Śrī Vedānta-sūtra

With the *Govinda-bhāṣya* Commentary of Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa
Translated by His Grace Kuṣakratha das Brahmacārī

Adhyāya 2

Expanded Commentary and Vedic Evidence

— by —

David Bruce Hughes

[Śrī Gaurahari Dāsānudās Bābājī]

— Published by —

Esoteric Teaching Seminars

http://esotericteaching.org

Table of Contents

Śrī Vedānta-sūtra

Adhyāya 2: No Conflict Between Vedānta and Other Vedic Scriptures

Pāda 1: Refutation of Opposing Views

duryuktika-droṇaja-bāṇa-vikṣataṁ
parīkṣitaṁ yaḥ sphuṭam uttarāśrayam
sudarśanena śruti-maulim avyathaṁ vyadhāt
sa kṛṣṇaḥ prabhur astu me gatiḥ

"May Lord Śrī Kṛṣṇa, who protected His devotee Mahārāja Parīkṣit the son of Abhimanyu in the womb of his mother Uttarā from the burning arrows of the son of Droṇa with His Sudarśana disc, be my refuge and goal."

The First Adhyāya established that the texts of the *Vedas* in general, and *Vedānta-sūtra* in particular, teach that the Supreme Brahman, the Lord of all, is the chief objective of human life; that He is the material and operative cause of everything; that He has His own individuality, distinct from everything and everyone else; that He is the inner Self of all existence and beings; that He is free from all imperfections; that He possesses infinite inconceivable powers and a measureless abundance of auspicious transcendental qualities. This was proved by the *samanvaya* or harmonious contextual interpretation of the texts of *Vedānta-sūtra*.

This Second Adhyāya will prove elaborately that all theories attempting to establish a material cause, such as *pradhāna,* for the creation of the universe, are incorrect; it will show that the conflicts between the *Smṛti-śāstra* and such theories are due to the fallacious reasoning of those theories, and that the views of the *Vedānta* texts are the only possible correct view. Specifically, this Adhyāya will disprove the speculative Sāṅkhya theories of the atheistic Kapila, and others such as the various Buddhist schools; but these arguments also disprove all materialistic theories of creation, such as the theories of modern materialistic science.

Most people do not subject their beliefs to the stringent test of reason. They simply are taught a certain opinion in school, and they accept this opinion, wrongly accepting it as knowledge. Thus if you inquire, they will say that "The universe was created in the Big Bang," but they cannot explain or defend this theory because it is not really knowledge, just an opinion that they were taught, and blindly accepted without any real understanding. Similarly, if we simply take Śrīla Vyāsadeva's word for it that these theories are wrong, then all we have done is exchange one shallow opinion for another. We still cannot explain why we accept one theory and not another; nor do we have the power to change others' thinking, because our so-called knowledge is merely a belief. Therefore first we must penetrate to the essence of the misunderstanding inherent in the materialistic theories, and then we will be in a position to understand the real truth.

The basic flaw in all these systems is the false assumption that matter can create or act independently. Matter is inert; it can do nothing on its own. The dynamic material creation that we observe requires not only the inert material ingredients, but also an injection of energy and intelligence. The energy animates the dull matter, filling it with light and motion, and the intelligence takes the form of the universal laws that govern matter's behavior. This energy and intelligence must come from a source outside of the material continuum, and that source can only be the Supreme Personality of Godhead in the spiritual world. Lord Kṛṣṇa states in *Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam:*

aham evāsam evāgre
nānyad yat sad-asat param
paścād aham yad etac ca
yo 'vaśiṣyeta so 'smy aham

"Brahmā, it is I, the Personality of Godhead, who was existing before the creation, when there was nothing but Myself. Nor was there the material nature, the cause of this creation. That [material creation] which you see now is also I, the Personality of Godhead, and after annihilation what remains will also be I, the Personality of Godhead." [*Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* 2.9.33]

The material nature or *pradhāna* [the unmanifested total material elements] is nothing but a transformation of the cosmic root substance Brahman. Brahman is completely spiritual, therefore before the Lord manifests the material creation, only Brahman and the spiritual world exist. At the time of creation, the Supreme Personality of Godhead allocates a portion of His eternal spiritual energy and transforms it into the *pradhāna;* but being material, *pradhāna* cannot do anything until He specifically animates it by His glance. This injection of the Lord's potent creative energy animates the material elements by the force of time, setting the cosmos into motion. He also creates the rules of material interactions, the laws of nature that underlie all material transformations, with His perfect intelligence. Then He enters into His creation and superintends its operation from a hidden position within.

The Lord provides the material creation as facility for those souls who, due to the exercise of their God-given free will, do not wish to live in the spiritual world. The presence of the Lord is directly manifest everywhere in the spiritual world, but the conditioned living entities do not want His personal association: they want to enjoy His facilities without Him. This spirit of independence leads them to become offensive to the Lord and His eternal devotees, so such conditioned souls are sent to the material world for their life of so-called independent enjoyment. But actually all the facility for their so-called independent life is created by the Lord, and out of His perfect, unconditional love, He remains their constant companion, hidden within their hearts as Paramātmā, the Supersoul.

Naturally the rebellious conditioned souls are motivated to explain the creation without reference to the energy or will of the Lord, but all their atheistic theories suffer from the same flaw: they attribute to matter energy and intelligence that it does not possess. Actually matter becomes animated only in association with life, or the soul; the proof of this is that as soon as the soul leaves the material body, it immediately becomes inert and begins to disintegrate. Therefore the universe, as the cosmic body of the Supreme Personality of Godhead, displays energy and activity only because of His presence; when He withdraws His energy there is devastation, and the whole creation comes to an end [*pralaya*]. He is therefore the soul of the entire creation.

The importance of this topic in the process of self-realization is that as long as we remain under the illusion that matter can create independently, we cannot appreciate the presence of the Lord within the material creation. Understanding the falsity of these atheistic theories, and that the dynamic cosmos that we observe all around us is possible only by the energy and intelligence of the Lord, is an important early step on the path of spiritual awakening. Having been thoroughly convinced of this point, one becomes qualified to engage in the process of devotional service [*bhakti-yoga*] discussed in the Third Adhyāya, and experience its unequalled benefits as described in the Fourth Adhyāya of *Śrī Vedānta-sūtra*.

Adhikaraṇa 1: Vedānta Rejects the Sāṅkhya doctrine

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: First the author of the *sūtras* proves that atheistic Sāṅkhya is opposed to the Vedic texts, and removes the doubt that the views of *Vedānta-sūtra* contradict the Vedic texts that Kapila uses to establish the Sāṅkhya theory. It will be shown that that Kapila's philosophy is not supported by the very Vedic texts he uses to establish it.

The atheistic Sāṅkhya philosopher Kapila has explained the different elementary truths given in the *Vedas* according to his own opinion. According to him, material nature consists of *pradhāna,* the equilibrium of the three material qualities: goodness, passion and ignorance. Material nature produces the material energy, known as the *mahat-tattva*, and *mahat* produces the false ego. The ego produces the five objects of sense perception, which produce the ten senses [five for acquiring knowledge and five for working], the mind and the five gross elements [space, air, fire, water and earth]. Counting the *puruṣa*, the soul or the enjoyer, with these twenty-four elements, there are twenty-five different *tattvas* [fundamental ontological categories]. The unmanifested stage of these twenty-five ontological truths is called *pradhāna,* and the manifested stage is called *prakṛti*, or material nature. The qualities of material nature are the causes of happiness, distress and illusion. The quality of goodness is the cause of material happiness, the quality of passion is the cause of material distress, and the quality of ignorance is the cause of illusion. Our material experience lies within the boundaries of these three manifestations of happiness, distress and illusion. For example, a beautiful woman is certainly a cause of material happiness for one who possesses her as a wife, but the same beautiful woman is a cause of distress to a man whom she rejects or who is the cause of her anger, and if she leaves a man she becomes the cause of illusion.

The two kinds of senses are the ten external senses and the internal sense, the mind. Thus there are eleven senses. According to Kapila, material nature is eternal and all-powerful. Originally there is no spirit, and matter has no cause. Matter itself is the chief cause of everything. It is the all-pervading cause of all causes. The Sāṅkhya philosophy regards the total material energy [*mahat-tattva*], the false ego and the five objects of sense perception [sound, form, touch, taste and odor] as the seven diverse manifestations of material nature, which has two features: the material cause and efficient cause. The *puruṣa* [soul or enjoyer] is without transformation, whereas material nature is always subject to transformation. But although material nature is inert, it is the cause of enjoyment and salvation for many living creatures. Its activities are beyond the scope of sense perception, but still one may guess at them by superior intelligence. Material nature is one, but because of the interaction of the three qualities, it can produce the total energy and the wonderful cosmic manifestation. Such transformations divide material nature into two features, namely the efficient and material causes.

The *puruṣa*, the soul or enjoyer, is inactive and without material qualities, although at the same time he is the master, existing separately in each and every body as the emblem of knowledge. By understanding the material cause, one can guess that the *puruṣa*, the enjoyer, being without activity, is aloof from all kinds of enjoyment or superintendence. Sāṅkhya philosophy, after describing the nature of *prakṛti* [material nature] and *puruṣa* [the enjoyer], asserts that the creation is only a product of their combination or proximity to one another. The living symptoms are visible in material nature because of this proximity, but one can guess that in the person of the enjoyer, the *puruṣa*, there are powers of control and enjoyment. When the *puruṣa* is in illusion because of lack of sufficient knowledge, he feels himself to be the enjoyer, and when he is in full knowledge he is liberated. The liberated *puruṣa* is described in the Sāṅkhya philosophy to be always indifferent to the activities of *prakṛti*.

The Sāṅkhya philosopher accepts three kinds of evidence: direct perception, hypothesis and traditional authority. When such evidence is complete, everything is perfect. The process of comparison is within

such perfection. Beyond such evidence there is no proof. The Sāṅkhya system of philosophy identifies three kinds of procedures—namely, *pariṇāmāt* (transformation), *samanvayāt* (adjustment) and *śaktitaḥ* (performance of energies)—as the causes of the cosmic manifestation.

Vedānta-sūtra nullifies the Sāṅkhya conclusion because it proves that the actual cause of creation is Brahman, not *pradhāna.* Discrediting *pradhāna* as the cause of the cosmic manifestation nullifies the entire Sāṅkhya philosophy. Materialistic philosophers accept matter to be the material and efficient cause of creation; for them, matter is the cause of every type of manifestation. Generally they give the example of a waterpot and clay. Clay is the cause of the waterpot, but the clay can be found as both cause and effect. The waterpot is the effect and clay is the cause, but the pot is nothing but clay. A tree is matter, but a tree produces fruit. Water is matter, but water flows. In this way, say the Sāṅkhyas, matter is the cause of movements and production. As such, matter can be considered the material and efficient cause of everything in the cosmic manifestation.

But matter is inert, therefore it cannot act as the material or efficient cause of creation. The wonderful arrangement and management of the cosmic manifestation means that a living intelligence is behind it, for such an arrangement could not exist without a sentient designer. It is impossible for any complex arrangement to exist without conscious direction. In our practical experience we never see that inert bricks can construct a big building themselves. The example of the waterpot cannot be accepted because a waterpot has no perception of pleasure and distress. Consciousness and the perception of pleasure and pain are within every living entity. Therefore symbolizing the covering body by the empty waterpot is not an acceptable analogy.

Sometimes the material scientists suggest that trees grow from the earth without the assistance of a gardener, because that is a tendency of matter. They also consider the intuition of living creatures from birth to be material. But tendencies like bodily intuition cannot be accepted as independent, for they require the existence of a spirit soul within the body. Actually, neither the tree nor any other body of a living creature has any independent tendency or intuition; the tendency and intuition exist because the soul is present within the body. As soon as the soul leaves the body, all action and intelligence cease. For example, a car has a tendency to move and turn right or left, but the car does not move or turn without the direction of a driver. A material car has neither tendencies nor intuitions independent of the intentions of the living driver within the car. The same principle applies to the automatic growth of trees in the forest. The growth takes place because of the souls present within the trees. As soon as the souls leave, the trees fall to the ground and do not reproduce further.

Sometimes foolish people take it for granted that because scorpions appear in bags of rice or flies appear in heaps of garbage, the rice has produced the scorpions or the garbage has produced the flies. But just because the scorpions and flies appear there, it does not mean that the rice gives birth to the scorpions, or the garbage creates the flies. The real fact is that the mother scorpion lays eggs within the rice, and by the proper fermentation of the rice the eggs give birth to baby scorpions, which come out in due course. Similarly the flies lay their eggs in the garbage, and as it rots it feeds the larvae of the flies. Different living creatures appear in different places, but one should not conclude that matter produces such living creatures. Thus the theory cited by the materialists that trees automatically come from the earth because the earth's natural tendency is to produce trees is incorrect.

According to the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, every living being is forced by divine superintendence to take a certain type of body according to his past deeds. There are many varieties of bodies, and a living entity takes bodies of different shapes because of divine arrangement. When a person thinks "I am doing this," the 'I am' does not refer to the body. It refers to something more than the body, or the soul within the body. The material body has neither tendencies nor intuition by itself; the tendencies and

intuition belong to the living soul within the body. Material scientists sometimes suggest that the tendencies of male and female bodies cause their union, and that this is the cause of the birth of the child. But since according to Sāṅkhya philosophy, the *puruṣa* is always unaffected, where does the tendency to give birth come from? Life manifests and growth happens only in the presence of the soul, otherwise matter remains inert.

Sometimes the Sāṅkhyas give the example that milk turns into curd automatically, and that distilled water pouring from the clouds falls down to earth, producing different kinds of trees, and enters different kinds of flowers and fruits with different fragrances and tastes. Therefore, they say, matter produces varieties of material things on its own. But the same proposition of the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad*—that different kinds of living creatures are put into different kinds of bodies by the management of a superior power—also rebuts this argument. Under the superintendence of spiritual authority, various souls are given the chance to take a particular type of body, such as that of a tree, animal, bird or beast, according to their past activities, and thus their different tendencies develop under these circumstances. The *Bhagavad-gītā* [13.22] also further affirms:

> *puruṣaḥ prakṛti-stho hi*
> *bhuṅkte prakṛti-jān guṇān*
> *kāraṇaṁ guṇa-saṅgo 'sya*
> *sad-asad-yoni-janmasu*
>
> "The living entity in material nature thus follows the ways of life, enjoying the three modes of nature. This is due to his association with that material nature. Thus he meets with good and evil among various species."

The soul is given different types of bodies according to his *karma*. For example, were souls not given varieties of tree bodies, the different varieties of fruits and flowers could not be produced. There is distinction among the different species of trees. Each kind of tree produces a particular kind of fruit and flower; an individual tree does not produce flowers of different colors or fruits of different tastes. We can observe classes demarcated among humans, animals, birds and other species. There are innumerable living entities, and their qualities and activities according to the three material modes of nature give them the chance to have different kinds of experiences, as required by their previous activities.

Thus one should understand that *pradhāna*, being dull matter, cannot create the material world unless impelled by a spiritual living entity. The materialistic theory that matter acts independently cannot be accepted. Matter is called *prakṛti*, which refers to female energy. A woman is *prakṛti*, a female. A female cannot produce a child without the association of a *puruṣa*, a man. The *puruṣa* causes the birth of a child because the man injects the soul, which is sheltered in the semen, into the womb of the woman. The woman supplies the body of the soul as the material cause, and as the efficient cause she gives birth to the child; but the *puruṣa*, the male, is the original cause of the child. Similarly, this material world gives rise to varieties of manifestations due to the entrance of Garbhodakaśāyī Viṣṇu within the universe. He is present not only within the universe but within the bodies of all living creatures, as well as within the atom. We understand from the *Brahma-saṁhitā* that the Supersoul is present within the universe, within the atom and within the heart of every living creature. Therefore the atheistic theory that matter is the cause of the entire cosmic manifestation cannot be accepted by anyone with sufficient knowledge of matter and spirit.

Materialists sometimes give the argument that as straw eaten by a cow produces milk automatically, so material nature automatically produces varieties of manifestations under different circumstances. Thus matter is the original cause. To refute this argument, we may say that an animal of the same species as

the cow—namely, the bull—also eats straw like the cow, but does not produce milk. Under the circumstances, it cannot be said that straw in connection with a particular species produces milk. The conclusion should be that there is superior management, as confirmed in the *Bhagavad-gītā* [9.10], where the Lord says,

> *mayādhyakṣeṇa prakṛtiḥ sūyate sa-carācaram*
>
> "This material nature is producing all moving and unmoving beings under My direction."

The Supreme Lord says *mayādhyakṣeṇa:* "Under My superintendence." When He desires that the cow produce milk by eating straw, there is milk; and when He does not so desire it, the mixture of such straw cannot produce milk. If the way of material nature had been that straw produced milk, a stack of straw could also produce milk. But that is not possible. And the same straw given to a human female also cannot produce milk. That is the meaning of the *Bhagavad-gītā's* statement that everything takes place only under the superior orders of the will of the Lord. Matter itself has no power to produce independently. The conclusion, therefore, is that insentient matter cannot be the cause of the material creation. The ultimate creator is the Supreme Personality of Godhead.

If matter were accepted as the original cause of creation, all the authorized scriptures in the world would be useless; for in every scripture, especially the Vedic scriptures like the *Manu-smṛti*, the Supreme Personality of Godhead is said to be the ultimate creator. The *Manu-smṛti* is considered the highest Vedic direction to humanity. Manu is the lawgiver to mankind, and in the *Manu-smṛti* it is clearly stated that before the creation the entire universal space was darkness, without information and without variety, and was in a state of complete suspension. Everything was darkness. The Supreme Personality of Godhead then entered the universal space, and although He is invisible, He created the visible cosmic manifestation. In the material world the Supreme Personality of Godhead is not manifested by His personal presence, but the presence of the cosmic manifestation in different varieties is the proof that everything has been created under His direction. He entered the universe with all creative potencies, and thus He removed the darkness of the unlimited space.

Saṁśaya [arisal of doubt]: Is the view established in the First Adhyāya, that Brahman is the sole cause of the material universe, contradicted by the *Sāṅkhya-smṛti?*

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: If Brahman is the sole cause of the material universe, then what about those Vedic texts that establish the Sāṅkhya view that *pradhāna* [the unmanifested total material elements] is the material cause of the universe? According to the *Vedānta* texts, the *Sāṅkhya-smṛti* would have to be rejected. Kapila, the author of Sāṅkhya, is called a *ṛṣi* [great sage] in the following text of the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* [5.2]:

> "It is the one who superintends every cause, all forms and all germs; who sustains with knowledge the Ṛṣi Kapila, the first born, and who saw him born."

This sage Kapila is thus an authoritative person, because the *Śruti* itself calls him "Ṛṣi Kapila." Kapila acknowledges the validity of fire sacrifices and other practices taught in the *karma-kaṇḍa*, and thus is not a heretical scoffer. He has composed the *saṅkhya-smṛti* as part of the *jñāna-kaṇḍa* to teach the nature and means of attaining liberation to those who desire it. The first *sūtra* of his system is:

> "The highest goal for human beings is the complete cessation of the threefold miseries."

In another aphorism he says:

> "The cessation of suffering is not possible by material means, because the relief afforded by them is only temporary, and there is recurrence of pain."

In this system the insentient *pradhāna* is the independent cause of the creation; *pradhāna* generates the creation to give the conditioned *jīvas* an opportunity for liberation, or for her own sake. Though insentient, *pradhāna* creates the world, just as insentient milk turns into curd by its own accord. If Brahman is the sole cause of the creation, as *Vedānta* philosophy asserts, then there will be no scope for the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy. It will be invalidated, because it is entirely devoted to setting out a theoretical truth and not a practical duty, and if it is not accepted as a valid theory, it will find no use whatsoever. Therefore the texts of *Vedānta* should be interpreted in such as way as not to contradict Kapila, who is a great authority. If we interpret the *Vedānta* texts in conformity with *Saṅkhya*, it is not that *Manu-smṛti* and similar works would be contradicted. Actually there is no harm if *Manu-smṛti* and similar works would be contradicted on theoretical grounds, for such contradictions would not make such works useless. For Manu and similar works instruct in practical religious duties and are authoritative in the practices of *karma-kaṇḍa*, and thus will have a scope of their own. The *Saṅkhya-smṛti*, however, is purely theoretical.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: The author replies to this objection with the following *sūtra:*

Sūtra 2.1.1

> *smṛtyanavakāśadoṣaprasaṅga iti cet na anyasmṛtyanavakāśadoṣaprasaṅgāt*
>
> *smṛti* – the Kapila-*smṛti* philosophy; *anavakāśa* – want of application, redundancy; *doṣa* – fault; *prasaṅgaḥ* – result; *iti* – thus; *cet* – if; *na* – not; *anya* – other; *smṛti* – the *smṛti; anavakāśa* – non-scope or redundancy; *doṣa* – fault; *prasaṅgāt* – because of the result.
>
> **[If it is objected that the Kapila]-*smṛti* will find no scope [under Vedāntic interpretation] we say no; because [under Sāṅkhya interpretation] there would result the fault of want of scope for other *smṛtis* [like that of Manu, etc.]**

The word *anavakāśa* means lack of scope; in other words, having no area of application and becoming totally useless. The Sāṅkhyas' objection to the *Vedānta* texts explaining, by force of *samanvaya*, the teaching that Brahman is the sole cause of the universe is that the *Sāṅkhya-smṛti* does not find any scope under that interpretation; therefore, the Sāṅkhya philosophers desire the Vedāntic texts to be explained in a way opposite to their direct meaning. This objection is raised in the first part of the *sūtra* [*smṛtyanavakāśadoṣaprasaṅga*].

The objection is answered in the second part of the *sūtra*, which says *anyasmṛtyanavakāśadoṣaprasaṅgāt:* "Let it be so that the *Sāṅkhya-smṛti* finds no scope, for otherwise other *smṛtis,* such as Manu and the rest, that also declare Brahman to be the universal cause and are in harmony with the teachings of *Vedānta,* would become useless." Thus there is a choice of two evils: should the texts of *Vedānta* be interpreted in a distorted way to give scope to the *Sāṅkhya-smṛti*, or should they be interpreted in a natural way to give scope to Manu and the rest? Certainly the greater evil is to deny scope to Manu and the other *smṛtis*. *Manu-smṛti* and others like it establish that the Lord is the cause of the creation, sustenance and dissolution of the universe, and that the atheistic creation theory of Kapila is incorrect. Thus *Manu-smṛti* [1.5] says:

> "This universe existed in the form of darkness, unperceived, destitute of distinctive marks, unattainable by reasoning, unknowable, as though it were immersed in deep sleep. Then the divine Self-existent, Svayambhū the Self-born, Himself indiscernible, but making all this—the great elements and the rest—discernible, appeared with irresistible creative power, dispelling the darkness. He who can be perceived only with the internal organ [of consciousness], who is subtle, indiscernible and eternal, who contains all created beings and is inconceivable, shone

> forth of His own will. He, desiring to produce beings of many kinds from His own body, first created the waters by His thought, and placed His seed in them. That seed became a golden egg, equal to the sun in brilliance; in that egg He Himself was born as Brahmā, the progenitor of the whole world."

Similarly Parāṣara says in *Viṣṇu-Purāṇa:*

> "From Lord Viṣṇu sprang the world, and in Him it abides; He makes this world persist and He rules it. He is the world. As a spider draws out the web from his abdomen, and again draws it into his body, similarly the world is emitted from the body of the Lord and merges back into Him."

There are other *smṛtis* with the same purport. These find no scope in the *karma-kaṇḍa* section of the *Vedas,* for they do not teach a particular course of action but are concerned with theoretical truth alone. They are taught for the sake of *jñāna*, with the object of purifying the mind of the conditioned soul so that knowledge of Brahman may arise therein. Sometimes impersonalists claim that philosophical speculations are meant for the advancement of knowledge free from the limitations of religious ritualistic principles. But the religious ritualistic principles are actually meant for the advancement of spiritual knowledge by accrual of pious activities. By performance of religious rituals one ultimately reaches the supreme goal of knowledge by understanding that Vāsudeva, the Supreme Personality of Godhead, is the cause of everything. It is clearly stated in the *Bhagavad-gītā* that even those who are advocates of knowledge alone, without any religious ritualistic processes, advance in knowledge after many, many lifetimes of speculation and thus come to the conclusion that Vāsudeva is the supreme cause of everything that be.

> *bahūnāṁ janmanām ante*
> *jñānavān māṁ prapadyate*
> *vāsudevaḥ sarvam iti*
> *sa mahātmā su-durlabhaḥ*
>
> "After many births and deaths, he who is actually in knowledge surrenders unto Me, knowing Me to be the cause of all causes and all that is. Such a great soul is very rare." [*Bhagavad-gītā* 7.19]

As a result of this God consciousness, the goal of human life, an advanced learned scholar or philosopher surrenders unto the Supreme Personality of Godhead and achieves perfection. The ritualistic religious performances and spiritual practices given in the *Vedas* are meant to cleanse the mind of material contamination, and the special feature of this Age of Kali is that one can execute the process of cleansing the mind of contamination simply by chanting the holy names of God. All abstract science and philosophy are of no practical use, except insofar as they promote the general development of intelligence and mental culture. The following text from the *śruti* shows that purification of the mind is the object of the *jñāna-kaṇḍa:*

> "The *brāhmaṇas* try to know Him through study of the *Vedas*, by sacrifice, by alms, by austerity and by fasting."

No doubt in some cases we would find that the performance of these things leads to results like rainfall, begetting sons, attainment of heaven etc., but that is only a byproduct that arises occasionally. The actual aim of scriptural study and spiritual practices is to produce faith in the conclusions of the scriptures, and the higher aim is to attain direct transcendental knowledge and realization of Brahman. In fact the entire Vedic literature has this aim:

sarve vedā yat padam āmananti

"Whose form and essential nature all the *Vedas* declare, and in order to attain Him they prescribe austerities, desiring to know Him the great ones perform *brahmācārya*, that symbol I will briefly tell you: it is *oṁ*." [*Kaṭha Upaniṣad* 1.3.15]

nārāyaṇa-parā vedāḥ

"All the *Vedas* declare Nārāyaṇa alone."

Therefore, the main purpose of understanding the *Vedas*, performing Vedic sacrifices and speculating on the *Vedānta-sūtra* is to understand Kṛṣṇa. Accepting the impersonalist view of voidness or the nonexistence of the Supreme Personality of Godhead negates all study of the *Vedas*. Impersonal speculation aims at disproving the conclusion of the *Vedas*. Therefore any impersonal speculative presentation should be understood to be against the principles of the *Vedas*, or the oldest, most voluminous and consistent standard scriptures in the world. Since the speculation of the impersonalists does not follow the principles of the *Vedas*, their conclusion must be considered to be against the Vedic principles. Anything not supported by the Vedic principles must be considered imaginary and lacking in authority and proof. Therefore no impersonalist explanation or materialistic interpretation of any Vedic literature can be accepted.

Since our opponent raises his objection on the strength of Kapila's *Smṛti*, then we shall refute him by his own argument; namely, by the strength of other Vedic *Smṛtis* such as Manu, etc. For if the argument of the objector has any force, it is that scope should be given to the *Smṛtis*, and the *Vedānta* should be interpreted in such a way as to accommodate them. Taking our stand on this proposition of our opponent, we conclude that we must explain the *Vedānta* so as to give scope to the largest number of *Smṛtis*, such as Manu and the rest. We cannot interpret the meaning of the *Vedānta* texts by means of the *Sāṅkhya-smṛti* of Kapila, because then we would have to accept an extremely undesirable conclusion: that all the other *smṛtis* are without authority. This would establish a conclusion opposed to the unity of the sacred scriptures, the most fundamental principle of the Vedic literature. For accepting a certain text to settle the meaning of another would show clearly the whole direction and intent of the scriptures as a whole. The *Saṅkhya-smṛti* does not possess this authority, because its conclusion is contrary to the conclusion of the *Vedas* as a whole. Actually this determining role belongs to the *Vedānta-sūtra* and its natural commentary *Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* alone, for they are the mature verdict of Kṛṣṇa-dvaipāyana Vyāsa, the authoritative compiler of the most important Vedic literatures. First he divided the *Vedas* into four, then he explained them in the *Purāṇas*, and for less capable people he wrote the *Mahābhārata*. In the *Mahābhārata* there is given the *Bhagavad-gītā*, the best-known and most beloved Vedic scripture. Then all Vedic literature is summarized in the *Vedānta-sūtra*, and for future guidance he gave its natural commentary, *Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam*.

tataḥ saptadaśe jātaḥ
satyavatyāṁ parāśarāt
cakre veda-taroḥ śākhā
dṛṣṭvā puṁso 'lpa-medhasaḥ

"Thereafter, in the seventeenth incarnation of Godhead, Śrī Vyāsadeva appeared in the womb of Satyavatī through Parāśara Muni, and he divided the one *Veda* into several branches and sub-branches, seeing that the people in general were less intelligent." [*Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* 1.3.21]

Thus the *Saṅkhya-smṛti* is merely the product of an individual's mental concoction, and not the product of an actual spiritual authority. So we do not fear the contingency that the *Saṅkhya-smṛti* would find no scope in the *Vedānta*. Let the *Saṅkhya-smṛti* be totally discarded, when by doing so we save the

numerous other *smṛtis* that follow the conclusions of *Vedānta*. It would be improper to show undue preference to the *Saṅkhya-smṛti* merely on the strength of its being composed by an authoritative person. If we did, we would have to accept many conflicting *smṛtis* by those who are considered authorities, such as those of Gautama. But these authors have given theories about the world, the soul and God that are in conflict with the conclusions of the *Vedas*. Thus we would be put into the absurd position of accepting contradictory theories simply on the strength of someone saying that their authors were persons of reliability, honesty and authority. The result of following that path is that we would never be able to reach any firm conclusion or know the real truth.

It is a well-known principle in Vedic philosophy that in case of conflict between two *smṛtis*, one should follow the one that agrees with the conclusions of the *Vedas*, and reject the other. If one tries to nullify the conclusions of the *Vedas* by accepting an unauthorized so-called scripture, it will be impossible for him to come to the right conclusion about the Absolute Truth. The system for adjusting two contradictory scriptures is to refer to the *Vedas*, for references from the *Vedas* are accepted as final judgments. When we refer to a particular scripture, it must be authorized, and to possess this authority it must strictly follow the Vedic injunctions. If someone presents an alternative doctrine he himself has manufactured, that doctrine will prove itself useless, for any doctrine that tries to prove that Vedic evidence is meaningless immediately proves itself meaningless, for the *Vedas* are the oldest scriptures and the primary spiritual authority.

The atheist Kapila is a descendant of the dynasty of Agni and is one of the conditioned souls. There are many statements directly against the Vedic principles in the doctrine of the atheist Kapila. He does not accept the Supreme Personality of Godhead; he says that the living entity is himself the Supreme Lord and that no one is greater than him; his conceptions of so-called conditioned and liberated life are materialistic, and he refuses to accept the importance of immortal time. All such statements are against the principles of the *Vedānta-sūtra*. Therefore the atheistic Kapila is an impostor.

The actual Kapila who is the son of Kardama Muni is accepted as an incarnation of Vāsudeva. The *Padma Purāṇa* gives evidence that the Supreme Personality of Godhead Vāsudeva takes birth in the incarnation of Kapila and, by His expansion of theistic Sāṅkhya philosophy, teaches all the demigods and a *brāhmaṇa* of the name Āsuri. The followers of the *Vedas* unanimously accept the authority of Manu and Parāśara in the disciplic succession. Their statements do not support the atheistic Kapila, because the Kapila mentioned in the *Vedas* is a different Kapila, the son of Kardama and Devahūti.

Regarding the objection that the author of the *Sāṅkhya-smṛti* is spoken of respectfully in the *Śruti* itself, in the famous passage of *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* [5.2], we reply that the *pūvapakṣin* has not properly understood that verse. It does not refer to Kapila, the founder of atheistic *Sāṅkhya*, but to a different person altogether. The *śloka* really means:

> "He who before the creation of the world produced the sage Kapila [namely, the golden-colored Brahmā], in order to maintain the universe and who sustains this Brahmā with knowledge of the past, present and future, we worship that Lord God."

The word *kapila* here means golden-colored, and is another name of Hiraṇyagarbha Brahmā, referred to in *śloka* 3.4 of the same *Upaniṣad:*

> "May Rudra, the lord of all, the omniscient, who is the cause of the birth and power of the demigods, who begot Hiraṇyagarbha at the beginning, grant us good understanding."

