūtra 2.2.16

\[ \text{ubhayathā ca doṣāt} \]
\[ \text{ubhayathā} - \text{in both ways; } \text{ca} - \text{and; } \text{doṣāt} - \text{because of the difficulties.} \]

And there are difficulties in both cases.

If it is accepted that atoms have no color, taste, etc. then we cannot explain the possession of these qualities by earth, water, etc., for that which is in the effect must also be in the cause. If we take the contrary view and hold that the atoms have color, taste, etc. then the theory is open to the objection mentioned in the previous sūtra. Thus the atomic theory of the Vaiśeṣikas is untenable either way.

Similarly, the modern atomic theory cannot actually explain why substances have particular attributes of color, form, mass, density etc. because they cannot explain the universal forces such as space, gravity and time behind all these attributes. If we inquire deeply into their theories, their chain of cause and effect breaks down and their logic becomes circular. This their atomic theory is untenable.

Sūtra 2.2.17

\[ \text{aparigrahāccātyantamanapekṣā} \]
\[ \text{aparigrahāt} – \text{because it is not accepted; } \text{ca} – \text{and; } \text{atyanām} – \text{totally; } \text{anapekṣā} – \text{disregard.} \]

The atomic theory of the Vaiśeṣikas is not accepted by authoritative sages, therefore it is to be disregarded altogether.

Some regard may be shown for the doctrine of Kapila and the rest, because authoritative sages like Manu have accepted parts of their philosophy. But because this atomic doctrine is opposed to the
Vedas, the sages have not accepted any portion of it, therefore it is undemonstrated and should be disregarded by everyone who aims at the highest good for man. Similarly, any so-called scientific theory that denies the existence of God and the soul is actually most unscientific, because it ignores the ancient teachings of the greatest sages.

**Adhikaraṇa 3: Buddhist Doctrine Examined**

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: The actual history of Buddhism is largely unknown, especially in the West. Actually there were two Buddhas: Śākyamuni Buddha and the much earlier Viṣṇu-avatāra Buddha. Lord Buddha is declared by scripture to be one of the ten incarnations (avatāras) of the Supreme Lord, Śrī Viṣṇu. This is described in Śrīla Jayadeva Gosvāmi’s composition Gītā-Govinda:

vedāṁ uddhаратे jagantā vahate bhūgolam udābhrate
daiyayāṁ dārayate balīṁ chalayate kṣatra kṣayaṁ kurvate
paulastyam jayate halam kalayate kārṇyam ātánvate
mlecchāṁ mūṛccayate daśāktikrte krṣṇāya tubhyam namah

“O Kṛṣṇa, He who accepts ten incarnations! I offer my obeisances unto You for saving the Vedic scriptures as the Matsya incarnation; You held up the universe as the Kurma incarnation and lifted up the world as Varāha, the Boar incarnation; as Nṛsiṁha You vanquished Hiraṇyakaśipu; as Vāmana You deceived Bali Mahārāja; as Parasurāma You exterminated the corrupt warrior class; as Rāma You slew Rāvana; as Balarāma You took up the plough; as Buddha You bestowed compassion and as Kalki, You kill the mlecchas.”

Śrīla Jayadeva writes in the ninth verse of his Daśavatāra Strotram:

nindasi yajña vidherahāha śrutijātām
sadaya hṛdaya dārsita pasuṁghātam
keśava dhṛta buddha śaṁśra
jaya jagadīśa hare jaya jagadīśa hare

“O Lord of the universe, Keśava! You took the form of Lord Buddha who is full of compassion, and stopped the slaughter of animals which is strictly forbidden in the Vedas.”

If Lord Buddha is an incarnation of Lord Viṣṇu, then His actual identity requires further elaboration and analysis. It becomes imperative to research this matter since so many modern impersonalist and voidist philosophies are based upon Buddhism. How can it be that an incarnation of the Lord would spread an athestic philosophy based on voidism? The answer is that the commonly accepted history of Buddhism is a deliberate fabrication.

The common understanding of Buddha, that the Viṣṇu-avatāra Buddha that the Vaiṣṇavas worship is the same personality as the recent Śākyamuni Buddha, is inaccurate. Śākyamuni or Śākya-siṁha Buddha was simply a highly intelligent mortal, a vastly learned person who had attained some inner realizations. It was Śrī Śaṅkarācārya who declared Śākya-siṁha to be Lord Buddha, equating him with Lord Viṣṇu’s incarnation. This was a deliberate deception intended to hoodwink the public, which has been handed down by Śaṅkarācārya’s followers and which has since become the gospel of academic texts on comparative religion, thanks to the political disinformation of the British.

Śrī Śaṅkarācārya declared Śākya-siṁha Buddha (also known as Gautama Buddha) and Avatāra Buddha to be the same personality in his commentary on the present Adhikaraṇa of Vedānta-sūtra. While discussing Buddha’s philosophy, Śrī Śaṅkarācārya mentions his name in his commentary:

sarvathā api anādārṇaṁ ayam sugata-samāyāḥ śreyaskāmaṁ iti abhiprāyaṁ.
In this statement, *sugata* is meant to indicate Gautama Buddha, the son of Śuddhodana and Māyādevi, and not to the original Viśṇu incarnation Buddha. The word *samāyāḥ* means Gautama Buddha’s *siddhānta* [philosophical conclusions]. However, Viśṇu-avatāra Buddha is also named Sugata, and thus Śaṅkarācārya falsely interpolated Śākyasimha Buddha as if he were Viśṇu-avatāra Buddha. The use of the name Sugata for Viśṇu-avatāra Buddha was already extant in Buddhist scriptures. This is substantiated in the book *Amarakoṣa*, an ancient treatise written by the famous nihilist and atheist Amara Śīṃha. It is believed that Amara Śīṃha was born approximately 150 years prior to Śaṅkarācārya’s birth. Amara Śīṃha was the son of the *brāhmaṇa* Sabara Svāmī, who fathered a host of children with different mothers of different castes. This ancient verse about Amara Śīṃha was well known in the learned circles of yore:

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brāhmāṇyāṁ abhavat varāha mihira jyotiśvidām agranīḥ
rājā bharyharīś ca vikrāmanṛpaḥ ksatrārātmajāyām abhūt
vaśyāyāṁ haricandra vaidya tilaka jātaś ca śāṅkuḥ kṛ̣tī
dsūdrāyāṁ amaraḥ saḍeva śāvara svāmī dviya sya ātmajāḥ
```

“Varāha Mihira, foremost among the greatest astrologers, was born from the womb of a *brāhmaṇa* lady. King Vikrama and King Bhartṛhari were born from a *ksatriya* mother. From a vaśyāya mother were born Haricandra, a *vaidya* tilaka [an excellent Ayurveda physician] and Śāṅkhyā; and from a *śūdra* [maidservant] mother was born Amara Śīṃha. These six were fathered by the *brāhmaṇa* Sabara Svāmī.”

Amara Śīṃha, the son of a *brāhmaṇa* in a *śūdra* lady, authored many books on Buddhism. By coincidence, all these books came into the possession of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya, who preserved only the *Amarakoṣa* and burnt all the others. The following verse about Buddha is found in the *Amarakoṣa*:

```
sarvājñāḥ sugato buddho dharmarājas tathāgataḥ
samanta bhadro bhagavān māra jil lokajī jinaḥ
dsādbhijño daśabalo dvayavādi vināyakah
munindrā śīrghanah śāṣṭā munih
```

“All-knowing, transcendental Buddha, king of righteousness, He who has come, beneficent, all encompassing Lord, conqueror of Māra the god of love, conqueror of worlds, He who controls his senses, protector of the six enemies, possessor of the ten powers, speaker of monism, foremost leader, lord of the ascetics, embodiment of splendor and teacher of the ascetics.”

The above verse contains eighteen names of Viśṇu-avatāra Buddha including Sugata, and the verse below, also from the *Amarakoṣa*, contains the seven names of Śākyasimha Buddha without any mention of Sugata.

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sākyamunis tu yah sa śākyasimhah sarvārāthasiddha sauddhodaniś ca saḥ
gautamaś cārkabandhuś ca māyādevī sutaś ca saḥ
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“Teacher of the Śākyas, lion of the Śākyas, accomplisher of all goals, son of Śuddhodana, of Gautama’s line, friend of the entrapped ones, the son of Māyādevī.”

In these verses, starting with *sarvājñāḥ* and finishing with *munih* are eighteen names addressing the original Viśṇu incarnation Lord Buddha. The next seven names, beginning with Śākyamuni to Māyādevi-Sutaśca, refer to Śākyasimha Buddha. The Buddha referred to in the first eighteen names and the Buddha referred to in the latter seven names are clearly not the same person. In the commentary on *Amarakoṣa* by the learned Śrī Raghunātha Cakravartī, he also divided the verses into two sections. To the eighteen names of Viśṇu-avatāra Buddha he writes the words *astadāś buddha,*
which clearly refers only to the Viṣṇu-avatāra. Next, on his commentary for the seven aliases of Śākyasiṁha he writes, *ete sapta Śākya bangṣabatirneḥ buddha muni bisheṭe:* “The next seven names starting from Śākya-munistu are aliases of Buddha-muni who was born into the Śākya dynasty.”

Thus from the above verses and their commentaries it is clear that the divine incarnation Sugata Buddha and the atheist sage Gautama Buddha are different personalities. Another edition of the Amarakoṣa was published by the respected scholar H. T. Colebrooke in 1872. On pages 2 & 3 of this book the name ‘Buddha’ has been explained. The Marginal Note on page 2 states that the first eighteen names are names of Ajina or Buddha; the Marginal Note for the latter seven names states these are aliases of Śākyasiṁha Buddha. A further footnote is added to clarify the second Buddha, of the later seven names: Footnote (b) ‘the founder of the religion named after him.’ Mr. Colebrooke lists the names of the many commentaries he used as references in his Preface. In addition to Raghunātha Cakravarti’s commentary, he took references from twenty-five others.

Therefore it can be said with certainty that the propagator of Bahyatma, Jñanatma and Śūnyatma, the three pillars of atheism, was Gautama Buddha or Śākyasiṁha Buddha. There is no evidence whatsoever that Sugata Buddha, Lord Viṣṇu’s incarnation, was in any way connected with atheism. Śākyasiṁha or Siddhārtha Buddha received the name Gautama from his spiritual master Gautama Muni, who belonged to the Kapila dynasty. This is confirmed in the ancient Buddhist treatise Sundarānanda Carita:

> guru gotrād atāḥ kautsāste bhavanti sma gautamāḥ

> “O Kautsa, because his teacher was Gautama, they became known from his family line.”

Besides the Amarakoṣa, so highly favored by Śaṅkarācārya, there are other famous Buddhist texts like Prajñā-Pāramitā Sūtra, Astasahasrika Prajñā-Pāramitā Sūtra, Sata-sahasrika Prajñā-Pāramitā Sūtra, Lalita Vistara etc. Proper scrutiny of these texts reveals the existence of three categories of Buddhas:

- Bodhisattva Buddhas, including personalities like Samanta Bhadraka who were born enlightened.
- Human Buddhas like Gautama, who came to be known as Buddha after their enlightenment.

The Amarakoṣa states that Lord Buddha, Śrī Viṣṇu’s incarnation is also known as Samanta Bhadra [universal auspiciousness], whereas Gautama Buddha is a human being. Other than the eighteen names of the Viṣṇu-avatāra Buddha mentioned in Amarakoṣa, many names of Lord Buddha are recorded in the above-mentioned Buddhist texts. In Lalita Vistara, Ch. 21 page 178, it is described how Gautama Buddha meditated on the same spot as the Ādi-Buddha.

> ea dharaṇīmunde pūrvabuddhāsanasthaḥ
> samartha dhanur grhitvā śunya nairātmavāṇaṁ
> klesaripuṁ niḥvatvā dṛṣṭijālaṁ ca bhītvā
> śiva virajamaśokāṁ prāpyate bodhim agryāṁ

> “The one seated on the hallowed earth of the previous Buddha’s birthplace is on the path of voidism and renunciation. With his weapon, the powerful bow, he vanquishes the enemies of distress and illusion. Thus with wisdom he will attain the auspicious state of grieflessness and worldly detachment.”
It is evident from this verse that Gautama Buddha, realizing the spiritual potency of the previous Buddha’s birthplace, chose to perform meditation and austerities in that vicinity, under a *pipal* tree. The ancient and original name of this place was Kīkata, but after Gautama attained enlightenment here it came to be known as ‘Buddha Gaya’ [Bodhi Gaya or Bodh Gaya]. Even to the present day, the rituals of worship to the deity of Buddha at Bodhi Gaya are conducted by a *sannyāsī* of the Giri order of the Śāṅkarācārya sect. It is commonly accepted amongst these monks that Buddha-Gaya [Viṣṇu-avatāra Buddha] was a predecessor of Gautama Buddha, who came later to the original Buddha’s birthplace to practice meditation. Śākya-sīhiha Buddha chose this place to attain liberation, knowing it to be saturated with immense spiritual power.

*Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* is a famous and authoritative Buddhist scripture. From the description of Buddha found in this book, it may be firmly concluded that he is not the more recent Śākyamuni Buddha. In the beginning of this book we find Rāvaṇa, King of Lanka, praying first to the original Viṣṇu incarnation Buddha and then to the successive future Buddha. A part of this prayer is reproduced below:

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lāṅkāvatāra sūtraṁ vai pūrva buddha anuvartitaṁ
smarāmi pūrvakaṁ buddhaṁ jina-putra puraskṛtaṁ
tsūram etan nigadyante bhagavān api bhāṣatāṁ
bhavisyatanaṁgate kāle buddhāḥ buddha-sutaṁ ca ye
```

Rāvaṇa, the king of Laṅka, at first recited in the *toṭaka* meter, then sang the following: “I invoke in my memory the aphorisms known as *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, compiled and propagated by the previous Buddha (Viṣṇu’s incarnation). The son of Jina (Lord Buddha) presented this book. Lord Buddha and his sons, who will appear in the future, as well as Bhagavān, the Viṣṇu incarnation, will continue to instruct all from this book.”

Therefore, the Buddha incarnation described in the *Linga Purāṇa, Bhavisya Purāṇa* and the ninth of the ten Viṣṇu incarnations mentioned in the *Vāraha Purāṇa* and *Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* is not the same personality as Gautama or Śākyamuni Buddha, who was the son of Śuddhodana. Vaiṣṇavas never worship the nihilist and atheist [sūnyavāda] Gautama Buddha. They only worship Lord Viṣṇu’s ninth incarnation, Lord Buddha, with this prayer from the *Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* [10.40.22]:

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namo buddhāya śuddhāya daitya-dānava-mohine
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“O Supreme Lord Buddha! I offer my obeisances unto You, who are faultless and have appeared to delude the demoniac and atheistic class of men.”

Earlier in *Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* [1.3.24], Lord Buddha’s advent is described in the following manner:

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tataḥ kalau sampravṛtte
sammohāya sura-dviṣām
buddho nāmnāṇjana-sutaḥ
kīkaṭeṣu bhāvisyatati
```

“They, in the beginning of Kali-yuga, the Lord will appear as Buddha, the son of Añjanā, in the province of Gayā, just for the purpose of deluding those who are envious of the faithful theist.”

The Buddha mentioned in this verse is Lord Buddha, the son of Añjana, also known by some as Ajina’s son. Śrī Śrīdhara Svāmī writes in his authoritative commentary to this verse:

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buddha avartāramāha tata iti aṇjanasya sutāḥ
ajina sutā it pāthe ajino’ pi sa eva kīkaṭeṣu madhye gayā-pradeṣe
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*Śrī Vedānta-sūtra*  
*Adhyāya 2*  
*Page 98*
“The words tataḥ kalau etc. describe Viṣṇu’s incarnation Buddha as the son of Aṅjana. Ajīna in the word ajīna sutah actually means Aṅjana. Kīkata is the name of the district of Gayā.

The following quote is from Nṛśimha Purāṇa [36.29]:

kalau prāpte yathā buddho bhavannārāyaṇa – prabhuḥ

“In Kali-yuga the Supreme Lord Nārāyaṇa appears as Buddha.”

A fair estimate of Lord Buddha’s appearance can be made from astronomical and astrological calculation to be around 4,000 years ago. Regarding the astrological facts at the time of His birth, the treatise Nirnaya-sindhu states in the second chapter:

jyaiṣṭha śukla dvitīyāyāṁ buddha-janma bhāviṣyati

“Lord Buddha will appear on the second day of the waxing moon in the month of Jyaiṣṭha.”

Elsewhere in this book is described the procedure for Lord Buddha’s worship:

pauṣa śuklasya saptamyāṁ kuryāt buddhasya pūjanam

“Lord Buddha is especially worshipped on the seventh day of the waxing moon in the month of Pausa.”

The rituals, prayers and procedures for worship mentioned in these scriptures all clearly indicate that they are meant for Lord Viṣṇu’s ninth avatāra incarnation. Lord Buddha also finds repeated mention in many authentic Vedic scriptures like Viṣṇu Purāṇa, Agni Purāṇa, Vāyu Purāṇa and Skanda Purāṇa.

The truth remains that there are many different demigods and goddesses, both real and imaginary, who are worshipped by their respective devotees, in the same way that Śākyamuni Buddha (who was an atheist) is worshipped or glorified by his followers. However, this kind of worship and glorification is completely separate and unrelated to sātvatana-dharma, the eternal religion of Vedānta-sūtra, enunciated in its natural commentary Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam.

According to the German scholar Max Müller, Śākyamuni Buddha was born in 477 BC in the Lumbini gardens within the city of Kapilavastu. This ancient, and at that time, well-populated city in the Terai region of Nepal was well known. Śākyamuni, Śākyamuni or Gautama Buddha’s father was known as Śuddhodana, while his mother was called Māyādevi; this is all accepted historical fact. Although Aṅjana’s son and Śuddhodana’s son both share the same name, Buddha, they are nevertheless two different personalities. Ādi-Buddha was born in Kīkata, which is now famous as Bodhi-Gayā, while the second Buddha was born in Kapilavastu, Nepal. Thus the birthplace, parents, and era of Viṣṇu-avatāra Buddha and Gautama Buddha are totally at variance.

The atheistic Śākyamuni Buddha had four principal disciples, who founded four systems of philosophy called Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra and Mādhyamika. The Vaibhāṣikas hold that every object that is perceived is real. The Sautrāntikas hold that there is no proof whether external objects really exist or not; only the ideas of objects exist, and the external objects are inferred from these ideas. Thus the Vaibhāṣikas hold that external objects are directly perceived, while the Sautrāntikas maintain that the outward world is an inference from ideas. The third system of Yogācāra holds that ideas alone are real, there is no external world corresponding to these ideas, and external objects are unreal, like things seen in a dream. The Mādhyamikas maintain that even the ideas themselves are unreal, and all that really exists is the void [śūnyam].

These were the doctrines held by the four classes of Buddhists. All of them agree that every existing object has only a momentary existence. The first two, namely the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas,
hold that all perceptible things may be classified as either physical or mental. The physical is subdivided into two classes, bhūta [elements] and bhautika [elementals]. Similarly mental objects are classified as either citta [mind] or caittika [mental]. They further hold that there are five skandhas, namely rūpa, vijñāna, vedanā, sañjñā and saṃskāra. The rūpa-skandha is composed of the elements earth, water, fire and air, produced by the aggregation of four kinds of atoms possessing the attributes of hardness, fluidity, hotness and mobility, respectively. These four elements comprise the bodies and senses of the various beings. The rūpa-skandha includes all such elements and elementals, the objects composed of them. The vijñāna-skandha is the stream of consciousness that gives the notion of egoism. Thus the feeling of ‘I am’ is the vijñāna-skandha, also called the ātmā [the enjoyer or agent]. The vedanā-skandha includes the awareness of pleasure and pain, and may be called the skandha of feeling. The sañjñā-skandha includes all names and words. The fifth or saṃskāra-skandha includes the attributes of the mind, such as affection, hatred, delusion, merit, demerit, etc. The last four skandhas are collectively called citta-caittika, mind-mental or internal objects. All activities depend upon them and they constitute the inner life of every being. All internal objects are thus called catus-skandhī or belonging to one of these four internal skandhas. All external objects belong to rūpa-skandha alone. Thus the whole world consists of these two kinds of objects, internal and external. Except for these two, there exists nothing else like ether, etc.

Samśaya [arisal of doubt]: Is this a valid theory or not?

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: This theory is valid, because it explains the world and all activities.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: This is not so, as shown in the following sūtra.

**Sūtra 2.2.18**

samudāya ubhahetukepi tadaprāptih

samudāy— the aggregate; ubhaya—having two causes; api — also; tat-aprāptih — there is non-establishment of that.

Even admitting that these two classes of objects are the cause of the whole aggregate, still the world order is not explained.

The theory of the Buddhists, which classifies all objects as either internal or external, is insufficient to explain the world order, because these aggregates are unintelligent, and there is no intelligence admitted by the Baudhhas that can bring about these aggregations. According to the Buddhists everything is impermanent, and there is no permanent intelligent substance that can bring about the aggregation of these skandhas. If it is said that they come together out of their own internal motion, then the world would be eternal, for the skandhas being eternal and possessing motion of their own, they will constantly bring about creation. Thus the main doctrine of the Buddhists is untenable.

Whenever we see a complicated construction or dynamic machine, we take it for granted that there is an intelligent designer and builder behind it. Even a relatively small, simple machine like an automobile requires regular maintenance by a trained mechanic, or it becomes inoperable and useless. How much more skill and intelligence must be required to maintain the operation of the sun and planets, the biosphere, or space and time themselves. Even accepting for argument’s sake that the Buddhist or modern scientific model of the universe is correct, how foolish it would be to think that the great machine of the cosmic reality has no intelligence, no conscious, powerful builder or designer.
The Buddhists may object, “In our system there is a concatenation of cause and effect, beginning with avidyā [ignorance]. Thus through avidyā arises the desire, aversion, etc. which compose the saṁskāra-skandha. From this arises cognition, or the kindling of mind which composes vijñāna-skandha. From this arises the six sense organs which comprise the vedanā-skandha, and from sensation again arises avidyā. Thus avidyā produces saṁskāra, from which comes vijñāna, nāma-rūpa [name and form], the body, touch, sentiency, trṣnā [thirst or desire], activity, birth, species, decay, death, grief, lamentation, pain and despondency. Thus the circle of causation goes on. We Buddhists hold this theory of the circle of causation, and as this circle is not refuted by anyone and is admitted by all, and as it moves of its own accord like a waterwheel by which water is drawn from a well, so our theory is not open to any objections you may raise.”

This theory is refuted by the author in the next sūtra.

Sūtra 2.2.19

itaretarapratyayattvādītī cennotpattimātranimittatvāt

itara-itara – mutual; pratyayattvāt – because of being the cause; iti – thus; cet – if; utpattimātra – merely production; nimittatvāt – because of there being an efficient cause only.

[If it is said that the world is produced by] the mutual causality [of avidyā, etc. then we say no,] because they are merely efficient causes [of the immediately subsequent links.]

If you say that this aggregate of the world is formed by the mutual causation of avidyā and the rest, as described above, then we say it is not so, for each of your links of causation describes only the origin of the subsequent stage from the previous one. It only explains how vijñāna arises from saṁskāra, etc.; it does not explain how the aggregate itself is brought about. A saṅghāta [aggregate] like a house cannot be explained to have been produced merely by putting together bricks, mortar, etc. because this does not explain the design.

We see in the natural world that a small seed contains the possibility of the entire tree, its fruits, and the generation of further seeds. The Lord, the actual designer of the cosmic creation, is so intelligent that He can make one prototype of each species, and they continue producing unlimited descendants automatically. Scientists have boasted for many years that they will create life, but even with genetic engineering they cannot synthesize a single cell; they always have to start with an existing living entity. Therefore the creation cannot exist without God, because any aggregate including living beings requires superhuman intelligence and skill to design, create and maintain.

Any saṅghāta [aggregate] always shows a design, and is created for the purpose of enjoyment. The Buddhists say there is no permanent ātmā, and identity is momentary only. There can be no enjoyment or experience for such a temporary soul, because the momentary soul has not produced the merit or demerit whose consequences it has to enjoy or suffer; it was produced by another momentary soul. Nor can you say that the momentary soul enjoys or suffers the results of the acts done by its ancestral soul, for then that ancestral soul and its effects must be held to be permanent and not momentary; and if you hold any soul to be permanent, you give up your idea of the impermanence of everything. But if you hold everything be impermanent, then you open your theory to the objection already made in Sūtra 2.2.18. Hence this theory is untenable.
Sūtra 2.2.20

uttarātpāde ca pūrvanirodhāt

uttara - in the subsequent; upāde - on the origination; ca - and; pūrvanirodhāt - because there is cessation of the preceding.

There can be no causal relation between avidyā and the rest, because when the subsequent one is produced, the preceding one ceases to exist.

In this sūtra the author criticizes the view that avidyā, etc. give rise to the subsequent terms of the series by showing that avidyā, etc. cannot stand in a causal relationship to the subsequent terms. The Buddhists, asserting the momentary existence of everything, admit that when a thing comes into existence in a subsequent moment, the thing that existed in the previous moment has ceased to exist; an effect produced in a subsequent moment is the result of the total destruction of the cause that existed in the previous moment. This being their doctrine, the series of avidyā, etc. cannot stand in a causal relationship to the subsequent terms, for the cause having totally ceased to exist, cannot stand in the relation of originator to the effect that comes into existence in a subsequent moment.

The essence of the Buddhist doctrine, like scientific materialism, is that it is a psychological trick to make the believer feel that he is not responsible for the causes or consequences of his actions. In Buddhism, the cause ceases to exist as soon as the effect manifests; in materialism, everything comes from atoms and returns to atoms at the end. In both systems there is no permanent existence of the soul, no God, and no reward or punishment after death; therefore one may as well do whatever he likes. This devastates the rationale for morality, which is the civilizing force in human society. Thus we see that cultures under the sway of Buddhism or materialism gradually deteriorate until they are just like animal society, based on nothing more than competition for sense gratification and power, with no morality.

In reality, we always perceive that the cause subsists in the effect, as a thread subsists in the cloth or clay continues to exist in the pot. But the Buddhists hold that existence arises from nonexistence, for they maintain that the effect cannot manifest without the destruction of the cause; the tree cannot appear without the destruction of the seed. Similarly the material scientists want us to believe that the gigantic cosmic creation appeared from nothing, or if there was a cause in the beginning, it has long since ceased to exist. This view is refuted by the author in the next sūtra.

Sūtra 2.2.21

asati pratijñoparodhā yaugapadyamanyathā

asati – if there were nonexistence; pratijña – admitted principle; uparodhāḥ – contradiction; yaugapadyam – simultaneity; anyathā – otherwise.

[If the cause] ceases to exist [when the effect manifests itself, then there results]
contradiction of the admitted principle [that the universe is caused by the skandhas,]
otherwise [there would arise] simultaneity [of cause and effect.]

If it is said that an effect may originate even when the cause is totally non-existent, then that would contradict the admitted principle of the Buddhists that the world originates from the skandhas. Nonexistence being present everywhere, then anything may arise anywhere, at any time. If, however, the Buddhists say that the antecedent momentary existence of the cause lasts only as long as the effect
does not originate, then they are landed in the complimentary difficulty, namely that the cause and effect would exist simultaneously, for the cause would then remain in the effect. This would contradict the accepted doctrine of the Buddhists that everything is merely momentary. Therefore, it follows that the effect does not originate from nonexistence of the cause.

It is unreasonable and impossible that something should arise from nothingness; but the Buddhists and material scientists want us to accept that this is the case. However, we never see an actual case where something comes from nothing. The gigantic material creation must have an even more gigantic and powerful source, otherwise there is no way for it to appear out of nothing. Even if we accept just for the sake of argument the scientific argument that the material ingredients of the universe are always existing without a prior cause, or the Buddhist theory that the cause ceased to exist as soon as the creation came into existence, then as discussed above, there must still be an outside source of energy and intelligence to put those inert ingredients into motion and organize them into the complex forms and dynamic processes of the cosmos we observe today.

The Buddhists also hold that substances like a pot, etc. totally cease to exist, like the flame of a lamp that is blown out. The author next refutes the tenet that there can be absolute annihilation of a substance.

Sūtra 2.2.22

pratisaṁkhyāpratisaṁkhyā nirodhāprāptiravicchedāt

pratisaṁkhyā – depending upon the volition of some conscious entity; apratisaṁkhyā – not depending upon the volition of some conscious entity; nirodhā – destruction; aprāptih – non-establishment; avicchedāt – because there is no complete interruption.

Nor can there be established that there are two kinds of destruction, volitional and non-volitional, because there is never any complete interruption [of existence.]

Pratisaṁkhyā-nirodha is destruction dependent on the volition of some conscious agent, for example when a man smashes a clay pot with a hammer. Apratisaṁkhyā-nirodha happens by the force of time, or otherwise without dependence on the will of a sentient agent. These plus ākāśa [space], which the Buddhists define as the absence of all obstruction or covering, are the three kinds of nonentities accepted by the Buddhists. The two kinds of destruction and space are called niraṅvaya vināśa [absolute destruction] or nirupākhya śūnyam [total void]. Everything else is momentary only, as found in the following aphorism: “Everything which is an object of conception other than these three is temporary and composite.” The author will refute the theory that ākāśa is a nonentity in Sūtra 2.2.24.

The present sūtra refutes the wrong doctrine of the two kinds of nirodha [complete destruction]. These two kinds of destruction are impossible because of the absence of interruption of existence.

An object, once existent, cannot be absolutely annihilated, for the origination and destruction of a substance only mean the change of condition of the substance. When a pot is broken into pieces, the original substance of the pot continues to exist; it has merely changed its form and condition. The substance of an object undergoes modification or change of condition, but the substance remains permanently existent. One cannot say when a candle is burnt out that it is completely annihilated; it substance simply has changed state into heat, light, gases etc. that certainly still exist somewhere. We do not perceive the candle when it has been burnt out, because its substance has been transformed into a more subtle condition. As we can easily infer in the case of a pot or candle that there is no permanent
destruction, in all other cases also we will find that so-called destruction is simply a change in the state or condition of the substance, which continues to exist, albeit in a different form. Consequently absolute annihilation is an improvable impossibility.

Next the author refutes the notion of liberation as entertained by the Buddhists.

**Śūtra 2.2.23**

ubiḥyahāḥ ca dosāt

ubiḥyahāḥ – in either case; ca – and; dosāt – because there are objections.

_In both cases there are objections, and [thus the very idea of liberation is not established.]_

The word _na_ [not] is understood in this _sūtra_ and the three following ones from _Śūtra_ 2.2.19. The Buddhists define _mokṣa_ or liberation as the cessation of the cycle of _avidyā_ and the rest, which constitute the world cycle called _saṁsāra_. Does this liberation accrue from direct knowledge of the truth, or does it happen by itself? It cannot be the first, for then the acceptance of _apratisaṁkhyā-nirodha_, destruction without the agency of a sentient being, would be useless. Nor can it be the latter, for then all the disciplines and methods laid down by the Buddhists for their students would become useless.

Real liberation means reinstatement of the soul, who is temporarily in a state of illusory conditioned consciousness, in his real eternal identity and normal spiritual consciousness. This can only happen through revival of his original relationship with the Supreme Personality of Godhead. The only destruction involved in the process of liberation is destruction of the false, illusory material identity based on the bodily misconception of life. This is due to be destroyed anyway by the force of time; but in actual liberation, the false ego or false material identity is permanently set aside.

The Buddhist idea of liberation is insubstantial because it is based on the mere absence of something, the destruction of an illusion that never existed in the first place. The destruction of a mirage does not automatically reveal the truth. Thus their teaching cannot stand the test of reason, and actual liberation cannot be established in their system. Next the author refutes the Buddhist doctrine that _ākāśa_ is an absolute nonentity.

**Śūtra 2.2.24**

ākāśe cāviśeṣāt

ākāśe – in the case of ākāśa; ca – and; aviśeṣāt – because of no specific difference.

_The tenet of absolute nonexistence of ākāśa also is untenable because there is no difference in this case either._

The Buddhist tenet that ākāśa or space is an absolute nonentity is untenable. Why? The _sūtra_ says it is _aviśeṣāt_: because ākāśa is no different from any other substance that is an object of perception. When we say, “The bird flies in space,” we perceive space. Space is therefore just as real a substance as earth, water, etc. As we know earth from its quality of smell, water by its quality of taste etc., we know ākāśa by its attribute of being the abode of objects, and by its quality of sound. Thus ākāśa is a real substance and not a nonentity. The Buddhists also say that air exists in ākāśa. If ākāśa is totally nonexistent, then
what would be the receptacle of air? Nor can you say that space is simply the absence of any occupying object, for this also does not stand to reason.

The logicians hold that nonexistence [abhāva] is of three kinds: prāk-abhāva [prior nonexistence], as the nonexistence of a pot before being made by the potter; pradhvaṣṭa-abhāva [absence by destruction], as when a pot is broken into pieces; and atyanta-abhāva [absolute nonexistence], as in the horn of a hare, which is a complete fiction. Ākāśa is none of these three kinds of nonexistence. Consequently ākāśa or space is not the negative substance of the logicians. If ākāśa were a nonentity, then the whole universe would become devoid of space. For if you say that ākāśa is nothing but the absence of occupying objects or covering, then it cannot be the covering of earth, etc., and if you say that it is imperceptible because there is an occupying body like the earth, etc. then you land in the position that the whole universe is without space, because something or other exists everywhere. Thus the Buddhist theory of space is untenable on either alternative.

Sūtra 2.2.25

anusmrteśca

anu-smṛteḥ – because of memory; ca – and.

The fact of memory or recollection also [proves that things are not momentary.]

The Buddhist idea of the momentariness of everything is also disproved by the persistence of memory and recognition. Memory or recollection is the idea or cognition of what was previously perceived, and recognition is based on memory. In recollection we recognize a thing that was perceived in the past, and assert, “This is the thing that was seen before.” This proves at least that the person who recollects is not a momentary thing, but has continuity of existence between the moment of perception and the moment of recollection.

You cannot say that this recognition of a thing that was perceived in the past is only a cognition of similarity, as in “This is the Ganges,” or “This is the same flame we saw before.” In the cases of the Ganges and the flame, no doubt it is a false assumption to say that they are the same things that we saw before, for the water in the river is not the same, nor the effulgent particles that compose the flame. In that case, the perception is merely of similarity, or of a familiar pattern. But unless there exists a permanent knowing subject who can perceive the similarity of the present with the past, he cannot assert that “This is the Ganges,” or “This is the same flame we saw before.”

The knowing, remembering or recognizing subject must be permanent, or at least have continuity of existence in time, and cannot be momentary. It may be possible that sometimes doubts may arise whether an external object is really the identically same one that was seen in the past, or merely something similar to it. But with regard to the cognizing subject, there can never arise the doubt, “Am I the same person who existed in the past?” For it impossible that the memory of something perceived by another personality would exist in one’s own mind. Nor can you say that there is unity due to a succession of impressions, where one impression vanishes after giving birth to a new similar impression, and that this current of impressions gives the appearance of unity. For if the succession of impressions is identical to the original one, that is practically the same thing as admitting to the existence of a permanent chain of similar impressions, and this permanent chain may as well be called ātmā, and thus it would also refute the Buddhist theory. But the fact of memory, recollection or recognition cannot be explained without the permanent existence of a cognizing subject.
Moreover, what exactly is meant by ‘momentary’? Do you mean that which is related to a moment, or that which is originated or is destroyed in a moment? It cannot be the first, for every permanent object must be related to one or more moments, as many moments pass during its existence. Nor can it be the second, for we do not perceive objects coming into existence or vanishing in a moment. Thus the theory of the momentariness of all things is refuted. These same arguments also refute the theory of drṣṭi-sṛṣṭi, which posits that creation is constant and going on at every moment, which is only the theory of momentariness under another name. Consequently things are not momentary, but exist for definite periods of time.

The author next takes up the theory of the Sautrāntikas and proves its untenability. They maintain that objects leave their ideas in our consciousness—ideas of having a certain color, form, etc. and though they may vanish and cease to exist, they exist in our consciousness as ideas, and are inferred as such. Therefore ideas are the only really existing things, and their manifoldness is caused by the manifoldness of external objects. This view is set aside in the next sūtra.

Sūtra 2.2.26

na'sato'dṛṣṭatvāt

na – not; asataḥ – of that which no longer exists; adṛṣṭatvāt – because it is not perceived.

[There can be] no [persistence of cognition] of that which no longer exists, because it is nowhere seen [to be so.]

The Sautrāntikas hold that a thing that has perished imparts its form to the cognition, and on the foundation of that form, color and so on, the thing itself is inferred. But when the substance perishes, the qualities inherent in it would perish along with it. The cognitions of its qualities, such as its color, etc. cannot be the actual qualities of the thing that has perished, for they exist only in cognition and we never see them in actual reality. All that remains are the impressions of those qualities in our minds. Once the substance itself is gone we do not see the qualities passing over to another object. Nor can you say that objects like pots, etc. are mere inferences and have no objective existence. When a person sees a pot, he says “I see the pot”; he does not say, “I have the idea of a pot in my mind, and therefore I infer that there must be something outside of me which I call a pot.” For this kind of idealism is contradicted by the very pronouncement of our consciousness that declares the pot to exist outside. It follows therefore that the existence of the pot, which is an object of perception, is not inferred from the idea of a pot formed in our cognition. Such existence is intuitively given by the very fact of perception. This is a specific objection to the Sautrāntika theory.

The author next shows a defect common to both the theories of the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas.

Sūtra 2.2.27

udāsīnānāmapi caivam siddhiḥ

udāsīnānam – of persons who are perfectly indifferent and inactive; api – also; ca – and; evam – thus; siddhiḥ – accomplishment.

[If things were all momentary,] then even persons who are inactive could accomplish all their objects without exertion.
If things originate from nonexistence, because everything is momentary, then persons who never exert will accomplish their objects by their mere laziness, because effects are produced without any real cause. In the theory of universal momentariness, the thing does not exist in the next moment, and so there can be no effort made to attain a desired thing or to ward off an undesired thing, for there would remain no motive for such exertion; good things would be obtained without exertion, and evil warded off similarly. One who believes in this doctrine would never exert himself, either to attain heaven or liberation. But the Buddhists are inconsistent in their actions, for while believing in the momentariness of all objects, they still make efforts, such as study, meditation and performance of rituals, to attain mokṣa.

As a matter of fact, everyone believes that to attain an object he must employ appropriate means and right effort. Consequently these two schools of Buddhism merely tend to delude mankind; for they lay down practices for the attainment of heaven and mokṣa for souls that are, in their theory, simply momentary. And believing that entities can arise from nonentities, they still exert for the realization of their objects, as if they believed that the world originated from a real entity, the skandhas which according to them are real substances. Their theory being thus self-contradictory deserves no serious consideration. Thus the theories of the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas have been refuted.

**Adhikaraṇa 4: The Yogācāra Theory Considered**

**Viṣṇya [thesis or statement]:** Now the author considers the theory of the Yogācāras. They say that Lord Śākyamuni Buddha assumed the existence of external things, and in his systems of Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika showed the relation of those things with thought, merely out of deference to those weak-minded disciples of his who were attached to external things. In fact, Śākyamuni Buddha did not believe in the reality of the external world. His highest doctrine is represented by the Yogācāra system, according to which the viññāna-skandha or cognition alone is real.

According to this system an object like a pot, etc. which is perceived in cognition is nothing more than cognition. The viññāna modifies itself into the form of the object. It is not an objection that without external objects the worldly business cannot be transacted, because in a dream also there are no external objects, and still all kinds of activities are performed with the thought objects. Even those who believe in the reality of external objects have to admit that those objects are cognized insofar as the mind becomes modified into the shape of those objects. If it were not so, there would not arise phrases like “I know the pot,” or “I know the cloth.” Thus all worldly activities can go on with mere cognition, and all practical thought and communication are rendered possible with cognition alone. What, then, is the necessity of assuming the existence of an external object corresponding to those ideas? Nor can it be objected that thought-forms being very minute and subtle, cannot represent the forms of big things like a mountain. A little consideration will show that the mind can accommodate an object of any complexity or scale. Its smallness is no reason against its containing large objects, for a small object like the retina of the eye can contain within it the entire visible external world.

Mind or idea itself is the power of illumination. It shines forth, it has a form, and because it has a form it has the possibility of shining forth in the shapes of all these objects. An objector may say that, if there are no real external objects, what causes the mind to assume the manifold shapes? To this we reply that the mind assumes different shapes according to the different vāsanās [desire-impressions] submerged in it. Just as these vāsanās left in the mind create the dream-world in sleep, so the external world in waking consciousness is also the result of the vāsanās. The manifoldness of cognition is thus caused by the manifoldness of the vāsanās, and we can easily find this out by a little thinking. For wherever there is a vāsanā there is a change of mental form corresponding to the vāsanā, but whenever the vāsanās are
stopped, the mind also stops. Moreover you also admit that the cognition and the object of cognition are always coexistent, and the act of perception is one. We never see an object without the corresponding conception of it, consequently there is no necessity of admitting the existence of an external object corresponding to the internal idea. But as a matter of fact the object of knowledge is identical with cognition, and is not separate from it. We are conscious of only one form, and that is the idea, though this idea appears to us at the same time as an external object. The latter, however, is an error. And since we are always conscious of ideas and things together, it is useless to assume that the object is different from the idea. Thus only ideas actually exist.

Saṁśaya [arise of doubt]: Is everything merely an idea, and is it possible to have practical thought and communication with others without external objects, just as in a dream?

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: The Yogācāras say that all practical purposes are well rendered possible by admitting the reality of ideas only, for no good purpose is served by the additional assumption of external objects corresponding to internal ideas.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: The external world really exists, as shown by the author in the next sūtra.

**Sūtra 2.2.28**

nābhāva upalabdheḥ

na – not; abhāva – non-existence; upalabdheḥ – because they are perceived.

The external things are not nonexistent, because our consciousness [bears testimony to their existence.]

As it is consciousness alone by which we judge the existence or nonexistence of a thing, we must admit that the external things really exist, because our consciousness says that they exist. The very words we use show that we admit the existence of external things. We say “the knowledge of a pot,” which assumes that the knowledge is different from the pot. The wise refuse to consider any theory that goes against the testimony of one’s consciousness. The Yogācāra may say, “I also feel that the object of which I am conscious appears as an external thing; but what I affirm is that I am always directly conscious of nothing but my own ideas, hence the appearance of the so-called external things is nothing but the result of my own ideas.” To this we reply that the very fact of being conscious of external things proves that there is an external object giving rise to the idea of externality.

Moreover in the sentence “I know the pot,” there are three things: the knower or ‘I’, the knowledge and the pot, the object of knowledge. The verb to know is an active verb, requiring both an agent or subject, and an object. It also affirms the existence of a relationship between the subject and the object of consciousness. The whole human society believes it to be so, and makes others believe it also. Therefore to say that there is only knowledge and no object of knowledge is to court ridicule and derision. Consequently it is established that an object is separate from knowledge.

An objector may say, “If a pot and other objects are separate from the knowledge of them, how is it that this knowledge arises in cognition? If you say that it shines forth in consciousness, then by the knowledge of the one pot we ought to know everything external, because all external things have the common attribute of being different from knowledge, being its object. If one thing that is other than the knowledge of it is known, then everything that is different from knowledge must be known.” To this we reply, it is not so. There is no doubt that all external objects have in common the attribute that they are
different from the sentient subject; they all come under the category of non-self or object. Certainly we can understand the general attribute of non-self by knowing one thing that is non-self. But there are many non-selves, and their special relations with the self are all different; one object may be yellow, another may be red, and it cannot be said that the knowledge of the yellow object is the same as that of the red one.

Ideas and things are certainly concomitant, for they always go together. But instead of proving that things are unreal and only ideas are real, this very concomitance proves just the opposite; for the very fact that they go together proves that they are different things and not one. Moreover the Lord Buddha, while denying the reality of the external things, admitted the separate existence of the external world; for he says, “The form that is perceived internally appears like an external object.” He says, “like an external object,” which shows that he admits the existence of external objects. Otherwise he would not have used this word, for no one makes a comparison to something that is absolutely unreal. No one says “He is like the son of a barren woman.”