That this golden-colored first-born is Brahmā we learn from *śloka* 4.12 of the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*. Thus the *Upaniṣad's* reference to Kapila indicates another being altogether; it does not refer to the founder of the atheistic science, for he misinterpreted the meaning of the *Śruti*. Therefore if the

impostor Kapila is denied respect as an authoritative person, that does not show any disrespect to the *Śruti*. On the other hand, the authority of Manu is stated in unambiguous language in the *Taittirīya Brahmaṇa*, where it is said: "Whatever Manu has declared is a panacea."

Similarly, Śrī Parāśara is mentioned in the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* to have obtained knowledge of the transcendental worlds and of the true nature of the *devatās* through the blessings of Pulastya and Vaśiṣtha. Thus both Manu and Parāśara are undoubtedly *āptas* [great spiritual authorities], but not the atheist Kapila. The Kapila who wrote *Sāṅkhya-smṛti* and founded the philosophy opposed to the Vedic conclusions was a particular *jīva*, born in the family of Agni-vaṁśa, and deluded by the mysterious power of the Lord, he propounded this false philosophy. Thus we find in the *Padma Purāṇa:*

> "One Kapila also called Vāsudeva taught the philosophy of Sāṅkhya to the *devas*, Brahmā and the rest, to the *ṛṣis* beginning with Bhṛgu, as well as to Āsuri. His doctrine was full in harmony with teachings of the *Vedas*. There was another Kapila who also taught a Sāṅkhya philosophy, fully opposed to all the Vedic teachings, and he also had a disciple named Āsuri, who was other than the first Āsuri. His philosophy is full of bad reasoning and false arguments."
>
> *namo 'vyaktāya sūkṣmāya*
> *pradhāna-puruṣāya ca*
> *catur-viṁśad-guṇa-jñāya*
> *guṇa-saṅkhyāna-hetave*
>
> "I offer my respectful obeisances unto You, the Supreme Person. Being very subtle, You are never visible to material eyes. You are the knower of the twenty-four elements, and You are the inaugurator of the *sāṅkhya-yoga* system." [*Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* 8.16.30]
>
> *śrī-bhagavān uvāca*
> *atha te sampravakṣyāmi*
> *sāṅkhyaṁ pūrvair viniścitam*
> *yad vijñāya pumān sadyo*
> *jahyād vaikalpikaṁ bhramam*
>
> Lord Śrī Kṛṣṇa said: "Now I shall describe to you the science of Sāṅkhya, which has been perfectly established by ancient authorities. By understanding this science a person can immediately give up the illusion of material duality." [*Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* 11.24.1]

Therefore there is no fault if the *Sāṅkhya-smṛti* of the atheist Kapila is rejected, because it is opposed to the *Vedas* and is the work of a person who is not a spiritual authority.

Sūtra 2.1.2

> *itareṣāccānupalabdheḥ*
>
> *itareṣām* – of others, mainly the points raised in the Sāṅkhya philosophy; *ca* – and; *anupalabdheḥ* – because of non-perception.
>
> **Many other [doctrines taught in the Sāṅkhya philosophy] also are not found [in the *Vedas*, hence this system is not authoritative.]**

The atheistic Sāṅkhya is unacceptable, not only because it teaches that *pradhāna* is the cause of creation, but also because it teaches many other doctrines that have no foundation in the *Vedas*. For example it teaches that:

- the *jīvas* are pure consciousness and all-pervading

- bondage and liberation are effects of *prakṛti* alone
- there is no Supreme Brahman or personal God
- time is not a *tattva*
- the *prāṇas* are merely forms of the five senses, and have no separate existence of their own

and many other anomalous and heterodox ideas, as discussed in detail above and refuted in other *sūtras* of the *Vedānta*. Therefore the atheistic Sāṅkhya and all other similar philosophies must be rejected.

For example, the modern so-called scientific creation myths share the deficiency of Sāṅkhya that matter can create independently. If the universe was really created in a 'Big Bang,' then who set it off? Where did the material ingredients originate? Who determined the universal laws that led to the universe as we see it today? No materialistic or atheistic theory can answer these questions satisfactorily. The material scientists want to ascribe everything to 'chance,' which simply means that they have substituted chance for God. Just as no one would want to live in a house that was designed by throwing dice, no one could live in a universe designed by chance.

Adhikaraṇa 2: Refutation of Yoga-sūtras

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: The present *sūtra* opens a new Adhikaraṇa, since *yoga* differs from *Sāṅkhya* in admitting the existence of the Lord; so the doubt arose that the refutation of *Sāṅkhya* did not necessarily require the refutation of *yoga*. This Adhikaraṇa removes that doubt.

It would be difficult to find an ancient text that has been misinterpreted and exploited more thoroughly in the West than the *Yoga-sūtras* of Patañjali. The commercial teaching of so-called "*yoga*" is a multi-million-dollar business, yet very little of what they teach has anything to do with the original source literature on the subject. Instead of a process of self-realization and linking the individual soul with God, *yoga* is misrepresented as a means to superior materialistic pleasure through sense enjoyment. This is often portrayed as somehow 'spiritual'; but if we inquire from such materialistic so-called *yogis* what is the precise definition of spiritual life according to *yoga* philosophy, they cannot give a satisfactory answer.

Perhaps the most egregious deception offered by the modern materialistic *yogis* is the impression that that the *yoga* system is of Vedic origin, or approved by the *Vedas*. This Adhikaraṇa will show that nothing could be further from the truth; in fact the philosophy of the eightfold *yoga* system is against the conclusions of the *Vedas*. Patañjali is merely the most famous recent exponent of the eightfold *yoga* system, which is very old, being mentioned in *Bhagavad-gītā* [4.27]:

> *sarvāṇīndriya-karmāṇi*
> *prāṇa-karmāṇi cāpare*
> *ātma-saṁyama-yogāgnau*
> *juhvati jñāna-dīpite*
>
> "Others, who are interested in achieving self-realization through control of the mind and senses, offer the functions of all the senses, and of the life breath, as oblations into the fire of the controlled mind."

In the *Yoga-sūtras* of Patañjali, the soul is either *parāg-ātmā* or *pratyag-ātmā*. As long as the soul is attached to sense enjoyment he is called *parāg-ātmā*, but when the soul becomes detached from sense enjoyment he is called *pratyag-ātmā*. The soul is subjected to the functions of ten kinds of subtle air [*prāṇa-vāyu*] at work within the body, and this subtle internal air can be controlled through the

breathing system. The Patañjali system of *haṭha-yoga* gives a technical procedure, *prāṇāyāma,* to control the functions of the *prāṇa-vāyu* so that its functions become favorable for purifying the soul of material attachment. The senses interact with the sense objects, like the ear for hearing, eyes for seeing, nose for smelling, tongue for tasting, hands for touching, etc. and all of them are thus engaged in activities outside the self. According to this *yoga* system, the ultimate goal of *pratyag-ātmā* is reached when the soul withdraws from activities in matter.

There are eight stages or limbs in the practice of Yoga:

1. *yama* [positive regulative injunctions]
2. *niyama* [negative regulative injunctions]
3. *āsana* [sitting postures]
4. *prāṇāyāma* [breath control]
5. *pratyāhāra* [withdrawal of the senses from their objects]
6. *dhāraṇā* [concentration of the mind]
7. *dhyāna* [meditation]
8. *samādhi* [ecstatic spiritual trance]

The *prāṇa-vāyu* has various functions: the *apāna-vāyu* goes downwards, *vyāna-vāyu* acts to shrink and expand, *samāna-vāyu* adjusts equilibrium, *udāna-vāyu* goes upwards—and when one is enlightened, one engages all these in searching for self-realization.

Yoga practice is supposed to be based on the principles of the Patañjali system. But the modern unauthorized commentators and teachers of *yoga*, if they are interested in spiritual matters at all, think that liberation means to identify the individual soul with the Supersoul. They do not understand the real purpose of the Patañjali system of *yoga*. There is acceptance of transcendental pleasure in the Patañjali system, but the monists do not want to accept this transcendental pleasure out of fear of jeopardizing the theory of oneness. The monists reject the duality of knowledge and knower necessary for the experience of transcendental pleasure, but actually transcendental pleasure, realized through transcendental senses, is accepted in this system. This is corroborated by Patañjali Muni, who declares in his *Yoga-sūtras* [4.34]:

> *puruṣārtha-śūnyānāṁ guṇānāṁ pratiprasavaḥ kaivalyaṁ svarūpa-pratiṣṭhā vā citi-śaktir iti*
>
> "Kaivalya is the state [of Enlightenment] when the primary elements involve, or resolve themselves back into that out of which they emerged because of their becoming devoid of the object of the Purusa. In this state the Purusa is established in his real nature [*citi-śakti*], wherein the power of pure consciousness becomes established in its true nature."

The *citi-śakti* or internal potency mentioned in this *sūtra* is transcendental. *Puruṣārtha* means material religiosity, economic development, sense gratification and finally the futile attempt to become one with the Supreme. The monists consider *kaivalyam* to be oneness with the Supreme; but according to Patañjali, *kaivalyam* is an internal transcendental potency by which the living entity becomes aware of his actual constitutional position.

The theory of *nirvāṇa* also corresponds with this principle. After *nirvāṇa*, or cessation of material consciousness, there is the manifestation of spiritual activities, or devotional service to the Lord. In the words of the *Bhāgavatam, svarūpeṇa vyavasthitiḥ:* this is the "real life of the living entity."

muktir hitvānyathā rūpaṁ
sva-rūpeṇa vyavasthitiḥ

"Liberation is the permanent situation of the form of the living entity after he gives up the changeable gross and subtle material bodies." [*Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* 2.10.6]

Māyā, or illusion, is the condition of spiritual life contaminated by material infection. Liberation from this material infection does not mean destruction of the original eternal position of the living entity. Patañjali also accepts this by his words *kaivalyaṁ svarūpa-pratiṣṭhā vā citi-śaktir iti*. This *citi-śakti*, or transcendental pleasure, is real life. This is confirmed in the *Vedānta-sūtra* [1.1.12], *ānanda-mayo 'bhyāsāt*. This natural transcendental pleasure is the ultimate goal of *yoga,* and is easily achieved by execution of devotional service, or *bhakti-yoga.* A devotee does not need to practice *aṣṭāṅga-yoga* in order to transfer his soul to the spiritual planets. This is confirmed by the following verse in the *Varāha Purāṇa:*

nayāmi paramaṁ sthānam arcirādi-gatiṁ vinā
garuḍa-skandham āropya yathecchaṁ anivāritaḥ

"Just as a child is completely cared for by his parents, a devotee does not need to endeavor to transfer himself to other planets by *yoga* practice. A man who has fallen in the ocean cannot save himself unless someone comes and picks him up from the water. Similarly, by His great mercy, the Supreme Lord, riding on His bird carrier Garuḍa, picks up the devotee from this material existence."

Bhakti-yoga will be vividly described in the Third Adhyāya of *Vedānta-sūtra*.

In the *yoga* system as described by Patañjali, there are two kinds of *samādhi: samprajñāta-samādhi* and *asamprajñāta-samādh*i. When one becomes situated in the transcendental position by various philosophical researches, he is said to have achieved *samprajñāta-samādhi*. In the *asamprajñāta-samādhi* there is no longer any connection with mundane pleasure, for one is then transcendental to all sorts of happiness derived from the senses. When the *yogī* is once situated in that transcendental position, he is never shaken from it. The *yogī* is unsuccessful unless he is able to reach this transcendental position. Today's so-called *yoga* practice, which accepts various sense pleasures, is contradictory. A *yogī* indulging in sex and intoxication is a mockery. Even those *yogīs* who are attracted by the *siddhis* [mystic perfections], the byproducts of the process of *yoga,* are not perfectly situated. *Yogīs* who are attracted by the byproducts of *yoga* cannot attain the stage of perfection, because they remain attached to the subtle manifestations of the *gunas* or material qualities. Those who indulge in the showy practice of gymnastic feats or mystic *siddhis* as so-called *yoga* have lost the real aim of *yoga*.

One may sincerely accept the path of self-realization, but the process of cultivation of knowledge and the practice of the eightfold *yoga* system are generally very difficult for this age. Therefore despite constant endeavor one may fail. First of all, one may not be sufficiently serious about following the process. To pursue the transcendental path is more or less equivalent to declaring war on the illusory energy. Consequently, whenever a person tries to escape the clutches of the illusory energy, she tries to defeat the practitioner by various allurements. A conditioned soul is already allured by the modes of material energy, and there is every chance of being allured again, even while performing transcendental disciplines. This is called *yogāc calita-mānasaḥ:* deviation from the transcendental path.

arjuna uvāca
ayatiḥ śraddhayopeto
yogāc calita-mānasaḥ

aprāpya yoga-saṁsiddhiṁ
kāṁ gatiṁ kṛṣṇa gacchati

> Arjuna said: "O Kṛṣṇa, what is the destination of the unsuccessful transcendentalist, who in the beginning takes to the process of self-realization with faith but who later desists due to worldly-mindedness and thus does not attain perfection in mysticism?" [*Bhagavad-gītā* 6.37]

Even if the practice of mystic *yogas* like the Patañjali system of *haṭha-yoga* or *aṣṭāṅga-yoga* is successful, the ultimate result is temporary material perfections like birth on higher planets, mystical experiences and powers, or at best, merging into the existence of the impersonal Absolute. While these *yogīs* are sincerely seeking a higher status of life, the actual Vedic conclusion of the highest stage of life as expressed in *Vedānta-sūtra* is the direct service of the Supreme Lord. This highest goal of spiritual life, transcendental consciousness, cannot be attained by any of the nondevotional *yoga* systems, but only by the mercy of the Lord and His bona fide devotees. The *haṭha-yoga* or *aṣṭāṅga-yoga* system is actually a distraction, a deviation from the principles of *Vedānta*. Therefore for reasons similar to those discussed in the previous Adhikaraṇa, the *yoga-smṛti* is also rejected.

Saṁśaya [arisal of doubt]: Perhaps there is some value to the eightfold *yoga* system; after all Kṛṣṇa mentions it in *Bhagavad-gītā*, and many famous teachers endorse it.

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: We admit that the *Vedānta* should not be explained on the basis of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy, because it is opposed to the theistic philosophy of *Vedānta*. But the *sūtras* of *Vedānta* may be explained according to the philosophy of *yoga*, because it is based on the teachings of *Vedānta* and is not opposed to it. In fact, *yoga* is in complete harmony with the Vedic scriptures, and may therefore be called a *Śrauta* philosophy. It is mentioned in the *Upaniṣads* thus:

> "That they hold to be *yoga*, which is the firm restraint of the senses. Then one becomes not heedless. *Yoga* should be performed with regard to the Lord, from whom is the origin and destruction of all things." [*Kaṭha Upaniṣad* 6.11]

> "Nachiketas having then obtained all the knowledge and practices of *yoga* imparted by Yāmarāja, attained Brahman, became free from *rajas* [passion] and beyond death; anyone else who thus knows the Spirit certainly becomes liberated."

Similarly, the method of postures and other limbs of *yoga* are taught in the *Bhagavad-gītā* [6.13-14]:

samaṁ kāya-śiro-grīvaṁ
dhārayann acalaṁ sthiraḥ
samprekṣya nāsikāgraṁ svaṁ
diśaś cānavalokayan

praśāntātmā vigata-bhīr
brahmacāri-vrate sthitaḥ
manaḥ saṁyamya mac-citto
yukta āsīta mat-paraḥ

> "One should hold one's body, neck and head erect in a straight line and stare steadily at the tip of the nose. Thus with an unagitated, subdued mind, devoid of fear, completely free from sex life, one should meditate upon Me within the heart and make Me the ultimate goal of life."

Therefore, Patañjali composed the *Yoga-smṛti* so that men may conquer *saṁsāra* by crossing over the difficult ocean of the world. He is one of the best authors, and has composed his philosophy through his great Yogic powers. His aphorisms begin:

atha yogānuśāsbhanam

"Now, an explanation of *yoga*." [*Yoga-sūtras* 1.1]

yogaścittavṛttinirodhaḥ

"*Yoga* is the cessation of the modifications of the thinking principle." [*Yoga-sūtras* 1.2]

These *sūtras* are not opposed to *Vedānta*. If this *Yoga-smṛti*, which merely deals with the concentration of the mind, be held unauthoritative, then it will find no scope anywhere else; and if the *Vedānta* texts are explained by the method of *samanvaya*, without regard to any other *smṛti*, then this *Yoga-smṛti* becomes redundant. Therefore the *Vedānta* texts should be explained as to give scope to the *Yoga-smṛti,* and the doctrine of *samanvaya* should not be carried to an extreme. The *Smṛtis* like Manu and the rest, being concerned with the *karma-kaṇḍa* may be contradicted in certain parts by the *Yoga-smṛti;* but they will still have scope since they teach practical duties [*dharma*]. Therefore, the *Vedānta* texts should be construed by the *Yoga-smṛti* and not exclusively in accordance with *samanvaya*.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: The author replies to this objection with the following *sūtra:*

Sūtra 2.1.3

etena yogaḥ pratyuktaḥ

etena - by this; *yogaḥ* - the *Yoga* doctrine as to creation, etc.; *pratyuktaḥ* - has been refuted.

The *Yoga-smṛti* is also understood to have been refuted by the above refutation of the *Sāṅkhya-smṛti.*

The theory of *yoga* is also refuted on similar grounds to those employed to refute the Sāṅkhya theory of creation, for the *yoga* theory is at odds with the philosophy of *Vedānta*. If the *Vedānta* texts were to be explained in harmony with the *Yoga-smṛti*, then the other *smṛtis*, like Manu and the rest that are in harmony with *Vedānta*, would have no scope and become useless. Therefore, the *Vedānta* texts about creation are not to be explained or interpreted according to the *Yoga-smṛti.*

It is not a fact that the *yoga* theory of creation is harmonious with the *Vedānta* theory of cosmogony, for similar to the *Sāṅkhya* texts, the *Yoga-smṛti* says that the *pradhāna* is the independent cause of creation. According to the *Yoga-smṛti*, Brahman and the *jīvas* are mere consciousness [*citi-mātrāḥ*], without attributes or potencies, and both are all-pervading [*vibhu*].

Yoga theory is not only opposed to *Vedānta* on this point, but on many others also. For example, *yoga* teaches that:

- *Mukti* is merely the cessation of pain as a result of *Yoga* practice.
- The threefold means of right knowledge as given in the *yoga* texts are not given in *Vedānta*.
- The five *vṛttis* or functions of the mind mentioned by *Yoga-smṛti* are not supported by *Vedānta* philosophy.

Yoga philosophy holds that *pramāna* or right knowledge has three divisions—perception, inference and testimony—it also holds that the *citta* or thinking principle has five modifications: right knowledge, false knowledge, desire, sleep and memory. All these ideas are found in the *Yoga-smṛti* alone; therefore being opposed to *Vedānta* on these matters, the *Yoga-smṛti* is not a valid philosophy and should be rejected. If it is objected that the *Yoga* philosophy would find no scope as a result, then we say, let it be

so. Since the *Yoga-smṛti* is opposed to *Vedānta*, there is no loss if there is no scope left to it. In fact, all the arguments against the *Sāṅkhya-smṛti* in the previous Adhikaraṇa also apply against the *Yoga-smṛti*.

Certain Vedic texts appear to make reference to the practices of *yoga*, for example:

> "Making the three raised parts of the body steady and placing his senses into his heart with his intellect, the wise man should cross all the fearful streams of material existence on the raft of *oṁ*, the Brahman." [*Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 2.8]
>
> "The chief Eternal among all eternals, the chief conscious entity among all conscious entities, who though one, disposes to the many the objects of their desires; one who knows that Lord, the prime cause, who is knowable through *Sāṅkhya* and *yoga* is freed from all bondage." [*Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 6.13]

The words *Sāṅkhya* and *yoga* here, however, mean metaphysical analysis of the material elements and deep meditation, respectively, and do not refer to the *smṛtis* with the same names. The same is true of the text from *Bhagavad-gītā* quoted earlier by the *pūrvapakṣin*.

Mukti cannot be obtained by the method taught by *yoga*, namely, by discrimination between *prakṛti* [material nature, or the body] and *puruṣa* [the controller of nature, or the soul], which is also the favorite method of *Sāṅkhya*. According to *Vedānta*, liberation depends on knowledge of God plus the grace of God, and not merely on discrimination between the soul and matter. That may be a necessary stage of spiritual practice, but it is certainly not sufficient by itself to award liberation from material existence. This is proved by the following texts:

> "I know that Great Spirit, shining like the sun and transcending the world of darkness. It is only by knowing Him that one escapes death; there is no other path to go upon." [*Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 3.8]
>
> "Knowing Him alone, let the wise *brāhmaṇa* meditate constantly. Let him not study many books, for verily all that is a waste of energy." [*Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4.4.21]
>
> "He who meditates on Him, feels joy in Him and is devoted to Him, alone gets immortality and no one else."

Vedānta philosophy accepts the parts of *Sāṅkhya* and *yoga* that are not opposed to the Vedic conclusion. We do not hold any animosity against these schools, but take exception to certain doctrines and theories of theirs that are opposed to the authorized Vedic explanations of creation and liberation. We simply discard the portions of these teachings that are opposed to *Vedānta* and accept the rest.

For example, *yoga* is not atheistic like *Sāṅkhya*, for it admits the existence of God, as expressed in several *sūtras* similar to the following:

> *īśvārapraṇidhānātvā*
>
> "Concentration may be obtained by complete concentration on God."
>
> *kleśakarmavipākāsayairaparāmṛṣṭaḥ puruṣaviśeṣa īśvaraḥ*
>
> "The Lord is a particular spiritual being untouched by sin, evil, suffering actions and the fruits of actions."

Yet these *sūtras* are not absolutely necessary for the *yoga* system, and many of its more atheistic followers say that the author of *yoga* was not in his right mind when he wrote these particular aphorisms, and they are merely an anomaly or a mistake.

Besides the *yoga* and *Sāṅkhya-smṛtis*, the *Nyāya* of Gautama and the *Vaiśeṣika* of Kaṇāda contain views opposed to *Vedānta* philosophy, especially in their theories of creation and liberation; therefore we reject them, and will refute them in later sections. No doubt the authors of these treatises are very learned and wise, but their erroneous conclusions are either the result of their own conceit, thinking they are omniscient when actually they are merely human beings, or because of some mysterious purpose of His own, the Lord willed that they should write such deluding theories. In fact, some writers speculate that the Lord had them write their works just so they could be refuted by the commentaries on *Vedānta*, and thus bring out its perfect symmetry and harmoniousness with the entire Vedic literature. Certainly such atheistic theories are in tune with the mood of the Kali-yuga, which perhaps explains the popularity in the West of teachings ostensibly based on them.

Adhikaraṇa 3: The Vedas are Eternal and Infallible

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: The principal, and really the sole, axiomatic truth in Vedic philosophy is that the transcendental sound vibration of the Vedic literature is perfect and infallible; everything else is understood from the original Vedic texts by a process of deductive logic. This path of acceptance is called *avaroha-panthā.* The word *avaroha* is related to the word *avatāra*, which means "that which descends." This *avaroha-panthā,* the standard Vedic epistemological system, is the basis of the Vedic disciplic succession called the *paramparā* system. Therefore whatever the *Vedas* or *Vedānta-sūtra* says, we should accept without argument as Absolute Truth.

The transcendental philosophy and the principles of religion are established by the authorized explanations of Vedic literature. They cannot be ascertained merely through mundane exercises in logic. In the *Puruṣa-sūkta* [*Ṛg Veda, maṇḍala* 10, *sūkta* 90, *mantra* 9] it is stated,

> *tasmād yajñāt sarva-huta ṛcaḥ sāmāni jajñjire*
> *chandāṁsi jajñjire tasmāt*
>
> "From Him, Yajña, came all sacrificial offerings, hymns of invocation and songs of praise. All the *mantras* of the *Vedas* come from the Lord."

It is stated in the *Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* [6.1.40]:

> *veda-praṇihito dharmo*
> *hy adharmas tad-viparyayaḥ*
> *vedo nārāyaṇaḥ sākṣāt*
> *svayambhūr iti śuśruma*
>
> "That which is prescribed in the *Vedas* constitutes *dharma*, the religious principles, and the opposite of that is irreligion. The *Vedas* are directly the Supreme Personality of Godhead, Nārāyaṇa, and are self-born. This we have heard from Yamarāja."

Similarly, in *Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* [6.16.51] the Lord says,

> *ahaṁ vai sarva-bhūtāni*
> *bhūtātmā bhūta-bhāvanaḥ*
> *śabda-brahma paraṁ brahma*
> *mamobhe śāśvatī tanū*
>
> "All living entities, moving and nonmoving, are My expansions and are separate from Me. I am the Supersoul of all living beings, who exist because I manifest them. I am the form of the transcendental vibrations like *oṁkāra* and Hare Kṛṣṇa Hare Rāma, and I am the Supreme Absolute Truth. These two forms of Mine—namely, the transcendental sound vibration of the

Vedas and the eternally blissful spiritual form of the Deity, are My eternal forms; they are not material."

All the incarnations of the Supreme Personality of Godhead are completely transcendental and free from the four defects of conditioned life, namely mistakes, illusion, cheating and imperfect senses. So Vedic knowledge, being a plenary manifestation of the Supreme Lord, is similarly infallible and transcendental.

Materialistic people do not like the Vedic way of acceptance, because they think it limits their independence. Therefore the materialist wants to understand everything by the *āroha-panthā*—by speculative argument and inferential reason—but transcendental matters cannot be understood in that way, because they are beyond the range of our imperfect senses and limited intelligence. Rather, one must follow the *avaroha-panthā*, the process of descending knowledge or revelation because the origin of the eternal Vedic wisdom is the infallible Supreme Personality of Godhead. If not, then we must accept a constantly changing array of foolish contradictory theories that cannot adequately explain the world that we see before us, or the inner life of consciousness that we experience every day.

The rebellious nature of the materialists is mirrored by their insistence, against all logic and evidence, that matter has independent creative potency and intelligence. They want us to believe that the complex structures of living entities are developed by a process of evolution driven by chance mutation, and that the subtle qualities and experiences of mind and consciousness are due simply to electrochemical changes in our brains. They criticize the *Vedas* because they require faith, but they do not admit that their own theories require enormous leaps of faith against all experience and common sense.

Actually, in the end the *Vedas* do not require faith, for one who follows their instructions is able to realize and verify everything simply with his own purified and spiritualized consciousness. This is far more scientific than putting forward theories like the Big Bang and evolution that have not been, and can never be, verified by objective observation or experiment. The materialistic scientists' insistence that subjective evidence is unacceptable is simply a ruse to discourage serious research into the nature of consciousness, because that would reveal the transcendental nature of the soul and ultimately, the Supreme Personality of Godhead.

Saṁśaya [arisal of doubt]: If the *smṛtis* like *Sāṅkhya* and the rest are to be set aside as invalid and *anāpta* [not spiritually authoritative] merely because they are opposed to the *Vedas*, then you must first establish that the *Vedas* themselves are infallible and contain nothing that is opposed to science or reason.

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: Is the *Veda* fallible or infallible? Is it the product of an *āpta* [spiritual authority] or an *anāpta?* If the *Veda* is infallible, then everything it says would turn out to be true. But that is not the case. For example it says, "Let a person who desires rain perform the *Kāriri* sacrifice." Now it is seen that the performance of the *Kāriri* sacrifice does not inevitably produce rain. Therefore, the *Veda* is not infallible.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: The author replies to this objection with the following *sūtra:*

Sūtra 2.1.4

na vilakṣaṇatvātasya tathātvacca śabdāt

na – not; *vilakṣaṇatvāt* – because of the difference in characteristics; *asya* – of the *Veda; tathātvam* – the eternity, the authority; *ca* – and; *śabdāt* – from the scripture.

The *Veda* is authoritative [unlike the *Sāṅkhya-smṛti*, etc.] because it is of a different character altogether, and because it is established from the scriptures.

The *Veda* is authoritative, unlike the *Sāṅkhya-smṛti, Yoga-smṛti* and others. Why? *Vilakṣaṇatvāt:* because it is fundamentally different in character from relative materialistic knowledge, being eternal and spoken by God. Every product of human effort is subject to four kinds of errors: ignorance leading to error, the cheating propensity, delusion due to being covered by a material body, and imperfect senses and intelligence. These errors are impossible in the case of the *Veda*, because it is eternal and not of human origin. These attributes are proved from the scripture itself, in both *śruti*- and *smṛti-śāstra*.

> *tasmai nunaṁ abhidyave vācā virupa nityayā*
> *vṛṣṇe codasya su-stutim*
>
> "Now, O Virupa, rouse for Him, strong God who is ever Self-satisfied, fair praise with the eternal Vedic speech." [*Ṛg-Veda*, 7.91.6]

Thus the *Śruti* itself calls the *mantras* of the *Vedas* by the significant term *nitya-vak*, the Eternal Voice. The *Smṛtis* also declare the *Vedas* to be eternal:

> "The Self-existing Lord, in the beginning of creation, sent forth the eternal, beginningless Voice, the divine *Veda*, from which proceeded all other scriptures." [*Mahābhārata*]

The *Smṛtis*, like those of Manu and the rest, are authoritative simply because they are based on the *Vedas*, and for no other reason. The eternity of the *Vedas* was established in *Sūtra* 1.3.29 by reasoning. In the present *sūtra* it is established by authority; that is the difference between these two *sūtras*.

An objector may say, "The *Vedas* are non-eternal because we find in them statements to the effect that they were created at a certain time, and everything that is created necessarily ends at some time. The following *śloka* of the *Puruṣa-Sūkta* prayers shows that the *Vedas* were created:

> "The *Ricas* and *Sāma* hymns were born from that great general sacrifice, and from them spells and charms were produced. The *Yajus* had its birth from Him." [*Ṛg-Veda* 10.90.9]

To this objection we reply, it is not so. In this passage the word *jan* does not mean "was born" in the ordinary sense, but "was manifested." As stated in the following verse:

> "This Lord *Veda* is Self-existent [eternal]. You, O God, have sung it out in ancient times. The great ones, from Śiva down to the Ṛṣis, are its reciters only and not its authors."

Nor can it validly be objected that the *Vedas* are unauthoritative because they do not always produce the results promised by them. The production of any particular result depends on the qualification of the person performing the act. A competent person always gets the predicted result by the proper chanting of the Vedic hymns, while an incompetent person fails to get the expected result. The failure to obtain the result proves only the incompetence of the agent, and not the defectiveness of the science. However, the *Smṛtis* like *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga* are unauthoritative not because they fail to produce the results promised by them, but because they conflict with the teachings of the *Vedas* on the important points of creation, liberation of the soul, the nature of the Supreme Personality of Godhead, etc. because they are products of defective human intelligence. The great sage Bhṛgu Muni states in *Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* [4.2.30]:

> *eṣa eva hi lokānāṁ*
> *śivaḥ panthāḥ sanātanaḥ*
> *yaṁ pūrve cānusantasthur*
> *yat-pramāṇaṁ janārdanaḥ*

> "The *Vedas* give the eternal regulative principles for auspicious advancement in human civilization which have been rigidly followed in the past. The strong evidence of this principle is the Supreme Personality of Godhead, who is called Janārdana, the well-wisher of all living entities."

In the *Bhagavad-gītā* the Supreme Personality of Godhead, Kṛṣṇa, claims to be the father of all living entities. Because the living entities are parts and parcels of the Supreme Personality of Godhead, they are all children of the Lord. The Lord kindly manifests the *Vedas* for their guidance and benefit, because they are hovering on the mental platform under the false impression that they can lord it over material nature. Therefore the *Vedas* are called *apauruṣeya:* not written by any man or demigod, including the first living creature, Brahmā. Brahmā is not the creator or author of the *Vedas*. He is also one of the living beings in this material world; therefore he does not have the power to write or speak the *Vedas* independently.

Every living entity within this material world is subject to four deficiencies: he commits mistakes, he is illusioned, he cheats, and he has imperfect senses. The *Vedas*, however, are not written by any living creature within this material world, but originate from the Supreme Personality of Godhead Himself. Therefore they are said to be *apauruṣeya*. No one can trace out the history of the *Vedas*. Of course, modern human civilization has no chronological history of the world or the universe older than 5,000 years, and it cannot present actual historical facts older than three thousand years. But no one has traced out when the *Vedas* were written, because they were never written by any living being within this material world.

All other systems of knowledge are defective because they have been written or spoken by men or demigods who are products of this material creation, but the *Vedas* are *apauruṣeya*. That is accepted by such stalwart scholars as Śaṅkarācārya, not to speak of Vaiṣṇava *ācāryas* such as Rāmānujācārya and Madhvācārya. Śaṅkarācārya has accepted that Nārāyaṇa and Kṛṣṇa are transcendental, and in *Bhagavad-gītā* [10.8] Lord Kṛṣṇa has declared,

> *ahaṁ sarvasya prabhavo mattaḥ sarvaṁ pravartate*
>
> "I am the origin of everything; everything emanates from Me."

This material creation, including Brahmā and Śiva and all the demigods, has been created by Him, for everything has emanated from Him. He also says in *Bhagavad-gītā* [15.15]:

> *vedaiś ca sarvair aham eva vedyo*
> *vedānta-kṛd veda-vid eva cāham*
>
> "By all the *Vedas* am I to be known; indeed I am the compiler of *Vedānta*, and I am the knower of the *Vedas*."

In the beginning of *Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* it is established, *tene brahma hṛdā:* the Supreme Absolute Truth, the Personality of Godhead, instructed Brahmā in the Vedic knowledge through his heart. Therefore the evidence that Vedic knowledge is free from the defects of mistakes, illusions, cheating and imperfection is that it is spoken by the Supreme Personality of Godhead, Janārdana, and has thus been followed from time immemorial, beginning from Brahmā. The Vedic religion or the principles of the *Vedas* have been followed by the highly cultured population of India since time immemorial; no one can trace out the history of Vedic religion. Therefore it is *sanātana* [eternal], and any blasphemy against the *Vedas* is calculated to be atheism. The *Vedas* are described as *setu* [a bridge]. If one wants to attain his spiritual existence, one has to cross an ocean of nescience. The *Vedas* are the bridge by which to cross that great ocean.

Adhikaraṇa 4: Terms like Fire, Earth etc. Denote the Superintending Devas

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: The materialistic creation theories all require that we accept an impossible assumption: that dull, inert matter somehow or other can create itself, organize itself and manifest the symptoms of life. We experience daily that matter cannot do anything without the energy and intelligence of living entities. And while we may not be able to observe consciousness in others except by its symptoms, we can certainly observe it directly in ourselves. Therefore the correct understanding is that the energy and intelligence shown by the material creation come from the Supreme Personality of Godhead, and the consciousness and other living symptoms displayed by the living entities actually indicate the presence of the *jīva* souls emanated from Him.

The effect [the creation] mirrors the attributes found in the cause [Brahman or the Supreme Personality of Godhead]. Unless energy, intelligence, consciousness etc. are there in the cause of the material creation, how can they be manifest in the effect? The causes that materialistic theories such as Sāṅkhya, Buddhism and material science put forward for the material creation [*pradhāna, śunyata*, the Big Bang, etc.] do not possess the qualities such as energy, intelligence, sentience etc. that we see displayed in the creation. So in assuming that matter can manifest these qualities independently, essentially they are asking us to believe that nonexistence can manifest existence, or that something comes from nothing.

In the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.4.1-5.2 we read:

> "The *Sat* was alone in the beginning, one only, without an equal. The others say about this, 'The *Asat* alone existed in the beginning, one without a second. From the *Asat* was produced the *Sat*.'
>
> "But, O child, how could it be thus?" said the father. "How should the *Sat* be born from *Asat*? Therefore the *Sat* existed alone in the beginning, O child, one without an equal.
>
> "He thought, 'I shall assume many forms and create beings.' He created fire. The fire thought, 'I shall assume many forms and create beings.' That created the waters.
>
> "The waters thought, 'We shall assume many forms and create beings.' That created the food.
>
> "Then God thought, 'These three *devatās* are well-created; now I shall enter into them with that aspect of Mine called the Living Self, and shall develop name and form.' "

Saṁśaya [arisal of doubt]: How do you reconcile these absurd statements of the *Vedas*, such as:

> "The fire willed, 'Let me become many'; the water willed, 'Let me become many.'
> " [*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.4]
>
> "The *prāṇas*, quarreling among themselves, went to Lord Brahmā and asked who was the best among them." [*Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad*]

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: The elements like fire and so forth are insentient, and to say that they willed or quarreled is as reasonable as to say that "the sons of barren woman held a discussion." Therefore, one section of the *Vedas* being proved unauthoritative, the portion asserting that Brahman is the cause of the world is also without authority. The cause of the world is therefore the *pradhāna*.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: The author replies to this objection in the following *sūtra*.

Sūtra 2.1.5

> *abhimāni vyapadeśastu viśeṣanugatibhyām*

abhimāni – the presiding deities of the elements, etc.; *vyapadeśaḥ* – pointing out of, denotation of; *tu* – but; *viśeṣa* – on account of distinction, being so qualified; *anugatibhyām* – on account of their entering.

[The words fire etc. here denote] the superintending *devas*, because [the epithet] *deva* is mentioned there, and also because the statement that they entered these elements.

The word *tu* [but] shows that the doubt of the *pūrvapakṣin* is being removed.

Why do you say so? The phrases "the fire willed," etc. clearly mean the conscious superintending *devas* of these elements, because the epithet *devatā* is expressly given in the same passage. *Devatā* means a conscious living being, a demigod; so they cannot be inanimate elements, but empowered cosmic intelligences.

Similarly, the passage regarding the quarrel among the *prāṇas* refers to the *devatās*, as the following quotation shows:

> "Next follows the recognition of the pre-eminence of the *prāṇa* by the other *devatās*. All the *devatās*, contending with one another to assert their own pre-eminence, went out of the body. It lay inert like a piece of wood. Then speech entered into it. It spoke and lay down still. Then they eye entered into it. It spoke and saw, but lay down still. Then the ear entered into it, and it spoke, saw and heard, but still lay down. Then the mind entered into it, and it spoke, saw, heard and thought, but still lay down. Then the *prāṇa* entered into it, and it immediately got up. All these *devatās*, knowing the *prāṇa* to be pre-eminent, and fully comprehending Him as the conscious Self, went out of this world with all these." [*Kauṣītakī Upaniṣad* 2.9]

Here again, the term *devatās* is applied to the senses. Consequently the quarrel was among the *devas* of the senses, and not among inanimate elements. Not only is the specific term *devatās* applied to them, but also in other *Upaniṣads* we find that the *devas* entered into these elements and senses to regulate their activities. For example in *Aitareya Ārṇayaka* [2.4.2.4] it is said,

> "After those *devatās*, Agni and others had been created, they fell into a great ocean... Then Agni becoming speech, entered into the mouth. Vāyu having becoming scent, entered into the nostrils. Āditya becoming sight, entered the eyes. The Diś, becoming hearing, entered the ears."

This shows that the terms Agni etc. mean the the superintending *devas* of the senses. The entering of the *devas* into the senses and body is another reason for holding that sentient entities, and not insentient elements, are meant. For example, *Bhaviṣya Purāṇa* states:

> "The superintending *devatās* of earth, etc. possessed of inconceivable energies and mighty powers, are actually seen by the sages."

Similarly, apparently impossible phrases such as "the stones float," as in the passages describing Lord Rāma's crossing the ocean, should be understood as praises of the *devatās* within them. The *devatās* within the stones and water held up the stones and made them float. Not only do the *devatās* enter into the material elements; it is stated that the Supreme Personality of Godhead also enters into the elements of the creation:

> *yathā mahānti bhūtāni*
> *bhūteṣūccāvaceṣv anu*
> *praviṣṭāny apraviṣṭāni*
> *tathā teṣu na teṣv aham*

> "O Brahmā, please know that the universal elements enter into the cosmos and at the same time do not enter into the cosmos; similarly, I Myself also exist within everything created, and at the same time I am outside of everything. [*Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* 2.9.35]

The great elements of material creation—namely earth, water, fire, air and ether—enter into the bodies of all manifested entities—the seas, mountains, aquatics, plants, reptiles, birds, beasts, human beings, demigods and everyone materially manifested—and at the same time the elements are situated outside their manifestations as the *devatās* or controlling deities of the elements. Human beings in the developed stage of consciousness can study physiological and physical science, but the basic principles of such sciences are nothing but the material elements. The body of the human being and the body of the mountain, as also the bodies of the demigods, including Brahmā, are all of the same ingredients—earth, water, etc.—and at the same time, the elements are beyond the body. The elements were created first, and entered into the bodily construction later, but in both circumstances they entered the cosmos and its forms, and also did not enter. Similarly the Supreme Lord, by His different internal and external energies, is within everything in the manifested cosmos, and at the same time He is outside of everything, situated in the kingdom of God, Vaikuṇṭhaloka. This is very nicely stated in the *Brahma-saṁhitā* [5.37] as follows:

> *ānanda-cinmaya-rasa-pratibhāvitābhis*
> *tābhir ya eva nija-rūpatayā kalābhiḥ*
> *goloka eva nivasaty akhilātma-bhūto*
> *govindam ādi-puruṣaṁ tam ahaṁ bhajāmi*
>
> "I worship the Personality of Godhead, Govinda, who by expansion of His internal potency of transcendental existence, knowledge and bliss, enjoys in His own and expanded forms. Simultaneously He enters into every atom of the creation."

This expansion of His plenary parts is also more definitely explained in the *Brahma-saṁhitā* [5.35] as follows:

> *eko 'py asau racayituṁ jagad-aṇḍa-koṭiṁ*
> *yac-chaktir asti jagad-aṇḍa-cayā yad-antaḥ*
> *aṇḍāntara-stha-paramāṇu-cayāntara-sthaṁ*
> *govindam ādi-puruṣaṁ tam ahaṁ bhajāmi*
>
> "I worship the Personality of Godhead, Govinda, who, by one of His plenary portions, enters into the existence of every universe and every particle of the atoms, and thus unlimitedly manifests His infinite energy all over the material creation."

The impersonalists such as the Sāṅkhyas can imagine or even perceive that the Supreme Brahman is all-pervading in His impersonal form, but then they wrongly conclude that there is no possibility of His personal form. Herein lies the mystery of Vedic transcendental knowledge. This mystery is transcendental love of Godhead, and one who is surcharged with such transcendental love of Godhead can see the Personality of Godhead in every atom and every movable or immovable object without difficulty. And at the same time he can see the Personality of Godhead in His own abode, Goloka, enjoying eternal pastimes with His eternal associates, who are also expansions of His transcendental existence. This vision is the real mystery of spiritual knowledge, as stated by the Lord to Brahmā in the beginning of creation:

> *śrī-bhagavān uvāca*
> *jñānaṁ parama-guhyaṁ me*
> *yad vijñāna-samanvitam*

sarahasyaṁ tad-aṅgaṁ ca
gṛhāṇa gaditaṁ mayā

The Personality of Godhead said: "Knowledge about Me as described in the scriptures is very confidential, and it has to be realized in conjunction with devotional service. The necessary paraphernalia for that process is being explained by Me. You may take it up carefully." [*Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* 2.9.31]

This esoteric mystery is the most confidential part of the knowledge of the Supreme, and it is impossible for the mental speculators to discover by their intellectual gymnastics. The mystery can be revealed through the process recommended by Brahmājī in his *Brahma-saṁhitā* [5.38] as follows:

premāñjana-cchurita-bhakti-vilocanena
santaḥ sadaiva hṛdayeṣu vilokayanti
yaṁ śyāmasundaram acintya-guṇa-svarūpaṁ
govindam ādi-puruṣaṁ tam ahaṁ bhajāmi

"I worship the original Personality of Godhead, Govinda, whom the pure devotees, their eyes smeared with the ointment of love of Godhead, always observe within their hearts. This Govinda, the original Personality of Godhead, is Śyāmasundara with all transcendental qualities."

Therefore although He is present in every atom, the Supreme Personality of Godhead is invisible to the materialistic speculators; the mystery is unfolded before the eyes of the pure devotees because their eyes are anointed with love of Godhead. And this love of Godhead can be attained by the practice of transcendental loving service of the Lord, and nothing else. The process of devotional service is summarized in the Third Adhyāya of *Vedānta-sūtra*. The vision of the devotees is extraordinary because it is purified by the process of devotional service. In other words, as the universal elements are both within and without, similarly the Lord's name, form, quality, pastimes, entourage, etc., as they are described in the revealed scriptures or as performed in the Vaikuṇṭhalokas, far, far beyond the material cosmic manifestation, are factually manifest in the heart of the devotee. One with a poor fund of knowledge cannot understand, but that is the mystery of knowledge of the Personality of Godhead.

There is nothing unauthoritative in the *Vedas;* consequently the teaching of *Vedānta* that the Supreme Brahman is the sole cause of the material universe is firmly established, and the objections raised by the Sāṅkhyas and other atheistic speculators are invalid.

Adhikaraṇa 5: Brahman is the Material Cause of the Universe Established by Reason

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: So far *Vedānta-sūtra* has established that it is impossible for *pradhāna* or matter alone to be the cause of the creation. However the materialistic philosophers not only try to establish their own version, they also criticize the version of the *Vedas* and try to invalidate it. The chief attack of the materialist scholars is that spirit, if it exists at all, is so different from matter that it cannot possibly be the cause of the material creation. If there is any relationship at all, it must be that God created the initial conditions for material world ["Let there be light"], and the material energy created everything independently from there.

The demonic materialists conclude that this cosmic manifestation arises due to chance material actions and reactions. They do not think that the world was created by God for a certain purpose. They have their own theory: that the world has come about in its own way, and that there is no reason to believe

that there is a God behind it. For them there is no difference between spirit and matter; spirit is an illusion, everything is matter, and the whole cosmos is just a mass of ignorance. According to them, everything is ultimately impersonal or void, and whatever manifestation apparently exists is simply due to our ignorance in perception. They take it for granted that all manifestation of diversity is a display of ignorance. Such misinformed critics do not at all understand the relationship between spirit and matter.

nāsato vidyate bhāvo
nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ
ubhayor api dṛṣṭo 'ntas
tv anayos tattva-darśibhiḥ

"Those who are seers of the truth have concluded that of the nonexistent there is no endurance, and of the eternal there is no cessation. This they have concluded by studying the nature of both." [*Bhagavad-gītā* 2.16]

In other words, matter is temporary but spirit is eternal. In addition, before the creation of the material world and after its destruction in due course of time, only spirit exists:

aham evāsam evāgre
nānyad yat sad-asat param
paścād ahaṁ yad etac ca
yo 'vaśiṣyeta so 'smy aham

"Brahmā, it is I, the Personality of Godhead, who was existing before the creation, when there was nothing but Myself. Nor was there the material nature, the cause of this creation. That which you see now is also I, the Personality of Godhead, and after annihilation what remains will also be I, the Personality of Godhead." [*Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* 2.9.33]

Therefore only spirit can be the source of matter. Consequently, matter must be a transformation of spirit.

idaṁ hi viśvaṁ bhagavān ivetaro
yato jagat-sthāna-nirodha-sambhavāḥ
tad dhi svayaṁ veda bhavāṁs tathāpi te
prādeśa-mātraṁ bhavataḥ pradarśitam

"The Supreme Lord Personality of Godhead is Himself this cosmos, and still He is aloof from it. From Him only has this cosmic manifestation emanated, in Him it rests, and unto Him it enters after annihilation. Your good self knows all about this. I have given only a synopsis." [*Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* 1.5.20]

The entire cosmic manifestation is but a transformation of the energy of the Supreme Personality of Godhead, but because of illusion, the conditioned souls cannot appreciate that God is nondifferent from the material energy, and that this material world is simply a transformation of His different energies. It is stated in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* [6.8]:

parāsya śaktir vividhaiva śrūyate
svābhāvikī jñāna-bala-kriyā ca

"The Supreme Lord has multipotencies, which act so perfectly that all consciousness, strength and activity are being directed solely by His will."

This also supported by the *Vedas: sarvaṁ khalv idaṁ brahma:* "Matter and spirit are all nondifferent from the Supreme Brahman." Lord Śrī Kṛṣṇa confirms this statement in the *Bhagavad-gītā* [7.4]:

bhūmir āpo 'nalo vāyuḥ
khaṁ mano buddhir eva ca
ahaṅkāra itīyaṁ me
bhinnā prakṛtir aṣṭadhā

"Earth, water, fire, air, ether, mind, intelligence and false ego—all together these eight constitute My separated material energies."

The material energy is the Lord's energy, but it is separated from Him. The spiritual energy is also His energy, but it is not separated from Him. When the material energy is engaged in the service of the Supreme Spirit, so-called material energy becomes transformed into spiritual energy, just as an iron rod becomes fire when placed in contact with fire. Simply understanding the transformations of different energies is partial knowledge. When we can understand by an analytical study that the Supreme Personality of Godhead is the cause of all causes, our knowledge is perfect. We must come to the ultimate cause, and this requires a bona fide spiritual master in the Vedic lineage. Otherwise we shall remain entrapped by nescience:

na te viduḥ svārtha-gatiṁ hi viṣṇuṁ
durāśayā ye bahir-artha-māninaḥ
andhā yathāndhair upanīyamānās
te 'pīśa-tantryām uru-dāmni baddhāḥ

"Persons who are strongly entrapped by the consciousness of enjoying material life, and who have therefore accepted as their leader or *guru* a similar blind man attached to external sense objects, cannot understand that the goal of life is to return home, back to Godhead, and engage in the service of Lord Viṣṇu. As blind men guided by another blind man miss the right path and fall into a ditch, materially attached men led by another materially attached man are bound by the ropes of fruitive labor, which are made of very strong cords, and they continue again and again in materialistic life, suffering the threefold miseries." [*Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* 7.5.31]

The materialists want to be reassured that matter is independent from spirit, so they can push God far into the background, or better yet, eliminate Him entirely, and go on with their lusty program of material sense gratification in full confidence, free from the doubts of conscience. So they find some foolish lusty rascal just like themselves and elect him to the post of *guru*, so they can continue their material exploitation without being confronted by the Absolute Truth of the *Vedas*. They see the Vedic philosophy as a great challenge, not just to their religious and philosophical beliefs, but to their very existence. For if the *Vedas* are right, then everything they are thinking and doing is built upon a wrong platform.

Therefore even after being defeated in the preceding Adhikaraṇas, the Sāṅkhya philosopher comes to the attack again, saying that Brahman cannot be the material cause of the universe; this time not relying on texts, but on reason alone. Normally the Sāṅkhyas admit that reason is of little help in transcendental matters, such as the true nature of the Self, cosmogony, etc. and must be abandoned in favor of the *Śruti*. They even have the following aphorism:

śrutivirodhāt na kutarkāpadasyātmalābhaḥ

"The attainment of the Self cannot take place by mere false reasoning [*kutarka*, false arguments or sophistry alone], because it is opposed to the scriptures [*śruti*]." [*Sāṅkhya-smṛti* 6.35]

This apparent homage of the *Sāṅkhya* to the *Śruti* is only lip service, for the *Sāṅkhya* appeals to *Śruti* merely to find fault with *Vedānta*. The nature of the doubt raised is this:

Saṁśaya [arisal of doubt]: Is it possible for Brahman to be the material cause of the universe or not?

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: Brahman cannot be the material cause of the universe because the world is of a substantially different nature from Brahman. Brahman is understood to be omniscient, omnipotent, all-pure and possessing the highest joy as His nature. The world, on the other hand is seen to consist of ignorance, impotence, impurity and sorrow. Thus it is inarguable that the natures of Brahman and the material world are diametrically opposed. And it is a fact of daily experience that the effect of a cause has the same nature as the cause. For example, a pot or a crown or a piece of cloth have the same nature as the clay, gold or threads of which they are made. Therefore the world, having a different nature from Brahman, cannot have Him as its material cause.

We must, therefore, search out some appropriate material cause for the world, and we find that in *pradhāna* alone. The world consists of joy, sorrow and delusion, and for such a world, the *pradhāna* consisting of *sattva, rajas* and *tamas* is the most appropriate cause. The *Vedānta* philosopher says, "We explain this by positing the existence of two energies, spirit and matter, both dwelling in Brahman, and thus there is no difficulty understanding how this world proceeds as an effect from Brahman." But this theory does not solve the difficulty. The world still remains of a different character from it supposed material cause, the Brahman. It is difficult to explain how this material world comes into existence from two very subtle causes such as spirit and matter. There are too many differences between this world and Brahman for Brahman to be the material cause of its existence. Therefore Brahman is not the material cause of the world, because it is essentially different from Brahman; therefore *Vedānta* must take help in worldly matters from reason to ascertain the truth.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: The next *sūtra* answers this objection.

Sūtra 2.1.6

dṛṣyate tu

dṛṣyate – is seen; *tu* – but.

But it is seen [that the material cause of a thing may be of totally different quality from it].

The word *tu* [but] removes the familiar doubt raised by the *pūrvapakṣin.* The word *na* [not] from *Sūtra* 2.1.4 is understood in this *sūtra* also. The objection that "the world cannot have Brahman for its cause because it is of a totally different nature from Him" is not correct, because it is seen in everyday experience that things that are entirely different in their essential natures stand as material cause and effect. Thus the rise of different qualities from things of different nature is common. For example, the quality of intoxication arises from the fermentation of pure sugar; flying insects arise from crawling larvae; the origin of the different species of animals, such as elephants and horses, from the wish-fulfilling tree in the heavenly planets; gold arises from the Philosopher's Stone, etc. Referring to matter coming out from spirit, the Ātharvanikas say:

yathorṇa-nābhiḥ sṛjate gṛhṇate ca
yathā pṛthivyām oṣadhayaḥ sambhavanti
yathā sataḥ puruṣāt keśa-lomāni
tathākṣarāt sambhavatīha viśvam

"As a web is expanded and withdrawn by a spider, as herbs grow from the earth, and as hair grows from a living person's head and body, so this universe is generated from the inexhaustible Supreme." [*Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* 1.1.7]

Ultimately everything is spiritual because everything is an expansion of Kṛṣṇa; that is, everything is an expansion either of Kṛṣṇa Himself or of His potency. Because the potency is nondifferent from the potent, the potency and the potent are one [*śakti-śaktimatayor abhedaḥ*]. The Māyāvādīs, however, say, *cid-acit-samanvayaḥ:* "Spirit and matter are one." This is a wrong conception. Spirit [*cit*] is different from matter [*acit*], as explained by Kṛṣṇa Himself in *Bhagavad-gītā* [7.4-5]:

> *bhūmir āpo 'nalo vāyuḥ*
> *khaṁ mano buddhir eva ca*
> *ahaṅkāra itīyaṁ me*
> *bhinnā prakṛtir aṣṭadhā*
>
> *apareyam itas tv anyāṁ*
> *prakṛtiṁ viddhi me parām*
> *jīva-bhūtāṁ mahā-bāho*
> *yayedaṁ dhāryate jagat*
>
> "Earth, water, fire, air, ether, mind, intelligence and false ego—all together these eight comprise My separated material energies. But besides this inferior nature, O mighty-armed Arjuna, there is a superior energy of Mine, which consists of all living entities who are struggling with material nature and are sustaining the universe."

Spirit and matter are superior and inferior energies, yet the Māyāvādīs and other speculators artificially try to make them one. Although spirit and matter ultimately come from the same source, they cannot be made one. There are many things that come from our bodies, but although they come from the same source, they are qualitatively different. Although the supreme source of both matter and spirit is one, the emanations from this source should be regarded separately, as inferior and superior. *Vedānta* philosophy recognizes this fact, and this is the main difference between it and all other speculative impersonal philosophies of the creation.

Spirit and matter emanate from the same source, exist together and interpenetrate one another. Yet they are different and cannot be artificially combined. For example, fire and heat interpenetrate and cannot be separated; where there is fire there is heat, and where there is heat there is fire. Nonetheless, although they are one, they are different. Therefore the actual *Vedānta* philosophy is *acintya-bhedābheda:* inconceivable, simultaneous qualitative oneness and difference between the Lord and His potencies.

Adhikaraṇa 6: Non-Being not the First Cause

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: The previous *sūtras* proved that something—namely the energy, organization and life symptoms of the material creation—cannot come from nothing; so now the speculators, refusing to admit defeat, argue the Buddhist doctrine that the material world not only comes from nothing, it is itself nothingness, just to maintain their commitment to atheism to the bitter end. This absurdist attitude is typical of the demons. My spiritual master Śrīla Prabhupāda used to tell the story of the two arguing men:

> Two men were arguing about which cutting instrument is better, a knife or scissors. "Knife!" said one. "No, scissors!" said the other. Their talk became a heated fight. "If you don't agree," said the man who advocated the knife, "I will throw you in the river." "No, I'll never change my mind. It's scissors!" So the knife advocate threw the other into the swift river. He swam for a while but became exhausted and began to sink. But he was so stubborn about holding his point of view, that even after he was sinking under the water to his death, he held up his arm and

crossed his fingers back and forth like a pair of scissors cutting. "The scientists are like that," said Śrīla Prabhupāda. "Even after defeating them with all logic, still they will say, 'Life comes from matter.' But more sane and innocent people would be convinced by the Vedic presentation, that life comes from life."

The argument about the source of life cannot be resolved, because the real intention of materialists like the scientists is not so much to prove that life comes from matter, as it is to prove that there is no God. If there is no God there are no rules, no right and wrong, no reward or punishment after death. Thus convinced, they do whatever they like, exploit and 'enjoy' in any way whatsoever, with full confidence that there is no moral authority to check their independence. In other words, atheism is a potent consciousness-altering drug that conveniently removes the need to listen to one's conscience. It therefore destroys morality in human society, reducing people to the animal level of consciousness. Atheism's habitual users are addicted far more powerfully than to any opiate. Convincing them of any sane viewpoint is most difficult because of the depth of their commitment to rebellion against God. They would rather look like fools, and waste valuable time and energy making absurd arguments, than give even an inch to the theistic point of view.

So if the atheists cannot be convinced, why does *Vedānta-sūtra* devote so much space to defeating their arguments? If they are so addicted to untruth, why not just let them drown in their own ignorance? The answer is that the arguments of *Vedānta-sūtra* are not so much directed at the atheists themselves, as to theists who lack the strength of mind to resist their seductive arguments. The real battleground of *Vedānta* versus atheism is not the public forum of debate, but the mind and heart of the neophyte devotee.

The devotee requires the strong medicine of *Vedānta* to protect himself against the atheistic poison of Kali-yuga in all its bewildering guises. By hearing the arguments of Vyāsa, anyone can defend their spiritual integrity and make their faith strong. This prophylactic is greatly needed in a time when theistic people are rare, as they are today. The faithful minority is surrounded on every side by pitchmen for materialism and atheism, and to maintain a consistent theistic temperament is most difficult.

Perhaps the most dangerous enemies of theism are the materialistic so-called religions and philosophies that superficially claim to be of God, but actually teach atheism. These are very common, especially in the materialistic West. While paying lip service to belief in God, they relegate Him to a very minor role in the creation, then keep Him far in the background while propagating atheistic ideas like the independent creative power of matter and the evolution of species by random mutation. Thus many ostensibly faithful people are recruited for the front lines of the atheists' war against God because they have no means to protect themselves against such sophisticated disinformation, which conceals its real purpose behind a respectable front. Many become addicted to sinful pleasures of the tongue based on animal slaughter. Others fall for the appeal of mass-marketed lust in a permissive atmosphere of easy licentiousness. Thus the enemies of God convince the weak, little by little, to take up their cause.

It is well-nigh impossible to remain free from sin in a demoniac culture such as Western materialism. The only hope is that some intelligent individuals sense that they have been cheated, and research the world's religious and philosophical literature in search of a cure, until they discover *Vedānta-sūtra* and allied writings, especially *Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam*. Then they should search out the association of advanced souls who have realized these esoteric teachings for themselves, and take up their service with enthusiasm. Such stalwart transcendentalists can recognize and defeat illusion is all its subtle disguises, for they know well the taste of Absolute Truth.

Saṁśaya [arisal of doubt]: Sāṅkhya philosophy differs from *Vedānta* in its view of the cause of creation, because it apprehends that the creation arose essentially from nothingness.

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: If the material cause is different in its essential nature from the effect—if Brahman differs in nature from its effect, the world—then because the cause and effect being essentially different, the world before its creation was nonexistent in Brahman, the cause. In other words, the world was nothing [*asat*] before its origination because only the One [Brahman] existed then. But *Vedānta*, which holds that the world is a real effect of Brahman, and is real, cannot support this view.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: To this objection the author of the *sūtras* replies:

Sūtra 2.1.7

asaditi cet na pratisedhamātratvāt

asat – nonexistence, absolute nothing; *iti* – thus; *cet* – if; *na* – not; *pratisedha* – denial, prohibition; *mātratvāt* – because, merely.

If it thus [be objected that the world is then an] absolute unreality, we say no, because [in the previous *sūtra* there was] merely a denial [of the sameness in nature between the cause and the effect, and not that the two are substantially different.]

The objection raised by the *pūrvapakṣin* is insubstantial, because the denial in the previous *sūtra* was was only with regard to the assumption that the cause and effect must be of the same essential nature. It was not intended to mean that the substances of the two are different. For example, liquid water is qualitatively different from the gases hydrogen and oxygen, but there is no substantial difference between the cause and the effect. Our position is that Brahman Himself becomes modified into the world, and then manifests different characteristics.

The meaning is this: when you say that there is a difference in nature between the cause—Brahman—and the effect—the world, and that therefore Brahman cannot be the cause of the world, do you mean to say that because all the attributes of Brahman do not reappear in the effect, therefore the effect is not due to Brahman? Or do you intend to say that because only some characteristics appear and others do not, therefore Brahman is not the cause? You cannot mean the first, for then there would be no such thing as cause and effect, because the cause and the effect are never identical in all characteristics. The very relationship of cause and effect implies that there is some difference between them. For example, although the lump of clay is the material cause of the jar that you make out of it, the jar does not possess lumpiness, but has a different form altogether. If however you mean the second, and try to say that no characteristics of Brahman appear in the world, then you are evidently wrong. For Brahman is *Sat* or being, and the quality of beingness or existence certainly appears in the world. Nor can you say that, because particular aspects of Brahman, such as His joyousness, etc., do not appear in the world therefore the world is not His effect. You cannot pick and choose the qualities at random, for then any thing may become the cause of any other thing; everything will be the cause of everything else, and the law of causation will be reduced to absurdity.

Says the objector, “We do not hold any such absurd position. But we demand that the particular attributes that differentiate the cause from other objects should reappear in the effect, for the relation of cause and effect is constituted by the persistence or inheritance of those characteristic things that differentiate the cause from other things. For example, the characteristics that distinguish a thread from gold persist in the cloth manufactured from the thread and the bracelet made from gold.”

To this, we reply that this is not an invariable rule, for this rule is violated in the production of herbs from earth, and so on. Nor is the gold in every respect the same as the bracelet; there is a difference in condition between the two. Though the world and Brahman are different, as the Philosopher's Stone is different from gold, yet they have this in common, that both are essentially one in substance, as the gold and the bracelet. Therefore the world, though an effect, is not unreal, because it is an emanation from Brahman, or absolute reality.

The modern atheistic scientists propound a variation on this same argument: "If you think that God created the world, how is it possible because even if God exists, He is spiritual, and spiritual things are insubstantial. It is not possible that an insubstantial spiritual entity created the manifested material creation, because something [matter or the universal creation] cannot come from nothing [God or the spiritual existence]."

This argument is invalid because it rests upon several false assumptions. The scientists' favorite trick is to deny subjective evidence that is revealed directly to consciousness, and accept only objective evidence that is visible to the material senses or their technological extensions. By doing so, they conveniently eliminate all manifestations of spiritual truth, because consciousness and its corollaries like personality, individuality, mind, intelligence and so on are always purely subjective. We will ignore for now the hypocrisy that the scientists' own consciousness and intelligence, of which they are so proud, fall among the subjective phenomena they refuse to accept when it suits their purposes. But the phenomenon of consciousness itself is completely subjective because it is a symptom of the soul. The existence of God and other spiritual entities can be realized only by consciousness purified of material contamination. So the scientists cleverly eliminate the only possibility of observing the existence of God or the spiritual world by limiting the domain of acceptable evidence to objectively verifiable material facts. They refuse to follow the process of purification of consciousness that would allow them to verify the existence of God subjectively, in their own consciousness, and go so far as to argue that consciousness itself is unreal and simply an epiphenomenon of the electrochemical functions of the brain.

The argument that "The material world is objective and substantial, and God or spirit is only subjective and insubstantial" is also misleading. They are trying to establish that only the material existence is real, and the spiritual world is more or less imagination. In reality it is the other way around, because the existence of all material things is relative and impermanent, but the existence of spiritual entities is eternal and absolute.

> *nāsato vidyate bhāvo*
> *nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ*
> *ubhayor api dṛṣṭo 'ntas*
> *tv anayos tattva-darśibhiḥ*
>
> "Those who are seers of the truth have concluded that of the nonexistent there is no endurance, and of the existent there is no cessation. This seers have concluded by studying the nature of both." [*Bhagavad-gītā* 2.16]

Brahman or God is not nothing; conversely, He is the source of everything. Dull matter has no way of bringing itself into existence; it must be created, energized and organized by an outside force. That force is the Supreme Personality of Godhead, who exists before the material world is created and after it is destroyed.