Now the author refutes the theory that external objects need not exist at all, because all different ideas can be explained as originating from vāsanās without the necessity of believing in the real existence of any external objects. The opinion of the Yogācāras is that all practical thought and communication are possible without assuming the existence of external things, in addition to our ideas about them. As in a dream a person performs all kinds of actions and has communication with other things and objects, which are nothing but his own ideas, similarly the manifoldness of ideas in the waking state may be explained through the vāsanās without the necessity for external things. This view is refuted in the next sūtra.

**Sūtra 2.2.29**

vaidharmyācca na svapnādīvat

vaidharmyāt – on account of difference of nature; ca – and; na – not; svapnādīvat – like dreams and the rest.

The ideas of the waking state are not like those of the dream state, because they are of a different nature.

The Yogācāra says, “In the dream state, in reverie and under hypnotic suggestion there are no external objects like the pot, etc. and all experience and different ideas in those states are caused merely by one’s own consciousness, not by anything external to the person; so also it may be in the waking state.” This view is impossible, because the ideas in the dream state are different from those of the waking state. The objects perceived in a dream are memories of waking experiences; in the waking state they are sense perceptions, not memories. The objects in the dream state can instantly change their forms, and upon waking from the dream are found to be unreal. In other words, the dream objects are sublated by waking consciousness. On the other hand, the objects perceived in waking consciousness do not change instantaneously. They retain their appearance, even after hundreds of years.

Moreover, we never have the consciousness of their being unreal; they are never sublated. Although we have said above that things perceived in dreams are mere memories, this is only a partial statement of the real fact. The opinion of Vyāsadeva is that the Supreme Lord as Supersoul creates objects in the dream state and makes the soul experience them, in response to certain karmas created in previous lives. Therefore they are also real, the only difference is that the Lord creates them for a temporary
purpose and for a particular soul; while He has created the external world for all souls and for the cosmic period, and given them greater permanence. This opinion will be fully explained in Sūtra 3.2.1, where he will show that all dream objects are creations of the Lord and not of the soul.

The author now refutes the view that the manifoldness of ideas can be explained by manifoldness of without the assumption of external objects.

**Sūtra 2.2.30**

\[ na bhāvo'napalabdheḥ \]

*na – not; bhāvah – existence; anupalabdheḥ – because they are not perceived.*

[The vāsanās] do not exist [without corresponding external objects,] because it is never so perceived [in experience.]

The vāsanās cannot exist according to your theory, because you hold that there are no external objects. We know that vāsanās are produced by external objects; without external objects there can be no vāsanās. This is demonstrated by the rule of identity and difference. We never see any vāsanās originating without an external object. The Yogācāras cannot explain how the vāsanās originate. And as they do not believe in the existence of external objects, they cannot even explain the existence of vāsanās. The existence of vāsanās is impossible according to their doctrine, as they do not admit the perception of external things.

According to us, the variety of vāsanās is caused by the variety of external objects. A vāsanā is really a kind of mental impression or saṃskāra. This saṃskāra cannot exist without some permanent substratum, a medium in which it may inhere. But the Yogācāras do not believe in the existence of any permanent substratum, hence for this reason their so-called vāsanās cannot exist. The author shows this in the next sūtra.

**Sūtra 2.2.31**

\[ kṣanikatvācca \]

*kṣanikatvāt – because of momentariness; ca – and.*

The vāsanās have no permanent substratum, because of the Yogācāras’ theory of universal momentariness.

The word *na* [not] is understood in this *sūtra* from the previous one. According to the Yogācāras’ theory there is no permanent substratum in which the vāsanās may inhere, for they believe that everything is momentary. According to them, the external ideas that we have during a life on earth and the cosmic ideas that end only with pralaya or the cessation of the world period and exist only in the Monad, are all momentary. Thus there being no conscious self that is permanent in past, present and future, it is not possible to have remembrance, recognition, and so on, which require mental impressions dependent on time, place and cause. All these vāsanās, memories and thoughts practically presuppose the existence of an unchangeable self or personality connected with the past, present and future. Consequently this theory is unworthy of further consideration, for it cannot explain how the
vāsanās can exist without a permanent substratum, and how they can be manifold in the absence of that substratum.

**Adhikaraṇa 5: Mādhyamika Theory Refuted**

**Vīṣaya** [thesis or statement]: The Yogācāra thus being refuted, now comes the Mādhyamika who holds the doctrine of the universal void. He says, “The Lord Śākyamuni Buddha admitted the existence of external objects and ideas only for the sake of his less-intelligent students who could not at once grasp his doctrine of a universal void. All the preceding theories of the momentariness of things and ideas are just concessions, and may be considered as rungs of a ladder leading to this theory. This is the real doctrine of the Buddha, for as a matter of fact, neither the external objects nor the ideas exist in reality. The only reality is śūnyam, the great void, and reaching this utter nothingness constitutes release or mokṣa.

This is the real secret taught by the Śākyamuni Buddha, and it is proved thus: śūnya [nothingness] is self-existent and self-proved, because no cause need be assigned for it production. Only a thing that exists requires a cause to explain its origination. But no-thing does not require either a cause or explanation. Further, a thing that exists [*sat*] cannot originate from an existing thing or being, because we do not see a tree with sprout and leaves as long as the seed is not destroyed. It is only when the seed is destroyed that the tree originates. Thus a being cannot originate from another being; not can it originate from a non-being [*abhāva*], for we do not see the origination of a tree from a seed that has been roasted. However, no-thing can originate of itself. It is not a state of consciousness, for then it would be dependent on ātmā, which would be a useless assumption. Nor can any motive be assigned for a thing originating from itself. Nor can it originate from anything else, for then it would follow that anything can originate from anything else, for all things are other things. Thus there being no origination, there is no destruction. Therefore words like origination, destruction, being and non-being are mere illusions, and the only reality is the śūnyam.

**Samśaya** [arise of doubt]: Is it true to believe that śūnyam is the only reality, or is it not?

**Pūrva-pakṣa** [antithesis]: The śūnyam is the only reality, because it is self-proved while other things are based on illusion and have no real existence. The only reality is the great void.

**Siddhānta** [Vedic conclusion]: The śūnyam is not the reality, as shown in the next sūtra:

**Sūtra 2.2.32**

\[
\text{sarvathānupatīteśa} \\
\text{sa} = \text{vēry way; an-upatīteh} = \text{because of not being proved; ca} = \text{and.}
\]

**The doctrine of the void is in every way unproved.**

The word *na* [not] is understood in this *sūtra*. What is this śūnyam of yours? Is it a being or a non-being or both? You cannot establish your doctrine in any way. If you admit that śūnyam is a being, then you give up your position of nothingness; if you say that it is a non-being, then your declaration amounts to establishing that everything is nothing. But you must admit yourself to be a being and your reasoning also to be something and not nothing, and this contradicts your theory that everything is nothing. If you say that it is both being and non-being, you also contradict your theory land yourself in undesirable results. Moreover, the means of knowledge by which śūnyam is proved must at least be real and
acknowledged to be true, for if such means of knowledge and arguments are themselves nothing, then the theory of nothingness cannot be established. And if those means and arguments are true, then something certainly is established, and then the theory of universal nothingness is certainly also disproved. Thus śūnyāvāda is disproved in every way; therefore it must be inferred that the Śākyamuni Buddha taught these self-contradictory doctrines in order to delude the world. At one time he teaches the reality of the external world, next the reality of ideas only, and then general nothingness. Thus he has made it clear that his object was to delude the asuras.

The Buddhist doctrine being refuted, its sister doctrine the Māyāvāda also stands defeated. The author of the sūtras has made no attempt to refute the Lokāyatikas or materialists, because their arguments are perfectly futile. The Drṣṭi-sṛṣṭivāda doctrine that creation depends upon perception, and the Vivartavāda doctrine that creation is an illusion similar to the snake and the rope hold in common with the Buddhist teaching that all things are of momentary existence only. Hence the refutation of Buddhism refutes all these teachings as well.

Adhikaraṇa 6: The Jaina Theory Examined

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: Now the author shows the faults of the Jaina theory. The doctrine of the Jainas is that substances are of two kinds: jīva [Souls] and ajīva [non-souls]. The jīva is sentient and intelligent, has the size of the body that it occupies, and has parts or members. The ajīva is of five kinds: dharma [merit], adharma [demerit], pudgala [bodies], kāla [time] and ākāśa [space]. Dharma or merit causes movement and progress, and adharma or demerit causes delays and obstacles; both of these are all-pervading. The pudgala or bodies are that which possesses color, smell, taste and touch. It is of two kinds: atomic and molecular. Air, water, fire, earth, the bodies of creatures and the various planes or worlds are compounds. The atoms, which are of one kind only, are causes. They assume different qualities through modifications. Time is a particular atomic substance that causes past, present and future. Space is one, infinite, contains other things and has dimensions. These six substances—the jīva and the five ajīvas—are called dravyas, and the whole world consists of them. The Jainas describe seven categories that are helpful for the purpose of release of the souls, namely jīva [souls], ajīva [non-souls], āsrava [influx or channel], samvāra [hindrance or obscuration], nirjara [exhaustion of passions], bandha [bondage] and mokṣa [liberation]. Jīva has already been defined. Ajīva is everything which is the object of enjoyment for the jīvas. The āsrava or channel is the senses. The samvāra or hindrances are lack of discrimination and dispassion, which hinder the development of discrimination, etc. Nirjara or exhaustion of passions is that which destroys totally or which exhausts the source of lust, anger, etc., such as austerities. Bondage or bandha is the cycle of birth and death, caused by eight kinds of karmas. Mukti or release consists either in remaining stationary in space above all worlds, or in which there is constant progress towards higher regions. This is accomplished by means of the practices taught in the Jaina scriptures that nullify the eight kinds of karmas and manifest the true nature of the soul. Their practices are called the three jewels: right knowledge, right seeing and right conduct.

They establish all these substances with their system of reasoning called sapta-bhangi-nyāya or syādvāda. The word sapta-bhangi means “that system of reasoning in which the seven rules are broken.” Those seven rules are:

9. sattvam [existence]
10. asattvam [nonexistence]
11. sat-asattvam [existence and nonexistence]
12. sad-asad-vilakṣaṇatvam [something different from existence and nonexistence]
13. sattve-sati-tad-vilakṣaṇatvam [while there is existence, yet it is different from it]
14. assatve-sati-tad-vilakṣaṇatvam [while there is nonexistence, yet it is different from it]
15. sad-assatve-sati-tad-vilakṣaṇatvam [while there is existence and nonexistence, yet it is different from it]

Thus there are seven kinds of theories regarding the existence of the world, some holding it to be existent or real, others holding it to be unreal, a third class holding it to be neither real nor unreal, and so on. Syād is an indeclinable and has the sense of “somewhat, somehow or not fully.” Thus they establish seven categories:

- syād-asti [it is somewhat, or maybe it is]
- syād-nāsti [it is not somewhat, or maybe it is not]
- syād-avaktavyaḥ [it may be predicted a little, or maybe it is not predictable]
- syād-asti-ca-nāsti-ca [it may be, or somewhat it is or is not]
- syād-asti-ca-avaktavyaḥ-ca [it may be, or somewhat it is or is not predictable]
- syād-nāsti-ca-avaktavyaḥ-ca [it may not be, or somewhat it is and is not predictable]
- syād-asti-ca-nāsti-ca-avaktavyaḥ-ca [it may be, or maybe somewhat it is or is not, and it is not predictable]

The object of sapta-bhangi is to refute these seven theories of existence. This is necessary for every object is either real or unreal, eternal or non-eternal, different or nondifferent and is manifold because of these attributes. If an object is absolutely existent, then it will exist always, everywhere and in every mode, and no one will ever desire either to acquire it or to abandon it, as no one ever desires to acquire air or reject it, since it exists everywhere. Something that one already has cannot become an object for acquisition, nor is it possible to abandon it, just as gravity which is everywhere cannot be abandoned. If however something does not exist absolutely, but only conditionally, to some extent, and sometimes for one person or place and somehow, then only is it possible to make exertion and attempt to obtain it or reject it. All exertions and cessation of exertions are possible only in regard to substances whose existence is conditional. All objects are either dravyas or different modifications of dravyas, called paryāya. The dravya or substance alone is qualified as satvā or real, while the paryāya or modification has the quality of asattva or unreal. Paryāya is the particular state in which a substance may exist. The substance is permanent, but the modification is impermanent; the substance is real, its modifications are unreal; the substance is eternal, but the modifications have origination and destruction. This is the theory of the Jainas.

Saṁśaya [arising of doubt]: These several categories taught by the Jaina Arhats—souls, non-souls, etc.—are they reasonable or not?

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: This theory is reasonable, because it is established by the seven paralogisms.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: This is, however, untrue: everything is not of an ambiguous nature as the Jainas hold. This is established by the next sūtra.

Sūtra 2.2.33

naikasminnasambhavāt
These categories cannot be established, because it is impossible [that opposing qualities such as real and unreal can exist simultaneously] in one substance.

These categories of the Jainas and their sevenfold reasoning cannot be established, because it is not possible that contradictory qualities should exist in one substance. No one ever sees the same object to be hot and cold simultaneously. Moreover it would be useless to lay down rules for the attainment of heaven or avoidance of hell, or for mokṣa; because of there being no certainty of anything, what you think of as heaven might actually be hell, and mokṣa nondifferent from these. Since everything is ambiguous, there would be nothing to distinguish heaven, hell and mokṣa from one another. Confusion would arise, not only with regard to spiritual matters, but with the objects of this world as well. If things are always indefinite, and if everything is “somewhat it is or is not,” then a person wanting water to quench his thirst will accept fire, for it may be that fire is hot, or it may be cold; and so on with everything else. Similarly in this system, there exists not only difference between objects but also nondifference; thus water is not only different from fire, it is also nondifferent from it. Their logic, therefore, is as fragile as the thread of a spider and cannot stand the strain of reasoning. As a matter of fact, substances are definite, and the means of establishing their definiteness are the seven logical categories or bhangas. The soul is the subject that makes this definition, and the fruit of this process is definite conception. But in this system of indefiniteness, nothing can be asserted as either existent or nonexistent, and nothing can be known with certainty. Therefore what is the use of examining this system any further, when nothing in it is discernible?

The modern scientists also use such indefinite logic in their statements, such as, “Our theory shows that it may be...” “We think is highly probable that...” and so on. They never make a definite statement because they know full well that the inferential logic they use is always falsifiable; in fact, this falsifiability is built into every so-called scientific theory. The scientists even argue that theories such as the Vedānta-sūtra philosophy, which are derived from the Absolute Truth of the Vedas by a process of deductive logic, are unscientific because they are not falsifiable. But that is precisely the point: the relative truths of material science are all conditional and therefore uncertain, but the eternal Absolute Truth is not falsifiable because it is unconditionally true.

In the next sūtra the author refutes the doctrine of the Jainas that the soul is the same size as the body.

Sūtra 2.2.34

evaṁ cātmākārtsnyam

evaṁ – thus; ca – and; ātmā – soul; ākārtsnyam – not wholeness.

[And in this view of the Jainas,] the soul also loses its wholeness and becomes mutilated.

The Jaina theory is open not only to the objection of predicating contradictory attributes like existence and nonexistence to the same object at the same time; but also their conception is that the soul is divisible into parts. They hold that the jīva has the size of the body it animates; therefore, the soul of a child would not be able to fill the body of a grown-up man. Nor would the soul of a man be able to fill the body of an elephant if, owing to some reaction of his past karmas, he had to occupy that body. The body being too big for the soul, he would not be able to perceive the pleasure and pain of the entire
organism. Similarly, a human soul condemned to occupy the body of a fly or gnat would be too big, and unable to occupy it.

Sūtra 2.2.35

\[ na \ ca \ paryāyādapyavirodhavikārādibhyah \]

\[ na \ – \ not; \ ca \ – \ and; \ paryāyāt \ – \ because \ of \ the \ assumption \ of \ sequential \ change; \ api \ – \ also; \ avirodhaḥ \ – \ non-contradiction; \ vikārādibhyah \ – \ because \ it \ would \ be \ open \ to \ the \ objection \ of \ change, \ etc. \]

Nor would this contradiction be removed by assuming the theory of paryāya, for then the soul would be liable to change and the rest.

The Jaina may say, “The soul is really indefinite in size, and therefore when it animates the body of an infant or a youth, it has that size, and when it occupies the bodies of horses and elephants, it expands itself to that size; so it fully occupies the body that it animates for the time being, by successive expansion and contraction, and thus there is no objection to our theory that the soul is the size of the body.” To this we reply that it cannot be so, because it requires the undesirable assumption that the soul is liable to change. In your own theory you admit that the soul is changeless; but if this paryāya theory is accepted, then the soul would become liable to change, and consequently it would become impermanent. This is a conclusion that neither you nor anyone else desires. Hence your theory is unreasonable.

There is another theory that the soul is free from change only when it assumes the body of mukti; in that body, the soul has the size of the body and is unchanging and permanent. This modified theory, which holds that the final size of the soul results from the mukta-deha, and is permanent because the soul does not pass into another body, is also unreasonable. If this final body is produced at a certain point in time, then it is also impermanent; or if it becomes the eternal body of the soul, which it possesses from the very beginning of its existence, in either case your theory of paryāya fails. Moreover, in your theory of everything being indefinite, the ultimate size of the soul may be either existence or nonexistent, and so there also would be no permanency of that size.

In the next sūtra, the author shows the faults in the theory of mukti as taught by the Jains.

Sūtra 2.2.36

\[ antyāvasthiteścobhayanityatvādaviśeṣāt \]

\[ antyāvasthiteḥ \ – \ in \ the \ final \ state; \ ca \ – \ and; \ ubhaya \ – \ both; \ nityatvāt \ – \ of \ being \ permanent; \ aviśeṣāt \ – \ because \ of \ there \ being \ no \ difference. \]

This theory is untenable because the final state of liberation is nondifferent from the worldly state, because both are eternal.

The word na [not] is understood in this sūtra from the previous one. According to the Jainas, there is no difference between the state of mukti and the mundane state, for both are permanent. They define mukti as eternal progress upward, or remaining fixed in the aloka-ākāśa. Thus there is no difference between worldly existence and release; for motion, whether in the worldly cycle or in a
confirmed in the answer is that he did so on the order of his master, the Supreme Personality of Godhead. This is since

Śrī Caitanya Mahāprabhu said, mukhya-vṛtye sei artha parama mahattva: “To teach the Vedic literature according to its direct meaning, without false commentary, is glorious.” Unfortunately, Śrī Śaṅkarācārya, by the order of the Supreme Personality of Godhead, compromised between atheism and theism in order to cheat the atheists and bring them to theism, and to do so he gave up the direct method of Vedic knowledge and tried to present a meaning which is indirect. It is with this purpose that he wrote his Śārīraka-bhāṣya commentary on the Vedānta-sūtra.

One should not, therefore, attribute very much importance to the Śārīraka-bhāṣya. In order to understand Vedānta philosophy, one must study Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam, which begins with the words

om namo bhagavate vāsudevāya, janmādy asya yato 'nvayād itarataś cārtheśv abhijñāḥ sva-rāṣṭ

“I offer my obeisances unto Lord Śrī Kṛṣṇa, son of Vasudeva, who is the Supreme all-pervading Personality of Godhead. I meditate upon Him, the transcendent reality, who is the primeval cause of all causes, from whom all manifested universes arise, in whom they dwell and by whom they are destroyed. I meditate upon that eternally effulgent Lord, who is directly and indirectly conscious of all manifestations and yet is fully independent.” [Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 1.1.1]

Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam is the real commentary on the Vedānta-sūtra. Unfortunately, if one is attracted to Śrī Śaṅkarācārya’s commentary, Śārīraka-bhāṣya, his spiritual life is doomed. One may argue that since Śaṅkarācārya is an incarnation of Lord Śiva, how is it that he cheated people in this way? The answer is that he did so on the order of his master, the Supreme Personality of Godhead. This is confirmed in the Padma Purāṇa, in the words of Lord Śiva himself:

māyāvādam asac chāstraṁ pracchannaṁ bauddham ucyate
mayaiva kalpitam devi kalau brāhmaṇa-rūpīṇā
brahmaṇaś cāparaṁ rūpaṁ nirguṇaṁ vakṣyate mayā
sarva-svāṁ jagato 'py asya mohanārtham kalau yuge
vedānte tu mahā-śāstre māyāvādam avidikam
mayaiva vakṣyate devi jagatāṁ nāśa-kāraṇāt

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“The Māyāvāda philosophy,” Lord Śiva informed his wife Pārvatī, “is impious [asac chāstra]. It is covered Buddhism. My dear Pārvatī, in Kali-yuga I assume the form of a brāhmaṇa and teach this imagined Māyāvāda philosophy. In order to cheat the atheists, I describe the Supreme Personality of Godhead to be without form and without qualities. Similarly, in explaining Vedānta I describe the same Māyāvāda philosophy in order to mislead the entire population toward atheism by denying the personal form of the Lord.”

In the Śiva Purāṇa the Supreme Personality of Godhead told Lord Śiva:

dvāparādau yuge bhūtvā kalayā mānuṣādiṣu
śvāgamaḥ kalpitais tvaṁ ca janān mad-vimukhān kuru

“In Kali-yuga, mislead the people in general by propounding imaginary meanings for the Veda to bewilder them.”

These are the descriptions of the Purāṇas. The direct meaning of the Vedic scriptures is abhidhā-vr̥tti, or the meaning that one can understand immediately from the statements of dictionaries, whereas gauna-vr̥tti, the indirect meaning, is a meaning that one imagines without consulting the dictionary. For example, one politician has said that Kurukṣetra refers to the body, but in the dictionary there is no such definition. Therefore this imaginary meaning is gauna-vr̥tti, whereas the direct meaning found in the dictionary is abhidhā-vr̥tti. This is the distinction between the two. Śrī Caitanya Mahāprabhu recommends that one understand the Vedic literature in terms of abhidhā-vr̥tti, and He rejects the gauna-vr̥tti.

The purpose of the discussions in the Upaniṣads and Vedānta-sūtra is to philosophically establish the personal feature of the Absolute Truth. The impersonalists, however, in order to establish their philosophy, accept these discussions in terms of lakṣaṇa-vr̥tti, or indirect meanings. Thus instead of being tattva-vāda, or in search of the Absolute Truth, they become Māyāvāda, or illusioned by the material energy. When Śrī Viṣṇu Śvāmī, one of the main ācāryas of the four Vaiṣṇava sampradāyas, presented his thesis on the subject matter of śuddhādvaita-vāda, immediately the Māyāvādīs took advantage of this philosophy and tried to establish their advaita-vāda or kevalādvaita-vāda. To defeat this kevalādvaita-vāda, Śrī Rāmānujačārya presented his philosophy as viśiṣṭadvaita-vāda, and Śrī Madhvācārya presented his philosophy of tattva-vāda, both of which are stumbling blocks to the Māyāvādīs because they defeat their philosophy in scrupulous detail. Students of Vedic philosophy know very well how strongly Śrī Rāmānujačārya’s viśiṣṭadvaita-vāda and Śrī Madhvācārya’s tattva-vāda contest the impersonal Māyāvāda philosophy.

Śrī Caitanya Mahāprabhu, however, accepted the direct meaning of the Vedānta philosophy and thus defeated the Māyāvāda philosophy immediately. He opined in this connection that anyone who follows the principles of the Śārīraka-bhāṣya is doomed. This is confirmed in the Padma Purāṇa, where Lord Śiva tells Pārvatī:

ṣṛṇu devi pravakṣyāmi tāmāsāni yathā-kramam
yeṣām śravane-mātreṇa pātiyam iñjānāṇām api
apārthaṁ śruti-vākyaṁ darśayal loka-garhitam
karma-svarūpa-tāyājayatvam atra ca pratipādyate
sarva-karma-paribhramāṁ naiṣkarmyaṁ tatra cocyate
parāṁ jīvayor aikyaṁ mayātā pratipādyate

“My dear wife, hear my explanations of how I have spread ignorance through Māyāvāda philosophy. Simply by hearing it, even an advanced scholar will fall down. In this philosophy, which is certainly very inauspicious for people in general, I have misrepresented the real
meaning of the Vedas and recommended that one give up all activities in order to achieve freedom from karma. In this Māyāvāda philosophy I have described the jīvātmā and Paramātmā to be one and the same.”

How the Māyāvāda philosophy was condemned by Śrī Caitanya Mahāprabhu and His followers is described in Śrī Caitanya-caritāmṛta, Antya-līlā, [2.94-99], where Svarūpa-dāmodara Gosvāmī says that anyone who is eager to understand the Māyāvāda philosophy must be considered insane. This especially applies to an aspiring Vaiṣṇava who reads Śārīraka-bhāṣya and then considers himself to be one with God. The Māyāvāda philosophers have presented their arguments in such attractive, flowery language that hearing Māyāvāda philosophy may sometimes change the mind of a devotee who is not very advanced. But an actual Vaiṣṇava or follower of Vedānta-sūtra cannot tolerate any philosophy that claims God and the living being to be one and the same.

Adhikāraṇa 7: Pāṣupata System Reviewed

Vīṣaya [thesis or statement]: The author now refutes the opinions of sectarians like the followers of Paśupati [Śiva], Ganeśa and Sūrya. The Paśupatas maintain that cause and effect, yoga [meditation], discipline [vidhī] and the end of pain are five categories revealed by the great Lord Paśupati Himself to break the bonds of the conditioned soul, here called paśu [animal]. In this system Paśupati is the operative cause, and mahat and the rest are effects. The yoga is the concentration, meditation etc. through oṁkāra. The vidhī is the discipline of bathing three times a day etc., while the end of pain means release or mokṣa. These are the five categories of the Paśupatas. Similar to this doctrine are the teachings of the followers of Ganeśa and Sūrya, who hold these deities to be the operative cause, and prakṛti and time to be the causes of creation of the world through the operative agency of these deities. By worshiping these gods the soul gains proximity to them, and there accrues complete cessation of all pain, which is mokṣa.

Saṁśaya [arising of doubt]: Now are these systems of the Paśupatas and the rest reasonable?

Pūrvaṇakṣa [antithesis]: The pūrvapaksin maintains that this system is reasonable, because we see in ordinary life also that an agent like a potter is only the operative cause of the pot that he makes; he is not its material cause. God, therefore is only the operative cause of the universe, not its material cause. The mater of the creation is supplied by the eternal prakṛti, and the disciples laid down are also reasonable and practical.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: This is not the right view, as the author shows in the next sūtra.

Sūtra 2.2.37

patyurasāmamāñjasyāt

patyuh – the doctrine of the three patis or lords; asāmāñjasyāt – because of untenableness.

The teaching of Paśupati also is not right, because of its inappropriateness.

The word na [not] is understood in this sūtra. The doctrine taught by Paśupati is not right because it is inappropriate; that is, it is opposed to the Vedas. The Vedas teach that the one God, Nārāyaṇa, is the sole cause of the creation of the world, while other deities like Brahmā, Rudra, etc. are His creations. It teaches that mokṣa [release] depends upon bhakti [devotional service], jñāna [knowledge], and the proper performance of the duties of varṇāśrama-dharma [the four occupational divisions and four
spiritual orders of human life] as taught by Nārāyaṇa in the Vedic scriptures. As we find in the Mahā-
Upaniṣat [1.1-2]:

“Thus say the sages how creation arose. Nārāyaṇa alone existed in the beginning. There were
neither Brahmā nor Īśāna, nor water, nor fire, nor moon; nor heaven nor earth, nor the stars nor
the sun. He being alone, did not rejoice; so He entered into meditation. From Him thus
meditating, there arose sacrifice and the hymns of the Vedas. From Him arose fourteen Puruṣas
and one daughter: namely, the ten Indriyas and Manas, the eleventh; Tejas, the twelfth;
Ahaṁkara the thirteenth, and Prāṇa the fourteenth. Fifteenth is the daughter called Buddhi.
From Him arose the five tan-mātras and the ten mahābhutas. From Nārāyaṇa thus meditating
there arose from His forehead Sūlapāṇi [Śiva], having three eyes and holding Śrī, truth,
brahmācyra, austerity, dispassion, etc.”

This shows that the four-faced Brahmā arose from Nārāyaṇa, and also Paśupati [Śiva]. We also find the
same version in the Nārāyaṇa-Upaniṣat [1.1]:

“So also in the Ṛg Veda [10.125.1-8] we find:

“Now verily Nārāyaṇa the Puruṣa desired “Let Me create offspring.” From Nārāyaṇa was
produced Prāṇa, Manas and all the sense organs. From Him arose space, air, light, water and
earth, the support of all. From Nārāyaṇa arose Brahmā, from Him arose Rudra, from Nārāyaṇa
was produced Prajāpati, Indra, the eight Vasus, the eleven Rudras, the twelve Ādityas, all the
Devatās, all Rṣis, all Vedic hymns; all beings verily are produced from Nārāyaṇa and they
merge into Nārāyaṇa.”

Similarly in the Yajur Veda [Brhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4.4.21-22]:

“Let a wise seeker of Brahman, after he has discovered Him, practice wisdom by meditating on
Him. The knowers of Brahman seek to understand Him by study of the Veda, by sacrifice, by
gifts, by fasting. He who knows Him becomes a Muni.”

ātmā vā are draṣṭavya śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ.

“It is the Self which must be observed, heard about, thought of and meditated upon with fixed
concentration.” [Brhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4.5.6]
So also the Smṛti-śāstra declare the same truth over and over again, following in the footsteps of the Vedas. No doubt in some places the Vedas and the Smṛti-śāstra use the words Paśupati, Ganeśa, Sūrya etc. and describe them as the ‘ruler of all,’ etc. But in those places these words are to be taken in their etymological sense as applying to Nārāyaṇa. Thus Paśupati would mean “Lord of all souls,” Ganeśa would be interpreted “the Lord of Hosts,” and Sūrya would mean “the Lord of the wise,” just as in the Veda the word Indra is the name of the Supreme Lord, being derived from the root inda, ‘to rule.’ Thus all the Vedas and the Smṛtis actually describe Nārāyaṇa, the Supreme Brahman, and not any lower deity. Therefore the proper interpretation of the Vedic texts is that the real creator is the Supreme Brahman.

īśvaraḥ paramah kṛṣṇah
sa-cid-ānanda-vigrahaḥ
anādir ādir govindaḥ
sarva-kāraṇa-kāraṇam
“Kṛṣṇa who is known as Govinda is the Supreme Godhead. He has an eternal blissful spiritual body. He is the origin of all. He has no other origin and He is the prime cause of all causes.”
[Brahma-saṁhitā 5.1]

The sectarians like the Paśupatas and the rest have established the existence of a particular deity as the Lord simply by logic and arguments. But reasoning must be according to certain worldly rules, therefore it cannot establish the existence or nonexistence of God, because it is impossible that the Lord is merely the operative cause of the world, without being the material cause as well, for then His connection with the world cannot be established. In ordinary worldly life we see that a potter, who is merely the operative cause of the pot, has a certain connection with the clay, the material cause with which he fashions the pot. What is that connection of the Lord with the souls and the pradhāna, with which He creates the world? The next sūtra shows that the sectarians cannot establish that connection.

Sūtra 2.2.38

sambandhānupapateśca
sambandha – connection; anupatteḥ – because of the impossibility; ca – and.

[The Lord can have no] connection as creator of the world, because of the impossibility [of such a connection.]

The sectarians hold that a Lord is without a body, consequently such a Lord can have no connection with matter and spirit. An embodied being, like a potter, can have such a relation with the clay because he has a body. Thus this theory cannot establish a connection between the Lord and the creation, because they imagine Him to be formless.

Sūtra 2.2.39

adīsthānā-nupatteśca
adīsthāna – having a position; anupatteḥ – because of the impossibility; ca – and.

A bodiless Lord cannot create the world, because He cannot occupy a position.
Controlling something is a function of embodied beings. An embodied being like a potter can control the clay and produce effects like pots, by virtue of occupying a particular position. A disembodied being cannot do this. It may be objected that the soul is in principle a disembodied being, yet he rules the sense organs and the body, without any particular position, so a disembodied Lord may rule pradhāna. The next sūtra replies to this argument.

**Sūtra 2.2.40**

*karaṇavaccenna bhogā'dibhyāḥ*

*karaṇa-vat* – like the instruments of the senses; *cet* – if; *na* – not; *bhogādibhyāḥ* – on account of enjoyment, etc.

If [it be said that the Lord rules matter] as the soul rules sense organs, [we reply that] it cannot be so, because the soul has to undergo the experiences of pleasure and pain [owing to his karma, but not so the Lord.]

You cannot say that matter exists in pralaya and the Lord creates the world with it, controlling it just as the soul controls the sense organs, because the connection of the soul with the body is so that he may undergo certain experiences of birth and death, pleasure and pain, to get the rewards of his karmas. But in the case of the Lord, there is no such karma. Then why should the Lord have any connection with pradhāna in order to create the world? If you say that His connection is similar to the connection of the conditioned soul to his senses, then the Lord would come under the control of the material energy and be subject to birth and death just like the conditioned soul. This is no idea of God at all.

The sectarian Paśupata may say, “Let us admit then that the Lord also has some kind of karma, some kind of adṛṣṭa, good karma and good adṛṣṭa, and that it is on account of such karma that the Lord gets the body by which He creates the universe. Just as we see a mighty monarch, owing to his great merit, gets a body by which he can rule over an extensive empire.” This theory is open to the objection raised in the next sūtra:

**Sūtra 2.2.41**

*aṅtavattvamasarvajñatā vā*

*aṅtavattvam* – finiteness; *asarvajñatā* – lack of omniscience; *vā* – or.

If the Lord has karma, however high and refined it may be, then He would be either a finite being, or not possessing omniscience.

If the Lord has a body on account of some karma from His previous actions, then He would be finite like any ordinary soul, nor would He be omniscient, for only one who is not subject to karma can have omniscience. The Paśupatas claim that their Lord is eternal and all-knowing; therefore a contradiction arises in their theory. The Paśupata may say, “But this objection applies to your theory also, for you believe that God is a personality.” To this we reply that our theory of a personal Brahman is not open to this objection, because we do not believe in this on account of any reason and arguments, but because of the revelation of the scriptures. The sacred revelation describes Brahman with personal attributes, and we never try to reconcile this description with reason. In other words, we take the words of the
scriptures to be axiomatic, and everything else is derived from them by a process of deductive logic. We have already shown this in Sūtra 2.1.27.

The holy Bādārāyaṇa does not show any disrespect to the mighty deities like Paśupati or Gaṇapati or Dināpati; all that he means is that these three patis or lords are not independent agents, as their worshippers misconceive, but work under the will and direction of the Supreme Brahman. The author of the sūtras refutes only the mistaken notion of the worshipers in attributing perfect independence to their deity. Since they are agents of Brahman, demigods or lords, we acknowledge that they deserve all reverence and worship, but we do not forget their subordinate position to Brahman, the Supreme Lord.

гуṇāभिमानिनो देवाः
sargaदिस्व अया यद-भयात
vartante 'नुयुगान येषां
वाषा एतार चराक्साराम

“Out of fear of the Supreme Personality of Godhead, the directing demigods in charge of the modes of material nature carry out the functions of creation, maintenance and destruction; everything animate and inanimate within this material world is under their control.” [Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 3.29.44]

These five sūtras are meant to refute the sectarian doctrine of these patis or lords. The word pati is mentioned in Sūtra 2.2.37 without any distinctive attribute, to apply to all three patis, namely the lord of the soul, the lord of the hosts, and the lord of the day. Other commentators hold that these five sūtras are meant to refute the argumentative philosophers and rationalists, who try to establish the existence of God by mere reason without revelation.

**Adhikaraṇa 8: The Śakti Theory Reviewed**

**Viṣaya** [thesis or statement]: The author now refutes the theory of the Śaktas. They hold that Śakti alone is the cause of the world, and that She possesses the attributes of omnipotence, omniscience and the rest.

**Samśaya** [arisal of doubt]: Is it possible that Śakti could be the independent creator of the world?

**Pūrvapakṣa** [antithesis]: No agent can accomplish anything without energy or Śakti. The effect, therefore, must not be attributed to the apparent agent. A red-hot iron has the power of burning but the effect of burning should properly be attributed to the fire, and not to the iron through which the fire manifests itself. It is the eternal energy, working through the Lord, that creates the world, and the Lord without energy has no creative power. Thus Śakti is the real creator.

**Siddhānta** [Vedic conclusion]: The author refutes this theory by the following sūtra:

**Sūtra 2.2.42**

_uptpattyasambhavāt_

_uptatti – origination; asambhavāt – because of the impossibility._

_[Śakti alone cannot] create, because creation is impossible [without the cooperation of the Lord.]_
The word *na* [not] is understood in this *sūtra*. The followers of Śakti have imagined Her to be the sole cause of the world by reasoning alone, unsupported by Vedic authority. Since they base their theory on reason, they must be refuted by such reason as would appeal to the common sense of mankind. It is not possible that Śakti alone could be the mother of the whole universe, because by Herself, She has no power of origination. We do not find immaculate conception in this world, nor do females give birth without connection with males. To attribute omnipotence, omniscience and the rest to Śakti is merely an outcome of non-reasoning, because we do not find energy with these attributes anywhere.

A Śakta may say, “We admit that there is a Puruṣa, Lord Śiva, the husband of Śakti, and She creates the universe through Her connection with Him. To this we reply that it also is not right, as shown by the following *sūtra*:

**Sūtra 2.2.43**

\[na ca kartuh karaṇam\]

*na – not; ca – and; kartuh – of the agent; karaṇam – sense organ.*

The creator has no sense instruments to come into connection with Śakti.

Even if it be admitted that there is a Lord who has connection with Śakti, yet in His case there is an absence of sense instruments like a material body, etc. with which He may create the universe. Thus it is not possible that such a Puruṣa can have any connection with Śakti. However, if it is assumed that He has a body and sense organs, then the objections raised in *Sūtra 2.2.40* would apply to Him.

An objector says, “But it need not be that the body and sense organs of the Lord are like ours, made of matter and the result of *karma*; He may have a body consisting of eternal knowledge, will etc.” The author answers this argument by the following *sūtra*:

**Sūtra 2.2.44**

\[vijñānādibhāve vā tadapratisedhāḥ\]

*vijñāna – knowledge; ādi – and the rest; bhāve – of the nature of; vā – or; tat – that; apratisedhāḥ – non-contradiction.*

If it is said that the body of the Lord consists of knowledge and so on, then there is no contradiction, for our Brahman is such a Lord.

If this Lord of the Śaktas is admitted to have a body and sense organs consisting of eternal knowledge, will etc. then there is no contradiction; the Śakta theory would be included in the *Vedānta* theory of Brahman, for we do admit that creation proceeds from just such a transcendental Lord.

We do not refute the theory of the Śaktas as a whole, but only the portion of it that portrays Śakti as independent of the Lord. The extreme Śaktas hold that Śakti alone is the cause of the universe. This must not be respected by anyone who wishes to attain final liberation from material existence. The author, therefore, completes this Pāda with the following *sūtra*:

**Sūtra Adhyāya 2**

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Sūtra 2.2.45

vipratiṣedhācca

carpriṣedhāt – on account of contradiction with all authorities; ca – and.

The theory of the Śaktas is untenable, because it contradicts all sacred authorities.

The force of the word ca [and] in this sūtra is to bring in the reasoning of Sūtra 2.2.42. The theory that Śakti alone creates the universe is untenable, because it contradicts the Vedic revelation, the tradition and reason. As we find in the Padma Purāṇa:

“The Śruti, the Smṛti and reason are unanimous in declaring that the Lord is the Supreme. He who declares anything against it is the vilest of the vile.”

The arguments against the sectarian believers such as the Pāṣupatas, Śaktas and the rest also hold true against the Western religions such as the various sects of Christianity, Islam etc. All these sectarian groups are created by ordinary human reason, and have no foundation in the Vedas; therefore they are of limited value in providing spiritual knowledge and bringing souls to ultimate liberation. Just as the arguments against Buddhism and Jainism apply with equal force against the Māyāvāda philosophy of Śaṅkarācārya, the arguments in the last two Adhikaranaś apply to the Western sectarian religions.

Thus in this Pāda has been shown that the paths of the Sāṅkhyaś, Vaiśeṣikas and the rest down to the Śaktas, are strewn with thorns and full of difficulties, while the path of Vedānta is free from all these defects and must be traveled by everyone who wishes to attain final enlightenment and liberation.

Thus ends the Second Pāda of the Second Adhyāya of Vedānta-sūtra. All glories to Śrīla Prabhupāda!

Śrī Vedānta-sūtra

Adhyāya 2: No Conflict Between Vedānta and Other Vedic Scriptures

Pāda 3: The Supreme Personality of Godhead Manifests the Material Elements

vyomādi-viśayāṁ gobhir
bibharti viṣajghāna yah
sa tāṁ mad-viśayāṁ bhāsvān
kṛṣṇah praṇiḥanisyati

“May the brilliant sun of Lord Kṛṣṇa, who destroys a host of misconceptions about ether and the other elements with rays of logic, destroy the misconceptions in my heart.”

The Second Pāda revealed the fallacies of theories that say pradhāna is the the first cause, and that claim something other than the Supreme Personality of Godhead is the first cause. This Third Pāda will show:
That the various elements of the material world are manifested from the Supreme Personality of
Godhead, and that they merge into Him at the end;

That the individual spirit souls always existed, there not being any point in time when they were
created;

That the individual spirit souls have spiritual bodies full of knowledge

That the individual spirit souls are atomic in size although by their consciousness they are all-
Pervading within the material body

That the individual spirit souls are part and parcel of the Supreme Personality of Godhead

That Matsya-avatāra and the other avatāras are directly the Supreme Personality of Godhead

That the variety of situations into which the conditioned souls are placed is caused by their
previous karma.

All these will be proved by refuting theories that claim that these statements are untrue. Although Śrī
Vedānta-sūtra was compiled over 5,000 years ago, a clue to its enduring value is that the same
arguments that refute the atheistic theories of those times apply equally to the atheistic theories of
today. Thus in the refutations of Sāṅkhya and Buddhist philosophies found in the previous Pāda we
also find very strong arguments against the theories of materialistic science. These theistic arguments
are developed further in this Pāda.

Adhikaraṇa 1: Ether Is Created

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: Ākāśa or ether is subject that modern science considers thoroughly
debunked, but in the Vedic literature ākāśa means something very specific; it signifies material space.
Space is not simply the absence of any obstruction or covering, as the Buddhists and Jainas think; it is a
specific material substance emanated by the Lord at the beginning of creation. It is as difficult for us to
conceive of space as it is for a fish to conceive of water, and for the same reason: it is the medium in
which we exist.

That space is a medium is easy to understand from the example of electromagnetic radiation. Light,
radio waves and other radiative energy must have a medium in which to propagate. They are vibrations,
and any vibration is the alternating compression and rarefaction of some medium. This is proved by the
fact that electromagnetic radiation has a specific frequency; therefore it must be a phenomenon of the
vibration of some medium. In the case of electromagnetic vibration, the medium is ether or space itself.

The Vedas say that ether carries the quality of sound; not the ordinary sound that is carried by air, but
anahata-nāda or subtle sound. Subtle sound is not produced in the ordinary way by vibrating a string
or other material object; neither is it heard by the ordinary ear, but directly by the inner hearing. We are
all familiar with inner hearing, in the constant subvocal conversation of the mind. So the sound carried
by ether is electromagnetic vibration. We now know that planets, stars and other heavenly bodies
radiate all kinds of vibratory energies, from radio waves to cosmic rays. The human brain also emits
electromagnetic vibrations, which can be measured by an electroencephalogram. Ākāśa is the medium of
these subtle vibrations.

Scientific experiments such as the famous Michelson-Morley experiment, which supposedly
invalidated the idea of ether or space as a substance, are actually based on a number of false
assumptions. The results of the Michelson-Morley experiment only proved that either the Doppler
Effect does not apply to light; or if it does, then the earth planet has its own etheric field that moves
along with it, and therefore the ether seems to be stationary from our point of view. Later work by Poincaré, Lorentz and Einstein showed that time and the dimensions of any objects at motion with respect to one another, adjust so that the speed of light remains constant for any observer. This is just another way of saying that the space [ether or ākāśa] contracts in the direction of motion, so that measurements such as those taken in the Michelson-Morley experiment will reveal no change in the speed of light. In either case, the existence of the ether or ākāśa is not invalidated; Relativity theory simply restates the experimental conditions in such a way that ether is replaced by ‘the space-time continuum.’ Modern science simply has given the medium of ether a more acceptable name.

Time, motion and distance are circularly defined in physics; they dance around the singularity of space or ākāśa, refusing to acknowledge or understand it. The entire structure of modern physics and other ‘hard science’ depends upon the properties of space or ākāśa, yet they deny its existence and simply call it something else. The space of the material creation is a product and thus a substance, albeit a subtle one; for we know from the scriptures that prior to the creation of the material world, only the spiritual world exists. Material space and time both are manifested only at the beginning of the material creation. The scientists cannot imagine that space could be created, because they have no conception of the spiritual world. Just as ether or ākāśa is the medium for sound vibration, similarly the spiritual world is the medium for the space of the material world. Hence ether or ākāśa is the subtle material substance of space, in which other material objects made of denser elements exist and move, and to which they are restricted just as the movements of a fish are limited to the water.

According to the Taittirīya Upaniṣad and other Vedic scriptures, the various aspects of the material world are created in the following sequence: 1. pradhāna, 2. mahat-tattva, 3. false ego, 4. the tanmātras, 5. the senses, and 6. the gross elements, beginning with ether. This sequence is given in the Subala-śruti, Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam and other scriptures. The sequence found in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad and other scriptures will also be discussed in order to show that sequence does not contradict what has already been said. Chāndogya Upaniṣad [6.2.1-4] explains:

sad eva saumyedyam agra āsīt...

“O gentle one, in the beginning the Supreme Personality of Godhead alone existed, one only without an equal. Others say the void alone existed before the creation, and from that void was produced everything that exists. But, gentle one, how could that be so?” said the father, “How can the void give birth to all that exists? Therefore Sat, the Supreme Personality of Godhead alone existed in the beginning of creation, one without an equal.”

“The Supreme Personality of Godhead thought: ‘I shall become many. I shall father children.’ Then He created fire. Then fire thought: ‘I shall become many. I shall father children.’ Then fire created water; thus whenever anyone weeps or perspires, water comes out, for water is produced from fire. Then water thought: ‘I shall become many. I shall father children.’ Then water created grains; thus whenever it rains, much food is produced. From water alone is produced all food fit for eating.”

This shows clearly that fire, water, and grains were created by Brahman, and are therefore products. In this, however, there is a doubt.

Saṁśaya [doubt]: Was ether ever created or not?

Pūrvapakṣa [the opponent speaks]: Because the Śruti-śāstra does not mention any creation of ether, therefore ether was never created, but was always existing.

This idea is expressed in the following sūtra.
**Sūtra 2.3.1**

*na viyad aśruteḥ*

*na* – not; *viyat* – ether; *aśruteḥ* – because of not being described in the Śruti-śāstra.

[Fire, water and food were created]; not so for ether, because that is not described in the Śruti-śāstra.

The Pūrvapakṣin says that ether is eternal and was never created. Why is that? The sūtra explains: “Because that is not described in the Śruti-śāstra.” The relevant passage of Chāndogya Upaniṣad mentions the creation of the other elements, but it does not mention the creation of ether. In the previously quoted passage of Chāndogya Upaniṣad the creation of fire, water, and grains is mentioned. However there is no mention of the creation of ether. For this reason ether must not have been created. That is the meaning.

This misconception is similar to the modern scientific idea that space is ever-existing. It is refuted in the following sūtra:

**Sūtra 2.3.2**

*asti tu*

*asti* – is; *tu* – indeed.

**Indeed it is so [that ether was created].**

The word *tu* [indeed] is used here to remove doubt. The word *asti* [it is so] means, “It is so that ether was created.” Although the creation of ether is not described in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, it is described in the Taɪtīrɪya Upaniṣad in the following words:

*tasmād vā etasmād ātmānā ākāśaḥ sambhūtah ākāśāḥ vāyur vāyor agnir agner āpo ābhyo mahaɪ prthivī*

“From the Supreme Personality of Godhead, ether was manifested. From ether, air was manifested. From air, fire was manifested. From fire, water was manifested. From water, earth was manifested.”

*bhūmir āpo ‘nalo vāyuḥ kham mano buddhir eva ca ahaṅkāra itīyaṁ me bhinnā prakṛtir aṣṭadhā*

“Earth, water, fire, air, ether, mind, intelligence and false ego—altogether these eight comprise My separated material energies.” [Bhagavad-gītā 7.4]

*tāmasāḥ ca vikurvānāḥ bhagavad-vīrya-codītāḥ śabda-mātram abhūt tasmān nabhaḥ śrotam tu śabdāgam*
“When egoism in ignorance is agitated by the sex energy of the Supreme Personality of Godhead, the subtle element sound is manifested, and from sound come the ethereal sky and the sense of hearing.” [Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 3.26.32]

Another doubt is expressed in the next sūtra.

Sūtra 2.3.3

gauny asambhavāc chabdāc ca

gauṇī – figure of speech; asambhavāt – because of being impossible; šabdāt – because of scripture; ca – also.

Because of scripture, and because it is impossible, it must be a mere figure of speech.

An objector may say, “It is not possible that ether was created. This is confirmed by Kaṇāda Muni and other great philosophers. The Taittirīya Upaniṣad’s description of the creation of ether is a mere figure of speech, as when, in ordinary speech one says, ‘Please make some space.’ For what other reasons is it not possible that ether is created? Because it is impossible to create ether. It is not possible to create ether because ether is formless and all-pervading, because it is not included in the chain of causes, and because scripture proclaims that ether is not created. Brhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad [2.3.2-3] proclaims:

vāyus cāntarīkṣam caitad amṛtam

“Air and ether are both eternal.”

This proves that ether was never created.”

However, if the passage from the Taittirīya Upaniṣad used the word sambhūta [created] only once to refer to the list of elements beginning with fire, how is it possible to claim that this word is used literally for all the elements and figuratively for ether alone?

The opponent of Vedānta replies in the next sūtra.

Sūtra 2.3.4

syāc caikasya brahma-śabda-vat

syāt – may be; ca – and; ekasya – of one; brahma – Brahma; śabda – the word; vat – like.

It may be for one, as in the word “Brahman” [in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad].

In the Taittirīya Upaniṣad [3.2] it is said:

tapasā brahma vijijñāsya tapo brahma

“By performing austerities strive to understand Brahman, for austerities are Brahman.”

In this passage the word Brahman is used in two ways. Used to describe the object of knowledge attained by performing austerities, Brahman is used in its literal sense. Then, equated with austerities, it is used figuratively to mean “the way to know Brahman”. In the same way the word sambhūta in the previously discussed passage can be use literally and figuratively simultaneously. In this way the fact
that the passage of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* makes no mention of it refutes the description in other *Upaniṣads* that ether was created.

The author of the *sūtras* refutes this idea in the following words.

**Sūtra 2.3.5**

\[pratijñāhānir avyatirekāc cabdebyah\]

*pratijñā* – statement of intent; *ahāniḥ* – non-abandonment; *avyatirekāḥ* – because of non-difference; *śabdebyah* – from the statements of scripture.

*It is affirmed because it is not different and because of the statements of scripture.*

The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* [6.1.3] affirms:

\[yenāśrutaṁ śrutaṁ bhavati\]

“Now I will teach how to hear what cannot be heard.”

In these words the intention to teach about Brahman is expressed. If this intention is not broken, then all that follows must be about Brahman, and it must be affirmed that nothing is different from Brahman. The idea that something is different from Brahman is to be rejected. If everything is nondifferent from Brahman, then Brahman is clearly the ingredient of which everything is made. Thus, simply by knowing Brahman one knows everything. If this is accepted, then it is also accepted that ether was created, for Brahman is the original source of everything.

The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* [6.2.1] again affirms:

\[sad eva saumyedam agra āśid ekam evādvitiyam aitad-ātmyam idaṁ sarvam\]

“O gentle one, in the beginning the Supreme Personality of Godhead alone existed. He was alone. There was no one else. Everything has Him as its ingredient.”

These words affirm that in the beginning everything was manifested from Him, and after the creation was manifested everything had Him as its ingredient. This should be accepted.

Here someone may object: “How can you talk like that? There is no clear statement in that *Upaniṣad* that ether was created.”

In the following words the author of the *sūtras* replies to this objection.

**Sūtra 2.3.6**

\[yāvat vikāram tu vibhāgo loka-vat\]

*yāvat* – to what extent; *vikāram* – creation; *tu* – indeed; *vibhāgaḥ* – creator; *loka* – the world; *vat* – like.

**Indeed, if there is a creation there must be a creator, as we see in the world.**

The word *tu* [indeed] is used here to remove doubt. The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* explains:

\[aitad-ātmyam idaṁ sarvam\]
“Everything has Him as its ingredient.”

This statement shows that there is both a creator and a creation. When the Subala Upaniṣad and other scriptures explain that the pradhāna, mahat-tattva and other things are created, they imply that everything that exists was created. That is the meaning.

The following example from the material world may be given. A person may say, “All these are the sons of Caitra.” In this way he affirms that they were all born from a man named Caitra. In the same way, when the Upaniṣad affirms that, Everything has the Supreme Personality of Godhead as its ingredient,” it is clear that pradhāna, mahat-tattva, and everything else has come from the Supreme Personality of Godhead.

Thus when the Upaniṣad states that fire, water, and grains come from the Supreme Personality of Godhead, it means to say that everything comes from Him. In this way it is understand that ether also was created.

The word vibhāgaḥ in this sūtra means “creation.” Sūtra 2.3.3 affirmed that it is not possible for ether to have been created. However, the Śruti-śāstra affirms that the Supreme Personality of Godhead has inconceivable powers. Even though it may be inconceivable, He can do anything without restriction. In some passages it is said that ether is immortal, which means that it is neither created nor destroyed. These statements may be taken as figures of speech because we can find other passages describing the creation and destruction of ether.

\[
\begin{align*}
tvam eka ādyah puruṣah supta-śaktis \\
tayā rajah-sattva-tamo vibhidyate \\
 mahān aham khaṁ marud agni-vār-dharāḥ \\
suraṁayo bhūta-gaṇā idaṁ yataḥ
\end{align*}
\]

“My dear Lord, You are the only Supreme Person, the cause of all causes. Before the creation of this material world, Your material energy remains in a dormant condition. When Your material energy is agitated, the three qualities—namely goodness, passion and ignorance—act, and as a result the total material energy—egotism, ether, air, fire, water, earth and all the various demigods and saintly persons—becomes manifest. Thus the material world is created.”

[Srīmad-Bhāgavatam 4.24.63]

Because ether is counted among the material elements, it must be created and also destroyed. Because ether has temporary material qualities, as fire and the other elements do, it must also be temporary, as the other elements are.

Whatever is not matter is spirit. Ether is not like eternal spirit; it is different because it is created. In this way the idea that ether was not created is disproved. Modern scientists and other philosophers who state that ether does not exist are wrong, because they are working with an incorrect definition of ether. They may as well state that “Space does not exist,” which of course is nonsense. Space simply has different properties than they assume in their experiments. It must be accepted on the authority of the Vedas that ether exists, and was created by the Supreme Personality of Godhead in the process of manifesting the material world.

**Adhikaraṇa 2: Air Is Created**

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: Air is also created.

Saṁśaya [arising of doubt]: Is air also created, or is it eternal?
Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: Because it was never described in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, it is clear that air was never created.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: The author of the sūtras gives the following explanation to show that the arguments of the previous Adhikaraṇa also apply to the creation of air.

Sūtra 2.3.7

etena mātariśvā vyākhyaṭaḥ
etena – by this; mātariśvā – air; vyākhyaṭaḥ – is explained.

This also refers to air.

This proof that ether was created clearly shows that air, which exists within ether, must also have been created. That is the meaning. This is so because the limbs of something must have the same qualities as the whole of which they are parts. This ontological principle technically is called inheritance; the properties of the cause exist in the effect. The passage of Taittirīya Upaniṣad quoted in the previous Adhikaraṇa also explains that air was created from ether.

Our opponent may object: “That description of the creation of air must have been a figure of speech, because the Śruti-śāstra explains that air is eternal.”

To this I reply: The Chāndogya Upaniṣad affirms in a pratijñā [promissory] statement, aitad-ātmyam idaṁ sarvam: “Everything was created by the Supreme Personality of Godhead.” Also Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam [10.74.20-21] affirms this point almost in the same words:

eka evādvitiyo 'sāv
aitad-ātmyam idaṁ jagat
ātmanātmāśrayah sabhyāḥ
srjaty avati hanty ajah

“This entire universe is founded upon Him, as are the great sacrificial performances, with their sacred fires, oblations and mantras. Śāṅkhya and yoga both aim toward Him, the one without a second. O assembly members, that unborn Lord, relying solely on Himself, creates, maintains and destroys this cosmos by His personal energies, and thus the existence of this universe depends on Him alone.”

In this way the creation of air is proved. When it is said that ‘air is eternal,’ the intention is that its existence precedes and outlives the existence of some of the other elements. Air is manifested before water, as described above, and continues to exist after the annihilation of water, as described in Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam:

anne pralīyate martyam annaṁ dhānāśu liyate
dhānā bhūmau pralīyante bhūmir gandhe pralīyate
apsu pralīyate gandha āpaś ca sva-guṇe rase
liyate jyotiśi raso jyotī rūpe pralīyate
rūpaṁ vāyau sa ca sparśe liyate so 'pi cāmbare
ambaraṁ śabda-tan-mātra indriyāṇi sva-yoniṣu
At the time of annihilation, the mortal body of the living being becomes merged into food. Food merges into the grains, and the grains merge back into the earth. The earth merges into its subtle sensation, fragrance. Fragrance merges into water, and water further merges into its own quality, taste. That taste merges into fire, which merges into form. Form merges into touch, and touch merges into ether. Ether finally merges into the sensation of sound. The senses all merge into their own origins, the presiding demigods, and they, O gentle Uddhava, merge into the controlling mind, which itself merges into false ego in the mode of goodness. Sound becomes one with false ego in the mode of ignorance, and all-powerful false ego, the first of all the physical elements, merges into the total nature. The total material nature, the primary repository of the three basic modes, dissolves into the modes. These modes of nature then merge into the unmanifest form of nature, and that unmanifest form merges into time. Time merges into the Supreme Lord, present in the form of the omniscient Mahā-puruṣa, the original activator of all living beings. That origin of all life merges into Me, the unborn Supreme Soul, who remains alone, established within Himself. It is from Him that all creation and annihilation are manifested.” [Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 11.24.22-27]

Air is discussed in a separate Adhikāraṇa and sūtra from the discussion of ether to facilitate the argument of Sūtra 2.3.9.

Adhikāraṇa 3: The Eternal Supreme Personality of Godhead is not Created

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: The Chāndogya Upaniṣad [6.2.1] affirms:

sad eva saumyedam

“O gentle one, in the beginning the Supreme Personality of Godhead alone existed.”

Saṃśaya [arise of doubt]: A doubt may arise about this statement. Was the eternal Supreme Personality of Godhead created or not?

Pūrva-pakṣa [antithesis]: Pradhāna, mahat-tattva, and many other things that are causes or creators of other things were created, so perhaps the Supreme Personality of Godhead was also created at some point. This may be so because the Supreme Personality of Godhead is not really different from these other causes.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: The author of the sūtras addresses this doubt in the following words.

Sūtra 2.3.8

asambhavas tu sato ‘nupapateḥ

asambhavaḥ – the state of not being created; tu – indeed; sataḥ – of the eternal Supreme Personality of Godhead; anupapateḥ – because of impossibility
Indeed, the eternal Supreme Personality of Godhead was never created, for such a creation is impossible.

The word *tu* [indeed] is used here to remove doubt and affirm the truth of this statement. The eternal Supreme Personality of Godhead was never created. Why not? The *sūtra* explains, *anupapatteḥ*:

“Because that is impossible.”

There is no creator of the Supreme Personality of Godhead, because it is illogical and inappropriate to assume the existence of such a creator. That is the meaning here. Śvetāśvatara *Upaniṣad* [6.9] explains:

\[
\text{sa kāraṇaṁ kāraṇādhipādhipo} \\
\text{na cāṣya kaścij janitā na cādhipaḥ}
\]

“The Supreme Personality of Godhead is the cause of all causes. He is the king of all other causes. No one is His creator. No one is His king.”

It is not possible to say that because all other causes are created by something else, therefore the Supreme Personality of Godhead must have been created by someone else; for such a statement contradicts these words of the Śrutī-śāstra. An Absolute root cause of everything must be accepted, for if it is not, then there is the infinite regress of an unending chain of causes. By definition the root cause of everything does not have another cause, a root from which it has sprung. This is described in the *Saṅkhya-sūtra* [1.67] in these words:

\[
\text{mūle mūlabhāvāt} \\
\text{īśvaraḥ paramaḥ kṛṣṇah} \\
\text{sac-cid-ānanda-vigrahaḥ} \\
\text{anādir ādir govindaḥ} \\
\text{saṁkarana-kāraṇam}
\]

“This is so because the root cause of everything is not caused by another root cause.”

\[
\text{Krṣṇa who is known as Govinda is the Supreme Godhead. He has an eternal blissful spiritual body. He is the origin of all. He has no other origin and He is the prime cause of all causes.”} \\
\text{[Brahma-sanhitā 5.1]}
\]

The modern atheistic philosophers, including the scientists, are unwilling to accept the truth of an Absolute cause because that would force them to accept the existence of the Supreme Personality of Godhead. However, this means that they are forced to accept an infinite regress of causes without any end or resolution. All their speculation is inconclusive because every cause they find must have another cause behind it. In this way they are envious, not only of the Lord, but even of their own selves. They would rather live with constant uncertainty than accept the easy and simple conclusion that the Supreme Lord is the ultimate transcendental cause of everything.

In this way the doubt that “perhaps the Supreme Personality of Godhead is created by someone else,” is clearly refuted. Because the Supreme Personality of Godhead is the first cause of all causes, by definition He is not caused by anyone else. However, the secondary causes, such as the *avyakta* [unmanifest or subtle material elements] and the *mahat-tattva* [the sum total of all material elements] are all created by another cause: the Supreme Personality of Godhead. The *sūtras* explaining that ether and the other material elements were all created were given as examples of this general truth.
Adhikarana 4: Fire Is Manifested From Air

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: After concluding this discussion, we will consider what seems to be a contradiction in the Śruti-śāstra’s description of fire. Chāndogya Upaniṣad [6.2.3] explains:

tat tejo 'srjata

“Then the Supreme Personality of Godhead created fire.”

In this way it is explained that the Supreme Personality of Godhead created fire.

Samśaya [arise of doubt]: However, the Taittiriya Upaniṣad [2.1.3] explains:

vāyor agniḥ

“From air, fire is manifested.”

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: These words explain that air created fire. Someone may say that in this second quote the word “vāyoḥ” is in the ablative case [meaning “after fire”], and in this way there is no contradiction because both elements were created by the Supreme Personality of Godhead, and fire was created after air was created.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: Considering that someone may say this, the author of the sūtras speaks the following words.

Sūtra 2.3.9

tejo 'tas tathā hy āha

tējāḥ – fire; atāḥ – from that; tathā – so; hy – indeed; āha – said.

Fire comes from it. Indeed, it said that.

From air comes fire. This is confirmed in the Śruti-śāstra, which explains:

vāyor agniḥ

“From air comes fire.”

The word sambhūta is used here. The use of that word shows that the meaning is that from air fire is created. Also, the primary meaning of the ablative case is “from.” If the primary meaning of a word makes sense, then the primary meaning should be accepted. In that circumstance the secondary meaning should not be accepted. As will be explained later, this statement does not contradict the statement that everything is created by the Supreme Personality of Godhead.

The entire sequence of the creation of the elements is explained in Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam:

nabhaso 'tha vikurvāṇād abhūt sparśa-guno 'nilaḥ
parāṇvayāc chabdavāṁś ca prāṇa ojāḥ saho balam

vāyor api vikurvāṇat kāla-karma-svabhāvataḥ
udapadyata tejo vai rūpavat sparśa-śabdavat

tejāsas tu vikurvāṇād āsīd ambho rasātmakam