> *aham evāsam evāgre*
> *nānyad yat sad-asat param*

paścād aham yad etac ca
yo 'vaśiṣyeta so 'smy aham

"Brahmā, it is I, the Personality of Godhead, who was existing before the creation, when there was nothing but Myself. Nor was there the material nature, the cause of this creation. That which you see now is also I, the Personality of Godhead, and after annihilation what remains will also be I, the Personality of Godhead." [*Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* 2.9.33]

The reality of God and the transcendental world can be known only by the revelation of the *Vedānta-sūtra* and other scriptures, and the direct perception of the self-realized soul. Anyone can verify this spiritual existence, but to do so requires enough faith in the words of the scriptures to follow the process of self-realization to completion. The scientists and other materialists will uselessly labor in the obscurity of material illusion until they recognize this fact and perform the process of self-realization in their own consciousness. Then no more proof will be needed, for they will see for themselves that the statements of the scriptures are correct.

The Sāṅkhya opponent comes forward now with another objection:

Sūtra 2.1.8

apitau tadvat prasaṅgādasamaṁjasam

apitau - at the time of *pralaya; tadvat* - like that; *prasaṅgāt* - on account of the consequences; *asamaṁjasam* – inappropriate.

[If Brahman is the material cause of the universe, then] when the world is re-absorbed in Him, Brahman would have all the consequences of the world [tainted with all its defects, and thus the *Vedānta* texts would become] inappropriate.

If Brahman, with His subtle energies of spirit and matter, is the material cause of the world—a world full of misery and many defects, injurious to the progress of the human soul—then when it is reabsorbed into Brahman at the time of *pralaya*, Brahman would become tainted with all the concomitant consequences of matter. The force of *vat* in the *sūtra* is similar to *iva* [like]. As because of its imperfections the world is not the final object of man, so the Brahman tainted with the defects of the world would not be the final object, for in the state of *pralaya* Brahman would become tainted with all the defects of the material existence. That being so, inappropriateness would arise because the texts of the *Upaniṣads* that declare Brahman to be omniscient, pure, etc. would be contradicted. This is an additional reason why Brahman is not the material cause of the world.

The author sets aside this objection in the next *sūtra:*

Sūtra 2.1.9

na tu dṛṣṭāntabhāvāt

na - not; *tu* - but; *dṛṣṭānta* - instances, illustrations; *bhāvāt* - because of the existence of.

But this is not so, as there are instances of this effect.

The validity of the objection is set aside with the word *tu* [but].

There is no inappropriateness in Brahman being the material cause of the universe, for there are many instances to show that the cause is not tainted by the defects of the effect. Though the world is full of misery, yet the Lord is all-pure. He remains always untouched by evil. As in one picture, the different

colors do not overlap one another, but remain in their proper places, so the qualities of the world remain in their proper place and do not affect Brahman. Similarly childhood, youth and old age are attributes belonging to the body only, therefore they do not affect the embodied being; or as the defects of blindness, deafness, etc. belong to the senses and not to the embodied being himself. The *Vedas* say, *asaṅgo 'yaṁ puruṣaḥ:* "The soul is untouched by any material contamination." So the defects of the world do not appertain to Brahman. All those modifications of Brahman belonging to matter and antagonistic to the highest goal of man appertain to the energies of Brahman, are energies of His *śakti* and remain with His *śakti*, and do not pervade the pure Brahman.

> *nātaḥ paraṁ parama yad bhavataḥ svarūpam*
> *ānanda-mātram avikalpam aviddha-varcaḥ*
> *paśyāmi viśva-sṛjam ekam aviśvam ātman*
> *bhūtendriyātmaka-madas ta upāśrito 'smi*
>
> "O my Lord, I do not see a form superior to Your present form of eternal bliss and knowledge. In Your impersonal Brahman effulgence in the spiritual sky, there is no occasional change and no deterioration of internal potency. I surrender unto You because whereas I am proud of my material body and senses, Your Lordship is the cause of the cosmic manifestation and yet You are untouched by matter." [*Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* 3.9.3]

We therefore hold that Brahman is the material cause of the world. This theory is not only free from all objections, but the opposing theory of the Sāṅkhyas that *pradhāna* is the cause of the world is open to the following objection:

Sūtra 2.1.10

> *svapakṣe doṣāt ca*
>
> *svapakṣe* - in his own side; *doṣāt* - because of the fault or objection; *ca* - and.
>
> **The objections [to the *Vedānta* theory raised by the Sāṅkhya] apply with equal force to the Sāṅkhya theory itself.**

"O Sāṅkhya, the faults that you find with our theory are to be found in your theory as well. These have been pointed out in another place." One fault found is that the *upādana* or cause is different from the effect. The same objection applies to the Sāṅkhya. *Pradhāna* is conceived to be devoid of sense objects, like sound and the rest; but the world generated by *pradhāna* has the attributes of sound, etc. Thus the cause is different from the effect in the Sāṅkhya theory also. The effect thus being different from the cause, the objection that the effect is nonexistent and unreal also remains. Similarly, in the state of reabsorption, when all objects merge with the *pradhāna* and become one with it, there will be pervasion of *pradhāna* of all the effects of the world, so the objection raised in *Sūtra* 2.1.8 applies to the Sāṅkhya theory also. All the objections raised by the Sāṅkhya against the *Vedānta* theory apply to the Sāṅkhya theory as well. The Brahman theory deduces the creation from a conscious Being or spirit; the *pradhāna* theory adduces it from unconscious matter. Moreover in the *pradhāna* theory of creation, the very motive for creation is unclear, for the *pradhāna* being inanimate and unconscious, can possess no motive at all. This will be examined in detail later on.

The author now shows that the scriptures, when supported by reason, are the cause of ascertaining the truth, and consequently reason has its place in this system.

Sūtra 2.1.11

tarkāpratiṣṭānādapyanyathānumeyamiti cedevamapyanirmoṣca prasaṅgaḥ

tarka - controversial reasoning; *apratiṣṭānāt* - because not having any finality; *api* - also; *anyathā* - otherwise; *anumeyam* - to be inferred; *iti* - thus; *cet* - if; *evam* - thus; *api* - also; *anirmoṣa* - want of release; *prasaṅgaḥ* - consequence.

[If it be said that there is] no finality about reasoning, for it is always possible to infer the truth of the opposite; we say no, for then the undesirable consequence would follow that that there would be no final liberation.

Owing to the differences in the brains of men, their reasoning powers are also different. There is no finality about reasoning; a position established by one man may be demolished the next day by a man with a stronger intellect. There is no conclusive certainty or definite finality about reasoning, even with regard to the acknowledged great intellects of the world; great thinkers like Kapila, Kaṇāda etc. are seen to contradict and refute one another. Therefore without relying upon defective human reason, we must accept that Brahman is the material cause of the world, simply because the *Vedas* and *Upaniṣads* declare it. Everything else follows by simple deduction.

It cannot be said that any human reasoning is absolute and unassailable, for then the reasoning by which a particular argument is held to be inconclusive would itself become invalid, leading to a logical paradox. On the other hand, if all reasoning is held to be inconclusive, then all worldly activities would come to an end. Human activities are all based upon inference, as we predict the future from the experiences of past and present. The actions that have been found to yield pleasant or painful results in the past are repeated or avoided by reason alone, for it is inferred that they would produce the same consequences in the future as well. Indeed, this is one of the most important and useful functions of the mind and intelligence.

This view that all reason is inconclusive also leads to the undesirable consequence that the existence of spiritual liberation cannot be established. A proposition established purely by human intellect, unaided by intuition or experience, is always liable to be set aside by a higher intellect born in another time or place. Thus over time, great confusion develops around the teachings of the scriptures as various commentators refute each others' arguments. Such speculative arguments are too unreliable to engender the firm faith required for genuine spiritual advancement. Therefore spiritual liberation can never be attained by methods evolved by human intelligence, but must be attained by the methods given by direct Upaniṣadic revelation alone. The *Mahābhārata* [*Bhīṣma-parva* 5.22] therefore says,

acintyāḥ khalu ye bhāvā na tāṁs tarkeṇa yojayet

"How can that which is beyond the imagination or sensory speculation of mundane creatures be approached simply by logic?"

Logic and argument are always imperfect when applied to spiritual understanding. By utilizing mundane logic, one frequently comes to the wrong conclusion regarding the Absolute Truth, and as a result of such a conclusion one may fall down into a hellish condition of life. Nevertheless reason can be useful in analyzing the instructions of the scriptures and applying them to various circumstances. Those who are actually inquisitive to understand the philosophy of *Vedānta* through logic and argument are welcome to put the *Vedānta-sūtras* to the test, and those who actually know how to apply logic will come to the right conclusion that there is no philosophy more powerful than *Vedānta*.

It is perfectly true that within the scope of secular matters, such as mathematics, reason is absolute; but in transcendental matters, such as the existence of God, His role in the creation, the afterlife, the

spiritual world, final liberation from material existence, etc., the conclusions of human intellect can never be perfectly free from doubt, because these matters are outside the scope of the mind and senses. For Brahman is inconceivable, and consequently unarguable. If you allow reasoning in the matter of Brahman, then you not only contradict the *Śruti*, but also your own assertions become incongruous. The *Śruti* itself says:

> "O Nāciketā, this faith that you have got cannot be brought about nor destroyed by argument. The Self becomes easily attained when one is taught by a true teacher. O dearest disciple, your determination is strong. Inquirers like you are very rare." [*Kaṭha Upaniṣad* 1.2.9]

The *Smṛti* also supports this:

> "O Ṛṣis! The sages realize that Truth with tranquil bodies, senses and minds, but when that realization is overwhelmed with dry reasoning, it vanishes."

Therefore, as *Śruti* is the highest authority in matter of religious law [*dharma*], it is the only authority in theological matters [Brahman]. Of course, reasoning auxiliary to *Śruti* is always allowed, because the word *mantavya* [reasoned about] shows that Brahman should be reasoned about. *Smṛti* also says that one should interpret a scriptural passage by looking into and reasoning about all that precedes and follow it. This is the very process of *samanvaya* by which this commentary is written.

Adhikaraṇa 7: Kaṇāda and Gautama Refuted

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: Once we understand the Vedic view that the Supreme Brahman is both the efficient and material cause of creation, and that His multifarious potencies, internal and external, are responsible for the creation, we are faced with the surprising conclusion that all other philosophies, religions and theories of the creation are incorrect, because they all ascribe some degree of independent creative power and intelligence to dull, inert matter. This view is surprising because many of these philosophies are ostensibly religious or spiritual, yet directly or indirectly, they promote the atheistic view that the personal intelligence, will and energy of the Supreme Personality of Godhead are not required to explain the creation. Therefore all such illusory theories, having been refuted by the clear arguments of *Vedānta-sūtra*, are rejected.

All these theories are merely covered atheism, masquerading as knowledge. None of them can be proven, and none are supported by the Vedic literature. There may be some residual material attachment to such theories due to material education, childhood religious training or simple ignorance, but this attachment must be given up to make continued spiritual progress, because all such notions are actually offensive to the Supreme Brahman, the Lord. He is the source of everything, and in one sense, He is everything. He is the creator, controller and the proprietor of everything and everyone.

> *mayā tatam idaṁ sarvaṁ*
> *jagad avyakta-mūrtinā*
> *mat-sthāni sarva-bhūtāni*
> *na cāhaṁ teṣv avasthitaḥ*
>
> *na ca mat-sthāni bhūtāni*
> *paśya me yogam aiśvaram*
> *bhūta-bhṛn na ca bhūta-stho*
> *mamātmā bhūta-bhāvanaḥ*
>
> "By Me, in My unmanifested form, this entire universe is pervaded. All beings are in Me, but I am not in them. And yet everything that is created does not rest in Me. Behold My mystic

opulence! Although I am the maintainer of all living entities, and although I am everywhere, still My Self is the very source of creation." [*Bhagavad-gītā* 9.4-5]

The idea that 'all religious beliefs are somehow correct, at least for the believer' is another sentimental attachment that must be rejected to make real spiritual progress. Actually it is a vestige of impersonalism; for all non-Vedic theories try to remove the Lord from the center stage of creation and diminish His importance. *Vedānta-sūtra* is very clear about its rejection of other theories and sole support of the Vedic version. This is because, of all the systems of knowledge in the world, only the *Vedas* are of divine origin; all others are unapologetically originated by defective human intelligence. Therefore, following the example of *Vedānta-sūtra*, no authentic self-realized soul will accept such factually erroneous, nonsensical and spiritually crippling theories.

The author has refuted the arguments of the *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga* philosophers as regards Brahman being only the operative cause and not the material cause of the creation. Now he refutes all non-Vedic theories in general, and the *Smṛtis* of Kaṇāda and Gautama in particular, and answers the objections brought forward by their followers.

Saṁśaya [arisal of doubt]: According to Kaṇāda and others, if Brahman is accepted as the material cause of the world, then those philosophies would find no scope at all.

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: According to Kaṇāda and Gautama, bigger atoms are formed by the aggregation of smaller atoms. When two smaller atoms unite, they form a molecule called a *dvianu* or dyad, a triad, etc. The whole world is made up of atoms, which are the ultimate material cause of the universe, and not the Brahman or *prakṛiti*. Brahman, being all-pervading, cannot be the material cause of the world because it is limited.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: The author replies to this with the following *sūtra:*

Sūtra 2.1.12

etena śiṣṭā parigrahā api vyākhyātaḥ

etena – by this; *śiṣṭāḥ* – the remaining systems; *aparigrahāḥ* – not accepted by the *Vedas; api* – also; *vyākhyātaḥ* – are refuted.

Hereby other systems not in harmony with the *Vedas* are also refuted.

The word *śiṣṭāḥ* means the remaining. The word *aparigrahāḥ* means those philosophical systems that do not acknowledge or accept the *Vedas* as authoritative, but which rely on reason alone, and which therefore are not accepted by *Vedānta* philosophy. This *sūtra* teaches that by the refutation of the *Sāṅkhya* doctrine above, the remaining similar theories such as the atomic theories of Kaṇāda and Gautama are also refuted, for they are opposed to the *Vedas* on the same points. *Vedānta-sūtra* will specifically refute the various atomic theories later on.

In the next *sūtra* the author raises another objection and disposes of it.

Sūtra 2.1.13

bhoktrāpatteravibhāgaścet syāllokavat

bhoktrā – with the enjoyer; *āpatteḥ* – from becoming; *avibhāgaḥ* – non-distinction; *cet* – if; *syāt* – it may be; *lokavat* – as in the world.

[Someone may object that] if Brahman is accepted as the material cause of the world, then there would be no difference between the *jīva* and the Lord. To this we reply, it need not be so, as we see in ordinary life.

The objector says, "The Vedic opinion is that Brahman as possessing the subtle energy of spirit is Himself the material cause of the creation, and as possessing the gross energy He is also the effect. Let us see whether this view is sound or not. Now energy is not different from the substance of which it is the energy; therefore the *jīva* is not different from Brahman. Thus your theory of two energies of Brahman lands you into contradiction, for it follows that Brahman and the *jīva* are one. Therefore the texts like 'two birds,' 'when it sees the other as the Lord' etc. become null and void when the difference established by them is ignored."

To this objection we reply, it is not so. Even in ordinary life, we see that energy is different from the person possessing it. Thus a man armed with a sword is a single man, but the sword is different from the man, though it represents the energy of the man. Therefore, Brahman possessing *śakti* is still nothing more than Brahman, but the *śakti* is different from Brahman. *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* [1.10] says:

haraḥ kṣarātmānāv īśate deva ekaḥ

"Although the living entities are inexhaustible, being proud by considering themselves the enjoyers of material objects, they are prone to be conditioned by *māyā*. Both material nature and the living entities are energies of and controlled by the Supreme Lord. The Supreme Lord is one without a second."

samāne vṛkṣe puruṣo nimagno
'nīśayā śocati muhyamānaḥ
juṣṭaṁ yadā paśyaty anyam īśam
asya mahimānam eti vīta-śokaḥ

"Although the two birds are in the same tree, the enjoying bird is full of anxiety and morose; but if somehow he turns to his friend, the Lord, and knows His glories, at once he is freed from all anxiety. [*Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* Chapter 4]

tam ātmasthaṁ ye' nupaśyanti dhīras-teṣāṁ sukhaṁ śāśvataṁ [śānti śāśvatī] netareṣām

"Only the wise person who can see that Supreme Soul within his heart becomes peaceful and enjoys transcendental bliss." [*Kaṭha Upaniṣad* 2.2.12-13]

sarvaṁ khalv idaṁ brahma taj jalāniti śānta upāsīta

"Whatever we see is a manifestation of Brahman. Everything is created, maintained, and annihilated by Brahman. Therefore one should peacefully worship Him." [*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 3.14]

bhūya eva vivitsāmi
bhagavān ātma-māyayā
yathedaṁ sṛjate viśvaṁ
durvibhāvyam adhīśvaraiḥ

"I beg to know from you how the Personality of Godhead, by His personal energies, creates these phenomenal universes as they are, which are inconceivable even to the great demigods." [*Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* 2.4.6]

nimitta-mātraṁ tatrāsīn
nirguṇaḥ puruṣarṣabhaḥ
vyaktāvyaktam idaṁ viśvaṁ
yatra bhramati lohavat

"My dear Dhruva, the Supreme Personality of Godhead is uncontaminated by the material modes of nature. He is the remote cause of the creation of this material cosmic manifestation. When He gives the impetus, many other causes and effects are produced, and thus the whole universe moves, just as iron moves by the integrated force of a magnet." [*Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* 4.11.7]

Thus there is no fault in the *Vedānta* theory of Brahman and His two *śaktis.* This theory will be discussed in more detail in Adhikaraṇas 8 and 9 below.

Adhikaraṇa 8: The World is Nondifferent from Brahman

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: Originally the path of self-realization was established by the standard direction of the *Vedas*. Śrīla Vyāsadeva divided the original *Veda* into the *Sāma, Atharva, Ṛg* and *Yajur-Vedas*, the eighteen *Purāṇas* (supplements) and the *Mahābhārata*, and then the same author summarized them in the *Vedānta-sūtras*. The purpose of all these Vedic literatures is to realize oneself to be a spiritual being, eternally related with the Supreme Personality of Godhead, the all-attractive spiritual fountainhead, Śrī Kṛṣṇa.

But all these different Vedic literatures were deliberately and systematically distorted by the onslaught of the age of Kali, as the walls of the paddy field and the strand of the river are distorted by heavy monsoon rains. These distorting attacks are offered by atheistic philosophers concerned only with eating, drinking, making merry and enjoying. These atheists are intimately attached to sense pleasures and gross materialism. Others do not believe in the soul or the eternity of existence. Some of them propose that life is ultimately annihilated, and that only the material energy is conserved. Others are less concerned with physical laws, but do not believe anything beyond their experience. And still others equate spirit and matter, declaring the distinction between them to be illusory, and that even consciousness itself is a myth. Therefore all of them are against the revelations of the *Vedas*.

There is no doubt that from every angle of vision, the *Vedas* stand as the oldest and most universally recognized books of knowledge. But over the course of time the Vedic path has been attacked by atheistic, materialistic and impersonalist philosophers like Cārvāka, Buddha, Arhat, Kapila, Patañjali, Śaṅkara, Vaikāraṇa, Jaimini, the Nyāyakas, the Vaiśeṣikas, the Saguṇists, the empiricists, the epicureans, the Pāśupata Śaivas, the Saguṇa Śaivas, the Brāhmos, Āryas, Brahma-kumaris, Muslims, Christians, material scientists and many others; the list of non-Vedic speculators grows daily, without restriction. While some are openly Godless and others hide their atheism behind a veneer of conventional religion, all of them without exception want to create the illusion that the Supreme Personality of Godhead is separate from His creation, and that the Lord is not omnipresent or omnipotent. These overt and covert attacks on the very basis of theism and morality have weakened people's intelligence and degraded the moral fabric of human civilization until it resembles the vicious activities of animals.

The path of the *Vedas* does not accept any philosophy lacking the concepts of an eternal relationship of the soul with God and attainment of His devotional service, culminating in transcendental ecstatic love for Him. It is the only spiritual teaching that fully recognizes and explains that the Supreme Personality of Godhead is the ultimate cause of everything; that His spiritual and material energies are source of the

living entities and the material creation; that since nothing but Him actually exists, whatever we see is simply a transformation of His energy and substance; that He creates this material existence as a means of fulfilling the desires of the living entities who wish to be apart from His personal association; and that self-realization, or the direct perception of the Absolute Truth by individual consciousness as described in the *Vedas*, is the ultimate solution to all the problems and suffering of human life.

The two great pillars of *Vedānta* philosophy are explained in this Adhikaraṇa and the following one: that because the material energy is simply a transformation of Brahman, the creation is nondifferent from Him; and that Brahman is both the operative and material cause of the creation. All the principal concepts of Vedic philosophy derive from these two most important revelations by a simple process of deduction. If these two ideas are firmly and clearly established in one's mind, then the complete cosmic conception of *Vedānta* is easily understood; without them it is inconceivable.

Although in a previous Adhikaraṇa it was proved that Brahman is the material cause of the world, yet it does not automatically follow that the creation is nondifferent from Him. Therefore in this Adhikaraṇa the author of the *sūtras* wishes to establish that the world is nondifferent from its cause, Brahman. In *Sūtra* 2.1.7 and subsequent *sūtras,* the non-difference of the world from Brahman was assumed, and the proof that Brahman is the material cause of the world was given on that assumption. The present *sūtra* raises an objection against that non-difference and then refutes it, making the doctrine that Brahman is nondifferent from His creation explicit.

Saṁśaya [arisal of doubt]: The question is whether this world, which is an effect, is different from its cause, Brahman, or not?

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: The followers of Kaṇāda hold the view that the effect is always different from the cause. Their reasons are as follows:

1. The difference of ideas: cause and effect are objects of different ideas; a lump of clay, which is the material cause, is different from the jar which is its effect.
2. The difference of words: the word 'jar' applied to the effect, is never applied to the lump of clay which is its material cause. Thus the cause and effect are not only represented by different ideas in our minds, but also by different words.
3. The difference of applications: a jar is useful for fetching water from a well, but the lump of clay has no such use.
4. The difference of forms: the cause, clay, is merely a lump in shape; the jar, the effect, has a different shape with a neck, etc.
5. The difference of time: the cause is prior in time, the effect is posterior.

Thus for all these reasons, the effect is different from the cause. If it were not different, then the work of the person producing the effect would be useless. If a jar is the same as a lump of clay, then the labor of the potter is useless; for the jar would come into existence automatically. If it is said that the effect is always existing, but simply unmanifest in the beginning, so the activity of the agent is necessary, this view is also incorrect. For the questions arise, "Does the effect exist before manifestation or not? Or is the manifestation existent or nonexistent prior to the activity of the agent?" The manifestation cannot exist prior to the action of the agent, for then such activity would be purposeless, and it would follow that the effect should be always perceptible. Moreover, this would result in removing the distinction between eternal and non-eternal things. If it is assumed that one manifestation requires another manifestation to account for it, then we are driven into an infinite regression. If it is held that manifestation is unreal [*asat*] then we lapse into the theory of the *asat-kāryavāda*, according to which

the effect does not exist before its origination. Therefore the *pūrvapakṣa* is that the effect is always different from the cause, and that activity of the agent is not necessary for the production of an unreal effect. Therefore the Nyāyikās hold that in the creation, a material cause which is *sat* produces an effect that is *asat*.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: This view of the Vaiśeṣikās is refuted by the author in the following *sūtra:*

Sūtra 2.1.14

tadananyatvamārambhaṇaśabdādibhyaḥ

tat – from that; *ananyatvam* – the identity; *ārambhaṇa – ārambhaṇa; śabdādibhyaḥ* – from the words beginning with.

The non-difference [of the world from Brahman is established in the verses of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*] beginning with the word *ārambhaṇa*.

The word *tat* means 'from that,' namely from Brahman, the material cause of the world who possesses two *śaktis* called *jīva* and *prakṛti*, spirit and matter. This world is certainly an effect, but it is not different from its cause, namely Brahman. How do we know this? We learn it from the passage of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* beginning with the word *ārambhaṇa* [in the beginning], as quoted below.

> *Hariḥ oṁ*. There once lived Śvetaketu Āruṇeya, the grandson of Āruṇa. His father Uddālaka said to him, "My dear Śvetaketu, go to school, for there is none in our family who has not studied the *Vedas* and is therefore a *brāhmaṇa* only by birth."
>
> Having begun his apprenticeship with a teacher when he was twelve years old, Śvetaketu returned to his father when he was twenty-four, having studied all the *Vedas*, conceited and stern, considering himself well-read.
>
> His father said to him, "My dear Śvetaketu, as you are so conceited and stern, considering yourself well-read; have you ever asked for that instruction by which we hear what cannot be heard, by which we perceive what cannot be perceived, by which we know what cannot be known?"
>
> "What is that instruction, Sir?" he asked. The father replied, "My dear boy, as by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the difference being only in name arising from speech, but the truth being that all is clay;
>
> "And my dear boy, as by one nugget of gold all that is made of gold is known, the difference being only a name arising from speech, but the truth being that all is gold;
>
> "And my dear boy, as by one pair of nail-scissors all that is made of iron is known, the difference being only a name arising from speech, but the truth being that all is iron; thus, my dear boy, is that instruction."
>
> The son said, "Surely those venerable men, my teachers, did not know that. For if they had known it, why should they have not told it to me? Therefore Sir, do tell me that." "Be it so, said the father.
>
> "That which is manifested, which owing to the distinctions of names and forms, bears a manifold shape, was in the beginning one only, owing to the absence of the distinction of names and forms. He thought, 'May I be many, may I grow forth.' " [*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.2.1-3]

Thus we see that the cause of the creation Brahman is nondifferent from the effect, the chief differences being only a matter of forms and names. So it is perfectly possible for a cause and its effect to be nondifferent. If it is held that the pot is different from the clay, the objection would arise that they should have double weight. The weight of a lump of clay being one unit, and the weight of the pot another; if the cause and effect were two different things, when the pot is weighed in the balance, the weight ought to be double. But the pot does not show any increase in weight over the lump of clay from which it is made; thus the substance of the clay and the pot is one. The clay and the pot are the same in other respects as well; for example, chemical analysis of the pot shows the same materials as in the clay. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* [6.1.4] states:

> *vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam mṛttikā iti eva satyam*
>
> "All transformation is a mere matter of words, and is nothing but name. Therefore, the truth is that it is only clay."

Pots of various shapes and sizes are made out of clay and given different names, but they are all nothing but clay, and do not have any reality apart from clay. Similarly, the world consisting of various forms and names is in reality nothing but Brahman, and has no existence apart from Brahman. The pot is not an illusory effect, like the illusion of silver in the seashell. Although silver exists as a real substance, there is no silver in mother of pearl; however, the pot consists wholly of the clay from which it is made. Similarly, the universe is nothing but Brahman, although Brahman has transformed Himself into the various forms and names of the manifested creation.

Nor can you say that the theory of manifestation has no Vedic authority for it. For we find in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* [7.3.26]:

> *kalpānte kāla-sṛṣṭena*
> *yo 'ndhena tamasāvṛtam*
> *abhivyanag jagad idaṁ*
> *svayañjyotiḥ sva-rociṣā*
>
> "At the end of each Kalpa, the universe is fully covered with dense darkness by the influence of time; and then again, during his next day, that self-effulgent lord, by his own effulgence, manifests, maintains and destroys the entire cosmic manifestation through the material energy, which is invested with the three modes of material nature."
>
> *ātma-māyāṁ samāviśya*
> *so 'haṁ guṇamayīṁ dvija*
> *sṛjan rakṣan haran viśvaṁ*
> *dadhre saṁjñāṁ kriyocitām*
>
> The Lord continued: "My dear Dakṣa Dvija, I am the original Personality of Godhead, but in order to create, maintain and annihilate this cosmic manifestation, I act through My material energy, and My representations are differently named according to the different grades of activity." [*Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* 4.7.51]

Nor is this theory open to the objections of accomplishing a thing that is already accomplished, or infinite regression. For we do not acknowledge that the manifestation existed prior to the activity of the agent; nor do we accept that one manifestation requires another to manifest it, and so on.

Says an objector, "If so, then you are open to the objection of maintaining the theory of *asat-kāryavāda* [the effect does not exist before its origination]. For the activity of the agent manifests the effect, which did not exist before; thus the activity of the agent creates the effect."

To this we reply, it is not so. The activity of the agent, material nature [*prakṛti*], produces manifestation, but does not produce the effect. For the manifestation of the material creation is not the effect; the effect of the Lord's creative potency is the material nature, which under the proper circumstances has the power of self-manifestation. Manifestation is characterized by the substratum of which it is the manifestation. In other words, the manifestation of the substratum of material nature—its basic elements, energies and laws—constitutes the manifestation of the world. But the manifestation in the form of *saṁsthāna-yoga* [integration of atoms] or material transformations is an ongoing manifestation, and thus there is no fault in the theory set out by *Vedānta* philosophy, because this potential power of material manifestation resides eternally in Brahman.

On the other hand, those who maintain that an effect is the result of a cause which is *asat* or nonexistent (in other words, that an effect is completely different from its cause) are wrong, because it is impossible to prove and is self-contradictory. For if it were so, then the result would be as follows: the effect will be nonexistent before the cause that manifests it, and consequently, anything would be the effect of any other thing, and everything would produce the same effect and every thing would come out of everything else. Since nonexistence is present everywhere, and according to you, an effect is nonexistent before its manifestation, therefore any effect can be produced from anything. Thus not only could oil be extracted from sesame, but we would also get milk from the same seeds. Because the oil [the effect] is nonexistent in the seed, being the result of the activity of the agent, milk could also be extracted from the seed by the same activity. Moreover your theory is open to another objection. If the effect were totally nonexistent prior to its manifestation, then the production of an effect would be agentless. Nor can you say that some energy inherent in the cause would regulate the particular effect that cause would produce, because there can be no relationship between an existent cause and a nonexistent effect.

Moreover we have the following dilemma also: does the origination originate itself or not? If so, then we have an infinite regression; for one origination we require another origination to originate it, and so on. In the second alternative, the effect being nonexistent and non-eternal, the origination becomes impossible. Thus both these alternatives are wrong. It would follow that we must perceive an effect always, or not at all. If you say "Origination being itself an origin, there is no necessity of imagining another origin for it," then it is the same thing as the Vedic theory of manifestation; and in that case the theory of origination and the theory of manifestation become identical.

> *sa eṣa ādyaḥ puruṣaḥ*
> *kalpe kalpe sṛjaty ajaḥ*
> *ātmātmany ātmanātmānaṁ*
> *sa saṁyacchati pāti ca*
>
> "That supreme original Personality of Godhead, Lord Śrī Kṛṣṇa, expanding His plenary portion as Mahā-Viṣṇu, the first incarnation, creates this manifested cosmos, but He is unborn. The creation, however, takes place in Him, and the material substance and manifestations are all Himself. He maintains them for some time and absorbs them into Himself again." [*Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* 2.6.39]

The author now shows through further arguments that the effect is nondifferent from the cause, by the following aphorism:

Sūtra 2.1.15

> *bhavecopalabdheḥ*

bhave – in the existence; *ca* – and; *upalabdheḥ* – because of the perception.

And because the cause is perceived in the effect.

We perceive the existence of the clay or gold that are the material causes of the pot or crown in their effects. In fact, the perception of the clay or gold in the pot of crown would not have been possible if the effect were completely different from the cause.

An objector may say, "But we do not recognize the cause in the elephants and other animals produced from the wish-fulfilling tree [*kalpa-vṛkṣa*], for there is nothing in common between the tree and its effects, the animals that are produced."

To this we reply that there is no force in the objection, for here also there is recognition of the cause in the effect. The *kalpa-vṛkṣa* tree is a physical object, and so are the animals produced from it; therefore, recognition is possible on the basis of both being physical matter.

An objector says, "But there is no recognition of fire in smoke; and smoke, being an effect of fire, ought to show fire in it."

To this we reply that smoke is really an effect of damp fuel, which when coming in contact with fire, throws off its earthy particles in the form of smoke. That the smoke is an effect of the damp fuel is proved by the fact that the aromas of the fuel and the smoke are similar.

tenaikam ātmānam aśeṣa-dehināṁ
kālaṁ pradhānaṁ puruṣaṁ pareśam
sva-tejasā dhvasta-guṇa-pravāham
ātmaika-bhāvena bhajadhvam addhā

"Because the Supreme Lord is the cause of all causes, He is the Supersoul of all individual living entities, and He exists as both the remote and immediate cause. Since He is aloof from the material emanations, He is free from their interactions and is Lord of material nature. You should therefore engage in His devotional service, thinking yourself qualitatively one with Him." [*Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* 4.31.18]

Sūtra 2.1.16

sattvāccāvarasya

sattvāt – because of the existence; *ca* – and; *avarasya* – of the posterior.