rūpavat sparśavac cāmbho ghośavac ca parāṇvayāt
viṣeṣas tu vikurvāṇād ambhaso gandhavān abhūt
parānvāyād rasa-sparśa-śabda-rūpa-guṇānvītāḥ

“Because the sky is transformed, the air is generated with the quality of touch, and by previous succession the air is also full of sound and the basic principles of duration of life: sense perception, mental power and bodily strength. When the air is transformed in course of time and nature's course, fire is generated, taking shape with the sense of touch and sound. Since fire is also transformed, there is a manifestation of water, full of juice and taste. As previously, it also has form and touch and is also full of sound. And water, being transformed from all variegatedness on earth, appears odorous and, as previously, becomes qualitatively full of juice, touch, sound and form respectively.” [Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 2.5.26-29]

Modern scientific thinkers should not reject this description just because it is not a literal account that can be verified in a laboratory. Such descriptions given by the scriptures in terms of consciousness, the senses and sense objects, not in terms of chemical elements, because consciousness or spirit and God are the ultimate subject matters of the scriptures. We are not interested in physical properties as much as the spiritual or psychological properties of the material creation, in order to understand the construction of the material trap and the means to winning our freedom from it. This will be described in detail in Adhyāyas 3 and 4 of Śrī Vedānta-sūtra.

Adhikaraṇa 5: Water Is Manifested From Fire

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: Now the author describes the origin of water from fire.

Samśaya [arisal of doubt]: Is fire really the origin of water, or not?

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: In some places the scriptures affirm that water is manifested from fire, and in other places the scriptures do not agree with this idea. In this way a doubt arises.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: To remove this doubt, the author of the sūtras gives the following explanation.

Sūtra 2.3.10

āpah

āpah – water.

Water.

To this sūtra should be added the previous sūtra’s phrase atas tathā hy āha [Water comes from it. Indeed it said that.] This means that water is manifested from fire. This is so because the Ģṛuti-śāstra declares it. Chāndogya Upaniṣad [6.2.3] explains:

_tad āpo 'ṣtrjata_

“Fire created water.”

Taittirīya Upaniṣad [2.1] also explains:

_agner āpah_

“From fire water was manifested.”
These two quotes are clear and need no elaborate explanation. Why water comes from fire is explained in the following words of Chândogya Upaniṣad already quoted above:

\[
tasmād yatra kva ca śocati svedate vā puruṣas tejasā eva tad adhy āpo jāyante
\]

“Heat makes a person produce water. This is so when a person perspires or weeps.”

**Adhikaraṇa 6: Earth Is Manifested From Water, and the Word “Anna” in the Chândogya Upaniṣad Means “Earth”**

**Viṣaya** [thesis or statement]: In the Chândogya Upaniṣad it is said:

\[
tā āpa aikṣanta bahvayaḥ syāma prajāyemahīti tā annam asṛjanta
\]

“Water thought: ‘I shall become many. I shall father many children.’ Then water created *anna*.”

**Samśaya** [arisal of doubt]: What is the meaning of the word *anna* here? Does it mean “barley and other food,” or does it mean “earth”?

**Pūrvapakṣa** [antithesis]: In the Chândogya Upaniṣad it is said:

\[
tasmād yatra kvacana varṣati tad eva bhūyisṭham annam bhavaty adbhyā eva tad adhy annādyāṁ jāyate
\]

“Therefore, whenever it rains there is abundant *anna*. In this way *anna* is produced by water.”

This passage seems, therefore, to support the idea that the word *anna* here means “barley and other food.”

**Siddhānta** [Vedic conclusion]: To explain the proper meaning here, the author of the *sūtras* speaks the following words.

**Sūtra 2.3.11**

\[
prthivy-adhikāra-rūpa-śabdāntarebhhyah
\]

*prthivi* – earth; *adhikāra* – context; *rūpa* – color; *śabda* – quotes from the Śruti-śāstra; *antarebhhyah* – because of other.

**Because its color, its context, and other quotes from the Śruti-śāstra, all confirm that earth is the proper meaning.**

Here the meaning “earth” should be accepted. Why? Because of the context and other reasons. It should be accepted because the context [*adhikāra*] of the passage is a description of the creation of the five material elements. It is also so, because the *anna* here is described as being black in color [*rūpa*], in the words:

\[
yat krṣṇaṁ tad annasya
\]

“That *anna* is black in color.”

It is also so because in other scriptures [*śastrāntarebhhyah*] it is said [in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad]:

\[
adbhyāḥ prthivī
\]

“From water, earth is manifested.”
The passage: “Therefore, whenever it rains there is abundant anna. In this way, “anna is produced by water,” clearly uses the word anna to mean “food.” However, because this passage is in the context of a description of the five material elements being manifested one from the other, the “food” here is a metaphor for “earth.” Thus the two meanings “food” and “earth” combine in the word anna in this passage.

Adhikaraṇa 7: The Elements Are Manifested From the Supreme Personality of Godhead

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: The description here, that the material elements are manifested in a particular sequence, beginning with ether, is given to remove controversy in regard to the sequence in which the elements are manifested. The fact that the pradhāna, mahat-tattva, and all the elements are created by the Supreme Personality of Godhead has already been proved in Śūtra 1.1.2 [janmādy asya yataḥ]. Now the author of the sūtras begins a more detailed description of that creation. In the Subala Upaniṣad it is said:

\[
\text{tad āhuḥ kiṁ tad āsīt tasmai sa hovāca na san nasan na sad asad iti tasmāt tamaḥ sañjāyate tamaso bhūtādīr bhūtāder ākāśam ākāśād vāyur vāyor agnir agner āpo 'dbhyaḥ prthivī tad āndam abhavat}
\]

“They said: ‘What was in the beginning?’ He replied: ‘In the beginning was neither existence nor non-existence. Nothing existed and nothing did not exist. In the beginning there was darkness [tamaḥ]. From the darkness the origin of the material elements was born. From the origin of the material elements, ether was born. From ether, air was born. From air, fire was born. From fire, water was born. From water, earth was born. In this way the egg of the material universe was created.’ ”

Here it should be understood that aksara [the inconceivable], avyakta [the unmanifest], mahat-tattva [the total material energy], tan-mātras [the attributes of the elements such as sound, touch, etc.], and the material senses should also be placed in this sequence, between darkness and ether. That is the meaning included in the phrase “the origin of the material elements.” This should be done to complement the following statement of Agnimalaya:

\[
\]

“When the all the elements are burned up, earth merges into water, water merges into fire, fire merges into air, air merges into ether, ether merges into the senses, the senses merge into the tan-mātras, the tan-mātras merge into the origin of the material elements, the origin of the material elements merges into the mahat-tattva, the mahat-tattva merges into the avyakta, the avyakta merges into the aksara, and the aksara merges into the great darkness. Then the great darkness becomes one with the Supreme. In the Supreme is neither existence nor nonexistence. Nothing exists and nothing does not exist.”

The word “origin of the material elements” here means ahaṅkāra [false ego]. False ego is of three kinds. From false ego in the mode of goodness, the mind and the demigods are manifested. From false ego in the mode of passion, the material senses are manifested. From false ego in the mode of ignorance are manifested the tan-mātras, from which are manifested the ether and the other elements. In this way these different explanations all corroborate each other.
In the *Gopāla-tāpanī Upaniṣad* it is said:

*pūrvam hy ekam evādvitiyām brahmāt. Tasmād avyaktaṁ vyaktam evākṣaraṁ tasmād aksarāṁ mahāṁ mahato vā ahaṅkāras tasmād ahaṅkārāt pañca-tan-mātrāṇī tebhyo bhūtāṁ tair āvṛtam aksaram bhavati.*

“Before the material world was manifest, only the Supreme Personality of Godhead, who is one without a second, existed. From Him came the *avyakta*. From the *avyakta* came the *aksiṣara*. From the *aksiṣara* came the *mahat-tattva*. From the *mahat-tattva* came false ego [*ahaṅkāra*]. From false ego came the five *tan-mātras*. From them came the material elements. The *aksiṣara* is filled with all these.”

**Saṁśaya [doubt]:** Do the *pradhāna* and other parts of this sequence arise one from the other, or do they all arise directly from the Supreme Personality of Godhead?

**Pūrvapakṣa:** They arise from each other, for that is the statement of the texts.

**Siddhānta [the conclusion]:** The author of the *sūtras* gives His conclusion in the following words.

**Sūtra 2.3.12**

*tad abhidhyānād eva tu tal liṅgāt saḥ*

* tat – that; abhidhyānāt – because of meditation; eva – indeed; tu – indeed; tat – that; liṅgāt – because of the body; saḥ – He.*

**Because of meditation and because of the body, it is indeed He.**

The word *tu* [indeed] is used to dispel doubt. The Supreme Personality of Godhead is the master of all potencies, including the potency of great darkness, the potency that begins the material creation. He is the direct cause, and the *pradhāna*, earth, and other features of the material creation are effects created by Him. Why is that? The *sūtra* explains: “Because of meditation and because of the body.” The Śṛuti-śāstra explains:

*so ‘kāmayata bahu syāṁ prajāyeya*

“The Supreme Personality of Godhead desired: ‘Let Me become many. Let me create the material world.’ ”

Thus, it is by the desire of the all-powerful Supreme Personality of Godhead that the *pradhāna* and other features of the material world are created. That is how He is the cause of the material world. Also, the material world is the body of the Supreme Personality of Godhead. The Supreme Personality of Godhead enters the great darkness of the material world and transforms it into *pradhāna* and the other aspects of matter. In this sense, the material world is His body. This is confirmed by the *Antaryāmi-brāhmaṇa* of the *Brhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, and also by the *Subala Upaniṣad*, which explains:

*yasya prthivī śarīram*

“The world is the body of the Supreme Personality of Godhead.”

*jagrhe pauruṣaṁ rūpaṁ bhagavān mahad-ādibhiḥ sambhūtaṁ śoḍaśa-kalam ādau loka-sisrṣayā*
“In the beginning of the creation, the Lord first expanded Himself in the universal form of the puruṣa incarnation and manifested all the ingredients for the material creation. And thus at first there was the creation of the sixteen principles of material action. This was for the purpose of creating the material universe.” [Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 1.3.1]

aṇḍa-kośe śarīre 'smin
saptāvarana-saṁyute
vairājaḥ puruṣo yo 'sau
bhagavān dhāraṇaśrayaḥ

“The gigantic universal form of the Personality of Godhead, within the body of the universal shell, which is covered by sevenfold material elements, is the subject for the conception of the virāṭ-rūpa.” [Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 2.1.25]

Sūtra 2.3.13

viparyayena tu krama ‘ta upapadyate ca

viparyayena – by the reverse; tu – indeed; kramaḥ – sequence; ataḥ – from this; upapadyate – is manifested; ca – and.

Indeed, this sequence is also reversed.

The word tu [indeed] is used here for emphasis. In the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad [2.1.3] it is said:

etasmāj jāyate praṇo manāḥ sarvendriyāṁ ca. Khaṁ vāyur jyotir āpah prthivī viśvasya dhārinī

“From Him are born life, mind, all the senses, ether, air, fire, water, and earth, the support of the world.”

In the Subala Upaniṣad the sequence is reversed, with pradhāna and mahat-tattva coming first. But this is not really an issue, because everything actually comes from the Supreme Personality of Godhead. He is present within everything, beginning with the life-air and ending with earth, and when one feature of creation comes from another, the second feature actually comes from the all-powerful Supreme Personality of Godhead present within the first feature. If this were not so, then these two different versions would contradict each other.

The Supreme Personality of Godhead is the origin of all and the creator of all. By knowing Him everything becomes known. The pradhāna and other features of matter, being inert and unconscious, cannot by themselves create changes in the material world. That is why the word ca [also] is used here. Therefore the Supreme Personality of Godhead is in every case the real cause of these transformations in the material world.

Adhikaraṇa 8: The Supreme Personality of Godhead is the Creator of Mind and Intelligence

Viśaya [thesis or statement]: Now the author of the sūtras removes a specific doubt.

Samśaya [ariseal of doubt]: Are the material elements generated by the Supreme Personality of Godhead or by one another?
Pūrva-pakṣa [antithesis]: It is not proper to assume that this quotation from Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad [2.1.3] quoted in the previous purport, supports the idea that all the features of the material world are directly created by the Supreme Personality of Godhead Himself. The list given in that verse merely gives the sequence in which those material features were manifested. It says that first come the material senses and then comes the mind. This does not mean that everything comes directly from the Supreme Personality of Godhead.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: To explain the proper meaning here, the author of the sūtras speaks the following words.

Sūtra 2.3.14

antarā vijnāna-manasī-krameṇa tal-liṅgād iti cen nāviśeṣāt
antarāḥ – in the middle; vijnāna – knowledge; manasī – and mind; krameṇa – with the sequence; tat – of that; liṅgāt – because of the sign; iti – thus; cet – if; na – not; aviseṣāt – because of not being different.

If it is said that the sequence of mind and intelligence appears in this way, then I reply: No. Because they are not different.

The word vijnāna here means “the material senses of the conditioned soul.” If this objection is raised, then I reply: No. It is not so. Why not? The sūtra explains, na viśeṣāt: “Because they are not different.” This means that the material senses and the mind are not different from the life-force, the element earth, or any of the other material features. They have all come directly from the Supreme Personality of Godhead. In this passage the life-force and all the other material features all come from the Supreme Personality of Godhead [etasmāt: “from Him”]. That is the meaning. The following scripture quotes also declare that the elements are all created by the Supreme Personality of Godhead:

so ‘kāmayata bahu syāṁ prajāyeya
“The Supreme Personality of Godhead desired: Let Me become many. Let me create the material world.”

etasmāj jāyate prāṇaḥ
“The life-force and everything else was manifested from the Supreme Personality of Godhead.”

In the Bhagavad-gītā [10.8] the Supreme Personality of Godhead Himself declares:

ahaṁ sarvasya prabhavo
mattāḥ sarvam pravartate
“I am the source of all spiritual and material worlds. Everything emanates from me.”

In the Vāmana Purāṇa it is said:

tatra tatra sthito viṣṇus
tat tāc chaktiṁ prabhodhayet
eka eva mahā-śaktih
kurute sarvam aṁjasā
“The Supreme Personality of Godhead, Lord Viṣṇu, enters everywhere and awakens the power dormant in everything. He is the supremely powerful one. He does everything perfectly.”
In this way it is shown that pradhāna and all other material features come directly from the Supreme Personality of Godhead. That fact is not at all contradicted by the sequence of events presented in the Subala Upaniṣad and the other scriptures. This is so because the Supreme Personality of Godhead is the creator of the original material darkness, the pradhāna and the other features of the material world. Thus when the scripture says tat tejo 'sṛjata: “The Supreme Personality of Godhead created fire,” it is understood that He also created darkness, a host of other potencies, pradhāna, air, and other aspects of matter. When the scriptures say tasmād vai: “From the Supreme Personality of Godhead everything has come,” it is understood that the Supreme Personality of Godhead is the master of material darkness and a host of other potencies, the pradhāna and other features of matter were born from Him, and the material element ether was also manifested from Him.

**Adhikaraṇa 9: All Words are Names of the Supreme Personality of Godhead**

**Viṣaya** [thesis or statement]: The Holy Names of the Supreme Personality of Godhead are eternal and innumerable. During the temporary manifestation of the material creation, some of these names are also used to refer to material personalities and objects. But the primary meaning of these words remains the Lord, since at the end of the creation the material persons and objects cease to exist.

**Samśaya** [arising of doubt]: Is it not so that if Lord Hari is the Supreme Personality of Godhead, the master of all, and the all-pervading Supersoul, then the names of all that is moving and inert would also be names of Him?

**Pūrvapakṣa** [antithesis]: It is not true that all names are names of the Lord, for words are primarily the names of the various moving and inert things. We accept the primary meaning of words as given in the dictionary, and if they also sometimes indicate Lord Hari, that is a secondary or indirect meaning.

**Siddhānta** [Vedic conclusion]: Thinking that someone may accept this idea that words are primarily names of various things and only secondarily names of the Supreme Personality of Godhead, the author of the sūtras gives the following explanation.

**Sūtra 2.3.15**

\[\text{carācara-vyapāśrayas tu syāt tadd-vyapadesāḥ `bhāktas tad- bhāva-bhāvitvāt}\]

- **cara** – moving; **acara** – and unmoving; **vyapāśrayah** – the abode; **tu** – indeed; **syāt** – may be; **tat** – of that; **vyapadesāh** – name; **abhāktah** – not figurative; **tad** – of Him; **bhāva** – the nature; **bhāvitvāt** – because of being in the future.

**Indeed, He resides in all that move and does not move. Therefore it will be learned that every word is one of His names.**

The word **tu** [indeed] is used here to dispel doubt. The word **carācara-vyapāśrayah** means that “The Supreme Personality of Godhead resides in all moving and unmoving beings.” The word **tadd-vyapadesāḥ** means “the names of the moving and unmoving beings.” The word **abhāktah** means “These names are primarily names of the Supreme Personality of Godhead.” Why is that? The sūtra explains: **bhāva-bhāvitvāt** [the real meaning of names will be learned in the future]. This means that by studying the scriptures one will come to understand that all words are names of the Supreme Personality of Godhead. The Śruti-śāstras explain:
so ‘kāmayata bahu syām

“The Supreme Personality of Godhead desired: ‘Let Me become many. Let me create the material world.’”

sa vāsudevo na yato ‘nyad asti

“He is the all-pervading Supreme Personality of Godhead. Nothing is different from Him.”

In the Viṣṇu Purāṇa [3.7.16] it is said:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{kaṭaka-mukuta-karnikādi-bhedaiḥ} \\
\text{kanakam abhedam apiṣyate yathaikam} \\
\text{sura-paśu-manujādi-kalpanābhīr} \\
\text{harir akhilābhīr udīryate tathaikaḥ}
\end{align*}
\]

“As golden bracelets, crowns, earrings, and other golden ornaments are all one because they are all made of gold, so all demigods, men, and animals are one with Lord because they are all made of Lord Hari’s potencies.”

The meaning is this: The names of potencies are primarily the names of the Master of these potencies. This is so because the Master is the very self of His potencies. Lord Śrī Caitanya Mahāprabhu was a teacher of grammar, He explained to His students the Vedic truth that the original meaning of every word is a Holy Name of the Lord. Material personalities and objects simply borrow their names from Him for the duration of the creation.

**Adhikaraṇa 10: The Individual Spirit Souls are Eternal and Without Beginning**

**Viṣaya** [thesis or statement]: Because He is the origin of everything, the Supreme Personality of Godhead has no other origin from which He was created. This has already been described. Now we will determine the nature of the individual spirit soul.

The modern materialist philosophers do not want to admit the existence of the soul. This is because of their envy of the Supreme Personality of Godhead. As soon as one acknowledges the existence of the soul, the very next question will be about the source of the soul, and that line of inquiry has to end in the Supreme Personality of Godhead. Thus all materialist philosophies deny the existence and eternity of the soul.

Some modern theologians speculate that the soul is created at the beginning of human life, but exists forever in heaven or hell as a result of his actions in this life. They wish to avoid accepting the truth of reincarnation. However, this position leads to intractable philosophical problems, because it cannot explain how some souls are born into good families and favorable situations and others into poverty or other difficulties. It also implied that God is not fair, or that He may not be perfectly omnipotent. For if the soul is newly created, then how do we explain that some souls are born into difficult situations such as poverty and ignorance, and others are blessed with wealth, education and other advantages? This means that God is either not all-good, since He allows some new souls to suffer and others to enjoy; or that God is not all-powerful, because He cannot help that some children are born in worse circumstances than others. Of course, the real answer is that each soul exists eternally, and has specific karma resulting from his activities in previous lives.

We have discussed these issues earlier; the eternity of the soul, both in the past and the future, is necessary if we want to preserve the idea that God is all-knowing, all-powerful and all-good. Eternal
means beginningless and endless. Thus the idea that the soul is created at a particular time is incorrect. Therefore, first the idea that the individual soul has an origin in time will be refuted.

In the *Taittirīya Aranyaka, Mahā-Nārāyaṇa Upaniṣad* [1.4] it is said:

\[
yataḥ prasūtā jagataḥ prasūtī
toyena jīvān vyasasarja bhūmyām
\]

“From the Supreme Personality of Godhead the universe was born. With water He created the living entities on the earth.”

In the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* it is said:

\[
san-mūlāḥ sauryemāḥ sarvāḥ prajāḥ
\]

“O gentle one, all living entities have their roots in the Supreme.”

_Samśaya_ [doubt]: Do the individual spirit souls have an origin or not?

_Pūrvapakṣa_ [the opponent speaks]: Because He is the creator of the material universe, which contains both sentient living entities and insentient matter, the Supreme Personality of Godhead must be the creator of the individual spirit souls. Any other idea would be illogical.

_Siddhānta_ [conclusion]: The author of the _sūtras_ gives the following conclusion.

### Sūtra 2.3.16

\[
nātmā śruter nityatvāc ca tābhyaḥ
\]

na – not; ātmā – the individual spirit soul; śruteḥ – from the _Śruti-śāstra_; nityatvāt – because of being eternal; ca – and; tābhyaḥ – from them.

_Because the individual spirit soul is eternal, and because of the statements of _Śruti-śāstra_ and other scriptures, [this idea about the individual spirit soul is not true.]_

The individual spirit soul was never created. Why not? The _sūtra_ explains, _śruteḥ_: “Because of the statements of _Śruti-śāstra_.” In _Katha Upaniṣad_ [1.2.18] it is said:

\[
na jāyate mriyate vā vipaścin
nāyaṁ kutaścin na babhūva kaścit
ajo nityah śāsvato ‘yaṁ purāṇo
na hanyate hanyamāne śarīre
\]

“O wise one, for the soul there is neither birth nor death at any time. He has not come into being, does not come into being, and will not come into being. He is unborn, eternal, ever-existing, and primeval. He is not slain when the body is slain.”

That the individual spirit soul was never born is also declared in the _Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad_ [1.9]:

\[
jñājñau dvāv ajāv īśāniśau
\]

“Neither the Supreme Personality of Godhead nor the individual spirit souls were ever born.”

The word _tābhyaḥ_ in the _sūtra_ means “The eternality of the individual spirit soul is described in the _Śrutis_ and _Smṛti-śāstras_.” The word _ca_ [and] in the _sūtra_ means that the individual spirit soul is also conscious and full of knowledge.
In the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* [2.5.13] it is said:

\[ \text{nityo nityānāṁ cetanaś cetanānām} \]

"Of all eternal living souls there is one who is the leader. Of all eternal souls there is one who is the leader."

In the *Bhagavad-gītā* the Supreme Lord explains:

\[ \text{ajo nityah śāśvato 'yam purāṇah} \]

"The soul is unborn, eternal, ever-existing, and primeval."

Therefore, when it is said, "Yajñadatta is born and again he dies," such words refer only to the external material body. The *jāta-karma* ceremony and other ceremonies like it also refer to the external material body. The individual spirit soul is different from the external material body and resides in it like a passenger. In the *Brhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* [4.3.8] it is said:

\[ \text{sa vā ayam puruṣo jāyamānah śarīram abhisampadyāmānāḥ sa utkraman mriyamānāḥ} \]

"At the moment of birth the spirit soul enters a material body, and at the moment of death the soul leaves the body."

In the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* [6.11.3] it is said:

\[ \text{jīvopetam vāva kiledāṁ mriyate na jīvo mriyate} \]

"The soul resides in the material body. When the body dies, the soul does not die."

Here someone may object: "How can this be? If this is so, then this fact disagrees with the scriptural description of the individual souls’ creation."

To this objection I reply: The individual spirit souls are said to be created because they are effects of the Supreme. The Supreme Personality of Godhead has two potencies—internal and external—and these are said to be His effects. Here is what makes these two potencies different. One potency is the pradhāna and other inert, unconscious, nonliving potencies that are meant to be objects of enjoyment and various experiences. The other potency is the individual spirit souls, who are not inert, dull matter, but conscious living beings, and who are able to enjoy and perceive various experiences. These two potencies share one common feature: that they are both the effects of the Supreme Personality of Godhead. In this way the scriptural description of the souls’ creation is not contradicted; the scriptures are correct, and the individual spirit souls are never born.

All transcendental entities are eternal; they have no beginning or end. The difference between material and spiritual things is precisely that material things are temporary but spiritual things are eternal.

\[ \text{nāsato vidyate bhāvo} \]
\[ \text{nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ} \]
\[ \text{ubhayor api drśto 'ntas} \]
\[ \text{tv anayos tattva-darśibhiḥ} \]

"Those who are seers of the truth have concluded that of the nonexistent there is no endurance, and of the existent there is no cessation. This seers have concluded by studying the nature of both.” [*Bhagavad-gītā* 2.16]

\[ \text{nātmā jajāna na marisyati naidhate 'sau} \]
\[ \text{na kṣiyate savana-vid vyabhicārināṁ hi} \]
The eternal soul was never born and will never die, nor does it grow or decay. That spiritual soul is actually the knower of the youth, middle age and death of the material body. Thus the soul can be understood to be pure consciousness, existing everywhere at all times and never being destroyed. Just as the life air within the body, although one, becomes manifest as many in contact with the various material senses, the one soul appears to assume various material designations in contact with the material body.” [Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 11.3.38]

Adhikaraṇa 11: The Individual Spirit Souls are Both Knowledge and Knowers

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: Now that he has cleared away the obstacles of spurious, non-Vedic philosophical systems, the author of the sūtras considers the nature of the individual spirit soul. In this context, “knowledge” refers not to discursive thought, verbal information or symbolic manipulation, but to consciousness. Thus the soul is both conscious and consciousness, knowledge and the knower.

Consciousness is the primary issue in life. Indeed, in the absence of consciousness there are no other issues. Consciousness and its corollaries are fundamental to every thought, word and action. Yet how strange that there is no universally accepted, comprehensive theory of consciousness in Western science. The reason for this is clear: if the existence and transcendental nature of the soul is accepted, the next question will be “Then what is the origin of the soul?” Because they want to avoid the Supreme Personality of Godhead, science has intentionally restricted its domain to empirical investigations of the manifest objective world, while consciousness and the soul are intrinsically subjective and immanent.

Consciousness is the primary experiential fact. Without a practical theory of consciousness, science cannot adequately explain the world in which we live. Any observer must be conscious, and therefore the consciousness of the observer is critical to the outcome of any experiment. Quantum Mechanics does recognize the role of the observer in determining the outcome of an experiment; however, so far it still treats the observer’s consciousness as a ‘black box,’ as if consciousness were proscribed from serious scientific inquiry.

Considering the profound importance of consciousness in human life, comparatively little scientific research has been done on it. And this research is deeply flawed, because it tries to treat consciousness as a material substance. This ontological error is technically called elementalism. Consciousness is not a thing but a quality of a transcendental entity, the soul. Unless we admit the existence of the soul, we can never understand consciousness, because a quality is different from a substance.

Here is a perfect example of how language can differ from reality. Just because it is possible to isolate the word ‘consciousness,’ it does not follow that one can isolate consciousness, because consciousness is not a thing. In reality, consciousness is inseparable from the living entity—he who is conscious of being conscious. Consciousness is never found separate from senses, form and personal identity. Any attempt to split off consciousness from its structural relationships with the living entity, form (whether material or spiritual) and identity, is a futile endeavor that can never lead to any practical application because it is against the structure of reality.

In other words, consciousness is only one member of a higher-order transcendental reality: ontologically, the soul or living entity is the root class, and his qualities such as consciousness, identity,
ideation, action etc. are subclasses. Our whole experience is a very large series of instances of these subclasses. We can very easily illustrate this in an ontological class diagram.

The living entity himself is ontologically inconceivable to us because we ourselves are living entities, and living entities are the *tāṭāstha-śakti* [marginal potency] of the Supreme. The ontological conception of the Supreme and His potencies as seen by the Supreme Himself is closed to the living entities. We can never be conscious of ourselves as God sees us, just as we can never see our own eyeballs; and His consciousness and intelligence are unlimited. Therefore the ultimate meaning of the soul and his eternal relationship with the Supreme Personality of Godhead can only be revealed by the scriptures. But we can be conscious of our own consciousness, the objects of consciousness and the relationships between and among them. So in the ontology of consciousness, the living entities are the superclass or senior order, and the symptoms of the living entity, which are all subjective, are the subclasses composing the living entities’ field of experience.

This ontological analysis of consciousness also explains why *bhakti* is the only path that actually leads to self-realization, because it is completely non-dual. The practices of all other forms of *yoga* change upon attainment of liberation. The *hatha-yogi* develops mystic powers; the *karma-yogi* becomes a renunciant; the *jñāna-yogi* becomes an *avādhuta*. But the *bhakta* just keeps on doing *bhakti-yoga* eternally, in this world and the next, in heaven or hell, in *saṁsāra* or in Vaikuṇṭha. In other words, the practices of devotional service are performed in the context of an exalted transcendental ontological conception. Because this conception is transcendental, it is eternal and changeless. The practices of *bhakti*, such as chanting the Holy Name of the Lord, are both the *sādhanā* [practice] and the *sādhya* [object of realization], and thus are complete, eternal and transcendental. One has to experience this to fully appreciate it.

When the mind is unified and one-pointed, such *samādhi* opens the door to connection with God. If our ontological platform is going to change, then we have not yet attained the Absolute Truth: only that which is true at all levels of form regardless of time, person, place, condition or state is the real Absolute Truth. Realization of this truth is the real goal of *Vedānta* and all the Vedic literature, and this is possible only through the non-dual methods of *bhakti-yoga*.

In the *Brhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* [3.7.22] it is said:

\[yo vietāni tiṣṭhaṇ\]

“The individual spirit soul is situated in knowledge.”

In another passage it is said:

\[sukham aham asvapsaṁ na kiñcid avediśi\]

“I slept happily. I did not know anything.”

*Sāṁśaya* [doubt]: Is the individual spirit soul unalloyed knowledge only, or is the soul the knower that experiences knowledge?

*Pūrvapakṣa* [the opponent speaks]: The individual spirit soul consists of knowledge only. This is confirmed by the statement of *Brhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* [3.7.22]: “The individual spirit soul is situated in knowledge.” The soul is not the knower or the perceiver of knowledge. The intelligence is the knower. Therefore the statement “I slept happily; I did not know anything,” is spoken by the intelligence, not by the soul.

*Siddhānta* [conclusion]: The author of the *sūtras* gives the following conclusion.
Sūtra 2.3.17

jño ‘ta eva
jñāḥ – knower; atah eva – therefore.

Therefore he is the knower.

The individual spirit soul is both knowledge and knower. In the Praśna Upaniṣad [4.9] it is said:

esa hi draśṭā spraṣṭā śrotā rasayitā ghrātā mantā boddhā kartā vijñānātmā puruṣah

“The individual spirit soul is the seer, the toucher, the hearer, the taster, the smeller, the thinker, the determiner, the doer, and the knower.”

This truth is accepted because it is declared by scripture, not because it is understood by logic. Our acceptance of the truth of scripture is described in Sūtra 2.1.27:

śrutes tu śabda-mūlatvāt

“The statements of Śruti-śāstra are the root of real knowledge.”

In the Smṛti-śāstra it is said:

jñātā jñāna-svarūpo ‘yam

“The individual spirit soul is both knower and knowledge.”

Therefore the individual spirit soul is not knowledge alone without being anything else, and this is not at all proved by the statement, “I slept happily. I did not know anything,” for such an idea would contradict these scripture statements that affirm the soul to be the knower. Therefore it is concluded that the individual spirit soul is both knowledge and knower. Of course, such a conclusion is beyond the limitations of Aristotelian logic; but Aristotelian logic is based on the properties of material objects, and the soul is a transcendental object, so he is not subject to the same limitations.

Adhikaraṇa 12: The Individual Spirit Souls are Atomic

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: Now the author of the sūtras considers the size of the individual spirit souls.

keśāgra-sāta-bhāgasya satāṁśa-sadrśātmakaḥ
jīvāḥ sūkṣma-svarūpo ‘yaṁ saṁkhyaṁ ti hi cit-kaṇaḥ

“If we divide the tip of a hair into a hundred parts and then take one of these parts and divide it again into a hundred parts, that very fine division is the size of but one of the numberless living entities. They are all cit-kaṇa, particles of spirit, not matter.”

This is quoted from the commentary on the portion of Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam wherein the Vedas personified offer their obeisances unto the Supreme Personality of Godhead. The jīva or living entity is an atomic particle of spirit, in exactly the same way as a photon is an atomic particle of light. In the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad [3.1.9] it is said:

eso ’nur ātmā cetāsā veditavyo yasmin prāṇah pañcadhā samvīseṣa

“When the life-breath withdraws from the five activities, the mind can understand the atomic soul.”
As long as our life energy is engaged with the senses, even though we may know intellectually that we are a spirit soul, the tendency to identify with the material body persists. When the life energy is withdrawn from the senses and sense objects and remains focused on the soul or consciousness itself, then the actual nature of the soul is revealed.

_Saṁśaya_ [doubt]: Is the individual spirit soul atomic or all-pervading?

_Pūrvapakṣa_ [the opponent speaks]: The individual spirit soul is all-pervading. _Brhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad_ [4.4.14] declares that the soul is _mahān_ [great]. The statement that the soul is atomic is merely a poetic metaphor.

_Siddhānta_ [conclusion]: The author of the _sūtras_ gives the conclusion in the following words.

**Sūtra 2.3.18**

\[\text{utra}_\text{rānti-gaty-āgaṭīnām}\]
\[\text{utra}_\text{rānti} – departure; gati – travel; āgaṭīnām – and of return\]

_Because of departure, travel and return._

In this _sūtra_ the word _aṇuḥ_ [the atomic soul] should be understood from the previous _sūtra_. In this _sūtra_ the genitive case is used in the sense of the ablative. The individual spirit soul is atomic and not all-pervading. Why is that? The _sūtra_ explains: “Because of departure, travel and return.”

In the _Brhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad_ [4.4.2] it is said:

\[\text{tasya hai} \text{tasya hrdayasyāgraṁ pradyotate. Tena pradyotenaiś ātmā niśkrāmati cakṣuśo vā mūrdhno vānyambhiḥ vā šarīra-deśebhyāḥ}\]

“The soul shines in the heart. At the moment of death the effulgent soul leaves through the opening of the eyes, the opening at the top of the the head, or another opening in the body.”

In the _Brhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad_ [4.4.11] it is said:

\[\text{anandā nāma te lokā}\]
\[\text{andhena tamasāvṛtāḥ}\]
\[\text{tāṁs te pretyābhigacchanti}\]
\[\text{avidvāṁso ‘budhā janāḥ}\]

“Sinful fools enter into planets known as the worlds of torment, full of darkness and ignorance.”

In the _Brhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad_ [4.4.6] it is said:

\[\text{prāpyāntam karmanas tasya}\]
\[\text{yat kiścedam karoty ayam}\]
\[\text{tasmāt lokāt punar etya}\]
\[\text{yasmai lokāya karmeṇe}\]

“At the time of death the soul reaps the results of his works. He goes to the world where he deserves to go. When the results of his past deeds are exhausted, again he returns to the middle planets, the world of _karma_.”
In this way the Brhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad describes the soul’s travel from one place to another. If he were all-pervading, the soul would not be able to travel from one place to another, for he would already be everywhere.

In Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam [10.87.30] it is said:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{aparimitā dhruvās tanu-bhṛto yadi sarva-gatās} \\
\text{tarhi na śāsyateti niyamo dhruva netarthā}
\end{align*}
\]

“O Lord, although the living entities who have accepted material bodies are spiritual and unlimited in number, if they were all-pervading there would be no question of their being under Your control.”

However, the Supreme Personality of Godhead, although all-pervading, can travel from place to place. This is possible because He possesses inconceivable powers.

Here someone may object: “The individual spirit soul can be all-pervading and unmoving, and still, because he mistakenly identifies with the external material body, he imagines that he goes and comes. He is like the ruler of a village who never really leaves his realm.”

To this the reply is given: Because it is said that he both departs and returns it is not possible that the soul is actually stationary and unmoving. The author of the sūtras confirms this in the following words.

**Sūtra 2.3.19**

\[
\text{svātmanaś cottarayoḥ}
\]

$sva$ – own; $ātmanaḥ$ – of the soul; $ca$ – and; $uttarayoḥ$ - of the latter two.

Also because the last two refer to the soul.

The word $ca$ [also] is used here for emphasis. Here the word $uttarayoḥ$ [the last two] means “of the coming and going.” The coming and going here definitely occur to the individual spirit soul. This is so because the coming and going in the pervious sūtra clearly refer to an agent, to the performer of the action. The coming and going here are understood to be coming and going from a material body. This is clearly seen in the first passage of Brhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad [4.4.2] quoted in the previous purport. It is also seen in the following words of Bhagavad-gītā [15.8]:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{śarīram yad avāpnoti} \\
\text{yac cāpy utkṛmatiśvaraḥ} \\
\text{grhītvatani samyāti} \\
\text{vāyur gandhān ivāśayāt}
\end{align*}
\]

“The living entity in the material world carries his different conceptions of life from one body to another as the air carries aromas. Thus he takes one kind of body and again quits it to take another.”

If someone says that the soul actually never goes anywhere, although it seems to go places because of the misidentification of the external material body as the self, then I say this is a foolish idea. In the following words the Kauśitakī Upaniṣad refutes this idea:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{sa yadāṃśāt śarīrāt samutkṛmati sahaivaitaiḥ sarvair utkṛmati}
\end{align*}
\]

“At the time of death the soul, accompanied by all his powers, leaves the material body.”
The word *saha* [accompanied by] is used when the more important is accompanied by another of lesser importance. An example is the sentence: “The father took his meal, accompanied by [saha] his son.” In this way the foolish example pushed forward by the impersonalists, the example of the air in the jar and in the sky, is clearly refuted.

**Sūtra 2.3.20**

\[nāṇur atac chruter iti cēn netarādhikārāt\]

na – not; aṅuh – atom; atat – not that; śruteḥ - from the scriptures; iti – thus; cet – is; na – not; itara – other; adhikārāt – because of being appropriate.

If it is claimed that the Śruti-śāstra denies the idea that the soul is atomic, then I reply that it is not so, because those descriptions apply to someone else.

Here someone may object: “Is it not so that that the individual spirit soul is not atomic? After all, the Brhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad [4.4.22] affirms:

\[sa vā eṣa mahā-jana ātmā\]

“The soul is very great.”

After all, to be great in size is the very opposite of being atomic.”

If someone claims this, then the sūtra replies: “No. It is not so.” Why not? The sūtra explains, itara: “Because these descriptions apply to someone else.” These words are descriptions of the Supreme Personality of Godhead, the all-pervading Supersoul. In the Brhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad [4.3.7] it is said:

\[yo ‘yam vijñānamayaḥ prāneṣu\]

“He is full of knowledge. He stays among the life-airs.”

Although this passage begins by describing the individual spirit soul, it proceeds with a description of the Supreme Personality of Godhead, as is seen in a following passage [Brhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad 4.3.13]:

\[yasyānuvittah pratibuddha ātmā\]

“He is the Self who knows everything.”

These words clearly describe the Supreme Personality of Godhead and not the individual spirit soul.

**Sūtra 2.3.21**

\[sva-śabdonmāṇabhyāṁ ca\]

sva – own; śabda – word; unmāṇabhyām – with measure; ca – and.

**Because of its word and measurement.**

The word *sva-śabda* [the word describing it] here means that the word ‘atomic’ is used to describe the individual spirit soul. An example of this is in Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad [2.1.9]:

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eṣo 'ṇur ātmā
“The soul is atomic in size.”

The word unmāṇa here means “Its measurement is atomic in size.” The precise measurement of the individual spirit soul is given in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad [4.9]:

bāḷāgra-ṣata-bhāgasya
śatadhā kalpitasya ca
bhāgo jīvāḥ sa vijnēyāḥ
sa cāntantyāya kalpate

“When the upper point of a hair is divided into one hundred parts and again each of these parts is further divided into one hundred parts, each such part is the measurement of the dimension of the spirit soul.”

In these two ways the atomic size of the soul is proved. The word ānantya here means “liberation.” Anta means “death,” and an means “without.” Therefore the word ānantya means “the condition of being free from death”.

Here someone may object: “Is it not so that if it is atomic in size and situated in a specific place in the material body, the soul could not perceive sensations in all other parts of the body, where the soul is not actually present?”

If this is said, then the author of the sūtras replies in the following words.

Sūtra 2.3.22

āvirodhaḥ candana-vat
āvirodhaḥ – not contradicting; candana – sandal; vat – like

It does not contradict; it is like sandal paste.

As a drop of sandal paste placed on one part of the body brings a pleasant sensation to the body as a whole, so the soul, although situated in one place, perceives what happens in the entire body. Therefore, there is no contradiction. In the Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa it is said:

aṇu-mātro 'py ayaṁ jīvāḥ
sva-dehaṁ vyāpya tiṣṭhāti
yathā vyāpya śarīrāṇi
haricandana-vipruṣāḥ

“As the sensation created by a drop of sandal paste pervades the entire body, so the individual spirit soul, although atomic in size, is conscious of what happens in the entire body.”

Sūtra 2.3.23

avasthitā-vaiśeṣyād iti cēn nābhupagamād dhṛdi hi
avasthitā – abode; vaiśeṣyāt – because of being specific; iti – thus; cet – if; na – not;
abhupagamāt – because of acceptance; dhṛdi – in the heart; hi – certainly.

If it is denied because it has no specific abode, then I say no, because it resides in the heart.
Here someone may object: “Is it not so that the drop of sandal paste has a single, clearly visible, place where it resides on the body but the soul has no such single residence in the body? There is no reason to make guesses about the location of the soul in the body. The soul is clearly present everywhere in the body, just as the element ether is present everywhere. Therefore the sandal-paste example is clumsy and wrong.”

If this objection is raised, then the author of the sūtras replies: “No. It is not so.” Why not? The sūtra explains, “Because it resides in the heart.” This means that the soul really does reside in a single place in the material body. The soul resides in the heart. This is confirmed in the following words of Praśna Upaniṣad [3.6]:

\[ hr̥di hy eṣa ātmā \]

“The soul resides in the heart.”

In the final conclusion the spirit soul, although atomic in size is, in one sense, all-pervading throughout the entire material body. This is explained in the following sūtra.

**Sūtra 2.3.24**

\[ guṇād vālokaṁvat \]
\[ guṇāt – by quality; vā – or; āloka – light; vat – like. \]

**By quality or like light.**

Although the soul is atomic in size, it pervades the body by the quality of consciousness. Like light it pervades the entire body. As the sun, although situated in one place, fills the universe with light, so the soul fills the body with consciousness. The Supreme Personality of Godhead Himself declares this in Bhagavad-gītā [13.34]:

\[ yathā prakāśayat ekaḥ \]
\[ kṛtsnaṁ lokam imaṁ raviḥ \]
\[ kṣetraṁ kṣetři tathā kṛtsnam \]
\[ prakāśayati bhārata \]

“O son of Bharata, as the sun alone illuminates all this universe, so does the living entity, one within the body, illuminate the entire body by consciousness.”

When the sun emanates sunlight it does not lose any atoms from its mass, nor does it become diminished in any way. Rubies and other jewels also emanate light without losing atoms from their mass or becoming diminished in any way. It is not possible to say that when light is emanated from them these things become diminished in size. The light they emanate is their quality, not their mass.

The quality can function in a plane apart from the substance that possesses it. The author of the sūtras explains this in the following example.

**Sūtra 2.3.25**

\[ vyatireko gandhavat tathā hi darśayati \]
vyatirekaḥ – difference; gandha – fragrance; vat – like; tathā – so; hi – indeed; darśayati – shows.

As a fragrance is in a different place, so it [the soul] is also in a different place. This the scripture shows.

As the fragrance of flowers or other objects may travel to a place far from its source, so the consciousness that emanates from the soul may travel from the heart and enter the head, feet, or other parts of the body. The Kauśitaki Upaniṣad [3.6] explains:

prajñāyā śarīraṁ samāruhya

“The soul is all-pervading in the material body by consciousness.”

Even though the fragrance may travel very far it is never actually separated from its source, just as the light of a jewel is also not separated from its source. In the Smṛti-śāstra it is said:

upalabhyān ced gandhaṁ
ced brūyur anaipuṇāḥ
prthivyāṁ eva tam vidyād
apo vāyuṁ ca sanāṁritam

“They who do not understand may sometimes say that fragrance is present in water. Earth is the natural home of fragrance, although it may sometimes take shelter of water or air.”

In the Praśna Upaniṣad [4.9] it is said:

eṣa hi drṣṭā

“The soul is the person who sees.”

Someone may doubt: “Is the consciousness that the soul possesses eternal or not? The soul is by nature unconscious. It is like a stone. Consciousness only arises when the soul comes in contact with the mind. This is seen in the scriptures’ statement: ‘I slept happily; I was not conscious of anything.’ This statement shows that consciousness is not an inherent quality of the soul but rather is attained by contact with something else. It is like iron and fire. When placed in fire, an iron rod gradually assumes the qualities of fire. If it were an inherent quality of the soul, then consciousness would not be lost in deep sleep.”

The author of the sūtras gives the conclusion in the following words:

Sūtra 2.3.26

prthag-upadeśāt

prthak – separate; upadeśāt – because of the teaching.

Because there is a specific teaching.

The soul is eternally conscious. How is that known? The sūtra explains. “Because there is a specific teaching.” Some examples of that teaching follow.

In the Praśna Upaniṣad [4.9] it is said:
ēṣa hi draśṭā
“The soul sees eternally.”

In the Brhad-āraṇyaka Upanīṣad [4.5.14] it is said:

aviniśi vā are ayam ātmānucitti-dharmā
“The soul’s consciousness is never destroyed.”

The soul does not become conscious merely by contact with the mind, for soul and mind are both indivisible and cannot interact. Turning away from the Supreme Personality of Godhead, the soul obscures its natural spiritual knowledge. Turning towards the Supreme Personality of Godhead, the soul revives its natural spiritual consciousness. This is described in the Smṛti-śāstra:

yathā na kriyate jyotsnā
mala-prakṣāḍanān maṇeḥ
dosa-prahānān na jñānam
ātmanah kriyate tathā
“As by washing away the dirt that covered a jewel, the jewel’s splendor is not created but merely uncovered, so by removing the dirt of materialism that covered the soul, the soul’s splendor is not created, but merely uncovered.

yathodapāna-khananāt
kriyate na jalāntaram
sad eva nīyate vyāktyān
asataḥ sambhavah kutaḥ
“As by digging a well, water is brought forth but not created, so by spiritual activities the nature of the soul is brought forth but not created. How would it be possible to create the the soul’s qualities from nothing?

tathā heya-guṇa-dhvaṁsād
avarodhdādayo guṇāḥ
prakāśyante na jānyante
nitya evātmāno hi te
“When material faults are destroyed, the soul’s qualities become revealed. The soul’s qualities are eternal. They are never created.”

Here someone may object: “These quotes from scripture merely show that the soul is synonymous with consciousness. They do not prove that the soul itself is conscious.”

To this objection the author of the sūtras replies in the following words.

Sūtra 2.3.27

tad-guṇa-sāratvāt tad vyapadeśah prājña-vat

tat – of that; guṇa – quality; sāratvāt – because of being the essence; tat – that; vyapadeśah – designation; prajña – intelligent; vat – like.

It is called that because that is its essential nature, just as He who is intelligent.
Because the soul is consciousness itself, therefore it is conscious. Why is that? The sūtra explains: “It is called that because that is its essential nature.”

In this sūtra the word guṇa [quality] refers to the soul’s quality of consciousness. The word sāra means “the essential nature of the thing, the absence of which makes the thing non-existent.” The word prājña-vat means “Like Lord Viṣṇu, who is known as prājña [all-knowing] because He is all knowledge.

Because He is all knowledge personified, Lord Viṣṇu is said to know everything. In the same way, because the soul is consciousness personified, therefore the soul is conscious. That the statement “The soul is consciousness personified,” means the same thing as “The soul is conscious,” is also confirmed in the next sūtra.

Sūtra 2.3.28

yāvad ātma-bhāvitvāc ca na doṣas tad-darśanāt

yāvat – as long as; ātma – of the soul; bhāvitvāt – because of existence; ca – and; na – not; doṣah – fault; tat – of that; darśanāt – because of the sight.

It exists as long as the soul exists. There is no fault in this, because it is clearly seen.

There is no fault in saying that the two sentences “The soul is consciousness,” and “The soul is conscious,” mean the same thing. That is the meaning here. Why is that? The sūtra explains: “It exists as long as the soul exists. There is no fault in this, because it is clearly seen.” The soul’s consciousness exists for as long as the soul exists.

As long as the soul exists, the soul’s consciousness will not be destroyed. The soul exists eternally, without a beginning or end in time, and the soul’s consciousness also exists eternally. The sun may be given here as an example. The sun is both light and the bringer of light. As long as the sun exists it will have these two features, which are actually not different. In the same way the soul is both consciousness and conscious.

Here someone may object: “Is it not true that consciousness is born from the modes of material nature? Is it not true that, because it does not exist in the state of dreamless sleep, consciousness is not eternal? Is it not true that even when the living entity is fully awake his consciousness is in fact created by a barrage of various sense-objects?”

If these objections are raised, the author of the sūtras replies in the following words.

Sūtra 2.3.29

puṃstvādi-vat tv asya sato ‘bhivyakti-yogāt

puṃstva – virility; ādi – beginning with; vat – like; tu – but; asya – of him; sataḥ – of the existing; abhivyakti-yogāt – because of manifestation.

But like virility and other things it exists and then is manifest.

The word tu [but] is used here to dispel doubt. The word na [it is not like that] is understood in this sūtra. It is not true than consciousness is non-existent in dreamless sleep and only exists in the waking
state. Why is that? The sūtra explains: “But like virility and other things it exists and then is manifest.” In the state of dreamless sleep the soul’s consciousness exists in a dormant state, and in the state of wakefulness that dormant consciousness becomes fully manifested. Here the sūtra gives the example of virility. In childhood virility and other qualities associated with it exist in a dormant state. Then, at the beginning of adulthood, they become manifested. In the same way consciousness is dormant in dreamless sleep and fully manifested in the waking state. This is described in the following words of Brhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad [4.3.30]:

\[
yad vai tan na vijñāti viṣṇu nan vaitad viṇñeyam na vijñāti na hi vijñātur vijñāṇāt viparītōpo vidyate avināśītvān na tu tād dvitiyam asti tato ‘nyad vibhaktam yad vijñāṇīyāt
\]

“In the state of dreamless sleep the soul is both conscious and unconscious. The soul is always conscious, and consciousness can never be separated from it, because the soul and its consciousness can never be destroyed. Still, in the state of dreamless sleep no object is presented before the soul for it to be conscious of.”

When there is no object for consciousness to perceive, then consciousness is dormant. Therefore in dreamless sleep consciousness is dormant. When the senses contact the sense objects, then consciousness becomes manifested. Had it not existed in a dormant state during dreamless sleep, consciousness could not have manifested itself in the waking state, just as a person born a eunuch cannot manifest virility at the beginning of adulthood. In this way it is proved that the individual spirit soul is atomic, is consciousness, and is conscious eternally.

Now the author of the sūtras refutes the theory of the Saṅkhya philosophers. “Is the individual spirit soul consciousness and nothing else? Is the individual spirit soul all-pervading? The individual spirit soul is all-pervading. This is so because the results of its actions are seen everywhere. Had it been atomic, the soul would be unable to perceive the pains and pleasures present in different parts of the body. Had it been of a medium size, the soul would not be eternal. Therefore the individual spirit soul must be all-pervading.”

In the following words the author of the sūtras gives the proper conclusion.

**Sūtra 2.3.30**

\[
nityopalabhdy-anupalabdhi-prasaṅgo ‘nyatara-niyamo vānyathā
\]

nitya – eternal; upalabdhi – perception; anupalabdhi – non-perception; prasaṅga – result; anyatara – otherwise; niyamaḥ – restriction; vā – or; anyathā – otherwise.

**Otherwise there would be eternal consciousness, eternal unconsciousness, or the limited existence of one or the other.**

If the soul were only consciousness and nothing else, and if it were all-pervading, then the soul would be either always conscious or always unconscious. Either that, or there would be a limited existence of one or the other. This is the meaning: It is clear to the entire world that consciousness and unconsciousness both exist. If the cause of this were a soul that is consciousness only and also all-pervading, then consciousness and unconsciousness would both be perceived simultaneously at every moment by the entire world. If this all-pervading soul were the cause of consciousness only and not unconsciousness, then no one would ever be unconscious, and if this all-pervading soul were the cause of unconsciousness only and not consciousness, then no one would ever be conscious.
It cannot be said that consciousness is created by contact with the senses and unconsciousness is created when there is no contact with the senses, because if the soul is all-pervading then it would be always in contact with the senses. Furthermore, if the individual spirit soul were all-pervading then everyone would simultaneously experience the pains and pleasures of everyone else. If this were so, there would be no meaning to individual experience, individual desire or individual destiny. This effectively refutes the theory that the individual spirit soul is all-pervading.

However, our theory, which affirms that the spirit soul is atomic in size and different in each material body, is not refuted by these considerations. Although atomic in size, the individual spirit soul can act in any place, although it cannot act in every place simultaneously. By its quality of consciousness the individual spirit soul can pervade its material body and perceive the happiness and other sensations present in the various parts of the material body.

Adhikaraṇa 13: The Individual Spirit Soul Performs Actions

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: Now the author of the sūtras will consider another point. Modern science and other atheistic philosophies consider that material nature is the cause of all actions. They say that the combination and reactions of aggregates of atoms under the laws of material nature are the cause of everything. But we have already proven that matter cannot act without the initiative and superintendence of spirit. Thus the actual causes of all actions are the Supreme Personality of Godhead and the individual spirit soul.

In the Taittirīya Upaniṣad [2.5.1] it is said:

\[
\text{vijñānaṁ yajñam tanute, karmāṇi tanute `pi ca.}
\]

“Consciousness performs yajñas; consciousness performs actions.”

Saṁśaya [doubt]: Does the individual soul, indicated in this passage by the word “consciousness,” perform actions or not?

Pūrvapakṣa [the opponent speaks]: In the Kaṭha Upaniṣad [2.18] it is said:

\[
\text{hantā cen manyate hantuḥ}
\text{hataś cen manyate hatam}
\text{ubhau tau na vijānītau}
\text{nāyaṁ hanti na hanyate}
\]

“Neither he who thinks the living entity the slayer nor he who thinks it slain is in knowledge, for the self slays not nor is slain.”

These words clearly declare that the individual spirit soul never performs actions. In the Bhagavad-gītā [3.27] it is said:

\[
\text{prakṛteḥ kriyamānāni}
\text{gunaḥ karmāṇi sarvaśaḥ}
\text{ahaṅkāra-vimūḍhātmā}
\text{kartāham iti manyate}
\]

“The spirit soul bewildered by the influence of false ego thinks himself the doer of activities that are in actuality carried out by the three modes of material nature.”

In the Bhagavad-gītā [13.21] it is also said:
kārya-kāraṇa-karṇāt
hatuḥ prakṛtir ucyate
puruṣaḥ sukhā-duḥkhānām
bhokṣṭītehetur ucyate

“Nature is said to be the cause of all material causes and effects, whereas the living entity is the cause of the various sufferings and enjoyments in this world.”

Therefore the individual spirit soul does not perform actions. When a person understands the truth he understands that all actions are actually performed by the material energy, and the individual spirit soul is merely the person who experiences the fruits of action.

Siddhānta [conclusion]: In the following words the author of the sūtras gives the proper conclusion.

Sūtra 2.3.31

kartā śastra-rthavat-tvāt

kartā – the doer; śastra – of the scriptures; ārtha – meaning; vat – possessing; tvāt – because of having the nature.

He performs actions. This is so because the scriptures are meaningful.

It is the individual spirit soul who performs actions, not the modes of material nature. Why is that? The sūtra explains: “Because the scriptures are meaningful.” In the scriptures it is said:

svarga-kāmo yajeta

“A person who desires Svargaloka should perform yajnas.”

and

ātmānam eva lokam upāsīta

“One should worship the Supreme Personality of Godhead.”

These statements have meaning only if the individual spirit soul does actually perform actions. If all actions are performed by the modes of nature and the individual spirit soul never does anything, these statements of the scriptures are meaningless.

These statements of scripture are intended to motivate the individual spirit soul to act in a certain way so he can enjoy the results of his actions. It is not even possible in this way to try to motivate the inert material modes to act in any way at all.

That the individual spirit soul does actually perform actions is also confirmed in the next sūtra.

Sūtra 2.3.32

vihāropadeśāt

vihāra – of pastimes; upadeśāt – because of the teaching.

Because of the teaching about pastimes.
The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* [8.12.3] describes the activities of the liberated souls:

\[sa tatra paryeti jakṣan krīḍan ramamāṇaḥ\]

“In the spiritual world the individual spirit soul eats, plays, and enjoys.”

Therefore action by itself does not brings pain and unhappiness to the soul, rather it is the bondage of the three modes of nature that brings unhappiness. This is so because the three modes of nature obscure the reality of the soul’s spiritual nature.

**Sūtra 2.3.33**

upādānāt

upādānāt – because of taking.

**Because of taking.**

In the *Brhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* [2.1.18] it is said:

\[sa yathā mahā-rājah . . . evam evaiṣa etān prānān grhītvā sve  śrore yathā-kāmaṁ parivartate\]

“In the dreaming state the individual spirit soul acts like a king. The soul grasps the life-airs and does as he wishes.”

In the *Bhagavad-gītā* [15.8] it is also said:

grhītvaitāni samyāti

vāyur gandhān ivāśayāt

“The living entity in the material world carries his different conceptions of life from one body to another as the air carries aromas. Thus he takes one kind of body and again quits it to take another.”

In these passages it is seen that the individual spirit soul does perform actions, for the soul moves the life-airs as a magnet moves iron. The life-airs may move many things, but it is the individual spirit soul who moves the life-airs. Nothing else moves them.

In the following words the author of the *sūtras* now gives another reason.

**Sūtra 2.3.34**

vyapadeśāc ca kriyāyām na cēn nirdeśa-viparyayaḥ

vyapadeśāt – because of designation; ca – and; kriyāyām – in action; na – not; cet – if; nirdeśa – grammatical construction; viparyayaḥ – different.

**Also because of the name in the action. If this were not so the grammatical structure would be different.**

In the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* [2.5.1] it is said:

vijñānam yajñām tanute. karmāṇi tanute ‘pi ca.
“Consciousness performs yajñas; consciousness performs actions.”

These words clearly show that the individual spirit soul is the primary performer of Vedic and ordinary actions. If the word vijñānam is interpreted to mean not the individual spirit soul, but the intelligence, then the grammatical structure of the sentence would be different. Then the word vijñāna would be in the instrumental case, for the intelligence would be the instrument by which the action is performed. However, the word is not in the instrumental case. If the intelligence were the performer of the action here, then another word must be given in the instrumental case to show with what instrument the intelligence performs the action, for there must be an instrument in every action. However, if the individual spirit soul is the performer of the action there is not need for another word in the instrumental case to show the instrument used, for in that situation the individual spirit soul is both the performer of the action and the instrument employed.

Here someone may object: “Is it not so that the individual spirit soul, being independent and able to act as he likes, will naturally act for his own welfare and will not perform actions that bring him harm?”

To this I reply: No. It is not like that. The individual spirit soul desires to benefit himself, but because his past karma acts against him, he sometimes creates his own misfortune.

For these reasons it is clear that the individual spirit soul certainly performs actions. When the scriptures sometimes say that the individual spirit soul does not perform actions, the meaning is that the soul is not independent and free to do exactly everything he wishes.

Here someone may object: “It is not possible that the individual spirit soul is the performer of actions, for it is clearly seen that these actions often bring him suffering.”

To this I reply: No. It is not so. If the individual spirit soul is not the performer of actions, then the scriptural descriptions of the agnihotra, darśa, paurṇamāsa, and other yajñas would not make any sense.

In the following words the author of the sūtras refutes the idea that material nature is the real performer of actions.

Sūtra 2.3.35

_uplabdhi-vad aniyamaḥ_

_uplabdhi – consciousness; vat – like; aniyamaḥ – uncertainty._

_As in the situation of consciousness, it would be indefinite._

In previous sūtras it was shown that if the individual spirit soul were all-pervading, then consciousness would be vague and indefinite. In the same way if all-pervading material nature were the sole performer of all actions, then all actions would bring the same result to all spirit souls simultaneously. Clearly this is not so. Also, it could not be said that the individual spirit soul would need to be near the place where a certain action was performed in order to experience the result of that action. The Sāṅkhya philosophers cannot say this, for in their theory each individual spirit soul is all-pervading and is thus already near the places where all actions are performed.

Sūtra 2.3.36

_śakti-viparyayāt_
śakti – of power; viparyayāt – because of difference.

Because the power is changed.

If the material nature is the performer of actions, then material nature must also experience the good and bad results of those actions. However, the Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad [1.8] affirms:

bhokṛt-bhāvāt

“The individual spirit soul enjoys the good and bad results of actions.”

In this way the idea that the material nature is the performer of actions is refuted. Because the individual spirit soul enjoys the good and bad results of actions, the individual spirit soul must also be the performer of those actions.

Sūtra 2.3.37

samādhy-abhāvāc ca

samādhi – of liberation; abhāvāt – because of the nonexistence; ca – also.

Also because there is no liberation.

Actions are meant to bring one to liberation from the material world. Because it is not possible for the material nature to act in such a way and attain such a goal, the idea that the material nature is the performer of actions cannot be entertained. Liberation means understanding the truth “I am different from matter.” It is not possible for the material nature to come to this understanding because it is unconscious, and also because it really is matter. In this way it is proved that the individual spirit soul is the performer of actions.

Adhikaraṇa 14: Activity is the Soul’s Nature

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: The soul is always active, as shown by the following śloka:

na hi kaścit kṣaṇam api
jātu tiṣṭhaty akarma-kṛt
kāryate hy avaśaḥ karma
sarvah prakṛti-jair guṇaiḥ

“All men are forced to act helplessly according to the impulses born of the modes of material nature; therefore no one can refrain from doing something, not even for a moment.”

[Bhagavad-gītā 3.5]

Samśaya [doubt]: Are the spirit souls always engaged in action? Is there no time when they become free from activity?

Pūrvapakṣa [the opponent speaks]: The soul may become free from activity during deep sleep, or at the time of liberation. Or maybe all these activities are performed by material nature, and the soul actually does nothing at all.
Siddhānta [conclusion]: In the following words the author of the sūtras gives an example to show that the individual spirit soul performs actions, using either its own potency or some other instrument to perform them.

Sūtra 2.3.38

yathā ca takṣobhayathā
yathā – as; ca – and; takṣa – carpenter; ubhayathā – in both ways.

In both ways like a carpenter.

As a carpenter performs actions, employing both his own power and a host of tools, so does the individual spirit soul, employing both his own power and the various life airs. Thus the soul employs the material body, and other instruments also, to perform actions. It is the pure spirit soul who thus uses the modes of material nature to perform actions. That is why the scriptures sometimes say that the modes of material nature are the performer of actions.

That the individual spirit soul is indeed the performer of actions is confirmed in Bhagavad-gītā [13.22], where it is said:

kāraṇaṁ guna-saṅgo ‘syā
sad-asad-yoni-janmasu

“The living entity in material nature thus follows the ways of life, enjoying the three modes of nature. Thus he meets with good and evil among the various species.”

These words explain the scripture passages that declare the modes of nature to be the performers of action. It is foolish for a person to think himself the sole performer of action and ignore the five factors of action. Of course it is not that the individual spirit soul never performs any action. The idea that the soul never does anything is clearly refuted by the many scriptural statements urging the soul to act such a way that he may attain liberation. When in the Bhagavad-gītā [2.19] the Lord says:

nāyam-hanti na hanyate

“The self slays not nor is slain.”

that does not mean that the individual spirit soul never performs any action, but rather that the eternal spirit soul can never be cut or slain. The meaning of the statement that the soul never acts has thus already been explained.

The devotees perform various actions of devotional service to the Lord, in both this life and the next. Because these actions are free from the touch of the modes of nature, because they are under the jurisdiction of the Lord’s spiritual potency and because they lead to liberation, these actions are said not to be action, for they are not material actions. This is explained by the Supreme Lord Himself in these words:

sāttvikah kārako ‘saṅgī
rāgāndho rājasah smṛtaḥ
tāmasah smṛti-vibhraṣto
nirguṇo mad-apāśrayaḥ
“One who acts without attachment is in the mode of goodness. One who is blinded with desire is in the mode of passion. One whose intelligence is broken is in the mode of ignorance. One who takes shelter of Me is free from the grip of the modes of nature.” [Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 11.25.26]