[The effect is nondifferent from the cause,] because it is existent in the cause [prior to its manifestation,] though it is posterior [in time].

The effect is nondifferent from its cause for this additional reason: before its manifestation it exists in latency in the cause. Thus the *Śruti* says, "Only Being existed in the beginning." Also *Smṛti* says:

"As in the seed of barley there exists in latency the root, the stem, the leaf, the bud, the carpels, the ovary, the flower, the milk, the rice, the husk and the seeds; they manifest out of the seed when they get the proper conditions and materials to manifest them. O best of the sages, similarly, the bodies of *devas* and others exist in innumerable *karmas*. When they get context with the Viṣṇu energy they come into manifestation. Certainly that Viṣṇu is the Supreme Brahman, who is the sustenance and dissolution of this universe.

We can get oil from sesame because the oil exists in latency in the seed; but we cannot get oil from sand because it has no oil in it. Existence is the same both in Brahman and in the world, and because everything exists in Brahman so it can come out of Him.

> *tvaṁ vā idaṁ sad-asad īśa bhavāṁs tato 'nyo*
> *māyā yad ātma-para-buddhir iyaṁ hy apārthā*
> *yad yasya janma nidhanaṁ sthitir īkṣaṇaṁ ca*
> *tad vaitad eva vasukālavad aṣṭi-tarvoḥ*
>
> "My dear Lord, O Supreme Personality of Godhead, the entire cosmic creation is caused by You, and the cosmic manifestation is an effect of Your energy. Although the entire cosmos is but You alone, You keep Yourself aloof from it. The conception of 'mine and yours' is certainly a type of illusion [*māyā*] because everything is an emanation from You and is therefore not different from You. Indeed, the cosmic manifestation is nondifferent from You, and the annihilation is also caused by You. This relationship between Your Lordship and the cosmos is illustrated by the example of the seed and the tree, or the subtle cause and the gross manifestation." [*Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* 7.9.31]

Previously we established the identity of the effect with the cause, even after origination. The next two aphorisms establish the same identity of the effect with the cause, even after the destruction of the effect and its merging into the cause.

Sūtra 2.1.17

> *asatvyapadeśānneticenna dharmāntareṇa vākyadeṣāt*
>
> *asat* – nonexistent; *vyapadeśāt* – because of the designation; *na* – not; *iti* – thus; *cet* – if; *na* – not; *dharma-antareṇa* – on account of another attribute; *vākyadeṣāt* – because of the complimentary passage.
>
> **[If it be said that the effect does not exist in the cause after dissolution,] because there is a text designating it as non-being, we reply that it not so, since the word *asat* [non-being] refers to another attribute of the effect, as would appear from the complimentary passage of that text.**

An objector declares, "Let it be so. But we find the following passage in *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* [2.7.1]:

> *asad vā idam agra āsīt*
>
> "In the beginning of this creation, only *asat* was present."

Here we see that the effect is called *asat* or non-existing, consequently the effect vanishes completely at the time of *pralaya*, and therefore does not exist in the cause."

To this objection we reply that it is not so, for the word *asat* used in that passage does not refer to absolute nonexistence, as you take it to mean, but it refers to another attribute of the effect, namely non-manifestation. The words *sat* and *asat* should be understood as referring to two attributes of the same object; namely to its gross or manifested condition, and its subtle or unmanifested condition. An object existing as cause is in subtle condition, and existing as effect it is in gross condition; therefore the word *sat* means the gross condition of an object, and *asat* means the subtle condition. Thus the word *asat* here refers to the subtle condition of the object, and is the designation due to another attribute of the object as different from the gross condition.

Objector: “But how do you explain the word *asat*, which literally means nonexistence, as meaning here the subtle condition?”

We do so in order to make sense of the passage consistent with follows in the same text; for further on we find the following:

> “*Asat* verily was this in the beginning; from it verily proceeded the *sat*. That made itself its Self, therefore it is said to be self-made.”

The words “*Asat* made itself its Self” clears up any doubt as to the real meaning of *asat*. For if the word *asat* meant absolute nonexistence, then there will be a contradiction, for a non-existing thing can never make itself the Self of anything. Similarly, the word *āsīt* [was] becomes absurd when applied to *asat*, in the sense of absolute nonexistence, for absolute nonexistence can never be said to exist, and ‘was’ means existence. An absolute nonexistence can have no relation with time, either past or present, nor can it have any agency as we find in the sentence, “It made itself its Self.” Therefore the word *asat* here should be explained as the subtle state of an object.

In general, *asat* does not mean absolute nonexistence, but refers to that which does not posses absolute existence. Similarly, *sat* generally refers to real existence, which is eternal and absolute.

> *nāsato vidyate bhāvo*
> *nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ*
> *ubhayor api dṛṣṭo 'ntas*
> *tv anayos tattva-darśibhiḥ*
>
> “Those who are seers of the truth have concluded that of the nonexistent [*asat*] there is no endurance, and of the existent [*sat*] there is no cessation. This seers have concluded by studying the nature of both.” [*Bhagavad-gītā* 2.16]

We do not say that the material world is unreal or that it does not exist, but that its existence is relative to the existence of Brahman. The principle of material energy [*pradhāna*] is eternal, being the external energy of Brahman, so it is real and existent in the full sense of the words. But the manifestation of the material creation [*prakṛti*], with its temporary names and forms, is both relative and temporary, therefore its existence is merely conditional. The Lord [*puruṣa*] is the origin, master and controller of both.

> *tvam eka ādyaḥ puruṣaḥ supta-śaktis*
> *tayā rajaḥ-sattva-tamo vibhidyate*
> *mahān ahaṁ khaṁ marud agni-vār-dharāḥ*
> *surarṣayo bhūta-gaṇā idaṁ yataḥ*
>
> “My dear Lord, You are the only Supreme Person, the cause of all causes. Before the creation of this material world, Your material energy remains in a dormant condition. When Your material energy is agitated, the three qualities—namely goodness, passion and ignorance—act, and as a result the total material energy—egotism, ether, air, fire, water, earth and all the various demigods and saintly persons—becomes manifest. Thus the material world is created.” [*Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* 4.24.63]

Sūtra 2.1.18

> *yukteśśabdāntarācca*
>
> *yukteḥ* - from reasoning; *śabda-antarāt* - from another text of the *Vedas; ca* – and.

[Being and non-being are attributes of things, as is proved] by reasoning and other texts of the *Vedas*.

The cause of our thinking that 'the pot exists' is the fact that the lump of clay assumes a particular form with a neck, hollow belly etc., while the actual material remains simply clay. On the other hand, we think and say 'the pot does not exist' when the clay takes a condition different from a pot, for example when it is broken into pieces. Therefore existence and nonexistence, when they are applied to objects, show their different conditions only, therefore nonexistence in this connection does not mean absolute nonexistence. The *Smṛti* declares the same fact, as discussed in the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa:*

> "The clay assumes the form of a pot, the pot [after being broken] becomes a potshard, which in time may be reduced to powder or dust, but the clay remains the same in all phases and conditions of the pot's existence. Further analysis of the dust would reveal atoms of physical matter, but the matter never vanishes."

Therefore the reason that we do not perceive the absolute nonexistence of the pot is that when we say 'the pot does not exist,' we mean only that the pot has been reduced into pieces. Thus there is no absolute annihilation of the pot; it has simply changed its condition from manifested to unmanifested. This is the proof by reasoning or *yukti*. As regards the other text, we find it in the well-known passage of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* [6.2.1]:

> *sad eva saumyedam agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyam*
>
> "My dear boy, the Absolute Truth alone existed prior to this creation, one without a second."

Thus both through reason and the authority of the Vedic texts, we come to the conclusion that the word *asat* used in the passage of the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* quoted above does not mean absolute nonexistence, like the nonexistence of the horn of a rabbit; it means a subtle condition, the state of unmanifestation into which all objects enter at the time of *pralaya* or devastation. When this world merges into the Supreme Brahman, that very subtle condition of the universe is called *asat* [non-being], on account of its extreme subtleness. Therefore we come to the conclusion that even prior to its origination the world existed, and thus the effect is nondifferent from the cause, but is simply the cause in a different form.

The statement "Non-being can never come into existence because of the impossibility of such a thing, nor can being be the result of the activity of an agent, because of the futility of such agency; therefore the whole process of creation is an inscrutable mystery," is incorrect, and proceeds from misunderstanding the significance of the words *sat* and *asat* as applied in the *Upaniṣads.* The Māyāvādīs hold the theory that *māyā* is neither being nor non-being, but different from both and utterly inconceivable. But there does not and cannot exist something unexplainable, different from *sat* and *asat;* therefore the only real *māyā* in the sense the Māyāvādīs conceive of it is their own nonsensical theory.

> *kālaṁ karma svabhāvaṁ ca*
> *māyeśo māyayā svayā*
> *ātman yadṛcchayā prāptaṁ*
> *vibubhūṣur upādade*
>
> "The Lord, who is the controller of all energies, thus creates, by His own potency, eternal time, the fate of all living entities, and their particular nature, for which they were created, and He again merges them into Himself at the time of devastation." [*Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* 2.5.21]

The author now gives some illustrations to confirm the doctrine that the effect is something real and nondifferent from the cause.

Sūtra 2.1.19

paṭavacca

paṭavat - like a piece of cloth; *ca* – and.

And as a piece of cloth is not different from its threads, so the effect is not different from its cause.

As the materials of a piece of cloth existed before its manifestation in the form of threads, and as these threads, when arranged in a particular way lengthwise and crosswise, manifest the cloth, similarly this whole universe existed as the subtle energy of Brahman, and when Brahman desires to create, it assumes manifestation of the material world. The word *ca* [and] in the *sūtra* shows that other illustrations, like the seed and the tree, may be given here also.

sa sarva-dhī-vṛtty-anubhūta-sarva
ātmā yathā svapna-janekṣitaikaḥ
taṁ satyam ānanda-nidhiṁ bhajeta
nānyatra sajjed yata ātma-pātaḥ

"One should concentrate his mind upon the Supreme Personality of Godhead, who alone distributes Himself in so many manifestations just as ordinary persons create thousands of manifestations in dreams. One must concentrate the mind on Him, the only all-blissful Absolute Truth. Otherwise one will be misled and will cause his own degradation." [*Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* 2.1.39]

Sūtra 2.1.20

yathā ca prāṇādiḥ

yathā – as; *ca* – and; *prāṇādi* – the vital airs called *prāṇa, apāna, vyāna, samāna* and *udāna.*

And as the different vital airs [are modifications of the chief *prāṇa*, so the effect is not different from the cause.]

In yogic trance induced by *prāṇāyāma,* or breath control, all the various life functions such as respiration, digestion, etc. cease for the time being; and the separated functions of *apāna, vyāna,* etc. merge in the main *prāṇa* and exist in latent in it. But when the *yogī* comes out of the trance, these other functions come out of the main *prāṇa,* manifest themselves, take possession of the various organs and manifest their different functions. Similarly, at the time of *pralaya* the universe loses all its specific differentiation and merges in the subtle energy of Brahman, but continues to exist in Brahman in that subtle aspect. Then at the time of new creation it emerges from Him because He desires to create, and then assumes different forms such as the *pradhāna, mahāt-tattva* etc.

The word *ca* [and] in the *sūtra* indicates that the illustrations of the piece of cloth in the previous *sūtra* and the example of the life functions in the present *sūtra* should be read together as one illustration. In fact, there are no illustrations anywhere of the theory that the effect is something non-real and different from the cause [*asat-kāryavāda*]. No one has ever seen the birth of the son of a barren woman, nor the flower in the sky, because such things are contradictions in terms.

Therefore Brahman, although one without a second, has two energies, the subtle and the gross, one consisting of the aggregation of all living entities [*jīvas*], and the other of all the aggregates of matter [*prakṛiti*]. In other words, Brahman's two energies are spirit and matter, and possessing these two energies, Brahman is the material cause of the universe, and consequently the universe is nondifferent

from Brahman, but also has Brahman for its Self. Thus the proposition that the effect is nondifferent from the cause has been established. But Brahman, manifesting as an effect, through His inconceivable potencies, retains all His powers in their fullness. The manifestation of the material creation does not cause any decrease in Brahman. As it is said in *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* [1.19.78]:

> *oṁ namo vāsudevāya tasmai bhagavate sadā*
> *vyatiriktaṁ na yasyāsti vyatirikto'khilasya yaḥ*
>
> "I offer my respectful obeisances unto the adorable Lord Vāsudeva; He is above the entire universe, and there is nothing greater than Him."

And Lord Vāsudeva Himself declares:

> *mayā tatam idaṁ sarvaṁ*
> *jagad avyakta-mūrtinā*
> *mat-sthāni sarva-bhūtāni*
> *na cāhaṁ teṣv avasthitaḥ*
>
> "By Me, in My unmanifested form, this entire universe is pervaded. All beings are in Me, but I am not in them." [*Bhagavad-gītā* 9.4]

Adhikaraṇa 9: Brahman, the Operative Cause

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: Modern so-called scientific doctrine not only assumes that matter can act independently, it also assumes that the natural laws of physics and so forth sprang into being and are enforced without any cause. This is extremely illogical. When they attempt to explain the origin of the laws of nature at all, the scientists simply say that they are due to chance. But the universe is too finely structured, and its laws too delicately balanced to be the result of chance. There must be a superhuman intelligence who not only plans and designs the universe and its natural laws, but also is a potent creator who sets the creation into motion and enforces those laws. Then there are ubiquitous phenomena like time and gravity that the scientists cannot explain at all. Where do they come from, how do they work, and from where does their power to compel all material things originate? The scientists cannot answer these questions, so they simply refuse to discuss them with religious people.

This Adhikaraṇa presents the second great pillar of *Vedānta* philosophy: that the Lord is not only the material cause of the creation, but also the operative cause; and that He does not create for any material motive, but out of His unlimited transcendental bliss. *Sūtra* 1.4.23 asserted that Brahman is the material as well as the operative cause of the universe. *Sūtras* 2.1.6-20 have answered objections to the view that Brahman is the material cause of the universe, and by answering these objections the author has strengthened this view. Now he confirms the second view, that Brahman is the operative cause of the universe, by showing that none but Brahman could be the operative cause, and he answers the objections of those who hold that *mukta jīvas* are the creators of universes.

Vedānta philosophy holds that Brahman is the operative cause of the universe because of texts like *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* [3.1.3]:

> *kartāram īśaṁ*
>
> "He is the agent, the Lord, and the creator."

Saṁśaya [arisal of doubt]: Is God the creator of the universe, or is some highly developed *mukta jīva* its cause? We find texts supporting both positions.

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: Those who hold the view that *mukta jīva* is the creator of the universe quote a different text in support of their position:

> *jīvād bhavanti bhūtānī*
>
> "All beings arise from the *jīva.*"

They maintain that if Brahman were the creator of the universe, it would detract from His perfection, because the world is full of imperfections. Therefore, they maintain that *mukta jīvas* create the universe.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: The author removes this doubt by showing that no *jīva,* however high, can ever produce the universe.

Sūtra 2.1.21

> *itaravyapadeśāddhitākaraṇādidoṣaprasaktiḥ*
>
> *itara* – of the others; *vyapadeśāt* – from the designation; *hita* – beneficial; *akaraṇādi* – not creating, etc.; *doṣa* – imperfection; *prasaktiḥ* – consequence.
>
> **If the other view be held, [that the *jīva* is the creator of the universe,] then the result would be that [the creation would be liable to the objection that] the *jīva* intentionally creates that which is not beneficial for him.**

Those who hold the view that the *jīva* is the creator of the universe must answer the objection, "Why does he create a world that is not beneficial for him?" If a man creates the world, why does he create it full of imperfections that cause him to suffer? If man would be the master of his destiny, and there were no Lord to award the result of good and bad actions, and if man alone were the creator of his world, then he certainly would not intentionally create a world that he knows would be painful for him.

The world, therefore is not the creation of man, because we find that it has the fault of not doing that which is beneficial for man; on the contrary, it does what is non-beneficial for him. No man willingly wants to labor, but the conditions of the world are such than no one can live without laboring and undergoing troubles. The world, therefore, is not the creation of any man. No wise and independent person is ever seen to act like the silkworm; to create his own prison, and then enter into it and suffer all the miseries of confinement by his own will. Nor does any human being, being a pure soul, voluntarily enter into a material body which is full of impurities.

You want us to believe that the *jīva*, supposed to be free and pure prior to the creation, voluntarily confines himself to a mortal body of flesh, full of impurities, and enters into a self-created world where his freedom of action is severely restricted. That is absurd. Nor has anyone ever seen any *jīva* create the cosmic matter of *pradhāna*, or the subtle matter of intelligence and false ego, nor even ordinary physical matter. Earth, water, fire, air, *ākāśa* etc. are not the creation of any man. In fact, limited human intelligence reels just from contemplating the wonderful organization of this universe. Therefore, the theory that the universe is man-made is wrong. On the other hand, God alone is the creator of the universe, and the objection that He has created the world full of imperfection, when He Himself is perfect, will be answered later on.

Although Lord Brahmā, a *jīva*, is commonly understood to be the creator of the universe, his creative activity is only secondary to that of the Supreme Personality of Godhead, the Supreme Brahman. Lord Brahmā admits:

tasyāpi draṣṭur īśasya
kūṭa-sthasyākhilātmanaḥ
sṛjyaṁ sṛjāmi sṛṣṭo 'ham
īkṣayaivābhicoditaḥ

"Inspired by Him only, I discover what is already created by Him [Nārāyaṇa] under His vision as the all-pervading Supersoul, and I also am created by Him only." [*Bhagavad-gītā* 2.5.17]

The same argument refutes the modern New-Age philosophy that the *jīva* is the creator, if not of the universe, at least of his own reality. They say, "Each of us is a godlike spiritual being, therefore we create our own reality. This is true even for people who do not understand this truth; therefore they create so many undesired effects because, not realizing their creative power, they do not control their minds and intentions. Because the mind creates whatever is placed into it, if they worry or think in a negative way, their mind automatically creates based on those negative ideas. Therefore one should keep his mind controlled and think only positively of the things that one wants to happen, and then the mind will automatically create it."

Even accepting this theory for the sake of argument, it does not answer the question, "Who gave the mind its power to create?" Because certainly the living entity's creative power is very limited. We do not have the power to empower our minds to create reality; therefore the power to do this must have come from some superior entity. If they answer that God gives the power, then they have to explain how He does so; and if they say that God is present within every living being, then it is the same as *Vedānta* philosophy. If they reply that the creative power is innate in the living entity, then again they have to explain where it comes from. Either way they have to accept the ultimate authority of the Lord. And we see in practice that undesired, unbeneficial events occur even to people who believe this theory. So actually the Lord as the Supersoul is the real creator, and all events occur by His power and authority. He may delegate some of His power to His servants, but if they misbehave He can easily withdraw it again. So the Lord alone is the original creator.

An objector may say, "If Brahman is the creator, then He also is liable to the objection of creating a world full of misery, and after creating it with great effort, enters into it as the Universal Form and Paramātmā. Thus He also voluntarily creates a world of misery and then enters into it and lives in it."

The author replies to this objection in the following *sūtra:*

Sūtra 2.1.22

adhikaṁ tu bhedanirdeśāt

adhikaṁ – greater than the *jīva; tu* – but; *bheda* – difference; *nirdeśāt* – because of pointing out.

But [Brahman is] greater than *jīva*, because the scriptures declare His difference [from the *jīva*].

The word *tu* [but] in this *sūtra* sets aside the doubt raised above. Brahman is greater than man, because He possesses vast power and is therefore something infinitely superior to man. When Brahman enters into the world that He creates, it cannot bind Him or limit His power, while the *jīva* entering into a self-created world would certainly be a cause of bondage to him. The difference between man and God is expressly taught in the scriptures. The *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* [3.1.2] declares:

samāne vṛkṣe puruṣo nimagno
'nīśayā śocati muhyamānaḥ

juṣṭaṁ yadā paśyaty anyam īśam
asya mahimānam iti vīta-śokaḥ

"Although the two birds are in the same tree, the eating bird is fully engrossed with anxiety and moroseness as the enjoyer of the fruits of the tree. But if in some way or other he turns his face to his friend who is the Lord and knows His glories—at once the suffering bird becomes free from all anxieties."

This verse clearly shows the difference between the *jīva,* full of sorrow and delusion, and the Supreme Self, full of lordliness and glory. So also in *Bhagavad-gītā* [15.16-17]:

dvāv imau puruṣau loke kṣaraś cākṣara eva ca
kṣaraḥ sarvāṇi bhūtāni kūṭa-stho 'kṣara ucyate

uttamaḥ puruṣas tv anyaḥ paramātmety udāhṛtaḥ
yo loka-trayam āviśya bibharty avyaya īśvaraḥ

"There are two classes of beings: the fallible and the infallible. In the material world every entity is fallible, and in the spiritual world every entity is called infallible. Besides these two, there is the greatest living personality, the Lord Himself, who has entered into these worlds and is maintaining them."

The *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* [1.2.16 and 24] declares:

"He who is higher than matter, *pradhāna*, *jīvas*, unmanifested world and time, He is the highest Viṣṇu, about whom the scriptures declare, 'The wise see the highest pure form of that Lord Viṣṇu.' Matter and the *jīvas* are distinct from Viṣṇu, though they are two aspects of Him. That aspect by which the Lord brings about the union of spirit with matter at the time of creation, and their separation from each other during *pralaya,* is called time. Thus the Supreme Viṣṇu has four aspects: the root of matter called *pradhāna*, the root of spirit called *puruṣa,* the manifested universe called *vyakta* and time called *kāla*."

Similarly, in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* [1.11.38]:

etad īśanam īśasya
prakṛti-stho 'pi tad-guṇaiḥ
na yujyate sadātma-sthair
yathā buddhis tad-āśrayā

"This is the divinity of the Personality of Godhead: He is not affected by the qualities of material nature, even though He is in contact with them. Similarly, the devotees who have taken shelter of the Lord do not become influenced by the material qualities."

The Lord's transcendental body is so powerful that even the limbs of His body are capable of the actions of the whole:

aṅgāni yasya sakalendriya-vṛtti-manti
paśyanti pānti kalayanti ciraṁ jaganti
ānanda-cinmaya-sad-ujjvala-vigrahasya
govindam ādi-puruṣaṁ tam ahaṁ bhajāmi

"I worship Govinda, the primeval Lord, whose transcendental form is full of bliss, truth, substantiality and is thus full of the most dazzling splendor. Each of the limbs of that transcendental figure possesses in Himself, the full-fledged functions of all the organs, and

eternally sees, maintains and manifests the infinite universes, both spiritual and mundane." [*Brahma-saṁhitā* 5.32]

Moreover in *Sūtra* 1.2.8 it has been shown that the Lord, though living in the world and in the *jīvas,* is not tainted by that contact. Thus the Lord, possessed of inconceivable infinite power, creates the world by His mere will, enters into it to sport in it and with it, and when it starts to decay, He destroys and rejuvenates it, just as a spider destroys its web and spins it again. Not the slightest taint of materialism accrues to the Lord as a result.

namaḥ samāya śuddhāya
puruṣāya parāya ca
vāsudevāya sattvāya
tubhyaṁ bhagavate namaḥ

"Dear Lord, You have no enemies or friends. Therefore You are equal to everyone. You cannot be contaminated by sinful activities, and Your transcendental form is always beyond the material creation. You are the Supreme Personality of Godhead because You remain everywhere within all existence. You are consequently known as Vāsudeva. We offer You our respectful obeisances." [*Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* 4.30.42]

An objector says: "Man and God are however one in essence, and the difference between them is that of degree alone, just as the difference between the limited space confined within a pot and the infinite space outside it. Space is one and not different."

To this we reply, it cannot be so, because we do not admit that the Supreme Brahman is liable to division or limitation like space. We cannot cut off a portion of Brahman and say that it is a *jīva* and the rest is the Lord. Nor are the *jīva* and Brahman related like the moon and its reflection in the water of a pot.

The objector replies, "Reflection no doubt does not possess all the glory and perfection of the original, and man being a reflection of God is certainly lower than God, but essentially the same."

But we do not admit this, because the Lord being materially formless, it is impossible to have a reflection of Him. Reflection, being a material phenomenon, can affect only matter; no one has ever seen a reflection of spirit. The *Vedānta* philosophy of the relationship between the Lord and the living entities is not reflection, but the theory of emanation. *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* [2.1] states:

yathāgneḥ kṣudrā visphuliṅgā vyuccaranty evam evāsmād ātmanaḥ sarve prāṇāḥ sarve lokāḥ sarve devāḥ sarvāṇi bhūtāni vyuccaranti. tasyopaniṣat satyasya satyam iti.

"Just as small sparks emanate from a big fire, similarly all living entities, all planets, all the demigods, and all material elements such as the earth emanate from the supreme soul, Śrī Govinda. His instructions are the Supreme Truth."

The third illustration given by the Advaitins is also inapt. "A king's son brought up by shepherds considered himself one of them and never knew his lineage. A wise man passing that way recognized him, and told him that he was not a shepherd's child but the son of the King. As soon as he heard this, his delusion vanished and he realized his own greatness. Similarly, as long as a man is overcome with ignorance, he thinks himself man, but as soon as he gets knowledge, he knows that he is actually God." To this we reply that according to this theory, God being one, and man being essentially equal to God, the delusion that a man is under must affect God, and thus it would detract from the omnipotence and omniscience of God. Since according to this theory no other being but God actually exists, the ignorance that makes a man think himself separate from God must be an ignorance dwelling in God

Himself. God then would be imperfect, subject to delusion and illusion, therefore this theory is impossible. In his commentary on *Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* [10.88.5], Śrīla Śrīdhara Svāmī cites the following passage from the Vedic literature:

> *nāti-bhedo bhaved bhedo*
> *guṇa-dharmair ihāṁśataḥ*
> *sattvasya śāntyā no jātu*
> *viṣṇor vikṣepa-mūḍhate*
>
> "Lord Viṣṇu's peaceful mode of goodness does not differ substantially from His original, spiritual qualities, although it is only a partial manifestation of them within this world. Thus Lord Viṣṇu's mode of goodness is never tainted by agitation [in passion] or delusion [in ignorance]."
>
> *nirmāna-mohā jita-saṅga-doṣā*
> *adhyātma-nityā vinivṛtta-kāmāḥ*
> *dvandvair vimuktāḥ sukha-duḥkha-saṁjñair*
> *gacchanty amūḍhāḥ padam avyayaṁ tat*
>
> "Those who are free from false prestige, illusion and false association, who understand the eternal, who are done with material lust, who are freed from the dualities of happiness and distress, and who, unbewildered, know how to surrender unto the Supreme Person attain to that eternal kingdom." [*Bhagavad-gītā* 15.5]
>
> arjuna uvāca
> naṣṭo mohaḥ smṛtir labdhā
> tvat-prasādān mayācyuta
> sthito 'smi gata-sandehaḥ
> kariṣye vacanaṁ tava
>
> Arjuna said: "My dear Kṛṣṇa, O infallible one, my illusion is now gone. I have regained my memory by Your mercy. I am now firm and free from doubt and am prepared to act according to Your instructions." [18.73]
>
> *dhāmnā svena sadā nirasta-kuhakaṁ satyaṁ paraṁ dhīmahi*
>
> "I therefore meditate upon Him, Lord Śrī Kṛṣṇa, who is eternally existent in the transcendental abode, which is forever free from the illusory representations of the material world. I meditate upon Him, for He is the Absolute Truth." [*Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* 1.1.1]

If the perfected souls become free from illusion by hearing the instructions of the Lord or meditating on Him, then how could the Lord Himself be subject to illusion? Therefore the Lord is always in a superior transcendental position, and never comes under the influence of His illusory energy.

Sūtra 2.1.23

> *aśmādivacca tadanupapattiḥ*
>
> *aśmādivat* – like stone, etc.; *ca* – and; *tat* – of that; *anupapattiḥ* – impossibility.
>
> **And as stones, etc. [are not creators of the universe, so the *jīvas*, which are equally finite, have no power to create the world,] for it is impossible [for the *jīva* to create the world, just as it is impossible for a piece of iron, wood, etc.]**

The *jīvas,* though sentient, have as little independence as a piece of stone, wood, or other inanimate object; consequently it is impossible for such a *jīva* to be the creator of the world. The *Śruti* also says that the Lord is the creator in the following text:

> "He is the ruler of all beings; He is in every body."

Similarly *Bhagavad-gītā* [18.61] says:

> *īśvaraḥ sarva-bhūtānāṁ hṛd-deśe 'rjuna tiṣṭhati*
> *bhrāmayan sarva-bhūtāni yantrārūḍhāni māyayā*
>
> "The Supreme Lord is situated in everyone's heart, O Arjuna, and is directing the wanderings of all living entities, who are seated as on a machine, made of the material energy."

Sūtra 2.1.24

> *upasaṁhāradarśanānneti cet kṣīravaddhi*
>
> *upasaṁhāra* – completion; *darśanāt* – because of the seeing; *na* – not; *iti* – thus; *cet* – if; *kṣīravat* – like milk; *hi* – because.
>
> **[If it be said that the *jīva* is the creator] because we see him bringing many acts to conclusion, we say it is not so, as in the case with milk.**

An objector may say, "The *jīva* is not perfectly inert like a piece of stone, etc.; he has the power of action, because we see him bringing various actions to their conclusions and getting the results. Nor is this agency of the *jīva* a delusion, because there is nothing to show that the *jīva* is not the real agent in the acts that he does. If it be said 'Let the *jīva* be an agent, but he is an agent only subject to the will of God,' we reply it is not so, for we have first to imagine a God, who we do not see in this world, and next to add that He is the mover of all other sentient beings in this world; the theory that God is the inciter of the souls to action therefore is wrong, on account of its very clumsiness. Therefore the *jīva* himself is the agent through his own self-initiated activity, and not because he is impelled to action by any external force."

To this objection the author replies by saying that it is not so, as in the case of milk, for the *jīva* has the power of agency only as far as the cow produces milk. The cow has no power of her own to produce milk, for the production of milk is not a voluntary act by the cow. The primary agent in the production of milk is the force of *prāṇa*, as the *Smṛti* says, "It is the *prāṇa* that changes the food into the various humors of the body such as chyle, milk, etc." Similarly, though we see the *jīva* apparently producing some effect, yet he is not acting independently; the primary agent is the Supreme Lord. This will be explained further in *Sūtra* 2.3.39, where it will be shown that the activity of every *jīva* proceeds from the Highest Self as the cause.

> *sa eṣa yarhi prakṛter*
> *guṇeṣv abhiviṣajjate*
> *ahaṅkriyā-vimūḍhātmā*
> *kartāsmīty abhimanyate*
>
> "When the soul is under the spell of material nature and false ego, identifying the body as his self, he becomes absorbed in material activities, and by the influence of false ego he thinks that he is the proprietor of everything." [*Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* 3.27.2]
>
> *prakṛtyaiva ca karmāṇi*
> *kriyamāṇāni sarvaśaḥ*

yaḥ paśyati tathātmānam
akartāraṁ sa paśyati

"One who can see that all activities are performed by the body, which is created of material nature, and sees that the self does nothing, actually sees." [*Bhagavad-gītā* 13.30]

Thus the living being is not at all free to act, but is fully under the control of material nature, which is fully under the control of the Supreme Personality of Godhead.

If it be said that we do not see the hand of God in the acts of men, the author answers this by the next *sūtra.*

Sūtra 2.1.25

devādivaditi loke

deva-adi-vat – like *devas* and the rest; *iti* – thus; *loke* – in the world.

[God, though invisible, is the creator of the world,] just as the *devas*, [although invisible,] are seen to work in the world.

Devas like Indra and the rest are invisible, yet we see their activities, such as the production of rain, etc. in the world. Similarly, though God is not perceptible in the world, He is the unseen creator of it.

yaṁ vai na gobhir manasāsubhir vā
hṛdā girā vāsu-bhṛto vicakṣate
ātmānam antar-hṛdi santam ātmanāṁ
cakṣur yathaivākṛtayas tataḥ param

"As the different limbs of the body cannot see the eyes, the living entities cannot see the Supreme Lord, who is situated as the Supersoul in everyone's heart. Not by the senses, by the mind, by the life air, by thoughts within the heart, or by the vibration of words can the living entities ascertain the real situation of the Supreme Lord." [*Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* 6.3.16]

The author now gives another reason to show the absurdity of holding the view that a *jīva* can be the author of the universe.

Sūtra 2.1.26

kṛtsnapraṣaktirniravayavatvaśabdavyākopo vā

kṛtsna – entire; *praṣaktiḥ* – activity; *niravayavatva* – indivisible; *śabda* – text; *vyākopaḥ* – contradiction; *vā* – or.