That the pure spirit soul experiences the results of his actions is described in Bhagavad-gītā [13.21]:

puruṣah sukha-duḥkhānāṁ
bhoktrtvē hetur ucyate

“The living entity is the cause of the various sufferings and enjoyments in this world.”

The soul experiences the results of his actions, because he is by nature conscious; the modes of nature do not experience them. This refutes the idea that the modes are active and the soul is not. In this way it is proved that it is the conscious soul who experiences happiness and other sensations. In this way the individual spirit soul brings knowledge to himself and others. Both kinds of action, direct and through the use of tools, exist for the soul. In the Praṣna Upaniṣad [4.9] it is said:

esa hi draṣṭā spraṣṭā śrotā

“It is the soul who sees, touches, and hears.”

Thus, by this example of the carpenter, the idea that the individual spirit soul is the only factor in action, and there are no others, is clearly refuted.

**Adhikaraṇa 15: The Individual Spirit Soul is Dependent on the Supreme Personality of Godhead**

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: Now another doubt is considered. In Bhagavad-gītā [18.14] Lord Kṛṣṇa tells Arjuna,

adhiṣṭhānam tathā kartā
karaṇaṁ ca prthag-vidham
vividhāś ca prthak ceṣṭā
daivaṁ caivaṁ pāñcamam

“The place of action [the body], the performer, the various senses, the many different kinds of endeavor, and ultimately the Supersoul—these are the five factors of action.”

Although the individual soul certainly performs actions and experiences their results, he is ultimately dependent on the Supersoul for his ability to act. He cannot act independently.

Saṁśaya [doubt]: Is the individual spirit soul independent in his actions, or does he depend on another?

Pūrvapakṣa [the opponent speaks]: The scriptures say:

svarga-kāmo yajeta

“One who desires Svargaloka should perform yajñas.”

and

tasmād brāhmaṇāh surāṁ na pibet pāpmanotsaṁstṛja

“A brāhmaṇa should not drink liquor and should not commit sins.”
That the scriptures give orders and prohibitions for the soul to follow is proof that the soul is independent, for independence means to have the power to do one thing and to refrain from doing another.

Siddhānta [conclusion]: In the following words the author of the sūtras gives his conclusion.

Sūtra 2.3.39

\[\text{parāt tu tac-chruteh}\]

\[\text{parāt – from the Supreme; tu – but; tat – of that; āruteh – from the scriptures.}\]

But from the Supreme, because of the scriptures.

The word \textit{tu} [but] is used to remove doubt. The Supreme Personality of Godhead inspires the individual spirit soul to act. How is that known? The sūtra explains, \textit{tac-chruteh}: “It is known from the scriptures.” The scriptures give the following explanations:

\[\text{antah praviṣṭah śāstā janānām}\]

“Entering their hearts, the Supreme Personality of Godhead controls all living entities.”

\[\text{ya ātmani tiṣṭhann ātmānam antaro yamayati}\]

“Entering their hearts, the Supreme Personality of Godhead controls all living entities.”

\[\text{eṣa eva sādhu karma kārayati}\]

“The Lord engages the living entity in pious activities so he may be elevated.”

Here someone may object: “So be it. However, if the Supreme Personality of Godhead is the actual performer of actions, then the orders and prohibitions of the scriptures are all meaningless. The scriptures can give orders and prohibitions only if the individual spirit soul is independent and thus has the power to make choices.”

If this is said, then the author of the sūtras gives the following reply.

Sūtra 2.3.40

\[\text{kṛta-prayatnāpeksas tu vihita-pratishddhāvaiyarthyādibhyāḥ}\]

\[\text{kṛta – done; prayatna – effort; āpeksa – relation; tu – but; vihita – ordered; pratishddha – forbidden; a – not; vaiyartha – meaninglessness; ādibhyāḥ – beginning.}\]

But it is by effort, because then orders and prohibitions are not without meaning.

The word \textit{tu} [but] is used here to dispel doubt. The individual spirit soul performs pious and impious deeds. Taking into consideration the individual soul’s efforts, the Supreme Personality of Godhead gives him facility to act in a certain way. Therefore the previously stated objection is not valid.

The pious and impious deeds of the individual spirit soul are like different seeds that sprout into different kinds of plants. The Supreme Personality of Godhead is like the rain that falls on these seeds and makes them grow. Therefore in this situation is the Supreme Personality of Godhead is the
instrument by which these seeds of karma bear fruit. The seeds of various trees, vines, and other plants are the specific cause of these plants, and the rain that makes them grow is the general cause.

If no rain cloud brings water, there will not be any variety of sweet flowers or other plants. If there is no seed there will not any flowers or plants either. In this way the Supreme Personality of Godhead gives the results of the pious and impious deeds performed by the individual spirit soul. Even though dispatched by another, a person is still the performer of the actions he does. Therefore it cannot be said that the individual spirit soul does not perform actions.

Why is that? The sūtra explains: “Because then orders and prohibitions are not without meaning.” The word ādi [beginning with] in this sūtra means that the Supreme Personality of Godhead gives mercy and punishment according to the pious and impious actions of the individual spirit souls. If that interpretation is accepted, then the orders and prohibitions of the scriptures are not without meaning. If the Supreme Personality of Godhead actually forces the individual spirit soul to act piously or impiously, and the soul is like a rock or a log and has no independence, then the orders of the scripture to perform pious deeds and avoid impious deeds are all worthless and should be rejected.

The scriptures say:

\[
esa u hy eva sādhu karma kārayati taṁ yamebhyo lokebhya unminīṣate eṣa u evāsādhu karma kārayati yamadho ninīṣate. aĵno jantur anīṣo ’yam ātmanaḥ sukha-duḥkhayoḥ īśvara-prerito
gacchet svargaṁ vāśvabhram eva ca.
\]

“The Lord engages the living entity in pious activities so he may be elevated. The Lord engages him in impious activities so he may go to hell. The living entity is completely dependent in his distress and happiness. By the will of the Supreme he can go to heaven or hell, as a cloud is driven by the air.”

If this means that the individual living entity has no choice, and pious and impious deeds are forced on him by the Supreme Personality of Godhead, then the Supreme Personality of Godhead is cruel and unjust, a monster. Therefore it must be concluded that the individual spirit soul does have free will and is responsible for his actions, although he does not have the power to transfer his desire and will into concrete action unless the Supreme Personality of Godhead permits. In this way everything is explained.

**Adhi karaṇa 16: The Individual Spirit Soul is Part and Parcel of the Supreme Personality of Godhead**

**Viśaya [thesis or statement]:** Next, to corroborate the previous explanation the author of the sūtras explains that the individual spirit soul is part and parcel of the Supreme Personality of Godhead. In the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad [3.1.1] it is said:

\[
dvā suparnā
\]

“The soul and the Supersoul within the body are compared to two friendly birds sitting together.”

The first bird here is the Supreme Personality of Godhead and the second is the individual spirit soul.

**Saṃśaya [doubt]:** Is the individual spirit soul in truth the Supreme Personality of Godhead, only seeming to be different because of the illusion of māyā, or is the the individual spirit soul part and parcel of the Supreme Personality of Godhead, different from the Lord, but related to Him as a ray of sunlight is related to the sun?
Pūrvapakṣa [the opponent speaks]: What is the truth? The truth is the individual spirit soul covered by the illusion of māyā is in truth the same as the Supreme Personality of Godhead. The Brahma-bindu Upaniṣad [13] explains:

ghaṭa-samvr̥tam ākāśaṁ
niyamāne ghaṭe yathā
gato liyeta nākāśaṁ
tadvai jīvo nabhopamaḥ

“The space within a jar is not moved when the jar is moved, nor is it destroyed when the jar is broken. The spirit soul is like that unbreakable space.”

The Chāndogya Upaniṣad also [6.8.7] affirms:

tat tvam asi

“You are that [Brahman].”

Siddhānta [conclusion]: In the following words the author of the sūtras gives his conclusion.

Sūtra 2.3.41

aṁśo nānā vyapadeśād anyathā cāpi dāsa-kitavāditvam adhīyate eke
aṁśaḥ – part; nānā – many; vyapadeśāt – because of the teaching; anyathā – otherwise; ca – and; api – also; dāsa – servant; kitava – gambler; ādi – beginning with; tvam – the state of being; adhīyate – is read; eke – some.

He is a part because of the description of being many, and also because some scriptures describe him as a servant, as a gambler, or as something else.

The individual spirit soul is a part and parcel of the Supreme Personality of Godhead as a ray of sunlight is part and parcel of the sun. The individual spirit soul is different from the Lord, dependent on the Lord, and related to the Lord. That is the meaning. Why is that? The sūtra explains: “Because of the description of being many.” The Subala Upaniṣad explains:

udbhavaḥ sambhavo divyo deva eko nārāyaṇo mātā bhrātā nivāsaṁ śaraṇaṁ suhṛd gatir nārāyaṇaḥ

“Nārāyaṇa is the transcendental Supreme Personality of Godhead. Nārāyaṇa is the creator, destroyer, mother, father, brother, home, shelter, friend and goal.”

In Bhagavat-gītā [9.18] Lord Kṛṣṇa declares:

gatir bhartā prabhūḥ sākṣi
nivāsaḥ śaraṇaṁ suhṛt

“I am the goal, the sustainer, the master, the witness, the abode, the refuge, and the most dear friend. I am the creation and the annihilation, the basis of everything, the resting place, and the eternal seed.”

The words nānā vyapadeśād in this sūtra describe the many relationships that exist between the Supreme Personality of Godhead and the individual spirit soul, relationships like that between the creator and created, controller and controlled, shelter and person who takes shelter, master and servant,
friend and goal, seeker. Some passages in the *Atharva Veda* declare that because the Supreme is all-pervading, the individual spirit souls and the Supreme are identical. The *Atharva Veda* declares:

*brahma dāsā brahma dāśā brahma kitavāḥ*

“These servants are the Supreme. These fishermen are the Supreme. These gamblers are the Supreme.”

It is not possible that this passage intends to say that the individual spirit soul is actually not different from the Supreme. It is not possible that the Supreme is simultaneously both the creator and created, the pervader and pervaded, nor is it possible that supremely intelligent Lord becomes a servant, fisherman or other lowly being. If it were true that the individual spirit souls are identical with the Supreme, then the scriptures’ advice to renounce the world would become meaningless. Nor is it possible that the Supreme has become covered by the influence of illusion, for illusion has no power to bewilder the Lord. Nor is it possible that the individual spirit souls are parts of the Supreme like fragments cut with a chisel from a great stone, for that would contradict the scriptures’ statements that the Supreme can neither be broken nor changed. Therefore the individual spirit soul is different from the Supreme, but related to Him as created to creator, and in other ways also. The individual spirit soul is thus a part and parcel of the Supreme. The truth is that the individual spirit soul is a potency of the Supreme Personality of Godhead. This is described in *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* [6.7.61]:

*viṣṇu-śaktih parā proktā
kṣetrajñākhya tathā parā*

“Originally, Kṛṣṇa’s energy is spiritual, and the energy known as the living entity is also spiritual.”

When it is said that the individual spirit soul is a part of the Supreme Personality of Godhead, the word “part” is used in the same way as in the sentence, “The circle of Venus is a one-hundredth part of the moon’s circle,” or the same way as in the definition, “A part, although situated in a smaller area than the whole, is identical with the whole in substance.” The use of the word “part” here is not different from that definition. Thus the Supreme Personality of Godhead is the master of all potencies, and the individual spirit soul is a part of the Lord’s spiritual potency. This, by being a localized manifestation of one of the Lord’s potencies, the individual spirit soul is a part of the Supreme Personality of Godhead. That is their relationship.

The example of the pot means that when the mistaken identification of the soul for the body is broken, the individual soul meets the Supreme Personality of Godhead. The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad’s* statement *tat tvam asī* [You are that] therefore means “You are dependent on the Supreme.” The context of that passage supports this view. It does not support any other interpretation. Therefore the individual spirit soul and the Supreme Personality of Godhead are separate and different. One is the controller, the other the controlled. One is all-pervading, the other atomic in size. This is directly seen in the scriptures. It is not possible to prove otherwise. In the next *sūtra* the author continues his explanation.

**Sūtra 2.3.42**

*Mantra-varṇāt*

mantra – of the mantras; varṇāt – from the description.

**Because of the description in the Vedic mantras.**
In the *Rg Veda* [10.90.3] it is said:

*pādo 'syā sarvā bhūtāni*

“All living entities are part and parcel of the Supreme.”

In this way the Vedic *mantras* declare that the individual spirit souls are part and parcel of the Supreme. The word *pāda* here means “part.” No other meaning makes sense in this context. The word *sarvā bhūtāni* [all living entities] here is in the plural, whereas the word *aṁśa* [part] in *Śūtra* 2.3.41 is in the singular. The singular here is used in a generic sense to denote all spirit souls. This kind of usage is also seen in many other places.

**Śūtra 2.3.43**

> api smaryate

> api – also; smaryate – in the *Śrī-śāstra*.

**Also in the *Śrī-śāstra*.**

In the *Bhagavad-gītā* [15.7] Lord Kṛṣṇa explains:

> mamaivāṁśo jīva-loke

> jīva-bhūtah sanātanaḥ

> “The living entities in this conditioned world are My eternal fragmental parts.”

By using the word *sanātana* [eternal], the Lord refutes the idea that the living entities referred to here are the temporary external bodies in which the eternal souls reside.

In this way it is seen that the individual spirit souls are part and parcel of the Supreme and have an relationship with Him. The Supreme is the creator and dominant in other ways also, and the individual spirit souls are dependent on Him. The nature of the individual spirit souls is described in the following passage of *Padma Purāṇa*:

> jñānāśrayo jñāna-gunaś
cetanaḥ prakṛteḥ paraḥ
na jāto nirvikāraś ca
eka-rūpaḥ svarūpa-bhāk

> “The individual spirit soul is the shelter of knowledge, has knowledge asone if his qualities, is consciousness, is beyond the world of matter, is never born, never changes, and has one form, a spiritual form.

> anur nityo vyāpti-śīlaś
cid-ānandātmakas tathā
aham arthaḥ vyayaḥ sākṣi
bhinnā-rūpaḥ sanātanaḥ

> “The soul is atomic, eternal, is present by consciousness everywhere in the material body, is by nature full of spiritual bliss and knowledge, has a sense of individual identity, is unchanging, is a witness within the body, is eternal, and is different from the Supreme.
adāhyo ‘cchedyo ‘kledyo
śoṣyo ‘kṣara eva ca
evam-ādi-gunair yuktah
śeṣa-bhūtaḥ parasya vai

“The soul can never be burned, cut, moistened, withered, or killed. It has these and many more qualities. It is part and parcel of the Supreme.

ma-kareṇocyate jīvah
kṣetra-jñah paravān sadā
dāśa-bhūto harer eva
nānyasyaiva kadācana

“Thus the word ma refers to the individual spirit soul. The soul is the knower of the field of activities. The soul is spiritual. The soul is an eternal servant of the Supreme Personality of Godhead. The soul is never the servant of anyone else.”

The phrase evam-ādi-gunaiḥ [with these and many more qualities] refers to the soul’s other qualities, such as his ability to perform actions, to experience sensations, to attain enlightenment, and to enlighten others. The word “enlightenment” here has two features. In the first feature the soul itself attains enlightenment. In the second feature the soul brings enlightenment to others. That is the nature of the soul. A lamp sheds light on itself and on other objects also. A jar or similar object has no power to bring light. Although a lamp may shine, because it is inanimate matter it cannot benefit from its own light. The individual soul, however, can benefit from the light it brings. Because the soul can thus become illuminated, it is said that the soul is spiritual and full of knowledge.

**Adhikarāṇa 17: The Lord’s Incarnations are not Part and Parcel of the Lord, for They are the Lord Himself**

**Viṣaya [thesis or statement]:** Digressing from the main topic for the moment, the author of the sūtras next considers the nature of the Lord’s incarnations.

In the Gopāla-tāpanī Upaniṣad it is said:

eko vaśi sarva-gah kṛṣṇa idya
ekō ‘pi san bahudhā yo ‘vabhāti

“The Lord Kṛṣṇa is the worshipable, all-pervading supreme controller, and although He is one, He manifests in many forms.”

In the Viṣṇu Purāṇa [1.2.3] it is said:

ekāneka-svarūpāya

“The Supreme Personality of Godhead is one, although He has many forms.”

Here it is said that the Lord is one because He remains one person, even though He appears in many forms, and He is also called many because of the great variety of these forms. That is the meaning.

**Samśaya [doubt]:** Are the incarnations of the Lord, such as the incarnation Matsya, part and parcel of the Lord in the same way the individual spirit souls are, or are They different from the individual spirit souls?

**Pūrvarakṣa [the opponent speaks]:** There is no difference between the individual spirit souls and the incarnations of the Supreme Personality of Godhead.
Siddhānta [conclusion]: In the following words the author of the sūtras gives His conclusion.

Sūtra 2.3.44

prakāśādi-van naivaṁ paraḥ

prakāśa – light; ādi – beginning with; vat – like; na – not; evam – thus; paraḥ – the Supreme.

The Supreme is not like light or other things.

Although the Lord’s incarnations, such as Lord Matsya, are called “parts” of the Supreme, They are not like the individual spirit souls. Here the author of the sūtras gives example: “The Supreme is not like light or other things.” As the sun and a firefly may both be called “light,” but are in truth very different, and as nectar and wine may both be called “liquid,” but in truth are very different, so the individual spirit souls and the incarnations of the Lord do have a similar nature in that they are all spiritual beings, but are very different in terms of size and power.

bhāvayaty eṣa sattvena
lokāḥ vai loka-bhāvanaḥ
lilāvatārānumato
deva-tiryāṇa-narādiṣu

“Thus the Lord of the universes maintains all planets inhabited by demigods, men and lower animals. Assuming the roles of incarnations, He performs pastimes to reclaim those in the mode of pure goodness.” [Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 1.2.34]

How could the Lord assume incarnations to maintain the universe and deliver the souls in the mode of goodness, unless He were in a superior position to the ordinary living entities? The Lord is a living entity, and the jīva souls are also living entities, but He is the Supreme living entity who creates and maintains all others. In the Kātha Upaniṣad [2.2.13] it is confirmed:

nityo nityānāṁ cetanaṁ cetanānāṁ eko bahūnāṁ yo vidadhāti kāmān

“He is the supreme eternally conscious person who maintains all other living entities.”

As proved in Adhikaraṇa 12, the living entities are atomic in size, but the Lord is unlimited. Therefore in His original form or in any of His incarnations, He is the Supreme.

Sūtra 2.3.45

smaranti ca

smaranti – the Smṛti-śāstras say; ca – and.

The Smṛti-śāstras also say it.

In the Varāha Purāṇa it is said:

svāṁśaś cātha vibhinnāṁśa
iti dvedhāṁśa isyate
aṁśino yat tu sāmarthyaṁ
yat-svarūpaṁ yathā sthitih
“It is said that there are two kinds of parts and parcels of the Supreme: direct parts and separated parts. Direct parts have exactly the same nature as the Lord.

\[
tad eva nāṇumātro 'pi
bhedaḥ svāmśāṁśino kvacit
vibhinnāṁśo 'lpā-śaktiḥ syāt
kiñcit sāmarthyā-mātra-yuk
\]

“Separated parts are different from the Lord. They are atomic in size and have very slight powers.

\[
sarve sarva-guṇaiḥ pūrnāḥ
sarva-doṣa-vivarjitāḥ
\]

“All direct parts of the Lord are filled with all virtues and glories and free of all vices and defects.”

In Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam [1.3.28] it is said:

\[
ete cāṁśa-kalāḥ puṁsaḥ
krṣnas tu bhagavān svayam
\]

“All the above mentioned incarnations are either plenary portions or portions of the plenary portions of the Lord, but Lord Śrī Kṛṣṇa is the original Personality of Godhead.”

Thus Lord Kṛṣṇa is the original Supreme Personality of Godhead and the various incarnations, such as Lord Matsya, are parts of Him, but they are not different from Lord Kṛṣṇa, as the individual spirit souls are. Lord Kṛṣṇa is like a vaidūrya stone, which manifests different colors from moment to moment. In this way Lord Kṛṣṇa appears in different forms.

In His various incarnations Lord Kṛṣṇa may display all or only some of His powers. That is the description of the scriptures. Lord Kṛṣṇa, the source of all incarnations, displays all of His six transcendental opulences in full. When the Lord does not display all His opulences in full, He appears as an aṁśa incarnation, and when He displays even fewer of His opulences, He appears as a kalā incarnation. In this circumstance He is like a great teacher, learned in the six sciences, who in certain circumstances teaches only a small portion of what he actually knows.

In the Puruṣa-bodhinī Upaniṣad it is said that Lord Kṛṣṇa appears with all His transcendental potencies, headed by Goddess Rādhā. In the Tenth Canto of Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam it is said that various transcendental qualities, such as being supreme over all, being filled with great love, being accompanied by loving associates, filling with wonder Brahmā, Śiva, and all the demigods, sages, and wise devotees, manifesting many pastimes, such as sweetly playing the flute, that fill everyone with wonder, displaying a great sweetness of transcendental handsomeness, and being very kind and merciful, are eternally manifested in Yaśodā’s infant Kṛṣṇa. Lord Matsya and the other incarnations manifest some but not all of these qualities. Still, the incarnations of the Lord are not like the individual spirit souls, for the incarnations actually are the Lord Himself.

Now the author of the sūtras presents another argument.

Sūtra 2.3.46

\[
anujī- pariḥārau deha-sambandhāt jyotir-ādi-vat
\]
Bondage and liberation come from contact with the material body, like the eye and other things.

Even though they are parts and parcels of the Supreme, the individual spirit souls, because beginningless ignorance, and also because of contact with material bodies, are subject to material bondage and liberation. The incarnations of the Lord, such as Lord Matsya, however, are not subject to such things.

This is the description of the Śruti-śāstra. In the Śruti-śāstra it is also said that the incarnations of the Lord do not have material bodies, but are directly the Lord Himself. That is the great difference between the individual spirit souls and the incarnations of the Lord.

The word *anujñā* here means “permission.” It is by the Lord’s permission that the individual spirit souls can perform pious and impious deeds, as the *Kauśitaki Upaniṣad* [3.8] explains:

`esa eva sādhu karma kārayati`

“The Lord engages the living entity in pious activities so he may be elevated.”

The word *parihāra* means “liberation”. This is described in the Śruti-śāstra:

`tam eva viditvāti mṛtyum eti`

“By understanding the Supreme Personality of Godhead one is able to cross beyond this world of death.”

Next, speaking the words *jyotir-ādi-vat* [like the eye], the author of the sūtras gives an example to explain this.

The eyes of the living entities are like small portions of the sun. However, the eyes depend on the sun for the power of sight, and if the sun does not give permission in the form of the sunlight, the eyes cannot see. In this way the eyes are dependent on the sun. The sunlight on the sun-planet, however, is identical with the sun itself, and thus it makes no sense to say they are dependent on the sun. The difference between the individual spirit souls and the incarnations of the Lord is like that, the incarnations being like the sunlight and the souls being like the eyes.

**Sūtra 2.3.47**

`asantateś cāvyatikarah`

`asantateh – because of imperfection; ca – not; avyatikarah – without bewilderment.`

**Because it is imperfect there can be no mistake.**

Because he is imperfect, the individual spirit soul cannot be mistaken for an incarnation of the Lord. The individual spirit souls are therefore not the same as or equal to the incarnations of the Lord, beginning with Lord Matsya, who are all perfect. In the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad [5.9], the individual spirit soul is described in the following words:

`bālāgra-śata-bāgasya`
“If we divide the tip of a hair into one hundred parts and then take one part and divide this into another one hundred parts, that ten-thousandth part is the dimension of the living entity.”

Instead of being atomic and limited, as the individual spirit souls are, the Lord’s incarnations, beginning with Lord Matsya, are perfect and complete in every way, as the Īsopaniṣad explains:

\[ pūrṇam adah pūrṇam idam \]

“The Personality of Godhead is perfect and complete.”

In the following words the author of the sūtras shows the great fault in thinking the individual soul identical with the Supreme.

**Sūtra 2.3.48**

\[ ābhāsa eva ca \]

ābhāsaḥ – fallacy; eva – indeed; ca – also.

It is also a fallacy.

In this sūtra is refuted the idea that because they are both called anāṁsas, or parts of the Lord, therefore the individual spirit souls and the incarnations of the Lord are identical. This idea is based on the logical fallacy of sat-pratipakṣa [undistributed middle]. We have discussed this logical error earlier. Therefore this idea is wrong because of imperfect reasoning.

The word ca [also] here hints that some examples may be given to show this. One example is that of earth and sky. Earth and sky are both substances, but that does not mean that they are identical. Existence and non-existence are both categories, but that does not mean they are equal. A drop of seawater and the ocean are both salty, but they are not equal. In the same way the individual spirit souls and the incarnations of the Supreme Personality of Godhead may both be parts of the Supreme, but that does not mean that they are equal.

**Adhikaraṇa 18: The Individual Spirit Souls are not all Alike**

Viśaya [thesis or statement]: Concluding this digression, the author of the sūtras now returns to His original topic. In the Kaṭha Upaniṣad [2.5.13] it is said:

\[ nityo nityānāṁ cetanaḥ cetanānāṁ \\
    eko bahuṁāṁ yo vidadhāti kāmān \]

“The Supreme Lord is eternal and the living beings are eternal. The Supreme Lord is cognizant and the living beings are cognizant. The difference is that the Supreme Lord is supplying all the necessities of life for the many other living entities.”

Saṁśaya [doubt]: In this way it is said that the individual spirit souls are eternal and cognizant. Are the individual spirit souls all alike or are they not?

Pūrvapakṣa [the opponent speaks]: The individual spirit souls are not different. They are all exactly alike.

Siddhānta [conclusion]: In the following words the author of the sūtras gives His conclusion.
Sūtra 2.3.49

adṛṣṭāniyamāt

adṛṣṭa – of fate; aniyamāt – because of difference.

Because of different fates.

As a frog jumps a long distance, the word na [not] should be inserted from Sūtra 44. In this way this sūtra means the individual spirit souls are not all alike. Why is that? The sūtra explains: “Even though the individual spirit souls have the same nature, they have different fates.” Their fates are beginningless, because the jīvas are eternally conditioned by material consciousness; they are different, because they have different activities and therefore different karma.

Here someone may object: “Are the different fates not created because the individual spirit souls have different desires and aversions?”

The author of the sūtras says, “No it is not so,” and gives the following explanation.

Sūtra 2.3.50

abhisandhy-ādiṣ api caivam

abhisandhi – inclinations; ādiṣ – beginning with; api – also; ca – and; evam – thus.

In this way there are different desires and other things.

The different natures of the individual spirit souls are to be explained in a different way. These differences exist because of different fates. The word ca [and] hints that these differences exist at every moment. Desire is not the cause of material conditioning or liberation; action is. When the living entity performs impious actions, he gradually sinks down into hellish condition of life. When the living entity performs pious actions, he gradually approaches liberation. Thus his fate is determined by actions, not words or desires.

Here someone may object: “Is it not so that these differences are created by differing environments, such as the environment of Svargaloka, the earth, or other places?”

To this the author of the sūtras replies, “No. It is not so.” He gives the following explanation.

Sūtra 2.3.51

pradeśād iti cen nāntar-bhāvāt

pradeśāt – from the environment; iti – thus; cet – if; na – not; antar-bhāvāt – because of being understood.

If it is said that this is because of environment, then the answer is: No, because there is another reason.

The other reason mentioned here is the differing fates of the individual spirit souls. The differences here cannot be attributed to different environments, for souls in the same environment often manifest
great differences. For example, sometimes a person born in a pious family may perform very bad activities, and a person born in an impious family may become a great saintly person. Therefore a jīva’s fate is due to his activities and not to his environment.

Vedānta-sūtra, Adhyāya 2 Pāda 4

tvaj-jātāh kalitotpātāh
mat-prāṇāh sānty āmitra-bhit
etān śādhi tathā deva
yathā sat-patha-gāmināḥ

“O Supreme Personality of Godhead, O destroyer of enemies, my life-breaths, which are born from You, have left the path of virtue. O Lord, please bring them under control and push them on the path that is right.”

In the Third Pāda, contradictory scriptural passages describing the elements were harmonized. In the Fourth Pāda contradictory passages describing the prāṇas [life-force and senses] will be harmonized.

Adhikaraṇa 1: The Prāṇas Are Manifested From the Supreme Personality of Godhead

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: The prāṇas are of two kinds: primary and secondary. The secondary prāṇas are the eleven senses, beginning with the eyes. The primary prāṇas are the five life-airs, beginning with apāna.

First the secondary prāṇas will be examined. In the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad [2.1.3] it is said:

etasmāj jāyate prāṇo manaḥ sarvendriyāṇi ca

“From this are born prāṇa, mind, and all the senses.”

Samśaya [doubt]: Is this description of the creation of the senses metaphorical, like the description of the creation of the individual souls, or literal, like the description of the creation of ether and the other elements?

Pūrvapakṣa [the opponent speaks]: This is explained in the following words of the Śruti-śāstra:

asad vā idam agra āsīt tad āhuḥ kiṁ tad āsīd iti ṛṣayo vāvā te asad āsīt tad āhuḥ ke te ṛṣaya iti prāṇā vāva ṛṣayaḥ.

“He said: ‘In the beginning was non-being.’ They said: ‘What was that non-being?’ He said: ‘The non-being was many sages.’ They said: ‘Who were those sages?’ He said: ‘Those sages were the prāṇas.’ ”

This passage from the Śruti-śāstra clearly shows that the senses, which are here called prāṇas or sages, existed before the creation of the material world. Therefore the senses are like the individual spirit souls, and the scriptures’ descriptions of the creation of the senses are only allegories.

Siddhānta [conclusion]: In the following words the author of the sūtras gives His conclusion.
Sūtra 2.4.1

tathā prāṇāḥ

 tathā – so; prāṇāḥ – the prāṇās.

The prāṇas are like that.

As ether and the other elements were manifested from the Supreme Personality of Godhead, so the prāṇas and the senses were also manifested from Him. That is the meaning here. In the beginning of creation the ingredients of the material world were merged together into one. Then the different ingredients were manifested. This is described in Muniḍaka Upaniṣad [2.1.3]:

etasmāj jāyate prāṇo manāḥ sarvendriyāni ca

“From this are born prāṇa, mind, and all the senses.”

The creation of the material senses is not like the creation of the conscious individual spirit souls, because the souls are free from the transformations that are always present in matter: conception, gestation, birth, growth, production of byproducts, dwindling and death. When they describe the creation of the individual spirit souls, the words of the scriptures are all allegories, but when they describe the creation of the senses, the words of the scriptures are literal descriptions. This is so because the senses are by nature material. This being so, the words prāṇa and rṣi [sages] in this passage refer to the Supreme Personality of Godhead. This is so because both these words are names of the all-knowing Supreme Person.

Here someone may object: “Is it not so that because the words prāṇāḥ and rṣayaḥ [sages] are both plural, it is not possible that they can here be names of the Supreme Personality of Godhead?”

In the following words the author of the sūtras answers this objection.

Sūtra 2.4.2

gauny asambhavāt

 gauṇī – secondary meaning; asambhavāt – because of impossibility.

This must be a secondary use of the word, because the primary use is impossible.

The use of the plural in this passage from the Śruti-śāstra must be a secondary usage of the plural. Why is that? Because there is only one God and not many Gods, the plural cannot be used to describe Him. Still, the plural may be applied to Him to refer to His many different manifestations. Although the Supreme Lord is one, He appears in His many incarnations like an actor assuming different roles, or a vaidūrya jewel displaying different colors. In this secondary sense the plural is appropriate in relation to Him. This is confirmed by the following words of the Śruti-śāstra:

ekāṁ santaṁ bahudhā dṛṣyamānām

“Although He is one, the Supreme Personality of Godhead is seen to be many.”

The Smṛti-śāstra also explains:

ekāneka-svarūpāya
“Although He is one, the Supreme Personality of Godhead appears in many forms.”

Śūtra 2.4.3

tat prāk śruteś ca

tat – that; prāk – before; śruteḥ – from the Śruti-śāstra; ca – and.

Because the Śruti-śāstra declares that He existed before the creation.

Because in the beginning of creation the varieties of material nature were not yet manifested, and thus the material world was all one, it is also not proper to accept the use of the plural here in a literal sense. This is so because the Śruti-śāstras declare that in the beginning of material creation only the Supreme Personality of Godhead existed. Therefore the plural here must be used in a secondary sense.

In the following words the author of the sūtras gives another reason why the word prāṇa should be interpreted as a name of the Supreme Personality of Godhead.

Śūtra 2.4.4

tat-pūrvakatvād vācaḥ

tat – that; pūrvakatvāt – because of being before; vācaḥ – speech.

Because speech existed before the material creation.

The word vācaḥ [speech] here means “the names of things other than the Supreme Personality of Godhead, the master of many spiritual potencies.” This speech existed before the pradhāna, the mahat-tattva, and the other features of the material world were created. Because the names and forms of the various material features were not yet created, and because the material senses also were not yet created at that time in the beginning of creation, the word prāṇa here must be used as a name of the Supreme Personality of Godhead. The Brhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad [1.4.7] explains:

tad dheidin tarhi

“In the beginning they were not manifested. Only later were the material forms and names manifested.”

This explains that in the beginning of the material creation the material names and forms were not yet manifested. Thus at that time the material senses as well as the elements beginning with ether, were not yet manifested.

Adhikaraṇa 2: The Senses Are Eleven

Viśaya [thesis or statement]: After refuting this false idea about the senses, an idea that contradicts the descriptions in Śruti-śāstra, the author of the sūtras refutes a false idea about how many senses there are.