[The *jīva* is] entirely absorbed in every activity, or else there would be a contradiction of the text [that the *jīva* is without parts.]

He who holds the theory that the *jīva* is the creator must accept the conclusion that inasmuch as the *jīva* is without parts, his entire self is present in every act. But this cannot be said, because in lifting a light thing like grass, we do not see the employment of the entire force of the *jīva.* When the *jīva* puts his entire self into any action, all his power is manifested therein. As in raising a heavy stone, the *jīva* puts in all his power, but he does not do so in raising a light straw, and so the exertion is infinitely less. Nor can one say that in the latter case, the entire *jīva* is not active, but only a portion; because it is an admitted fact that the *jīva* is without parts. Therefore we cannot say that the entire *jīva* is present in the

act of lifting a stone but only a portion in lifting a straw. You may say, "What is the harm in admitting that the *jīva* has parts?" To this we reply that then you will be contradicting all those texts of the scriptures that declare that the *jīva* is without parts, for example:

> "This self is atomic and is to be known by the mind alone, in which the chief prāṇa has completely withdrawn his five-fold activities. The mind of all beings is entirely interwoven by these five prāṇas and is consequently never quiet. But when the mind is perfectly pure, then the soul manifests his powers."
>
> *nainaṁ chindanti śastrāṇi*
>
> "The soul can never be cut into pieces by any weapon." [*Bhagavad-gītā* 2.23]

Thus the soul is atomic, and consequently partless and indivisible. As regards those texts that say that the world is produced by the *jīva,* we have already explained that the word *jīva* in those texts does not mean the individual soul, but the living Lord. Therefore, the theory that the *jīva* is the creator of the world is untenable.

Now we shall consider whether the above two objections apply to the agency of Brahman. The objector may say that Brahman is also entire and indivisible, therefore if in all acts He puts His entirety then in lifting straw, etc., He would employ His entire powers, but that is not possible because it is done by a fraction of His power, or rather it is possible to be accomplished by a portion of His power. On the other hand, if He puts in a only a portion of His power in any activity, then this does violence to those texts that declare Brahman to be partless and actionless. Thus the same two objections as in the case of the *jīva* being the agent also apply in the case of Brahman. To this the author replies in the next *sūtra:*

Sūtra 2.1.27

> *śrutestu śabdamūlatvāt*
>
> *śruteḥ* – from the scripture; *tu* – but; *śabda* – word; *mūlatvāt* – because of the root.
>
> **But [the above defects do not apply in the case of Brahman,] because the scriptures so declare it, and the revelation of God is the root [by which we learn anything about these transcendental subjects.]**

The word *tu* [but] removes the above doubt. The word *na* [not] is to be understood in this *sūtra,* and is drawn from *Sūtra* 2.1.24. In the case of Brahman being the agent, the above imperfections do not apply. Why do we say so? Because scripture declares it to be so, such as:

> "Brahman is transcendental, inconceivable pure consciousness and yet He has a form and possesses knowledge; and though He is partless He has parts, and though He is immeasurable He is yet measured. He is the creator of all, yet unmodified Himself."

Similarly, in *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* [3.1.7]:

> "The Lord shines forth as great, divine and inconceivable. He appears as smaller than the smallest, He is far off as well as near, and to the discerning, He is present in the cavity of the heart."

This text also shows the paradoxical and transcendental powers of Brahman. Similarly, another text says:

> "Lord Govinda is one, without parts, His form is existence, knowledge and bliss."

In the *Gopala Upaniṣad* we read, "Though one, He shines forth as many." In the *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad* we find Him described as partless and yet having parts.

> "He who knows the Lord as partless and yet full of an infinity of parts, as the destroyer of all false knowledge and blissful, is verily a sage and no one else; he is verily a sage and no one else."

Similarly in the *Kaṭhopaniṣad* [2.21] we find Him described as measured though immeasurable:

> "Sitting, He goes afar; resting, He moves everywhere; who other than myself is able to know that God who is the dispenser of pleasure and pain?"

So also in the *Ṛg Veda* [10.81.3]:

> "That one God, having His eyes, faces, arms and feet everywhere, when producing heaven and earth, forges them together with His arms and His wings."

And in *Śvetāṣvatara Upaniṣad* [4.17]

> "This God is the creator of all, is the Highest Self, He is always present in the hearts of men; the wise, who know Him with concentrated mind and heart full of love, become immortal. He is the creator of all, He is in the heart of all, the source of Ātman, omniscient, the creator of time, possessing all auspicious attributes and knowing all, He is the Lord of all matter and spirits, He is the Lord of all *guṇas*, He is the cause of transmigratory existence and liberation, bondage and freedom."
>
> "He is partless and actionless, pure and taintless, all peace. He is the supreme bridge of immortality, He is like fire that remains when all fuel is burnt." *Śvetāṣvatara Upaniṣad* [6.19]

These texts of *Śvetāṣvatara Upaniṣad* show very distinctly that the Lord possesses powers that appear to us to be self-contradictory, and hence impossible. But in transcendental matters we must be guided by scripture and not by mere human reason.

Says an objector, "But are we to renounce our reason in favor of scripture, when there is pure contradiction such as the statement, 'The fire has drenched the cloth'? Is not such a statement a logical absurdity?"

To this the *sūtra* replies, *śabdamūlatvāt:* "The revelation of God is the root." The knowledge of Brahman and His attributes being founded on the revelation of scripture, and scripture alone, we have no right to say that the scriptures are illogical, even if they describe God as having attributes that seem paradoxical from a material point of view. We must accept these inconceivable attributes of Brahman, because the only proof is the words of the scripture. Nor is it altogether mysterious. We see some distant analogy in the power of modern technology to produce apparently magical effects. Just because something is inexplicable or inconceivable to our tiny brains, there is no reason to hold that it is impossible.

There are three kinds of proofs: sense perception [*pratyakṣa*], inference [*anumāna*] and authority or the words of the scriptures [*śabda*]. In the first two cases, there is always room for error and illusion. A sensory perception may be a pure hallucination, caused by either hypnotic suggestion or a defect of the senses. Thus *pratyakṣa* or sensory experience is not absolutely reliable. Similarly, knowledge based on inference is also liable to error. We are all acquainted with the fragility of human reason. The only proof that is free from all these defects is the words of the scriptures, whether they are the words of God Himself, or those of an inspired sage or Āpta, meaning the perfect knowledge of one who is enlightened, competent and honest. Statements like "The Lord is omnipotent" and "the soul is eternal"

are always true, even though we may be unable to verify them by our blunt sense perception. The scriptures not only corroborate reason and perception; they are sometimes independent of both, and often declare that which neither reason nor perception could ever tell us.

The scriptures are the voice of God, giving us wisdom for our own benefit. As an instrument of proof, they support and corroborate perception and inference. Thus a man may have a jeweled necklace on his throat, but having forgotten it may be searching for it everywhere. But when he is told "The necklace is on your throat," he is saved all further trouble and anxiety. So also the scripture is the only means of knowing that which cannot be known either by perception or reason, or at least, cannot be known by the perception or reason of an ordinary man. For example, the movements of the heavenly bodies and their influences have been declared to us by the expert astronomers and astrologers. Therefore the words of these persons are the only means that we have of knowing when certain astronomical phenomena, such as eclipses or the equinoxes, will take place. We consult a physician and accept his advice in matters of health, and seek the expertise of lawyers, mechanics and other specialists. Thus even in such mundane matters, the words of experts are a means of higher knowledge than our own perception or inference. All the more so in transcendental matters, where we have to depend on the testimony of seers and saints, and the highest testimony of all, the words of God or scripture. As the *Śruti* says,

> "One who does not know the *Vedas* cannot even think of the Supreme."
>
> *vedaiś ca sarvair aham eva vedyo*
> *vedānta-kṛd veda-vid eva cāham*
>
> "By all the *Vedas* am I to be known; indeed I am the compiler of *Vedānta*, and I am the knower of the *Vedas*." [*Bhagavad-gītā* 15.15]

Therefore, the scripture being self-evident and self-manifest, is not open to any objections.

Sūtra 2.1.28

> *ātmani caivaṁ vicitrāśca hi*
>
> *ātmani* – in the Lord; *ca* – and; *evam* – thus; *vicitrāḥ* – variegated; *ca* – and; *hi* – because.
>
> **[And thus is the power] of the Lord, because manifold objects [are seen to be produced from the tree of all desires.]**

As from the *kalpa-vrkṣa* [desire tree] or the Philosopher's Stone, possessing inconceivable powers and energy, there come out animals and gold, and as these wonderful and mysterious creations are credible simply on the authority of the scriptures, similarly the inconceivable power of the Lord to create the world is understandable and believable by scriptural authority alone. The scriptures tell us that He creates the *devas*, men and lower animals by His power. If we believe in the wonderful powers of the desire tree or the Philosopher's Stone simply on the authority of the scriptures, then why should we not believe in the inconceivable power of the Lord on the same authority?

The knowledge of these mysterious things comes from the scripture alone. When we hear that animals come out of the desire tree, we do not question whether they are created by the entire tree or a portion of it, or whether any particular part of the tree has the power to produce a particular animal. We accept the information and classify it as a mystery, admitting that it leaves no scope for reason. The case of the Lord's creative agency is similar. It is useless to question whether the Lord is active in His entirety in any particular creative act, or whether it is done by a portion of His energy; we must simply accept the statement as we find it.

sarvam etad ṛtaṁ manye yan māṁ vadasi keśava

"O Kṛṣṇa, I totally accept as truth all that You have told me." [*Bhagavad-gītā* 10.14]

The word *ātmani* in the *sūtra* appears in the locative case to show that the Lord is the receptacle or support of all effects. The second *ca* [and] indicates that when we believe such wonderful things as the desire tree or the Philosopher's Stone, why should we hesitate to believe in the mysterious power of the Lord? The word *hi* [because] implies that the facts mentioned above are well-known in the *Purāṇas* and other scriptures. Therefore the conclusion is that the theory that Brahman is the agent of creation is far more reasonable than any *jīva* being the agent. The next *sūtra* strengthens this view.

Sūtra 2.1.29

svapakṣe doṣacca

sva-pakṣe – in the opponent's view; *doṣat* – because of the defect; *ca* – and

And because all these objections are similarly applicable to your own view, therefore it is not accepted.

The objections raised by the opponent equally apply to his own theory. If the *jīva* is the agent of creation, does he create with a portion of his energy or his entire energy? In the case of Brahman, we already answered the objection, but in the case if the *jīva* being the agent, there is no possibility of getting out of the difficulty.

Now the author raises another objection and answers it. The doubt arises whether Brahman shows any partiality to any *jīva*, and if so, whether it is possible for such a Brahman to be the creator. The text says that Brahman is pure truth, knowledge and infinity. He is pure being, knowledge and bliss. In these texts we do not find any energy attributed to Him. It is seen that only beings possessing energy or power [*śakti*] have the capacity to produce wonderful results, such as a carpenter or others. A man may have the whole knowledge of the art of carpentry, but if he has no energy, he cannot accomplish anything. To this objection, the author answers in the next *sūtra.*

Sūtra 2.1.30

sarvopetā ca taddarśanāt

sarva – all powers; *upetā* – endowed with; *ca* – and, alone; *tat* – that; *darśanāt* – because it is seen.

The Lord alone possesses all powers, because it is so seen [in the text.]

The Supreme Lord is endowed with all kinds of energies [*śaktis*] because we find many Vedic texts to that effect:

te dhyāna-yogānugatā apaśyan devātmā-śaktim sva-gunair nigūḍām
yaḥ kāraṇāni nikhilāni tāni kālātmā-yuktāny adhi tiṣṭhaty ekaḥ

"One Supremely Energetic Personality is present within the time factor and the *jīvas*, and is the sum total cause of this material universe, which is regulated by His own desire. The Brahman realized souls meditate on the energy that is generated by the Energetic's own will, possessing His selfsame qualities and influence. They perceive this energy as the cause of this material cosmos." [*Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 1.3]

ya eko 'varno bahudha śakti-yogād
varṇānekān nihitārtho dadhāti

"The Supreme Lord is the one, non-dual Absolute Truth endowed with immense unlimited potencies equal only to Him. Although He does not have any tinge of material qualities, He gives birth to the material modes of nature through the agency of His multifarious potencies." [*Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 4.1]

na tasya kāryaṁ karaṇaṁ ca vidyate
na tat-samaś cābhyadhikaś ca dṛśyate
parāsya śaktir vividhaiva śrūyate
svābhāvikī jñāna-bala-kriyā ca

"Nārāyaṇa, the Supreme Personality of Godhead, is almighty, omnipotent. He has multifarious energies, and therefore He is able to remain in His own abode and without endeavor supervise and manipulate the entire cosmic manifestation through the interaction of the three modes of material nature—*sattva-guṇa, rajo-guṇa* and *tamo-guṇa*. These interactions create different forms, bodies, activities and changes, which all occur perfectly. Because the Lord is perfect, everything works as if He were directly supervising and taking part in it. Atheistic men, however, being covered by the three modes of material nature, cannot see Nārāyaṇa to be the supreme cause behind all activities." [*Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 6.8]

Similarly, in the *Smṛti-śāstra* we find Him described as possessing all kinds of powers, such as *viṣṇu-śakti* which is said to be the highest. No doubt these powers are all inconceivable as says the *Smṛti:*

"He is without hands and feet, yet He can walk faster than anyone. His power is inconceivable, He is the Lord of Self, not to be found by reasoning, possessing thousands of *śaktis*."

Therefore it follows that Brahman is the agent in the act of creation, etc., because of His being endowed with wonderful and inconceivable powers. The texts declaring that Brahman is true knowledge, bliss, etc. reveal His essential nature, texts like *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* [1.3] quoted above declare His manifold powers. Consequently the nature of Brahman is one who is endowed with powers. Thus when the texts use expressions like 'He willed,' 'He saw,' etc. we find Him possessing the power of will and the rest. Both kinds of texts—those declaring Brahman to be pure existence, knowledge and bliss, and those declaring Him as willing, thinking, creating, etc.—are of equal value and authority because both are *Śruti*, and there is thus no difference between them.

The author raises and answers another objection: "Brahman cannot be the creator or agent, because He has no sense organs. *Devas* and others possess powers, and they are seen to be active agents in creation because they not only have powers, they also have sense organs. But Brahman is without sense organs, so how can He be capable of worldly activity? Even the verse [*Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 3.19] that you quoted to prove the possession of all powers by Brahman, declares definitely that He has no sense organs:

apāṇi-pādo javano grahītā
paśyaty acakṣuḥ sa śṛṇoty akarṇaḥ
sa vetti vedyaṁ na ca tasyāsti vettā
tam āhur agryaṁ puruṣaṁ mahāntam

"Although the Supreme Lord is described as having no hands and legs, He nonetheless accepts all sacrificial offerings. He has no eyes, yet He sees everything. He has no ears, yet He hears everything."

To this objection the author replies:

Sūtra 2.1.31

vikaraṇatvānneti cettaduktam

vikaraṇatvāt – on account of the absence of instruments of action and perception; *na* – not; *iti* – thus; *cet* – if; *tat* – that objection; *uktam* – answered.

[If it be objected that Brahman cannot be the agent of creation] because He does not possess sense organs, then we reply that this objection has already been met by the scripture.

The objection that Brahman cannot be the agent of creation because He has no sense organs is answered in the very text quoted by the objector to show that He possesses no sense organs. *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* [6.7-8] asserts:

tam īśvarāṇāṁ paramaṁ maheśvaraṁ
taṁ devatānāṁ paramaṁ ca daivatam
patiṁ patīnāṁ paramaṁ parastād
vidāma devaṁ bhuvaneśam īḍyam

"O Supreme Lord, You are the Supreme Maheśvara, the worshipable Deity of all the demigods and the Supreme Lord of all lords. You are the controller of all controllers, the Personality of Godhead, the Lord of everything worshipable."

na tasya kāryaṁ karaṇaṁ ca vidyate
na tat-samaś cābhyadhikaś ca dṛśyate
parāsya śaktir vividhaiva śrūyate
svābhāvikī jñāna-bala-kriyā ca

"Nārāyaṇa, the Supreme Personality of Godhead, is almighty, omnipotent. He has multifarious energies, and therefore He is able to remain in His own abode and without endeavor supervise and manipulate the entire cosmic manifestation through the interaction of the three modes of material nature—*sattva-guṇa, rajo-guṇa* and *tamo-guṇa*. These interactions create different forms, bodies, activities and changes, which all occur perfectly. Because the Lord is perfect, everything works as if He were directly supervising and taking part in it. Atheistic men, however, being covered by the three modes of material nature, cannot see Nārāyaṇa to be the supreme cause behind all activities."

In the verse beginning, "He has neither hands nor feet..." [*Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 3.19] it was mentioned that the Supreme Brahman can perform any action without the instrumentality of material sense organs, and the above-quoted verses clear up any remaining doubt how the Lord can be active without material sense organs. The Supreme Brahman is called *puruṣam mahāntam*, the Great Spirit, because He is the ruler of all living entities. When it is said that He has no activity or sense organs in His body, it is meant that His body is not made of ordinary matter, nor are His sense organs. Consequently His activity is also not material, but transcendental. Thus when the scriptures say that He has no activities, it only denies physical activity, because He does perform activities of the highest order through His *parāśakti*. That *parāśakti* is natural to Him, and therefore it is called *svābhāvikī;* in fact this supreme potency is the very essence of His Self. He manifests His threefold powers of knowledge [*jñāna*], strength [*bala*] and activity [*kriyā*] through this *parāśakti.* Since no one else possesses this transcendental attribute, *parāśakti,* therefore no one is equal to Him. It follows from this

that no one can be superior to Him. So although He is devoid of material sense organs, He possesses transcendental organs as essential parts of His nature, therefore there is the possibility of action for Him.

Other commentators say that the above-quoted text about His grasping without hands and walking without feet does not prohibit His possessing sense organs; it only prohibits the exclusive use of a particular sense organ for a particular purpose. Ordinary beings grasp only with the hands and run only with the feet. But for the Lord there is no such restriction; every one of His senses can perform the activities of every other organ. In fact the same *Upaniṣad* later says that *sarvataḥ pāṇi-pādam:* all His sense organs are universal in their activity.

> "He does not possess bodily form like that of an ordinary living entity. There is no difference between His body and His soul. He is absolute. All His senses are transcendental. Any one of His senses can perform the action of any other sense. Therefore, no one is greater than Him or equal to Him. His potencies are multifarious, and thus His deeds are automatically performed as a natural sequence." [*Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 6.7-8]

So also in the *Brahma-saṁhitā*, it is declared that every limb of His is endowed with the power of performing the functions of all the senses.

> *aṅgāni yasya sakalendriya-vṛtti-manti*
> *paśyanti pānti kalayanti ciraṁ jaganti*
> *ānanda-cinmaya-sad-ujjvala-vigrahasya*
> *govindam ādi-puruṣaṁ tam ahaṁ bhajāmi*
>
> "I worship Govinda, the primeval Lord, whose transcendental form is full of bliss, truth, substantiality and is thus full of the most dazzling splendor. Each of the limbs of that transcendental figure possesses in Himself, the full-fledged functions of all the organs, and eternally sees, maintains and manifests the infinite universes, both spiritual and mundane." [*Brahma-saṁhitā* 5.32]

This extraordinary power of the sense organs of the Lord was manifested in the forest picnic in Vṛndāvana among His boyhood companions. In the view of the above verses, the word *kāryam* should be explained as 'to be accomplished.' In other words, when *Śruti-śāstra* says there is no *kārya* for Him, it means there is nothing to be accomplished by Him, because He is already perfect and full. In this interpretation the word *karaṇa* [sense organs] may also be explained as something to be done. The rest is the same as the first explanation.

In the next *sūtra*, the question is raised whether Brahman has any motive to create the universe. The *prima facie* view is that He has no motive because He is perfect, and this view is set forth in the next *sūtra*.

Sūtra 2.1.32

> *na prayojanavattvāt*
>
> *na* – not; *prayojana-vattvāt* – being endowed with a motive.
>
> **[The Lord has no inclination towards creation, because] He has no motive.**

The word *na* [not] is understood in this *sūtra* from the preceding one. The word *na-prayojana-vattvāt* is a compound word meaning "because of being without motive." The usual form would have been *a-prayojana-vattvāt.* The Lord has no urge to create, because being perfect, He has no motive to create.

Every activity in the world is seen to exist on a motive beneficial either to one's self or for the sake of another. The motive of benefiting His own self cannot exist in the case of the Lord, because being perfect, His wishes are automatically fulfilled, as the scriptures repeatedly declare. The Lord tells Prahlāda in the *Hari-bhakti-sudhodaya* [14.32]:

> *nityaṁ ca pūrṇa-kāmasya*
> *janmāni vividhāni me*
> *bhakta-sarveṣṭa-dānāya*
> *tasmāt kiṁ te priyaṁ vada*
>
> "My desires are always automatically fulfilled, but I take various births in this world just to bestow on My devotees the satisfaction of all their desires. So please tell Me what you would like from Me."

An objector may say, "Nor is His motive to do something beneficial to others, because the creation evidently is for the sake of punishing the conditioned souls, making them suffer the pains of birth and death. An all-compassionate Lord would not create such a universe, merely to punish the erring *jīvas* for their misdeeds. And no one creates anything without a motive. Therefore, it follows that the Lord has nothing to urge Him to creation."

This objection is answered in the next *sūtra*.

Sūtra 2.1.33

> *lokavattu līlākaivalyam*
>
> *loka-vat* – as in the world; *tu* – but; *līlā* – pastimes; *kaivalyam* – merely.
>
> **[The motive of the Lord in creating the world is] to display His pastimes, as we see in ordinary life.**

The word *tu* [but] removes the above doubt. Though all-full, complete and desiring nothing, the motive that impels the Lord toward the creation of this wonderful world is mere sport, which has nothing beneficial for Him in view. As in ordinary life, men in good spirit, full of cheerfulness, when awakening from sound sleep, begin to dance around without any object, but merely from exuberance of spirit, such is the case with the Lord. This *līlā* or sport of the Lord is natural to Him, because He is full of Self-bliss. Says the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* [1.9]:

> "Some think that the creation is for the enjoyment of the creator, while others think that it is for the sake of recreation, to shake off the lethargy of *yoga-nidrā* or the solitude of *pralaya*. Actually, God's act of creation is simply His nature, without any motive. What motive can there be for one who has all His desires satisfied?"

The *Smṛti-śāstra* confirms [*Nārāyaṇa Saṁhitā*]

> "The creation, etc. of Hari does not depend on any motive; He creates out of sheer joy, as a drunkard dances because of intoxication. He who is full of bliss can have no motive whatsoever. When even the Muktas have got all their desires fulfilled through Him, what unfulfilled desire can there be for the Lord, who is the Self of the universe?"

But a man intoxicated with drink has no consciousness of what he is doing. Is the Lord also devoid of consciousness, like the drunkard? We say no, for then He would not be omniscient. All that we say is that as man plays and becomes sportive through sheer exuberance of spirit and joy of life, such is the case with Brahman. The Advaitins explain the words "as we see in ordinary life" in this *sūtra* as

referring to the well-known example of respiration that goes on even in deep sleep, and which is therefore involuntary and motiveless. However, this analogy is open to the objection that the Lord is not subject to deep sleep and losing consciousness as a man does. The example given by the Viśiṣṭādvaitins is that of a young prince, who amuses himself by playing games with a ball without any motive. However, this analogy is open to the objection that playing games with a ball is not altogether without motive, as the prince gets some pleasure by playing the game.

Therefore the conclusion is that the Supreme Brahman is the sole operative, efficient and material cause of the creation, and that He creates the material world as a pastime to satisfy the desires of the materially conditioned living entities. He then enters within the creation to support and maintain it, controlling the actions and reactions of the modes of material nature by His potency of time. He does this in such a way that the conditioned living entities eventually grow weary of suffering the imperfections of this world, and begin to inquire as to why they are suffering, and how they may be permanently relieved from it. At this time the merciful Lord makes the path of pious activities leading to devotional service available to them through *Vedānta-sūtra* and other scriptures. Those who are fortunate take it up and attain the completion of all their desires.

Adhikaraṇa 10: The Lord is Neither Partial nor Cruel

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: We see that some people are born into favorable situations, while others are born into difficult situations. We also observe that sometimes an apparently innocent person is punished, or a blameworthy person prospers. Some philosophers and theologians interpret this to mean that God is either not omnipotent or is partial and unfair. If God were equal to everyone, then He is not omnipotent, because He is incapable of creating a situation where everyone is offered an equal opportunity to prosper and enjoy life; and if He is omnipotent then He is unfair, because although all souls are inherently equal, we see that some are more fortunate and others less fortunate, and sometimes there is injustice.

Saṁśaya [arisal of doubt]: The author raises this objection and then goes on to remove the doubt.

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: The theory that Brahman is the omnipotent creator is open to the objection that the Lord is either partial or cruel; for He creates *devas* and men, some of whom enjoy happiness and others suffer misery. This theory is therefore not congruous, for the texts say that the Lord is neither partial nor cruel. How then can such a Lord be the creator?

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: The author answers this objection with the following *sūtra:*

Sūtra 2.1.34

> *vaiṣamyanaighṛṇyena na sāpekṣatvāt tathā hi darśayati*
>
> *vaiṣamya* – partiality; *naighṛṇyena* – cruelty; *na* – not; *sāpekṣatvāt* – because of having regard for *karma; tathā* – so; *hi* – because; *darśayati* – the scriptures declare.
>
> **Partiality and cruelty do not [exist in the Lord; the pleasure and pain experienced by beings is] in regard to their *karma*, and so the scriptures declare.**

No fault of partiality or cruelty exists in Brahman the creator. The different conditions into which creatures are born and the pleasures and pains they suffer depend entirely on their own *karma*. The Lord creates the environment in which the creatures are placed with the strictest regard to their *karma*. The proof of this is in the scripture itself. In the *Kauṣītakī Upaniṣad* [3.8] we find the following:

ajño jantur anīśo 'yam
ātmanaḥ sukha-duḥkhayoḥ
īśvara-prerito gacchet
svargaṁ vāśv abhram eva ca

"He makes one who He wishes to lead up from these worlds do good deeds, and He makes one who He wishes to lead down from these worlds do bad deeds, according to the tendencies generated by their past *karma*. By the will of the Supreme he can go to heaven or hell, as a cloud is driven by the air. The living entity is completely dependent in his distress and happiness."

The Lord is the operative cause of the enjoyment or suffering of the *jīvas*. They get promotion to the heavenly planets through the will of the Lord, and similarly they are degraded into hellish condition of life through the will of the Lord. But His will is always in regard to the *karma* of the *jīva*.

Sūtra 2.1.35

na karmāvibhāgātiti cennānāditvāt

na – not; *karma – karma; avibhāgāt* – because of non-distinction; *iti* – thus; *cet* – if; *na* – not; *anāditvāt* – because of beginninglessness.

[The theory of *karma*] cannot [explain the inequality and cruelty seen in this universe, because when the creation first started] there was no distinction [of souls, and consequently] of *karmas*. This [objection, however] is invalid, because there was no beginning of creation.

An objector may say, "Your theory of *karma* only pushes the difficulty one step back. No doubt, it explains the inequalities and sufferings of the *jīvas* in their present life, to some extent. That may indeed be due to the results of acts performed in a past life. But since in the beginning of creation there were no *jīvas,* nor their acts, they must have been created with inequalities in order to play different roles in the creation, such as the *devas* and demons. If they had been created all equal, there is no reason to hold that their acts would have been different. *Śruti-śāstra* also says,

sad eva saumyedam agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyam

"My dear boy, the Absolute Truth alone existed prior to this creation, one without a second." [*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.2.1]

This shows that when the creation started, there were no *jīvas* or *karma* distinguishable from Brahman. He alone existed, and nothing else."

To this objection raised in the first half of the *sūtra,* the next half gives the answer by saying, "This is not so, because of the beginninglessness of the *jīvas* and creation." The their *karmas* are beginningless, just like Brahman, and this is the theory adopted by the author. Thus there is no fault, for every subsequent action is motivated by the tendencies generated by past *karmas*. The good and bad *karmas* of the *jīvas* are not completely destroyed by *pralaya;* in the next *kalpa*, they are conditioned by the *karmas* of the previous creation. The *Bhaviṣya Purāṇa* states:

"The Lord makes the *jīvas* do good or bad deeds according to their past *karma;* nor is there any conflict in this position, because the *karmas* have no beginning."

If an objector says, "If you say that *karmas* are beginningless, then your theory is tainted with an infinite regression," we say it is not so, because we find authority for it in reason also. In point is the

well-known case of the seed and the tree. Does the seed come first, or the tree? Nor is there any objection that God loses His independence by being bound to create by the past *karma* of the *jīvas.* The Lord is certainly independent, but He is not capricious or whimsical. If He would create the world with total disregard to the past *karmas* of the *jīvas,* He might demonstrate His omnipotence to some minds, but to the majority His act would appear capricious, arbitrary and unjust. In fact, the authorities show that substance, *karma* and time are co-eternal with the Lord, and He creates the universe with full regard to these three. The universe is conditioned not only by the karma of the *jīvas;* its substance and time are also important factors in the creation. Of course these three are subordinate to the will of Īśvara, but He never disregards them in His act of creation. The Lord is not partial or cruel, not is He lacking in omnipotence. In fact, the theory of the beginninglessness of *karma* and creation reconciles all the difficulties. You cannot say that this theory is open to the same objections as the theory of specific creation; you cannot say it is the unwitting falling of the smugglers into the hands of the tax-collectors.

> "Certain merchants went by a roundabout way to avoid the customs-house and evade customs duties. In the dark of night, they missed their path and after wandering for some time, took shelter in a roadside house. in the morning it was found that the same house in which they had taken shelter was the customs-house they were trying to avoid. Thus they not only had to pay the duty, but were punished for trying to cheat the customs. This maxim is called 'Morning in the customs-house.' "

Our theory is not open to this objection of "morning in the customs house," but yours certainly is. To avoid the imputation of cruelty and inequality to the Lord, we have explained the eternity of creation. But if you say that since the Lord is not bound to regard the *karmas* of the living entities because of His independence, He creates a world of misery just to punish the errant souls, that brings you back around to to the same difficulty that you were trying to avoid. The Lord, being perfectly independent, could just as easily have created a world of perfect joy, with complete disregard to the *karmas* of the *jīvas.* But then in either case His action, instead of being regulated by any law or justice, would have been lawless and unfair, and these are not credible attributes of the Lord. Therefore his creation of a world with regard to the *karmas* of the *jīvas,* and to time and substance, does not detract from His omnipotence. Though He certainly can act against all the laws of matter, spirit and *karma*, nevertheless He does not do so, and thus His making the *jīvas* act according to the tendencies of their beginningless previous *karmas* is a matter for His glory, and not an instance of His partiality.

Adhikaraṇa 11: The Grace of the Lord is not Partiality

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: The previous Adhikaraṇa showed that Brahman is neither partial nor cruel. Now the author takes up the question of whether the Lord is open to the objection of partiality by showing special grace to His devotees. It is a fact that the Lord shows special grace to His devotees, for He especially protects them and specifically fulfills their desires.

Saṁśaya [arisal of doubt]: Is this special protection of the devotees by the Lord and fulfilling their desires a mark of partiality by the Lord?

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: He will protect His devotees even from the mouth of the lion, but allow ordinary men to be devoured by the beast.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: The author answers this objection by saying that it is not so.

Sūtra 2.1.36

upapadyate cā'pyupalabhyate ca

upa-padyate – it is reasonable that it should be so; *ca* – and; *api* – even; *upalabhyate* – is found; *ca* – and.

[Such partiality to His devotees by the Lord] is reasonable, and is also observed in the scriptures.