In the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad [2.1.8] it is said:

sapta prāṇāḥ prabhavanti tasmāt
saptārciṣāḥ samadhiḥ sapta-homāḥ
sapteme lokā yeṣu sañcaranti
prāṇā guhāśayā niḥitā sapta sapta

“From Him come the seven prāṇas, the seven arcis, the seven homas, and the seven lkas. These seven are placed in every heart.”

However, in the Brhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad [3.9.4] it is said:

daśe puruso prāṇā ātmākadaśa

“In the living entity there are ten prāṇas. The soul is the eleventh.”

Saṁśaya [doubt]: Are the prāṇas seven or eleven?

Pūrvapakṣa [the opponent speaks]: The pūrvapakṣa speaks the following sūtra.

Sūtra 2.4.5

sapta-gater višeṣitvāc ca

sapta – of seven; gateḥ – because of going; višeṣitvāt – because of the specific description; ca – also.

Because of the departure of seven and also because of a specific description.

The prāṇas are seven. Why is that? Because that is the opinion of scripture. In the Śruti-śāstra it is said:

saptānām eva jīvena saha sañcāra-rupāyā gateḥ

“Accompanied by the seven prāṇas, the soul leaves the body.”

In the Kaṭha Upaniṣad [6.10] it is said:

yadā pañcāvatiṣṭhante
jñānāṁ manasaṁ saha
buddhiṁ ca na viceṣṭeta
tāṁ āhuḥ paramāṁ gatim

“The sages say that the supreme goal is attained when the five knowers are at peace, and the mind and intelligence are no longer active.”

This passage describes the condition of the senses in the state of yogic trance. This passage describes five senses, which begin with the ears. To them are added the mind and intelligence. In this way the living entity has seven senses. The Śruti-śāstra also describes five working instruments, beginning with the voice and hands, but these cannot be called senses in the primary meaning of the word because these instruments do not accompany the soul when he leaves the material body and also because these instruments are less useful to the soul than the seven primary senses.

Siddhānta [conclusion]: If this is said, the author of the sūtras replies with the following conclusion.

Sūtra 2.4.6

hastādayas tu sthite ‘to naivam
hasta – the hands; ādayah – beginning with; tu – but; sthite – situated; atah – therefore; na – not; evam – like that.

But when he is situated in that way, the hands and other instruments are also present. Therefore it is not like that.

The word tu [but] is used here to begin the refutation of the pūrvapakṣin’s objection. Although they are not included among the seven, the instruments beginning with the hands are to be considered among the prāṇas. Why is that? Because as long as the soul is situated in the material body these instruments help in experiencing various things and in performing various tasks. In the Brhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad it is said:

ḥastau vai grahaḥ sarva-karmañābhigraheṇa grhītāḥ hastābhhyāṁ karma karoti.

“The hands are a sense, for with the hands one grasps things and performs actions.”

There are more than seven senses: there are five knowledge-acquiring senses, five working senses, and the mind. In this way there are eleven senses. In the Brhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad [3.9.4] it is said:

ātmakādaśa

“The ātmā is the eleventh sense.”

The word ātmā here means the mind. In this way it should be understood. There are five objects of perception: sound, touch, form, taste, and smell. To perceive these objects there are five knowledge-acquiring senses: ears, skin, eyes, tongue, and nose. There are five kinds of action: speech, grasping, moving, excretion, and reproduction. To perform these actions there are five working senses: voice, hands, feet, anus, and genital.

To co-ordinate the actions of all these and to take consideration of the three phases of time [past, present and future], there is the mind. Sometimes the mind is considered to have four aspects. In this way the actions of the mind are: desiring, coming to conclusions, understanding one’s identity, and thinking. To perform these actions the mind is divided into the heart [manah], intelligence [buddhi], false ego [ahaṅkāra] and thinking [citta]. In this way there are eleven senses.

Adhikaraṇa 3: The Senses are Atomic in Size

Next the author of the sūtras considers the question of the nature and size of the senses.

Samśaya [doubt]: Are the senses all-pervading or are they atomic?

Pūrvapakṣa [the opponent speaks]: The senses must be all-pervading, for things can be seen or heard from far away.

Siddhānta [conclusion]: In the following words the author of the sūtras gives his conclusion.

Sūtra 2.4.7

aṇavaś ca

aṇavaḥ – atoms; ca – and.

They are also atoms.
The word *ca* [also] is used here to indicate certainty. The eleven senses are atomic in size. This is so because the *Śruti-śāstra* declares that the senses leave the material body. Things can be heard from far away and in other ways be perceived from far away because the quality or power of the senses extends beyond the senses themselves. As the individual spirit soul is all-pervading within the material body, although he is situated within the heart, so the senses can also act at a distance. In this way the theory of Saṅkhya philosophers, that the senses are all-pervading, is refuted.

**Adhikaraṇa 4: The Principal Prāṇa [the Life-Force] has an Origin**

*Viṣaya* [thesis or statement]: In the *Mūndaka Upaniṣad* [2.1.3] it is said:

> etasmāj jāyate prāṇah
> “From Him the *prāṇa* [life-force] is born.”

Here the word *prāṇa* means “the principal *prāṇa*.”

*Saṁśaya* [doubt]: Is the principal *prāṇa* [life-force] created in the same way the individual spirit soul is ‘created,’ or is this *prāṇa* created in the same way ether and the other elements are created?

*Pūrvapakṣa* [the opponent speaks]: The *Śruti-śāstra* declares:

> naiṣa prāṇa udeți nāstam eti
> “This *prāṇa* is never born and never dies.”

The *Smṛti-śāstra* also declares:

> yat-prāptir yat-parityāga
> utpattir maraṇāṁ tathā
tasyotpattir mṛtiś caiva
> kathaṁ prāṇasya yujyate
> “Birth and death come and go. How can birth and death affect the *prāṇa*?”

Therefore it is concluded that the principal *prāṇa* is created in the same way the individual spirit soul is created.

*Siddhāṇta* [conclusion]: In the following words the author of the *sūtras* gives His conclusion.

**Sūtra 2.4.8**

> śreṣṭhaś ca
> śreṣṭhaś – the principal one; *ca* – also.

**The principal one also.**

The principal *prāṇa* [life-force] is created in the same way ether and the other elements are created. This is confirmed in the words of the *Mūndaka Upaniṣad* [2.1.3]:

> jāyate prāṇah
> “The *prāṇa* was created.”

In its *pratijñā* statement the *Mūndaka Upaniṣad* declares:
sa idam sarvam asrijata

“He created everything.”

To avoid contradicting these words, it must be accepted that the principal prāṇa was also created. For this reason the scriptural passages stating that the prāṇa was never created should be understood allegorically and not literally. One prāṇa is called the principal prāṇa because it maintains the material body. So its meaning can be carried into the next sūtra, this sūtra is given separately and not joined to the previous sūtra.

**Adhikaraṇa 5: The Principal Prāṇa [Life-Force] is not Air**

*Viṣaya* [thesis or statement]: Now the nature of the principal prāṇa [life-force] will be examined.

*Saṃśaya* [doubt]: Is the principal prāṇa air alone, the vibration of air, the activities of air or a condition of air when it goes to another place? Which is it?

*Pūrvapakṣa* [the opponent speaks]: It is the external element of air. This is confirmed in the following statement of Brhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad [3.1.5]:

\[
yo 'yaṁ prāṇah sa vāyuḥ
\]

“The prāṇa is air.”

Or, perhaps the principal prāṇa is the activities of air, the inhalation and exhalation of breath. In this way it is proved that the principal prāṇa is air.

*Siddhānta* [conclusion]: In the following words the author of the sūtras gives His conclusion.

**Sūtra 2.4.9**

\[
a vāyu-kriye prthag upadesāt
\]

na – not; vāyu – air; kriye – action; prthak – different; upadesāt – because of the teaching.

It is neither air nor the activities of air, because the teaching is that it is different.

The principal prāṇa [life-force] is neither air nor the movements of air. Why is that? The sūtra explains: “Because the teaching is that it is different.” The previously quoted passage of the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad [2.1.3] said that both air and prāṇa are born from the Supreme. In this way it should be understood that air and prāṇa are different, for they are mentioned separately. If air and prāṇa were identical, then there would be no need to mention them separately in this passage. If prāṇa were the movement of air, then there would also be no need to mention them both in this way. It is seen that the movements of fire and the other elements are not separately mentioned in this passage. The statement of the Brhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad that “Prāṇa is air,” means that prāṇa is a specific kind of air, and that prāṇa is not a separate element like fire and the other elements. That is the meaning here.

In the Kapila-sūtra [2.31] it is said:

\[
sāmānya-karana-vṛttih prāṇādyā vāyavaḥ paṁca
\]

“The five airs, beginning with prāṇa, perform the actions of the senses in general.”

Thus the Saṅkhya philosophers claim that prāṇa performs the actions of all the senses. This cannot be, for it is not possible for the single prāṇa to perform all the actions of all the senses.
Adhikaraṇa 6: The Principal Prāṇa [Life-Force] is an Instrument Used by the Soul

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: In the Brhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad it is said:

supteṣu vāg-ādiṣu prāṇa eko jāgarti. Prāṇa eko mṛtyunānantah. prāṇah samvargo vāg-ādīn samvyṅkte. prāṇa itarān prāṇān rakṣatī māteva putrān.

“When speech and the other senses sleep, prāṇa alone remains awake. Prāṇa alone is untouched by death. Prāṇa controls speech and the other senses. As a mother protects her children, so one prāṇa protects the other prāṇas.”

Saṁśaya [doubt]: Is this principal prāṇa identical with the independent spirit soul residing in the material body or is this principal prāṇa an instrument that assists the spirit soul?

Pūrvapakṣa [the opponent speaks]: Because the Śruti-śāstra describes this prāṇa as having many powers and glories, therefore this principal prāṇa is the independent spirit soul.

Siddhānta [conclusion]: In the following words the author of the sūtras gives His conclusion.

Sūtra 2.4.10

caṅṣur-ādi-vat tu tat saha śiṣṭhyādibhyāḥ
caṅṣuh – the eyes; ādi – beginning with; vat – like; tu – indeed; tat – that; saha – with; śiṣṭhyā – teaching; ādibhyāḥ – because of beginning with.

Indeed, it is like the eyes and other senses, because it is taught along with the senses.

Here the word tu [indeed] is used to dispel doubt. The prāṇa [life-force] is an instrument used by the individual spirit soul. It is like the eyes or the other senses. Why is that? The sūtra explains: “Because it is taught along with the senses.” The prāṇa is described along with the eyes and senses. Things of a like nature are generally described together. As example of that is the Brhadāratha meters, which are described together. This is also confirmed by the use of the word ādi [beginning with] in the sūtra.

That the prāṇa is here grouped with the senses is seen in the following passage:

yatya vāyāṁ mukhyāḥ prāṇāḥ sa evāyaṁ madhyamaḥ prāṇāḥ

“There is a principal prāṇa and there is a secondary prāṇa.”

In this way the idea that the prāṇa is the independent spirit soul is refuted.

Adhikaraṇa 7: The Principal Prāṇa [Life-Force] is the Primary Instrument of the Soul

Here someone may object: “Is it not so that if it is to be counted among the senses, the principal prāṇa must have a function to perform where it assists the soul? The principal prāṇa has no such function. Also, if the principal prāṇa is one of the senses, then the senses, beginning with the eyes, would be twelve in number.”

In the following words the author of the sūtras answers this objection.
Sūtra 2.4.11

akaraṇatvāc ca na doṣas tathā hi darśayati

akaraṇatvāt – because of not having a specific function; ca – and; na – no; doṣaḥ – fault; tathā – so, hi – indeed; darśayati – shows.

Also, there is no fault in not having a function, for the scriptures show it.

The word ca [also] is used to answer the previous objection. The word karaṇa here means “activity.” It is not a defect on the part of the prāṇa that is has no specific function to assist the soul, for it does have an important function in that it is the support and the resting place of the physical senses. That is the meaning here. In the following passage, the Chāndogya Upaniṣad [5.1.1] shows this:

atha ha prāṇāḥ ahām śreyasi vyūdīre. . .

“The senses argued among themselves. Each one said: ‘I am the best.’ They then approached their father, Lord Brahmā, and asked him, ‘O lord, who among us is the best?’ Brahmā replied, ‘He whose departure causes the greatest calamity for the body is the best.

“Then the voice departed from the body and stayed away for an entire year. When he returned, he asked: ‘How is it that you were able to live without me?’ Although it could not speak, still the body could breathe with the prāṇa, see with the eyes, hear with the ears, and think with the mind. Then the voice again entered the body.

“Then the eyes departed from the body and stayed away for an entire year. When they returned, they asked: ‘How is it that you were able to live without me?’ Although it could not see, the body could breathe with the prāṇa, speak with the voice, hear with the ears, and think with the mind. Then the voice again entered the body.

“Then the ears departed from the body and stayed away for an entire year. When they returned, they asked: ‘How is it that you were able to live without us?’ Although it could not hear, still the body could breathe with the prāṇa, see with the eyes, speak with the voice, and think with the mind. Then the ears again entered the body.

“Then the mind departed from the body and stayed away for an entire year. When he returned, he asked: ‘How is it that you were able to live without me?’ Although it could not think, still the body could breathe with the prāṇa, see with the eyes, speak with the voice, and hear with the ears. Then the mind again entered the body.

“When the prāṇa was about to depart it began to uproot all the senses. It became like a spirited horse uprooting the posts to which it is tethered. Then the other senses appealed to the prāṇa, ‘Please do not go. Please stay with us. You are the best of all of us.’”

In this way it is seen that the principal prāṇa has an important function to perform in relation to the spirit soul. The soul is the enjoyer and the performer of actions. The soul is like a king, the senses his royal attendants, and the principal prāṇa his prime minister, who helps attain the king’s objectives. In this way the prāṇa is the most important of the soul’s instruments. However, the prāṇa is still not independent of the soul itself.

Adhikaraṇa 8: The Principal Prāṇa has Five Functions

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: In the Brhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad [1.5.3] it is said:
Sa eṣā vāyuḥ pañca-vīdhah prāṇo ‘pāno vyāna udānah samānah
“The prāṇa is air. There are five prāṇas: prāṇa, apāṇa, vyāna, udāna, and samāna.”

Samśaya [doubt]: Are these five, beginning with apāṇa, different from prāṇa, or are they merely different functions of prāṇa?
Pūrvapakṣa [the opponent speaks]: Because they have different names and functions, therefore they are different.

Siddhānta [conclusion]: In the following words the author of the sūtras gives his conclusion.

Śūtra 2.4.12

pañca-vṛttir mano-vad vyapadiṣyate

pañca – five; vṛttih – functions; manah – the mind; vat – like; vyapadiṣyate – is said.

Like the mind, it is said to have five functions.

The prāṇa is one, although it assumes five different functions when present in the different places in the body, such as the heart. In this way the prāṇa is described. In this way these are different functions of prāṇa and not different prāṇas themselves. Because these functions are different, therefore different names are employed. Still there is no difference in their natures. In the Brhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad [1.5.3] it is said:

prāṇo ‘pāno vyāna udānah samānah iti. etat sarvaṁ prāṇa eva.

“There are five prāṇas: prāṇa, apāṇa, vyāna, udāna, and samāna. These five are all one prāṇa.”

In this way prāṇa is like the mind. In the Brhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad [1.5.3] it is said:

kāmah saṅkalpo vikalpo vicikitsā śraddhā dһrtir adhyaṭir hrīr dhīr bhīr ity etat sarvaṁ mana eva.

“The mind’s functions are: desire, determination, doubt, error, faith, steadfastness, unsteadiness, shame, intelligence and fear. All these are mind.”

All these have different functions and different names, but they are not different from mind itself. They are the various functions of the mind. In the yoga-śāstra also it is said that the mind has five functions. This is the meaning of the scriptures, either hinted at or explicitly shown in the texts.

Adhikaraṇa 9: The Principal Prāṇa is Atomic

Samśaya [doubt]: Is the principal prāṇa atomic or all-pervading?
Pūrvapakṣa [the opponent speaks]: In the Brhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad [1.3.22] it is said:

sama ebhis tribhir lokaiḥ

“Prāṇa is equal to the three worlds.”

This and other passages of Śruti-śāstra declare that prāṇa is all-pervading.

Siddhānta [conclusion]: In the following words the author of the sūtras gives his conclusion.
Sūtra 2.4.13

\textit{aṇuś ca}

\textit{aṇuh} – atomic; \textit{ca} – also.

\textit{It is also atomic.}

The principal \textit{prāṇa} is also atomic in size. This is so because the Śruti-śāstras declare that the principal \textit{prāṇa} leaves the material body at the time of death. Scriptural passages describing the principal \textit{prāṇas} as atomic should be understood to mean that living entities everywhere are dependent on the principal \textit{prāṇa}.

\textbf{Adhikaraṇa 10: The Supreme Personality of Godhead is the Moving Force Behind the Prāṇa}

\textit{Viśaya} [thesis or statement]: In the \textit{Bṛhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad} it is said:

\begin{quote}
\textit{supteṣu vāg-ādiṣu prāṇa eko jāgarti.}
\end{quote}

“When speech and the other senses sleep, \textit{prāṇa} alone remains awake. \textit{Prāṇa} alone is untouched by death. \textit{Prāṇa} controls speech and the other senses. As a mother protects her children, so one \textit{prāṇa} protects the other \textit{prāṇas}.”

In this way the function of the principal \textit{prāṇa} is described. The functions of the secondary \textit{prāṇas} are described in the following passage:

\begin{quote}
\textit{saptēme lokā yeṣu saṅcaranti}
\end{quote}

“The \textit{prāṇas} move in seven realms.”

Thus the secondary \textit{prāṇas} move among the senses.

\textit{Samśaya} [doubt]: Do the secondary \textit{prāṇas} move by their own power among the senses, or does something else create the movement of the \textit{prāṇas}? Are the \textit{prāṇas} moved by the demigods, the individual spirit soul or the Supreme Personality of Godhead?

\textit{Pūrvapakṣa} [the opponent speaks]: Endowed with the power of action, the \textit{prāṇas} move themselves. Or perhaps the demigods move them. In the \textit{Aitareya Upaniṣad} [2.4] it is said:

\begin{quote}
\textit{agnir vāg bhūtvā mukhaṁ prāviṣad}
\end{quote}

“Becoming speech, Agnideva entered the mouth.”

Or perhaps the individual spirit soul moves the \textit{prāṇas}. This may be so because the \textit{prāṇas} are instruments the soul uses to attain enjoyment.

\textit{Siddhānta} [conclusion]: In the following words the author of the \textit{sūtras} gives His conclusion.

Sūtra 2.4.14

\begin{quote}
\textit{jyotir-ādy-adhiṣṭhānaiṁ tu tad āmananāt}
\end{quote}

\textit{jyotih} – effulgence; \textit{ādy-adhiṣṭhānam} – the supreme ruler; \textit{tu} – indeed; \textit{tat} – that; \textit{āmananāt} – because of the description.
Indeed, light is the controller, because that is the description.

The word *tu* [indeed] is used here to dispel doubt. The word *jyotiḥ* [light] here means “the Supreme Personality of Godhead.” He is the mover [*adhiṣṭhānam*] of the prāṇas. The affix *lyuṭ* in the word *adhiṣṭhānam* makes it mean “the mover.” Why is the Supreme Personality of Godhead the mover of the prāṇas? The *śūtra* explains: “Because that is the description.” This means “Because it is understood that the Supreme Personality of Godhead, as the all-pervading Supersoul, moves the prāṇas and senses. In the *Brhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad* [3.7.16] it is said:

\[ \text{yaḥ prāṇesu tiṣṭhan} \]

“The Supersoul stays in the midst of the prāṇas and moves them.”

That the demigods and the individual spirit soul may also move the prāṇas is not disputed here, but the prāṇas cannot move themselves, for they are only inert matter. Hoping to enjoy, the individual spirit soul also moves the prāṇas. That is described in the next *śūtra*.

### Sūtra 2.4.15

prāṇavatā śabdāt

prāṇavatā – by the person who possesses the prāṇas; śabdāt – because of the Śruti-śāstra.

**By the person who possesses the prāṇas, because of the Śruti-śāstra.**

The word prāṇavatā [the person who possesses the prāṇas] refers here to the individual spirit soul. Hoping to enjoy, the spirit soul moves the prāṇas and senses. Why is that? The *śūtra* explains, śabdāt: “Because of the Śruti-śāstra.” In the *Brhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad* [2.1.18] it is said:

\[ \text{sa yathā mahā-rājo jānapadān grhītvā sve janapade yathā- kāmaṁ parivrartate evam evaiṣa etat prāṇān grhītvā sve śarīre yathā-kāmaṁ parivrartate.} \]

“As a great king rules the subjects in his kingdom, so the individual spirit soul rules the prāṇas in his body.”

This is the gist of the matter: The Supreme Personality of Godhead is the supreme ruler of the prāṇas and the demigods and the individual spirit soul also rule the senses. The former [the demigods] rule the prāṇas and senses by enabling them to act, and the latter [the individual spirit souls] rule the prāṇas and senses with the hope of attaining enjoyment. By exerting their wills, the individual souls thus move the prāṇas.

There is no alternative to this description. This the author of the *śūtras* explains in the following words.

### Sūtra 2.4.16

tasya ca nityatvāt

tasya – of this; ca – and; nityatvāt – because of eternality.

**Because this is eternal.**
Because He has an eternal relationship with them, the all-powerful Supersoul is the actual controller and mover of them. He should be considered the primary mover and controller. This is confirmed in the words of the Antaryāmi-brāhmaṇa [Brhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad 3.7].

Adhikaraṇa 11: The Principal Prāṇa is not a Sense

In this subject another doubt is raised.

Saṁśaya [doubt]: Are the principal prāṇa and the other prāṇas also senses?
Pūrvapakṣa [the opponent speaks]: Because they assist the individual spirit soul, all the prāṇas are considered to be senses.

Siddhānta [conclusion]: In the following words the author of the sūtras gives His conclusion.

Sūtra 2.4.17

ta indriyāni tad vyapadeśād anyatra śreṣṭhāt

They are senses, for that is the description. Only the principal one is not.

With the sole exception of the principal prāṇa, the prāṇas are all senses. Why is that? The sūtra explains: “For that is the description.” In the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad [2.1.3] it is said:

etasmāj jāyate prāṇaḥ
manah sarvendriyāni ca

“From the Supreme Personality of Godhead are born the principal prāṇa, the mind and the senses.”

In this way, with the sole exception of the principal prāṇa, the prāṇas are the senses, such as the ears and the others. In the Śruti-śāstra it is said:

indriyāni daśatām ca

“There are eleven senses.”

In another place in the Śruti-śāstra it is said:

prāṇo mukhya sa tv anindirīyam

“The principal prāṇa is not a sense.”

Here someone may object: “Is it not so that in the Brhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad [1.5.21] it is said:

hantsasyaiva sarve rūpam asāmetyetasyaiva sarve rūpam abhavat.

“The senses then assumed the form of the principal prāṇa. They all assumed his form.”

Because the secondary prāṇas are senses and because the secondary prāṇas are merely functions of the principal prāṇa, therefore the principal prāṇa is also a sense. How can you claim, then, that the principal prāṇa is not a sense?”

To the this objection the author of the sūtras gives the following reply.
Sūtra 2.4.18

bheda-śruteḥ
bheda – difference; śruteḥ – from Śruti-śāstra.

Because the Śruti-śāstra says it is different.

In the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad [2.1.3] it is said:

prāṇo manah sarvendriyāni

“From the Supreme Personality of Godhead are born the principal prāṇa, the mind and all the senses.”

In this way, because it is mentioned apart from the senses in this passage, the principal prāṇa is clearly different from the senses. That is the meaning here.

Here someone may doubt: “The mind is also mentioned apart from the senses in this passage. It must be that the mind is not a sense.”

This doubt is answered by the following words of Bhagavad-gītā [15.7]:

manah ṣaṣṭhindiyānī

“The mind is one of the six senses.”

Lord Kṛṣṇa also declares [Bhagavad-gītā 10.22]:

indriyāṇāṁ manas cāsmi

“Of the senses I am the mind.”

Sūtra 2.4.19

vailakṣanyāc ca

vailakṣanyāt – because of different qualities; ca – also.

Also because of different qualities.

During sleep the principal prāṇa is active, but the ears and other senses are not. The principal prāṇa supports the body and senses, but the senses are only instruments for perception and work. In these ways the principal prāṇa and the senses have different qualities. Thus it is said that as the individual spirit souls are dependent on the Supreme Personality of Godhead, so the senses are dependent on the principal prāṇa.

Adhikaraṇa 12: The Forms of the Material World are Created by the Supreme Personality of Godhead

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: The scriptures declare that the material elements, the senses, everything else in the material world, and the individual spirit souls also, are all manifested from the Supreme Personality of Godhead. Now we will consider the question: Who created the individual forms [vyaṣṭī]
of this world? After describing the creation of fire, water, and earth, the Chāndogya Upaniṣad [6.3.2-4] explains:

seyaṁ devataikṣata hantāham imās tisro devatā anena jīvenātmanānupraviṣya nāma-rūpe vyākaravāni tāsāṁ tri-vṛtam ekaikam karavānīti. Seyaṁ devatemās tisro devatā anena jīvenātmanānupraviṣya nāma-rūpe vyākarot tāsāṁ tri-vṛtam tri-vṛtam ekaikām akarot.

“After creating the splendid elements of fire, water, and earth, the Supreme Personality of Godhead thought, ‘Now I shall enter these three splendid elements with the individual souls and thus I shall create names and forms. One by one, I shall make them three.’ Then the Supreme Personality of Godhead entered those three splendid elements with the individual souls, created names and forms, and, one by one, made the splendid elements into three.”

Saṁśaya [doubt]: Is this creation of names and forms the work of the Supreme Personality of Godhead or an individual spirit soul?

Pūrvapakṣa [the opponent speaks]: It is the work of an individual spirit soul. In the Chāndogya Upaniṣad the Lord says, “With an individual soul I shall create.” The instrumental case here is not used in the sense of “with.” When the meaning of an agent is possible in this case it is not reasonable to accept a meaning that carries the sense of a preposition. Neither is the meaning of an instrument possible here, for the Supreme Personality of Godhead can do anything simply by His will, and therefore He has no need is employ an individual spirit soul to do anything. Neither can it be said that in this situation the entrance into the creation is done by an individual spirit soul and the creation of names and forms is done by the Supreme Personality of Godhead, for the use of the indeclinable past participle here indicates that the entrance and the act of creation were both performed by the same agent. Neither is the use of the first-person in the verb vyākaravāni [I shall create] inappropriate here, for it is like saying, “With a spy I will enter the enemy army and see it.” Neither is all this merely my own idea, for the Śruti-śāstra declares:

viriñco vā idaṁ virecayati vidadhāti brahmā vāva viriñca etasmād dhīme rūpa-nāmanī

“The demigod Brahmā is called viriñca because he organizes [virec] the material universe. From him have come the names and forms of the material universe.”

The Smṛti-śāstra also declares:

nāma-rūpe ca bhūtānām

“The demigod Brahmā created the names and forms of the creatures in the universe.”

Therefore the creation of names and forms was done by an individual spirit soul.

Siddhānta [conclusion]: In the following words the author of the sūtras gives His conclusion.

Sūtra 2.4.20

saṁjñā-mūrti-klptiḥ ca tri-vṛt kurvata upadeśāt

saṁjnā – names; mūrti – forms; klptih – creation; ca – and; tu – but; tri-vṛt – in three parts; kurvate – does; upadesāt – from the teaching.

But the creation of names and forms in groups of three is done by the creator, for that is the teaching.
The word *but* is used here is begin the refutation of the opponent’s argument. Here the word *saṁjñā-mūrti* means “names and forms” and the word *kṛptih* means “creation.” The words *trī-ṛt kurvataḥ* [done by the creator] indicate that this creation was done by the Supreme Personality of Godhead Himself and not by an individual spirit soul. Why is that? The *sūtra* explains, *upadeśāt*: “Because that is the teaching.” Thus the scriptures affirm that this creation was done by the Supreme Personality of Godhead. Thus the creation of threes and the creation of names and forms were both done by the same creator. That is the meaning.

The creation of threes was effected in the following way:

\[
\text{trīṇy ekaikāṁ dvidhā kuryāt}
\]

\[
\text{try-ardhāni vibhajed dvidhā}
\]

\[
\text{tat-tan-mukhyārdham utṣṛjya}
\]

\[
yojayec ca tri-rūpatā
\]

“The creator divides in half each of the three elements. Three of these halves He then divides in half again. Then He joins the smaller halves to the larger halves. In this way the compound elements, made of three parts, are created.”

This is like the process called *pañcī-karaṇa*. It cannot be said that this creation of threefold compound elements is within the power of the demigod Brahmā. That is so because Brahmā was born after the universal egg had been created from these threefold compound elements made of fire, water, and earth. This is corroborated by *Manu-samhitā* [1.9]:

\[
tasminn aṇḍe 'bhavad brahmā sarva-loka-pitāmahaḥ
\]

“Brahmā, the grandfather of all the worlds, was born in the egg of the universe.”

Therefore the creation of names and forms and the creation of threefold compound elements were both done by the same creator. It should not be thought, because of the sequence apparently described in the text, that the creation of names and forms preceded the creation of threefold compound elements. The creation of threefold compound elements came first, and only after that creation the creation of name and forms was effected. The universal egg cannot be created by the elements of fire, water and earth before those elements are compounded in the three ways. That this is not possible is described in the following words of *Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* [2.5.32-33]:

\[
yadaite 'saṅgatā bhāvā
ghootendriya-mano-guṇāḥ
yadāyatana-nirmāṇe
nen śekur brahma-vittama
\]

“O Nārada, best of the transcendentalists, the forms of the body cannot take place as long as these created parts, namely the elements, senses, mind, and modes of nature, are not assembled.”

\[
tadā samhata canyoṣyaṁ
bhagavac-chakti-coditāḥ
sad-sattvam upādāya
cobhayaṁ sasṛjur hy adaḥ
\]

“Thus when all these became assembled by the force of the energy of the Supreme Personality of Godhead, this universe certainly came into being by accepting both the primary and secondary causes of creation.”
The process of *pañcī-karaṇa* is also described here. In this way the creation should be understood. In the process of *pañcī-karaṇa* each of the five elements is divided in half, half of the halves are again divided in half, and the smaller halves are then joined with the larger in compound elements. In *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* [6.5.1] it is said:

\[
\text{annam aśitaṁ tridhā vidhiyate}
\]

“When food is eaten it is transformed in three ways.”

This transformation is completely different from the threefold combination of earth and the other elements previously described. Therefore this passage cannot be used to support the theory that the individual spirit soul is the creator of the names and forms of this world. The scriptural passage uses the phrase *ātmanā jīvena*. By thus placing these two words in apposition, it is clear that the word *jīva* [individual soul] here means “by the Supreme Personality of Godhead, whose potency is the individual spirit souls.” In a similar way the passage beginning with the words *virīco vā* is also explained.

Understood in this way the indeclinable past participle *praviśya* and the third-person verb following it can be understood in their primary meanings without any difficulty. In this way it is easily seen that the two actions described by the words *praviśya* and *vyākaravāṇi* are certainly performed by the same agent. Therefore it is certainly the Supreme Personality of Godhead who performed the act of creation described in the verb *vyākaravāṇi*. This is corroborated by the following words of *Taittirīya Aranyaka* [3.12.16]:

\[
\text{sarvāṇi rūpāṇi vicitya dhīro}
\]
\[
\text{nāmāṇi kṛtvābhivadan yad āste}
\]

“The all-knowing Supreme Personality of Godhead created all forms and names.”

### Adhikaraṇa 13: The Vehicles of the Soul are Made of Earth

**Viṣaya** [thesis or statement]: Now the nature of the material body, which is called by the name *mūrți* will be examined. In the *Brhad-āraṇyaka* [3.2.13] it is said that the material body is made of earth:

\[
\text{śarīraṁ prthivīṁ apy eti}
\]

“The material body becomes earth.”

However, in the *Kauṇḍinya-sruti* it is said that the material body is made of water:

\[
\text{adbhyo hīdam utpadyate āpo vāva māṁsaṁ asthi ca bhavanī āpaḥ śarīram āpa evedaṁ sarvam.}
\]

“From water the material body is created. Water becomes transformed into flesh and bones. The entire body is water.”

Another text of the *Śruti-śāstra* claims that the material body is made of fire:

\[
\text{saḥ agner deva-yonyāḥ}
\]

“The demigods’ bodies are made of fire.”

**Samśaya** [doubt]: What is the truth here?

**Pūrvapakṣa** [the opponent speaks]: One text says the material body is made of earth, another says it is made of water, and another that it is made of fire. Because the scriptures give these three differing explanations, the truth cannot be ascertained.
Siddhānta [conclusion]: In the following words the author of the sūtras give His conclusion.

Sūtra 2.4.21

māṁsādi bhaumam yathā-śabdam itarayoṣ ca

māṁsā – flesh; ādi – beginning with; bhaumam – earth; yathā – as; śabdam – the Śruti-śāstra; itarayoḥ – of the other two; ca – also.

As the Śruti-śāstra says, the flesh and other ingredients are made of earth. It also so for the other two.

Flesh and other ingredients are made of earth. However, blood is made of water, and bones are made of fire. This is described in the Śruti-śāstra [yathā-śabdam]. In the Garbha Upaniṣad it is said:

yat kaṭṭhaṁ sā prthivī yad dravaṁ tad āpo yad uṣṇaṁ tat tejāḥ

“What is hard in the body is made of earth, what is liquid is made of water, and what is hot is made of fire.”

In this way it is proved that all material bodies are made of these three elements.

Here someone may object: “If the material elements are all compounded of three elements, none of the elements pure, but all of them mixtures of elements, then why do the scriptures say, ‘This part of the body is made of fire, this part is made of water, and this part is made of earth’?”

To this objection the author of the sūtras gives the following reply:

Sūtra 2.4.22

vaiśeṣāṁ tu tad-vādāṁ tad-vādāḥ

vaiśeṣāṁ – because of the specific nature; tu – but; tat – of that; vādāḥ – statement; tat – of that; vādāḥ – statement.

Because of its specific nature, thus it is so said. Thus it is so said.

The word tu [but] is used to dispel doubt.

Everywhere in the material world the elements are arranged in threefold compounds with one element predominating. The elements are therefore named according to the predominating element. The word tad-vādāḥ is repeated to indicate the end of the chapter.

Epilogue

vardhasva kalpāga samaṁ samantāt
kuruṣva tāpa-ksatim āśritānām
tvad-aṅga-saṅkārṇi-karāḥ parās tā
hiṁsrā āsad-yukti-kuśṭhirikābhiḥ
“O tree that fulfills all desires, please extend yourself in all directions. To they who take shelter of you please give the shade that stops all troubles. The glistening axes of logic have now cut away the underbrush that choked you.”