The special grace shown by the Lord to His devotees is no doubt 'partiality,' but the Lord, the kind lover of His devotees, has such 'partiality,' and it is reasonable that it should be so. It is the natural, inherent power of the Lord to show forth His grace on those who have *bhakti* or devotion for Him. This special grace is not an arbitrary function of the Lord's will, but it also has regard to the factor of *bhakti* or devotion of the *jīva* on whom such special grace is shown. Nor does this favor contradict the statement that the Lord is free from partiality. For this sort of 'partiality' to the devotees, instead of being a fault with the Lord, has been praised in the scriptures as adding to His glory. For the scripture says that this grace upon His devotees is the highest jewel among the perfections of the Lord. If the Lord did not have this quality of showing special grace, then then all His other attributes, however great, would not have been attractive to the *jīvas,* and would not have evoked devotional love towards Him. This shows the reasonableness of the existence of this 'partiality' of the Lord. Not only is it reasonable, but revelation and tradition also declare it [*Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* 3.2.3]:

nāyam ātmā pravacanena labhyo
na medhasā na bahunā śrutena
yam evaiṣa vṛṇute tena labhyas
tasyaiṣa ātmā vivṛṇute tanuṁ svām

"The Supreme Lord is not obtained by expert explanations, by vast intelligence, or even by much hearing. He is obtained only by one whom He Himself chooses. To such a person, He manifests His own form."

teṣāṁ jñānī nitya-yukta
eka-bhaktir viśiṣyate
priyo hi jñānino 'tyartham
ahaṁ sa ca mama priyaḥ

"Of these, the wise one who is in full knowledge in union with Me through pure devotional service is the best. For I am very dear to him, and he is dear to Me." [*Bhagavad-gītā* 7.17]

samo 'haṁ sarva-bhūteṣu
na me dveṣyo 'sti na priyaḥ
ye bhajanti tu māṁ bhaktyā
mayi te teṣu cāpy aham

"I envy no one, nor am I partial to anyone. I am equal to all. But whoever renders service unto Me in devotion is a friend, is in Me, and I am also a friend to him." [*Bhagavad-gītā* 9.29]

kṣipraṁ bhavati dharmātmā
śaśvac-chāntiṁ nigacchati
kaunteya pratijānīhi
na me bhaktaḥ praṇaśyati

"He quickly becomes righteous and attains lasting peace. O son of Kuntī, declare it boldly that My devotee never perishes." [*Bhagavad-gītā* 9.31]

Sūtra 2.1.37

sarvadharmopapatteśca

sarva – all; *dharma* – qualities; *upapatteḥ* – because of the reasonableness; *ca* – and.

And because it is reasonable that all attributes are present in Brahman, [however contradictory they may be, therefore He is just to all, and 'partial' to His devotees.]

In has been proved above that all attributes exist in the Supreme Lord, whose essential nature is inconceivable, whether they are harmonious among themselves or contradictory with each other. It follows that along with His perfect justice and equality, He shows favor and partiality to His devotees. The wise, therefore, do not find any greater difficulty in reconciling the existence of these two heterogeneous qualities in Him than in any other pair of opposites that also exist in Him. For example, He is all-knowledge or unlimited consciousness, and yet He possesses knowledge of His individual identity and form, and consciousness of His difference from other beings; He is essentially formless and colorless, and yet possessing the most ravishing form that enchants the hearts of His devotees; similarly although He is perfectly just and equal to all, yet He does show special favor and grace to his devotees. Not only do all pairs of opposite qualities exist in Him, but also all harmonious qualities are found in Him, such as He is forgiving, kind, compassionate and merciful to all. The *Smṛti-śāstra* also says [*Kūrma Purāṇa*]:

asthūlaś cānaṇuś caiva sthūlo 'ṇuś caiva sarvataḥ
avarṇaḥ sarvataḥ proktaḥ śyāmo raktānta-locanaḥ

"The Lord is personal although impersonal, He is atomic although great, and He is blackish and has red eyes although He is colorless. Although He is described as possessing self-contradictory and opposite attributes, no evil or falsehood should ever be attributed to Him. On the contrary, all these conflicting attributes are reconciled by His supreme power."

Thus it has been proved that the Lord, though equal to all, is yet the eternal Friend of His devotees.

Thus ends the First Pāda of the Second Adhyāya of Vedānta-sūtra. All glories to Śrīla Prabhupāda!

Śrī Vedānta-sūtra

Adhyāya 2: No Conflict Between *Vedānta* and Other Vedic Scriptures

Pāda 2: Refutation of Opposing Views (continued)

kṛṣṇa-dvaipāyanaṁ naumi yaḥ sāṅkhyādy-ukti-kaṇṭakān
chittvā yukty-asinā viśvaṁ kṛṣṇa-krīḍā-sthalaṁ vyadhāt

"I offer my respectful obeisances unto Lord Kṛṣṇa-dvaipāyana Vyāsa, who has removed the thorny bushes of heterodox philosophical systems, such as Sāṅkhya and the rest, with the sharp sword of his reason, thus making this world a plain ground for Lord Kṛṣṇa to play upon."

Kapila the author of atheistic Sāṅkhya philosophy, as well as the Buddhists and Jainas, maintain that there is no God in this world. Kapila says that the world originates from matter [*pradhāna*]. The Buddhists and Jainas claim that atoms are the cause of creation. One class of Buddhists hold the view that the whole world is void, while all major schools of Buddhism are united in the view that there is no creator of this world, in the sense of a conscious and intelligent being. Philosophers like Kaṇāda [the author of Vaiśeṣika-sūtra] and Patañjali ostensibly admit the existence of God, but practically they are as atheistic in their tendencies as the Sāṅkhyas and the rest, because they do not accept the Personality of Godhead as taught in the *Vedas*. Vyāsa, seeing the world full of the thorns of the false philosophies of Kapila and the rest, and finding it intolerable that the Lord should tread on them with His soft lotus feet, prepared the way for His coming by cutting away these wild growths with the sharp sword of His reasoning. Then once Vyāsa prepared the world His coming, Lord Kṛṣṇa manifested His pastimes at the end of Dvāpara-yuga.

Similarly, in modern times there has been no dearth of speculative atheistic and impersonalist philosophies, but actually their basic arguments are very similar to those of the ancient authors mentioned above. Most modern materialistic philosophies hold that matter is the independent cause of the creation. Even the churches nowadays accept Darwin's theory of evolution or one of its variants. Physics speculates that atoms are the only things that really exist, and their combination and reactions are the cause of everything else, even consciousness. Highly-educated scientists labor their whole lives in well-equipped laboratories, spending huge research budgets trying to prove this nonsense. Most people spend a large proportion of their formative years imprisoned in state-run schools, force-fed the materialistic dogma of materialism and evolution. They are not given actual knowledge nor taught how to learn and think for themselves, but simply trained to repeat the opinions of others upon demand. This behavior is rewarded with opulence and material enjoyment, but they remain as confused as ever. Before such bewildered people can come to the platform of real knowledge, all this nonsense must be swept away and the Absolute Truth revealed, so that the actual Lord of the Heart can claim His throne.

In the First Pāda of the Second Adhyāya, the author has answered the objections raised by his opponents to the system of philosophy propounded in his *sūtras*. He was on the defensive in the last Pāda. This was necessary to prevent the weak-minded from from going astray, abandoning the ancient highway of the *Vedas*, and from being attacked by the fallacious arguments of these plausible systems, wandering in the pleasant labyrinths of these philosophies, losing their way and being destroyed. Now taking an aggressive attitude, He attacks the positions of His opponents, refuting their systems by proving the uncritical and unphilosophical nature of their doctrines. The author first takes up the atheistic Sāṅkhya philosophy and refutes it. Previous *sūtras* have proved only that the Vedic texts do not set forth the Sāṅkhya view, while the task of the present Pāda is to demolish that view itself; therefore the *Vedānta-sūtra* cannot therefore be charged with needless repetition.

Adhikaraṇa 1: Pradhāna Cannot be the Cause of the Creation

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: Kapila the author of Sāṅkhya wrote a collection of *sūtras* in which he enumerated various *tattvas* [ontological categories]. According to him, *prahdāna* is the name given to the original root of matter, and it is defined by him as the state of equilibrium of the three *guṇas* [modes of material nature], namely *sattva* [goodness], *rajas* [passion] and *tamas* [ignorance]. From this *prakṛti* emerges *puruṣa* [souls] the *mahat-tattva* [great principle], from the *mahat-tattva* proceeds *ahaṅkāra* [false ego], and from *ahaṅkāra* come the five *tan-matras* [subtle sense objects], the five knowledge-acquiring senses and the five active senses, and the gross elements. Thus according to Sāṅkhya philosophy the 25 *tattvas* of the material creation are as follows:

1		*prakṛti*	Material nature
2		*puruṣa*	Soul
3		*mahat-tattva*	Great principle
4		*ahaṅkāra*	False ego
5		*manas*	Mind
6	*tan-mātrā* (subtle sense objects)	*śravāṁsi*	Sound
7		*ākṛti*	Form
8		*sparśa*	Touch
9		*rasa*	Flavor
10		*gandha*	Aroma
11	*jñāna-indriya* (knowledge-acquiring senses)	*śrotram*	Hearing
12		*tvak*	Touch
13		*dṛk*	Sight
14		*rasana*	Taste
15		*nāsikāḥ*	Smell
16	*karma-indriya* (working senses)	*rasanām*	Tongue
17		*karau*	Hands
18		*pādau*	Feet
19		*prajananam*	Genital

20		*apānaḥ*	Anus
21	Material elements	*ākāśa*	Ether (space)
22		*vāyu*	Air
23		*agni*	Fire
24		*apas*	Water
25		*pṛthvī*	Earth

Prakṛti is the state of equilibrium of the three *guṇas* [modes of material nature], namely *sattva* [goodness], *rājas* [passion] and *tamas* [ignorance]. The essential nature [*dharma*] of *sattva* is joy, of *rājas* is pain and of *tamas* is delusion. The whole world is the effect of these qualities, and therefore we find joy, pain and inertia in it. Such is the nature of this world.

According to the Sāṅkhyas, *prakṛti* is eternal and all-pervading. It is the root or primeval cause, and there is no need to inquire into a further cause of it, as we find in *Sūtra* 1.67 of the *Sāṅkhya-smṛti:*

> "Since the root has no root, the root of all is rootless. That is to say, there is no other cause of *prakṛti,* because there would be an infinite regression of the cause of all required another cause, which by parity of reasoning would require another cause, and so on."

Prakṛti is unlimited and is the material cause of all. It is all-pervading as asserted in *Sūtra* 6.36 of the *Sāṅkhya-smṛti:*

> "She is all-pervading because her products are seen everywhere."

This *prakṛti,* eternally producing everything, is herself insentient, but is the cause of the enjoyment and liberation of countless sentient beings; and although she is super-sensuous and imperceptible, yet she is to be inferred from her effects. Though one, she has many heterogeneous attributes, and she produces this wonderful creation through her power of modification, beginning with the *mahat-tattva* and the rest; thus she is the operative and material cause of the universe. *Puruṣa,* on the other hand, is attributeless, all-pervading consciousness, individual and separate for each body. Its existence is to be inferred from the existence of organized life, because no organized life can exist but for the sake of something else. As stated in *Sūtra* 1.66 of the *Sāṅkhya-smṛti:*

> "The existence of soul is inferred from the fact that the combination of the principles of *prakṛti* into their various effects is for the sake of another besides the insentient *prakṛti* or her various insentient products."

Since *puruṣa* is free from all action and modification, nor produced by anything, it follows that it is agentless and without enjoyment. But people mistake *puruṣa* as agent or enjoyer through illusion.

When *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* come together, their very juxtaposition produces an apparent exchange of attributes: namely, consciousness appears in matter, and agency and enjoyment in spirit. This *adhyāsa* [superimposition] falsely attributes the qualities of one to the other. Nature is really unconscious, but the presence of spirit make it appear as if conscious; spirit is neither the agent nor the enjoyer, but its presence in matter makes it appear to be so. All the suffering of the soul arises from lack of discrimination between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, while liberation consists of realizing the difference. A person who has become indifferent to *prakṛti* has attained *mokṣa*.

This summarizes the Sāṅkhya theory, which bears a striking similarity to modern so-called scientific arguments about the process of creation. If we simply eliminate the Sāṅkhya teachings about the soul, add a few more chemical elements and substitute 'universe' for *pradhāna*, Sāṅkhya would become indistinguishable from the modern theories. The false assumption in both theories is that matter can create independently without an intelligent designer. This assumption is embedded so deeply in modern culture, language and thinking that most people are completely incapable of thinking rationally about alternative theories.

In this system there are three means of right knowledge [*pramāṇa*]: sensory perception, inference and testimony, as stated in *Sūtra* 1.88 of the *Sāṅkhya-smṛti:*

> "Proof is of three kinds; there is no need for more, for if these three are established, then all that is true can be established by one or the other of them: sensory perception [*pratyakṣa*], inference [*anumāna*] and testimony [*śabda*], to the exclusion of comparison, which is a distinct source of knowledge in Nyāya, and others."

We do not have much difference with the Sāṅkhyas regarding perception and testimony, because these two proofs deal with established objects; our difference with them is in regards to certain inferences they have drawn. They have inferred by reasoning that *pradhāna* is the cause of the universe; it is this reasoning and its conclusion that are erroneous. If we refute their arguments about *pradhāna* being the cause of the universe, we practically refute their whole philosophy, because this is the major point of their system.

Saṁśaya [arisal of doubt]: Is *pradhāna* both the operative and material cause of creation or not?

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: *Pradhāna* is the operative and material cause of creation, because the world consists of three modes of material nature—*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*—and so we infer that the principal cause must also have these three attributes, for nothing that is in the effect that is not in the cause. As we see in the case of pots, their material cause of clay belongs to the same category, earth, as the pot. Moreover, inert objects can become agents, for we use active verbs in connection with those objects: "The tree brings forth fruit;" "The water is moving." Therefore *pradhāna* alone is the material cause of the universe and the creator as well.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: The author replies to this view in the following *sūtra:*

Sūtra 2.2.1

> *racanānupapatteśca nānumānam*
>
> *racanā* – construction; *anupapatteḥ* – on account of the impossibility; *ca* – and; *na* – not; *ānumānam* – that which is inferred.
>
> **That which is inferred [*pradhāna*] [is not the cause of the world, because being insentient,] it is impossible [for her to have created the universe.]**

Pradhāna is called *ānumānam,* that which is inferred, because her existence is purely hypothetical. This hypothetical *pradhāna* is neither the operative nor the material cause of the universe. The world shows wonderful design and construction, therefore it is impossible for unintelligent matter to have produced this universe without the direction of an intelligent agent. No one has ever seen a beautiful palace constructed by the fortuitous coming together of bricks, mortar, and other material without the active cooperation of intelligent agents like the architect, masons and so on. Then how is it possible for the extremely great and complex construction of the universe to have come about by the independent action of matter? No one ever builds a house by calculating its measurements with a roll of dice; similarly, it is impossible for the finely-tuned design of the universe to come about by chance.

The word *ca* [and] in the *sūtra* implies that the argument in the *Sāṅkhya-smṛti* based upon the logic of *anvaya* [undistributed middle] has no probative force, because it is a logical fallacy. This central argument is contained in *Sūtras* 1.130-132 of the *Sāṅkhya-smṛti:*

> "Because of their measure, *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* are unlimited because they are uncaused, while mind and the rest are limited, being products. Because they conform to *pradhāna,* mind and the rest are products, thus they follow and correspond with *pradhāna;* because the qualities of *pradhāna* are seen in all things, and it is a maxim that the effect is derived from the cause and implies the cause. And finally because it is through the power of the cause that the effect can do anything, as a chain restrains an elephant only by the force of the iron that it is made of."

The logical fallacy of *anvaya* [undistributed middle] is displayed in the following syllogism:

> All Xs are Zs; all Ys are Zs. Therefore, all Xs are Ys.

This is the general form; now here are some examples:

> Penguins are black and white; newspapers are black and white. Therefore, penguins are newspapers.
>
> All Communists believe in heavy taxation; Senator Jones believes in heavy taxation. Therefore, Senator Jones is a Communist.
>
> The color of goodness is white; these cows are white. Therefore, all cows are white.

To infer that all cows must be white because some cows are observed to be white is a similar fallacious argument. Whiteness is merely an accidental attribute; it is not the cause of the class characteristics of cows. Similarly the Sāṅkhya philosophy, as quoted in the *sūtra* above, reasons like this: "Physical objects like the mind and senses give pleasure; *pradhāna* also has the attribute of giving pleasure. Therefore the mind, senses and so on are produced by *pradhāna*." The supposition of *pradhāna* is never really proved; it is simply assumed, and all creation deemed to be its effect.

Physical objects like flowers, beautiful jars, etc. no doubt possess the quality of producing pleasure. But the feeling of pleasure is internal and subjective, and though they may induce pleasure in us, we cannot say that the attribute of pleasure belongs to the objects themselves. Pleasure is an attribute of the soul or consciousness, and not of inanimate objects. So matter cannot be said to have the qualities of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, because these are attributes of consciousness. The proof is that the *guṇas* are relative to the perceiver; thus the same object may manifest all three *guṇas* to three different persons, or to the same person at different times. The beautiful girl is an object of joy to the accepted lover, an object of pain to the rejected lover, and an object of indifference to the ascetic. A wife, when in good humor, is a source of joy; when in anger, is a source of pain; and when away from her husband, a source of delusion.

There is a fuller discussion of this point in Śrī Rāmānuja's commentary on this *sūtra:*

> "...The *ca* [and] in the *sūtra* is meant to add as a further argument that *anvaya* [presence] has no proving force. For whiteness present in cows and so on is not invariably accompanied by the quality of being the cause of the class characteristics of cows. Nor must it be said that qualities such as whiteness, although present in the effect, may not indeed be causes, but that substances such as gold and the like which are present in certain effects are invariably accompanied by the quality of being causes, and that hence also the substances called *sattva, rājas* and *tamas*, which are found present in all effects, are proved to be the causes of all those effects. For *sattva* and so on are attributes of substances, but not themselves substances. *Sattva* and so on are the causes of the lightness, weight, etc. belonging to substances such as earth and the like, and hence distinctive attributes of the essential nature of those substances; but they are not observed to be present in any effects in a substantial form, as clay, gold, and other substances are. It is for this reason that they are known as *guṇas* [qualities]. You have further said that the world's having one cause only must be postulated in order that an ultimate cause may be reached. But as the *sattva, rājas*, and *tamas* are not one but three, you yourself do not assume one cause, and hence do not manage to arrive at an ultimate cause. For your *pradhāna* consists in the equipoise of the three *guṇas;* there are thus several causes, and you have no more an ultimate cause than others. Nor can you say that this end is accomplished through the three *guṇas* being unlimited. For if the three *guṇas* are all alike unlimited, and therefore omnipresent, there is nowhere a plus or minus of any of them, and as thus no inequality can result, effects cannot originate. In order to explain the origination of results it is therefore necessary to assume limitation of the *guṇas*. Nor is your view confirmed by those cases only in which it is clearly perceived that matter produces effects only when guided by an intelligent principle; other cases also (where the fact is not perceived with equal clearness) are in favor of our view. This the next *sūtra* declares."

Similarly, modern science assumes that because today we see matter apparently organizing itself without the guidance of a superior intelligence or creative energy, the creation must have occurred in a similar manner. Not only is this theory a classic logical fallacy of the undistributed middle as described above, it fails to answer the questions: "How does dull, inert matter initiate the process of creation? Where does the original impulse of energy to bring matter into motion come from? What is the origin of time, which is required for all material reactions and transformations; and what is the origin of the universal laws of physics, chemistry, etc.?"

> *oṁ namo bhagavate vāsudevāya*
> *janmādy asya yato 'nvayād itarataś cārtheṣv abhijñaḥ svarāṭ*
>
> "O my Lord, Śrī Kṛṣṇa, son of Vasudeva, O all-pervading Personality of Godhead, I offer my respectful obeisances unto You. I meditate upon Lord Śrī Kṛṣṇa because He is the Absolute Truth and the primeval cause of all causes of the creation, sustenance and destruction of the manifested universes. He is directly and indirectly conscious of all manifestations, and He is independent because there is no other cause beyond Him." [*Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* 1.1.1]

Sūtra 2.2.2

> *pravṛtteśca*
>
> *pravṛtteḥ* - because of the activity; *ca* – and, only.
>
> **And because [inert matter] becomes active only [when there is the directive action of intelligence upon it.]**

It is a fact of daily experience that inert matter becomes active only when there is the directive action of intelligence upon it. The activity, therefore, must be attributed to the directive intelligence rather than to the inert matter. The intelligence that sets matter into motion is the real agent. We do not say that a chariot moves by itself, but that the real mover of the chariot is the charioteer, by directing the movements of the horse. Therefore phrases like "the tree brings forth fruits" really mean that the Supersoul directs the activity of the tree, making it bring forth fruits. The fruit is actually produced by the indwelling Lord through the instrumentality of the tree. We learn this from scriptural passages describing the Supersoul, such as *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 2.7.3-23. This will become clearer later on.

> *pañcaitāni mahā-bāho kāraṇāni nibodha me*
> *sāṅkhye kṛtānte proktāni siddhaye sarva-karmaṇām*
>
> *adhiṣṭhānaṁ tathā kartā karaṇaṁ ca pṛthag-vidham*
> *vividhāś ca pṛthak ceṣṭā daivaṁ caivātra pañcamam*
>
> "O mighty-armed Arjuna, learn from Me of the five factors which bring about the accomplishment of all action. These are the place of action, the performer, the senses, the endeavor, and ultimately the Supersoul." [*Bhagavad-gītā* 18.13-14]

The force of *ca* in the *sūtra* is that of 'only.' "I do" can be asserted only by an intelligent being. Every activity is seen as the result of an intelligent agent. Therefore inert matter has no agency; *pradhāna* or matter can have no self-initiated activity of its own.

If an objector says, "It is possible for the world to have been created by the mere coming together of spirit and matter, *prakṛti* and *puruṣa,* and by the mutual superimposition of their qualities on one another," then we ask the following question. What is the cause of this superimposition which supposedly takes place by the mere coming together of spirit and matter? Does it inhere in them as a substance, or is it a modification of spirit and matter? It cannot be the first, because it would be an innate quality of spirit, and in that case the liberated souls would also have this superimposition. Nor can it be the second, because if superimposition be a modification of *prakṛti,* then it itself being an effect, it cannot be the cause of its own self. Nor can it be a modification of spirit, for according to the Sāṅkhya system, spirit is changeless. The question of the cause of the *adhyāsa* or superimposition therefore remains unresolved.

Modern science also assumes that the creation began by itself. Instead of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa,* science theorizes that time drives all material transformations. But physics attributes the force of time to the expansion of the space of the universe; that expansion supposedly began in the Big Bang, so before the Big Bang there was no time. Then how did the Big Bang begin? What force could have set off this gigantic explosion if there were no material space or time prior to it? If we pursue any materialistic creation theory to its roots, we find similar logical conundrums and unanswerable questions. The agency of an intelligent being external to the material universe is an unavoidable requirement for any explanation of the creation.

An objector says, "Milk is changed into curd by its own inherent quality; water falling from the clouds becomes bitter, sweet or acid according to the fruit it enters. Similarly *pradhāna,* although homogenous like water, becomes modified into different kinds as it comes into contact with the different *karmas* of the *jīvas*. The differences in the bodies and environments, etc. of the souls are the effects of the past *karmas* of these beings." The author replies to this in the next *sūtra.*

Sūtra 2.2.3

payo'mbuvaccettatrāpi

payas – milk; *ambu* – water; *vat* – like; *cet* – if; *tatra* – there; *api* – also.

If [it be said that the *pradhāna* modifies into her various products without the guidance of any intelligence,] like milk or water, [then we reply that the intelligence guides the change] there also.

Even in the case of the change of pure water into different saps and juices of plants and fruits or the change of milk into curd, the directive action of intelligence produces the change. We may not directly see the driver of the chariot, but we can infer his existence from the motion of the chariot. Similarly, though we may not see the intelligence working in the tree or the milk, we can infer its existence from the fact of changes in dull matter. Not only do we have this inference as proof, but also the sacred authority of the scriptures: see the *Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa* of the *Bṛhad-Āranyaka Upaniṣad*, where it is stated that that different kinds of living creatures are put into different kinds of bodies by the management of a superior power.

tvaṁ naḥ surāṇām asi sānvayānāṁ
kūṭa-stha ādyaḥ puruṣaḥ purāṇaḥ
tvaṁ deva śaktyāṁ guṇa-karma-yonau
retas tv ajāyāṁ kavim ādadhe 'jaḥ

"You are the original personal founder of all the demigods and the orders of different gradations, yet You are the oldest and are unchanged. O Lord, You have no source or superior. You have impregnated the external energy with the semen of the total living entities, yet You are unborn." [*Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* 3.5.50]

kṣetra-jñaṁ cāpi māṁ viddhi
sarva-kṣetreṣu bhārata
kṣetra-kṣetrajñayor jñānaṁ
yat taj jñānaṁ mataṁ mama

"O scion of Bharata, you should understand that I am also the knower in all bodies, and to understand this body and its knower is called knowledge. That is My opinion." [*Bhagavad-gītā* 13.3]

Sūtra 2.2.4

vyatirekānavasthiteścānapekṣattvāt

vyatireka – in the absence of anything else; *anavasthiteḥ* – because of the nonexistence; *ca* – and also; *anapekṣattvāt* – because of the independence.

[As before creation] there existed no other cause but *pradhāna,* so there would be no necessity of any other [cause than the *pradhāna* herself to produce her changes.]

This additional argument is to be adduced against the Sāṅkhya theory: According to the Sāṅkhya philosophy, *pradhāna* can produce the whole creation independently. Before the beginning of creation, there existed no other cause than *pradhāna.* Nor was there the necessity for the existence of any other

cause, for all the changes that *pradhāna* undergoes are self-initiated. There is no cause for the actions of *pradhāna* except for *pradhāna* herself. This argument is to be rejected because the actual Sāṅkhya theory is that it is the presence of *puruṣa* or spirit that starts the changes in *pradhāna.* Thus even according to Sāṅkhya theory, the *pradhāna* is not the sole creator, but just by proximity the presence of *puruṣa* initiates the changes in some mysterious way. This contradicts the theory that the pure inert matter or *pradhāna* produces this change.

The Sāṅkhyas therefore do not consistently say that *pradhāna* produces all changes without extraneous help. Their theory of proximity is also open to objection. If the proximity produces the change, then the *puruṣa* is always in proximity with *prakṛti,* even in the state of *pralaya*. The result would be that creation would start spontaneously and *pralaya* could not be maintained. The Sāṅkhyas may say that the *karmas* of the *jīvas* lie dormant during *pralaya*, so creation cannot start then. But what is preventing the awakening of *karma* in *pralaya?* Thus the theory of the Sāṅkhyas is self-contradictory.

The same is true of the theories of modern science. For example, materialistic science says that matter can create and organize itself, and there is no need for any outside force. But science also recognizes the influence of time and the laws of material nature; therefore their theory is self-contradictory. They ascribe the complex structure and transformations of matter to evolution driven by chance, but at the same time insist that nature has inviolable laws that are completely deterministic. This is also contradictory; if the laws of nature are perfect, then what is the need for chance? Actually, chance takes the place of the will of God in their theories. So in all the time since the theory of the Sāṅkhyas was first presented, nothing has really changed; the materialists' theories are still defective.

The Sāṅkhya philosopher says, "We see that when eaten by a cow, grass, creepers, leaves etc. transform themselves into milk through their inherent nature, without the help of any other cause. Similarly, *pradhāna* also transforms herself into the *mahat-tattva* without the guidance of an intelligent principle." The author replies to this in the next *sūtra.*

Sūtra 2.2.5

anyatrā'bhāvācca na tṛṇādivat

anyatra – elsewhere; *abhāvāt* – because of the absence; *ca* – and only; *na* – not; *tṛṇa-adi-vat* – like grass, etc.

It is not like the transformation of grass, etc. [into milk when eaten by a cow] because there is absence of such transformation [when eaten by a bull.]

The Sāṅkhyas argue their doctrine of the self-transformation of matter using the example that plain rainwater transforms automatically into the differently flavored juices of various fruits and vegetables, and grass is transformed automatically into milk when eaten by a cow. The argument of the Sāṅkhyas is not sound, because it is not natural for grass to transform itself into milk when eaten by an animal; it only when eaten by a female herbivore that the grass is transformed into milk. No such change is visible when eaten by a male animal. If it were natural for grass to transform into milk, then we would see such changes happening spontaneously, even when the grass is not eaten by an animal. But we do not see any such change. Therefore, it is not the natural quality of the grass to change itself into milk, but only when it comes into relationship with a female of particular kinds of animals does this change occur. And here also it is the will of the Supreme Personality of Godhead that brings about the change, not just because an animal has eaten it.

yo 'syotprekṣaka ādi-madhya-nidhane yo 'vyakta-jīveśvaro
yaḥ sṛṣṭvedam anupraviśya ṛṣiṇā cakre puraḥ śāsti tāḥ

"He is the Lord who eternally watches over this universe, who exists before, during and after its manifestation. He is the master of both the unmanifest material energy and the spirit soul. After sending forth the creation He enters within it, accompanying each living entity. There He creates the material bodies and then remains as their regulator." [*Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* 10.87.50]

It has been sufficiently proved that *pradhāna,* being inert, has no self-initiated activity of her own. Similarly, the theory of the scientists that chance is responsible for evolving the various species and their qualities and behavior, is fatally flawed. But even if we admit, for argument's sake, that *pradhāna* has such an activity, it will not help the cause of the Sāṅkhyas. The author shows this in the next *sūtra.*

Sūtra 2.2.6

abhyupagame'pyarthābhāvāt

abhy-upagamepi – even if it be accepted; *artha* – purpose; *abhāvāt* – because of the absence.

Even if it be accepted [that *pradhāna* has self-initiated activity, yet it is a useless theory,] because it serves no purpose.

The word *na* [not] is understood in this and the next three *sūtras.* The theory of the Sāṅkhyas is that *pradhāna* is moved to activity to cause experience and liberation for the *jīvas*. Her object is that after enjoying her, and finding her full of evil, the *jīva* should become indifferent to her, and thus attain liberation. The activity of the *pradhāna* is purely altruistic, with the object of giving experience and joy to the soul. She has no purpose of her own to be served by her activity. In the *Sāṅkhya-sūtras* [3.58] it is stated:

"*Pradhāna* creates for the sake of another, and though it be spontaneous, for she is not the enjoyer, just like a camel that carries the saffron for the sake of his master and not for himself."

The Sāṅkhyas believe that the *jīva* is actionless, though the experiencer. They say that the *jīva* can be a non-agent and yet experience the fruits of activity, just like a person who may not cook food for himself but eat it when it is cooked by another. But such an activity of *prakṛti* is not a reasonable proposition. Even if such an activity is accepted, it serves no purpose. What is the aim of such activity? It is either to produce experience for the *jīva* by showing him the various qualities of *prakṛti,* or to produce liberation for the *puruṣa* by making him indifferent to her charms.

The first, namely to produce experience for the *jīva,* cannot be the cause of activity by *prakṛti,* for it is admitted that before there was any such activity in the *prakṛti,* the *puruṣa* existed as pure intelligence—actionless, changeless and self-satisfied. Why should such a *puruṣa* leave his bliss of isolation to see the enchanting play of *prakṛti?* Merely because *prakṛti* is active is no reason for holding that the *puruṣa* must undergo change in the shape of looking at her. It therefore follows that the activity of *prakṛti* cannot be the cause of the experience of the *puruṣa*. Nor can such activity be the cause of the liberation of the *puruṣa,* because before such activity, the *puruṣa* was already in a liberated state. Why should the *prakṛti* make herself active to produce the liberation of the *puruṣa,* when he is already liberated?

If it is said that wherever the *prakṛti* is active she is bound to produce some change in the consciousness of the *puruṣa,* for he is in proximity to the *prakṛti* and thus the mere activity of the

prakṛti is the cause of experience to the *puruṣa,* then we reply that your proposition is rather too large. Merely because a soul is in proximity to matter is no reason why he should be affected by the activity of such matter; for then since matter is all-pervading, and the proximity of spirit to matter is eternal and impossible to remove, even the *mukta* souls would be affected by such activity, and fall into bondage again.

The Sāṅkhyas reply, "Even if the *prakṛti* is not active by her own inherent power, then we have another theory. The correlation between spirit and matter is like that of the blind and the lame. One has no power of motion, the other has no power of vision. The spirit is lame and has no power of motion, and *prakṛti* is blind, though possessing all power to move. Each is incapable of achieving any result independently. But when the lame spirit comes into contact with the blind but moving matter, it makes this blind matter become active and directs all her movements. Or to take another illustration, the magnet itself without moving, can set into motion the iron in its proximity; similarly the spirit, itself changeless and motionless, sets the *prakṛti* into motion when they come into contact. Thus this reflection of spirit in matter makes the matter appear intelligent, and sets in motion her creative activity."

The author replies to this theory of the Sāṅkhyas in the following *sūtra:*

Sūtra 2.2.7

puruṣāśmavaditi cet tathāpi

puruṣa – man; *aśma* – magnet; *vat* – like; *iti* – thus; *cet* – if; *tathāpi* – so also.

If [it be said that *prakṛti* creates] like [the lame] man [directing the blind, or] like the magnet [moving the iron,] even then [the theory is open to objection.]

Insentient matter has no power of self-initiated activity, and the examples of the lame man and the blind man or the magnet do not remove the difficulty; the inability of the *pradhāna* to act independently remains. The lame man, although incapable of walking, retains the ability to see the road and guide the blind man. The blind man, though sightless, does have the capacity to understand those instructions and act on them. They are both intelligent entities. Similarly, some entity must bring the magnet into proximity to the iron before the magnet can act on it. But according to the Sāṅkhyas, the soul is ever actionless, without any attributes and incapable of change. If it is said that the soul undergoes no change, but his mere proximity produces changes in *prakṛti,* then the soul always being near the *pradhāna,* it would follow that the creation is eternal, and there would never be any emancipation for the soul. Moreover the *prakṛti* is insentient, and the *puruṣa* is conscious; but in both examples, both entities are the same type: in the example of the lame and blind man, both are conscious beings, and in the example of the magnet, both and the iron are insentient. Consequently the instances given are not similar to the point they are supposed to support.

The Sāṅkhyas hold that the creation depends upon the superiority and inferiority of the *guṇas*, and the world results from a certain relation between the *tattvas* and their subordinate entities, as a consequence of such difference of *guṇas*. This view is refuted by the author in the next *sūtra:*

Sūtra 2.2.8

aṅgitvānupapatteśca

aṅgitva – the relation of being the principal; *anupapatteḥ* – on account of the impossibility and unreasonableness; *ca* – and.

It is impossible [that any one of the *guṇas*] may be the principal [in the state of *pralaya*, and hence the world would not originate.]

Pradhāna is defined in Sāṅkhya philosophy as the equilibrium of the three modes of material nature: *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas.* In the unmanifest state of *pradhāna,* none of the *guṇas* is superior or inferior; consequently the relation of principal and subordinate could not exist then. Nor can they say that Īśvara [the Lord] or *kāla* [time] brings about a disturbance in the equilibrium, making one of the *guṇas* superior to the others, because the Sāṅkhyas hold that God does not exist, nor do they admit the separate existence of time. Thus *Sāṅkhya-sūtras* [1.92-93] says:

> "It is not proved that there is a God. And further it is not proved that He exists, because whatever exists must be either free or bound, and He can be neither one nor the other, because either way He would be inefficient. Since if He were free, He would have no desires which as compulsory motives would instigate Him to create; and if He were bound, He would be under delusion. He must be on either alternative unequal to the creation, etc. of the world."

And, in *Sāṅkhya-sūtras* [2.12] Kapila denies the separate existence of time:

> "Space and time arise from the ether [*ākāśa*]."

Nor can the Sāṅkhyas say that the soul is the creator, because according to their theory, the very nature of the soul is indifference to everything. The *puruṣas* therefore being perfectly detached, have no interest to break the equipoise of the *pradhāna* and make one of the *guṇas* superior to the others. Hence the creation is not caused by the relative superiority and inferiority of the *guṇas.* Even admitting that in every successive creation and in *pralaya*, the *guṇas* will always be unequal in their force, there would be nothing to bring about this inequality in the first creation. Even admitting for argument's sake that there is inequality among the *guṇas* in the ordinary state of creation, and that such inequality may have come about without any reason, it would follow that in *pralaya* also the inequality would occur without any reason, and no *pralaya* will be possible, for creation would start up then also. And even if it can be established that the inequality, once established, continues without any further cause, you cannot explain how it can be brought about without any cause in the beginning.

Similarly in the modern scientific Big Bang theory, no source is given for the material elements, and no mechanism for setting off the explosion Big Bang, because both would require the existence of a potent, intelligent Creator pre-existent to the material creation. So there is nothing in either theory to explain how the inert material energy acquires the initial energy of creation.

"But," says the Sāṅkhya, "we must infer that the *guṇas* are of various nature and wonderful attributes because we see their effect in this world, and therefore your objections do not apply." The author replies to this in the next *sūtra:*

Sūtra 2.2.9

anyathānumitau ca jñaśaktiviyogāt

anyathā – otherwise; *anumitau* – in case of inference; *ca* – and; *jña* – intelligence; *śakti* – power; *viyogāt* – because of being destitute of.

Even if it be inferred otherwise, [yet the *pradhāna* cannot create,] because it does not possess the power of being a conscious entity.

Even if the inference that the *guṇas* must have different attributes and mysterious powers is accepted, it still does not answer the difficulty we have raised. Being insentient, *pradhāna* has no power of self-consciousness. Being thus destitute, it has no idea of any plan or change. It cannot say, "Let me create the world in such a way." Creation never proceeds from dead matter without the impetus of intelligence. Without the directive action of intelligence, the *guṇas,* no matter how wonderful their powers and attributes, can not create the universe by themselves.

The same objection applies to the creation theory of modern science. Matter has no power to initiate its own creation, because prior to the creation, nothing exists. Without a mechanism to initiate the creation, science cannot explain how it began. Even if we accept the 'steady-state' theory of a chain of Big Bangs followed by a 'Big Crunch,' this still does not explain how this state of affairs came to be in the first place.

The author concludes his refutation of Sāṅkhya philosophy with this *sūtra:*

Sūtra 2.2.10

vipratiṣedhāccāsamañjasam

vipratiṣedhāt - because of contradiction; *ca* - and; *asamañjasam* - untenable.

Because the theory of the Sāṅkhyas is full of internal contradictions, hence not being a consistent theory, it is untenable.

There are internal contradictions in this philosophy propounded by Kapila, hence it is inconsistent and untenable, and should be rejected by those who desire the highest good and the Absolute Truth. For example, it holds that *prakṛti* is for the sake of the *puruṣa* alone, who is the experiencer, the seer and the supervising agent. It holds the soul to be something different from all bodies, and vehicles. Thus in *Sāṅkhya-sūtras* [1.139-140] Kapila declares,

> "Soul is something different from the body, etc. Nature is a compound and a combination because that which is combined is for the sake of the other."

Thus spirit and matter are contrasted in these two *sūtras.* The spirit is single, indivisible and nonmaterial, and matter is composite and divisible, and exists only for the sake of the soul. But later on this same soul is defined to be actionless, changeless, attributeless, devoid of all agency, fruition and sentiency. It is said to be pure isolation. In one place it says that matter is non-luminous and luminosity belongs to the soul. But in the next *sūtra* it contradicts itself when it says that the soul does not have the attribute of intelligence. Thus intelligence belongs neither to soul nor to matter. In *Sāṅkhya-sūtras* [1.140-146] we find:

> "And soul is something else from the body, etc. because in a soul there is the absence of the three *guṇas* and because they are not seen in it. And soul is not material because of its superintendence over nature. for a superintendent is an intelligent being, and nature is unintelligent. And soul is not material because of its being the experiencer. It is for soul and not for nature, because the exertions are with a view to isolation from all qualities, a condition to which the soul is competent, but not nature. Since light does not pertain to the unintelligent,

> which must pertain to something or other, is the essence of the soul which, self-manifesting, manifests whatever else is manifest. Soul has not intelligence for its attribute, because it is without quality."

The Sāṅkhyas are further inconsistent, inasmuch as that in one place they say that it is the soul that undergoes bondage, owing to its want of discrimination, and that it attains release when it discriminates between the *guṇas* and itself; while in another place it says that bondage and release belong to the *guṇas* and not to the soul, which is eternally free. For example in *Sāṅkhya-sūtras* [3.71-72] we find:

> "Bondage and liberation do not belong actually to soul, and would not even appear to be but for non-discrimination. But in reality the aforesaid bondage and liberation belong to nature alone: so he asserts. It really belongs to nature, through association; like a beast, though being hampered by habits which are a cause of pain: just as a beast, through being hampered by a rope, experiences bondage and liberation. Such is the meaning."

Thus there are many internal contradictions in the Sāṅkhya system, and anyone who studies it carefully can easily find them out. Similarly there are many inconsistencies and contradictions in the modern scientific theories, which are startlingly similar to atheistic Sāṅkhya philosophy. The reader should study these theories deeply and find out their faults, then uproot these crippled theories from his mind and consciousness. Only *Vedānta-sūtra's* theory of emanation from the Supreme Personality of Godhead adequately explains the creation is all its details.

Adhikaraṇa 2: Refutation of the Atomic System

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: The author now refutes the atomic system of the Vaiśeṣikas. They hold that there are four kinds of atoms: earthy [physical], watery [astral], fiery [mental] and aerial [buddhic]. These atoms are partless, but possess the qualities of color, touch, taste and smell, and are spherical in form. At the time of *pralaya*, they exist in a latent state, without originating any effect, but at the time of creation, they originate this world by combining together and forming binary and ternary compounds, owing to their being in contact with souls, which have a mysterious quality called *adṛṣṭa* [literally, unseen]. In this theory, two atoms are brought into activity by the action of the *adṛṣṭa* of the souls residing in them. The souls in the atoms set them in motion, and thus there takes place the union of two atoms, and a binary is formed which is called *aṇu*. Thus three causes operate to produce a binary: two atoms, the *samavāyi* [aggregate] cause; their union, the *asamavāyi* [separated] cause; and the *adṛṣṭa* of the souls residing in them, the *nimitta* [operative] cause. Similarly, from three binary molecules, set in motion by the *adṛṣṭa* of the souls residing in them, there is produced the *mahat* or ternary. Two atoms cannot produce a ternary, because it requires a bigger cause and larger number of atoms. Similarly, four ternaries give rise to a quaternary, and so on to produce bigger and bigger things. Thus by conglomeration of the molecules are produced the big earth, the big water, the big fire and the big air. The color, taste, scent etc. seen in the big effect depend on the particular atoms that are the *samavāyi* [aggregate] cause. The qualities latent in the cause produce the qualities in the effects which are manifest. Thus the world comes into existence.

When the Lord wishes to destroy the world, He withdraws the active force of affinity that brought about the union of two atoms from the binaries. When this affinity is destroyed, the binary falls apart, and ceases to exist. The binaries being destroyed, the ternaries and so forth are also destroyed and the creation ceases to exist, just as when the thread is destroyed the cloth is also destroyed. The qualities of color, etc. also cease with the destruction of their substrate, the binaries. This is the method of the dissolution of the world.

In this system, the atoms are called *parimaṇḍala* or spherical. The size of an 'ultimate atom' is called *pārimaṇlḍalyam*. A binary is called in this system *aṇu* [atom], while the name *paramāṇu* is given to the 'ultimate atoms.' The size of a binary is called *hrasva* [short], while the size of the ternary is called *mahat* [big], meaning which has a perceptible magnitude, macroscopic.

Modern science also rests on an atomic theory of matter, in which the atoms themselves are the cause and ingredient of everything. Science recognizes many types of atomic elements and compounds, as well as subatomic particles and reactions. While *Vedānta-sūtra* does admit that atoms are the building blocks of manifested matter, it denies them the important role granted by both the Vaiśeṣikas and the scientists. Like all material things, atoms cannot act without the influence of some outside energy and intelligence. This was proved in the previous Adhikāraṇa. Therefore this Adhikāraṇa will also refute the materialistic scientific atomic theory.

Saṁśaya [arisal of doubt]: Is the theory that the word is produced by atoms without the guidance of the Lord consistent?

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: The *adṛṣṭa* of the souls sets the two atoms in motion. Being thus set in motion, the aoms come into union, and thus produce a binary, and so on. There is no inconsistency about this view, and it is the right view.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: The creation is not brought about simply by the combination of atoms. The next *sūtra* shows this.

Sūtra 2.2.11

> *mahat dīrghavad vā hrasvaparimaṇḍalābhyām*
>
> *mahat* – macroscopic; *dīrgha* – extensible, which is perceptible to the senses; *vat* – like; *vā* – and; *hrasva* – microscopic; *parimaṇḍalābhyām* – from the atomic.
>
> **And as origination of the macroscopic and extensible from the dimensionless [is untenable, so is the rest of the Vaiśeṣika system.]**

The word 'untenable' is to be supplied from the previous *sūtra* to complete the sense. The theory of the Vaiśeṣikas is untenable in its entirety, as their view of the origination of the macroscopic from the dimensionless atomic particles without the aid of the Lord is untenable. The other parts of their system, such as the origination of the earth, etc. are equally untenable along with their theory of the dimensionless sub-atoms giving rise to the ternary, having magnitude and dimension, and those combining to form macroscopic objects. Thus the theory is self-contradictory and unreasonable. No amount of combining dimensionless parts can yield a molecule with magnitude and dimension. A piece of cloth is produced by combining threads which themselves have parts. If the threads were partless or dimensionless, they could not have joined to form the cloth. Therefore it must be admitted that even an atom has magnitude and occupies space and dimension. Otherwise the union of any number of atoms could not give rise to macroscopic objects. Therefore to say that the ternary, which has length and dimension, is produced by a combination of dimensionless atoms, is to assert something which is void of sense. It may be consistent with reason to say that an object of larger bulk must have a larger number of constituent atoms. But even if this be admitted, then the atoms themselves must be admitted to have parts, and those parts will have further parts, and thus there will be an infinite regression.

This is exactly the situation that modern science has got itself into; the more they explore and catalog the subatomic particles, the more seem to crop up out of nowhere. So far, every single subatomic particle predicted by quantum theory has been discovered experimentally, with the exception (at the

time of this writing) of the Higgs boson, and confirmation of its discovery is expected soon. This fact alone should raise an alarm, for how is it possible for any theory of such subtle matter to be so accurate? The answer has to do with the nature of quantum effects, which depend on the intention and methodology of the observer. Such subtle matter begins to assume many of the qualities of spirit, therefore every time the scientists go looking for another subatomic particle, they find it. It is very likely that they are creating the particles simply by the design of their experiments. Since the scientists are clueless about the qualities of consciousness, naturally they do not notice this. So we can expect this foolish dance to continue as long as the scientists can demand more money for bigger particle accelerators from the demoniac leaders, in the hope that such arcane research will yield more powerful and destructive weapons.

This *sūtra* should not be explained, as some have done, as refuting an objection to the *Vedānta* theory of Brahman being the general cause; for the theme of this Adhyāya is refuting the systems of the opponents, and not in supporting our own theory. The theory of the Vaiśeṣikas is open to further objections, as shown in the next *sūtras.*

Sūtra 2.2.12

ubhayathāpi na karmātastadabhāvaḥ

ubhayathāpi – on both assumptions; *na* – not; *karma* – motion; *ataḥ* – therefore; *tat-abhāvaḥ* – the absence of that.

On both assumptions, [whether the *adṛṣṭa* is in the atom or the soul,] there is no motion, and consequently there is absence [of the origination of the world.]

The argumentative Vaiśeṣikas hold that the world is produced by the successive formations of compounds like binary, ternary, etc. of the union of atoms. Now arises the question, "How is this primal motion brought about?" Is it caused by the *adṛṣṭa* residing in the atoms or in the souls? It cannot be the first, because the *adṛṣṭa,* which itself is the result of the good and bad actions done by the soul, cannot possibly reside in the atoms. It must inhere in the soul. However, the *adṛṣṭa* residing in the soul cannot possibly produce motion in the atoms. Thus the motion of the atoms cannot be explained by either of these views. A third possibility may be advanced by the Vaiśeṣikas, that the motion originates in the atoms, as soon as they come into the proximity of souls charged with *adṛṣṭa.* But this also is an unreasonable view. There can be no proximity or contact between the souls which are partless, and the atoms, which are also partless; for there can be no contact between two objects, both of which have no parts by which they can come into contact. Thus the *adṛṣṭa* hypothesized by the Vaiśeṣikas cannot be the cause of the first motion of the atoms in any of these ways.

We have already proven that because of the inertness of dull matter, one insentient object cannot move another without being set in motion by a sentient being. We have seen that all motion of objects is initiated, guided and directed by intelligence and intelligent beings. Nor can the soul be the cause of the primal motion of the atoms at the beginning of a creative period, because according to the Vaiśeṣikas, during *pralaya* the soul lies dormant without possessing any intelligence, and thus is in no way superior to the atoms. Nor can it be said that the primal motion of the atoms is caused by the will of the Lord in conformity with the *adṛṣṭa* of the *jīvas*, because His will is eternal, and therefore the creation would be eternal. The Vaiśeṣikas say that during *pralaya* there is no creation because the *adṛṣṭa* of the *jīvas* does not mature and is not awakened, and consequently the will of the Lord is inactive. This view is also wrong, because all the materials being present, the creation ought to take place, irrespective of the

maturity. If the *adṛṣṭa* of the *jīvas* were the cause of the primal motion of the atoms, there is nothing to prove that the *adṛṣṭa,* which springs from the actions of the souls performed during many previous lives, should remain in latency without maturity during the full duration of *pralaya*. If the *adṛṣṭa* has any power of its own, irrespective of the will of the Lord, why should it remain dormant for such a long period of time? The atomic theory, therefore, is bound to fall back on the *Vedānta* philosophy that the will of the Lord is necessary, both to begin the creation and to keep the creation from occurring during *pralaya*.

Consequently there is no definite cause found that can explain the primal motion of the atoms, for neither the *adṛṣṭa* residing in the *jīvas* or in the atoms, nor the will of the Lord is a determined cause. The atoms thus being without motion in the beginning of creation, cannot come together and form aggregates. Since they cannot form aggregates, the binary, ternary etc. molecules cannot be produced, and consequently there can be no creation. By a similar line of reasoning, there can be no *pralaya* also. This refutation of the Vaiśeṣika system is only in regard to the first cause of the motion of the atoms. *Vedānta* philosophy does not deny the existence of atoms, but it denies the Vaiśeṣika theory of the *karma* of the souls being the first cause of the primal motions of the atoms. *Vedānta* philosophy holds that the creation depends entirely on the will of the Lord, and that will is not influenced by the *karma* of the *jīvas.*

The materialistic scientists today theorize that the primal motion of the atoms is begun by the Big Bang, a primordial explosion supposed by them to answer this same objection. But there is no way to travel back in time to verify this theory, nor any way to explain how the conditions necessary for the Big Bang came into existence. For the Big Bang would require space to be compressed into a tiny singularity containing all matter, an unimaginably dense condition. Science also theorizes the existence of black holes, compressed matter whose density is so high that no light or other energy can escape. These black holes appear to be stable, so why would a black hole containing all the mass in the universe explode? How would such a huge black hole come to exist in the first place? The scientists cannot answer these questions, because their whole theory is just a rationalization of how the initial creative energy was injected into the material universe. Why not simply admit that it was emanated by God?

Sūtra 2.2.13

samavāyābhyupagamācca sāmyādanavasthiteḥ

samavāya – concomitant cause; *abhyupagamāt* – because of the acceptance; *ca* – and; *sāmyāt* – from equality because of equality, by parity; *anavasthiteḥ* – because there results an infinite regress.

The Vaiśeṣika doctrine is untenable because of its acceptance of the fictitious relation called *samavāya*, from which an infinite regression results by parity of reasoning.

The Vaiśeṣika theory admits the relation called *samavāya* [not to be confused with *samanvaya*, the sixfold principle of Vedic interpretation according to context] and hence their doctrine in untenable. Why? Because the *samavāya* relation is equal to any other relation, thus it requires another *samavāya* to explain it, and that *samavāya* requires another *samavāya* to explain it and so on, causing an infinite regression of reasoning. The atoms come together to form a binary molecule through the relationship called *samavāya.* If there were no *samavāya* relationship, there would be no conjunction of atoms. But this *samavāya* relationship is a mere assumption, for it is inexplicable. If two atoms come together

through a *samavāya* relationship, it requires another *samavāya* to bring about this relationship. Thus there would be an infinite regress. The *samavāya* relationship has the notion of quality, action and general characteristics. Thus it is an unspecified causal relation. As such it would require another causal relation to explain it, and this produces the fault of *anavasthā,* infinite regression.

If it is objected that a relationship must be assumed to account for the connection between two things, and that this relationship is the essential nature of the thing, then it must be assumed everywhere. It cannot be said that the nature of *samavāya* is inseparable connection, for that also is open to the same objection. For then every quality would be found everywhere, and the holders of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine would have to admit that the consequence of their philosophy would be that the quality of smell would be found in air, the quality of sound in earth, the quality of form in the *ātman* and the quality of intelligence in light. Every quality would be found everywhere, because the *samavāya* being a unity, it would be present everywhere. But this is not a fact, therefore *samavāya* relationship is an incongruous assumption.

Similarly, the modern scientists are caught in an endless regression of one nonsensical theory on top of another, trying to explain the initial conditions of the material creation. Since matter is dull and inert, even for the simplest material reaction to take place, some source of energy has to supply the impetus to raise matter above absolute zero temperature. Every chemical reaction requires some Brownian motion due to temperature; so how did the ingredients of the universe gain their initial motion and heat? And where did those ingredients originate? Just like the atomic theory of the Vaiśeṣikas, material science cannot answer these questions, therefore it is to be rejected.

Sūtra 2.2.14

nityameva ca bhāvāt

nityam – eternal; *eva* – even; *ca* – and; *bhāvāt* – because of the existence.

The world would be eternal because *samavāya* is eternal.

If the *samavāya* is admitted to be eternal, then the creation, of which it is the relation, would be eternal. But this is untenable, for even the Vaiśeṣikas do not believe the world to be eternal. If *samavāya,* which might be described in modern terms as chemical affinity, is considered an eternal cause, then creation would be eternal, because the affinity of the atoms to combine together would be eternal. If *samavāya* is considered as the destructive cause that separates the atoms, then *pralaya* would be eternal. Both interpretations of *samavāya* are untenable, because they lead to the absurdity of an eternal creation or eternal dissolution of the world.

The modern scientific atomic theory is also open to the same objection. Because they do not recognize the existence of anything outside of the material world, the scientists cannot imagine how the universe began, neither can they imagine how it will end. Since the universe is created by a superior power, it is also destroyed by the same superior power.

Sūtra 2.2.15

rupādimattvācca viparyayo darśanāt

rupā-ādi-mattvāt – because of possessing color, etc.; *ca* – and; *viparyayaḥ* – the opposite; *darśanāt* – because it is observed.

The Vaiśeṣika theory is further untenable because its atoms have color, etc. and because the reverse is also observed in them.

The Vaiśeṣikas admit that the atoms of earth, water, fire and air possess the attributes of color, taste, smell and touch and that they are eternal and partless. But the logical result of their assumption should be the reverse: that the atoms are temporary and have parts, because it is observed in ordinary life that anything possessing color, etc. is liable to destruction, such as a pot. The atoms of the Vaiśeṣikas therefore must have the seed of destruction in them, and they must be made of parts, like the pot. Thus this doctrine is full of inherent contradictions.

Modern science also holds that objects derive their qualities from the properties of their component atoms. However, we now know that attributes such as color are actually due to objects selectively reflecting various portions of the spectrum of visible light. We also know that atoms and their parts can be converted into energy and back. Atoms are thus simply a stable form of vibrations of energy. We experience that all energy without exception has a source; light comes from the sun, water from the ocean, electricity from the powerhouse. But the scientists do not admit that the original energy of the universe must have a source that pre-exists the material creation; hence that source must be spiritual in nature. Therefore their theories are also full of contradictions.

Sūtra 2.2.16

ubhayathā ca doṣāt

ubhayathā - in both ways; *ca* - and; *doṣāt* - because of the difficulties.

And there are difficulties in both cases.

If it is accepted that atoms have no color, taste, etc. then we cannot explain the possession of these qualities by earth, water, etc., for that which is in the effect must also be in the cause. If we take the contrary view and hold that the atoms have color, taste, etc. then the theory is open to the objection mentioned in the previous *sūtra*. Thus the atomic theory of the Vaiśeṣikas is untenable either way.

Similarly, the modern atomic theory cannot actually explain why substances have particular attributes of color, form, mass, density etc. because they cannot explain the universal forces such as space, gravity and time behind all these attributes. If we inquire deeply into their theories, their chain of cause and effect breaks down and their logic becomes circular. This their atomic theory is untenable.

Sūtra 2.2.17

aparigrahāccātyantamanapekṣā

aparigrahāt – because it is not accepted; *ca* – and; *atyantam* – totally; *anapekṣā* – disregard.

The atomic theory of the Vaiśeṣikas is not accepted by authoritative sages, therefore it is to be disregarded altogether.

Some regard may be shown for the doctrine of Kapila and the rest, because authoritative sages like Manu have accepted parts of their philosophy. But because this atomic doctrine is opposed to the

Vedas, the sages have not accepted any portion of it, therefore it is undemonstrated and should be disregarded by everyone who aims at the highest good for man. Similarly, any so-called scientific theory that denies the existence of God and the soul is actually most unscientific, because it ignores the ancient teachings of the greatest sages.

Adhikaraṇa 3: Buddhist Doctrine Examined

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: The actual history of Buddhism is largely unknown, especially in the West. Actually there were two Buddhas: Śākyamuni Buddha and the much earlier Viṣṇu-avatāra Buddha. Lord Buddha is declared by scripture to be one of the ten incarnations (*avatāras*) of the Supreme Lord, Śrī Viṣṇu. This is described in Śrīla Jayadeva Gosvāmī's composition *Gītā-Govinda:*

> *vedān uddharate jaganti vahate bhūgolam udbibhrate*
> *daityaṁ dārayate baliṁ chalayate kṣatra kśayaṁ kurvate*
> *paulastyaṁ jayate halaṁ kalayate kāruṇyam ātanvate*
> *mlecchān mūrccayate daśākṭikṛte kṛṣṇāya tubhyaṁ namaḥ*
>
> "O Kṛṣṇa, He who accepts ten incarnations! I offer my obeisances unto You for saving the Vedic scriptures as the Matsya incarnation; You held up the universe as the Kurma incarnation and lifted up the world as Varāha, the Boar incarnation; as Nṛsiṁha You vanquished Hiraṇyakaśipu; as Vāmana You deceived Bali Mahārāja; as Paraśurāma You exterminated the corrupt warrior class; as Rāma You slew Rāvaṇa; as Balarāma You took up the plough; as Buddha You bestowed compassion and as Kalki, You kill the *mlecchas*."

Śrīla Jayadeva writes in the ninth verse of his *Daśavatāra Strotram:*

> *nindasi yajña vidherahaha śrutijātam*
> *sadaya hṛdaya darśita paśughātam*
> *keśava dhṛta buddha śarīra*
> *jaya jagadīśa hare jaya jagadīśa hare*
>
> "O Lord of the universe, Keśava! You took the form of Lord Buddha who is full of compassion, and stopped the slaughter of animals which is strictly forbidden in the *Vedas*."

If Lord Buddha is an incarnation of Lord Viṣṇu, then His actual identity requires further elaboration and analysis. It becomes imperative to research this matter since so many modern impersonalist and voidist philosophies are based upon Buddhism. How can it be that an incarnation of the Lord would spread an athestic philosophy based on voidism? The answer is that the commonly accepted history of Buddhism is a deliberate fabrication.

The common understanding of Buddha, that the Viṣṇu-avatāra Buddha that the Vaiṣṇavas worship is the same personality as the recent Śākyamuni Buddha, is inaccurate. Śākyamuni or Śākya-siṁha Buddha was simply a highly intelligent mortal, a vastly learned person who had attained some inner realizations. It was Śrī Śaṅkarācārya who declared Śākya-siṁha to be Lord Buddha, equating him with Lord Viṣṇu's incarnation. This was a deliberate deception intended to hoodwink the public, which has been handed down by Śaṅkarācārya's followers and which has since become the gospel of academic texts on comparative religion, thanks to the political disinformation of the British.

Śrī Śaṅkarācārya declared Śākya-siṁha Buddha (also known as Gautama Buddha) and Avatāra Buddha to be the same personality in his commentary on the present Adhikāraṇa of *Vedānta-sūtra*. While discussing Buddha's philosophy, Śrī Śaṅkarācārya mentions his name in his commentary:

> *sarvathā api anādarṇīya ayam sugata-samāyāḥ śreyaskāmaiḥ iti abhiprāyaḥ*.

In this statement, *sugata* is meant to indicate Gautama Buddha, the son of Śuddhodana and Māyādevi, and not to the original Viṣṇu incarnation Buddha. The word *samāyāḥ* means Gautama Buddha's *siddhānta* [philosophical conclusions]. However, Viṣṇu-avatāra Buddha is also named Sugata, and thus Śaṅkarācārya falsely interpolated Śākya-siṁha Buddha as if he were Viṣṇu-avatāra Buddha. The use of the name Sugata for Viṣṇu-avatāra Buddha was already extant in Buddhist scriptures. This is substantiated in the book *Amarakoṣa*, an ancient treatise written by the famous nihilist and atheist Amara Siṁha. It is believed that Amara Siṁha was born approximately 150 years prior to Śaṅkarācārya's birth. Amara Siṁha was the son of the *brāhmaṇa* Sabara Svāmī, who fathered a host of children with different mothers of different castes. This ancient verse about Amara Siṁha was well known in the learned circles of yore:

> *brāhmaṇyām abhavad varāha mihiro jyotirvidām agraṇīḥ*
> *rājā bhartṛhariś ca vikrāmanṛpaḥ kṣatrātrātmajāyām abhüt*
> *vaiśyāyāṁ haricandra vaidya tilako jātaś ca śaṅkuḥ kṛtī*
> *śüdrāyām amaraḥ ṣaḍeva śabara svāmī dvija sya ātmajāḥ*
>
> "Varāha Mihira, foremost among the greatest astrologers, was born from the womb of a *brāhmaṇa* lady. King Vikrama and King Bhartṛhari were born from a *kṣatriya* mother. From a *vaiśya* mother were born Haricandra, a *vaidya tilaka* [an excellent Āyurveda physician] and Śaṅkhya; and from a *śūdra* [maidservant] mother was born Amara Siṁha. These six were fathered by the *brāhmaṇa* Śabara Svāmī."

Amara Siṁha, the son of a *brāhmaṇa* in a *śūdra* lady, authored many books on Buddhism. By coincidence, all these books came into the possession of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya, who preserved only the *Amarakoṣa* and burnt all the others. The following verse about Buddha is found in the *Amarakoṣa:*

> *sarvajñaḥ sugato buddho dharmarājas tathāgataḥ*
> *samanta bhadro bhagavān mārajil lokajij jinaḥ*
> *ṣaḍabhijño daśabalo' dvayavādī vināyakaḥ*
> *munindrā śrīghanaḥ śāstā muniḥ*
>
> "All-knowing, transcendental Buddha, king of righteousness, He who has come, beneficent, all encompassing Lord, conqueror of Māra the god of love, conqueror of worlds, He who controls his senses, protector of the six enemies, possessor of the ten powers, speaker of monism, foremost leader, lord of the ascetics, embodiment of splendor and teacher of the ascetics."

The above verse contains eighteen names of Viṣṇu-avatāra Buddha including Sugata, and the verse below, also from the *Amarakoṣa,* contains the seven names of Śākya-siṁha Buddha without any mention of Sugata.

> *śākyamunis tu yaḥ sa śākyasiṁhaḥ sarvārthasiddha śauddhodaniś ca saḥ*
> *gautamaś cārkabandhuś ca māyādevī sutaś ca saḥ*
>
> "Teacher of the Śākyas, lion of the Śākyas, accomplisher of all goals, son of Śuddhodana, of Gautama's line, friend of the entrapped ones, the son of Māyādevī."

In these verses, starting with *sarvajñaḥ* and finishing with *muniḥ* are eighteen names addressing the original Viṣṇu incarnation Lord Buddha. The next seven names, beginning with Śākya-munistu to Māyādevī-Sutaśca, refer to Śākya-siṁha Buddha. The Buddha referred to in the first eighteen names and the Buddha referred to in the latter seven names are clearly not the same person. In the commentary on *Amarakoṣa* by the learned Śrī Raghunātha Cakravartī, he also divided the verses into two sections. To the eighteen names of Viṣṇu-avatāra Buddha he writes the words *astadaś buddha*,

which clearly refers only to the Viṣṇu-avatāra. Next, on his commentary for the seven aliases of Śākya-siṁha he writes, *ete sapta Śākya bangśabatirneh buddha muni bishete:* "The next seven names starting from Śākya-munistu are aliases of Buddha-muni who was born into the Śākya dynasty."

Thus from the above verses and their commentaries it is clear that the divine incarnation Sugata Buddha and the atheist sage Gautama Buddha are different personalities. Another edition of the *Amarakoṣa* was published by the respected scholar H. T. Colebrooke in 1872. On pages 2 & 3 of this book the name 'Buddha' has been explained. The Marginal Note on page 2 states that the first eighteen names are names of Ajina or Buddha; the Marginal Note for the latter seven names states these are aliases of Śākya-siṁha Buddha. A further footnote is added to clarify the second Buddha, of the later seven names: Footnote (b) 'the founder of the religion named after him.' Mr. Colebrooke lists the names of the many commentaries he used as references in his Preface. In addition to Raghunātha Cakravartī's commentary, he took references from twenty-five others.

Therefore it can be said with certainty that the propagator of Bahyatmavāda, Jñanatmavāda and Śūnyamavāda, the three pillars of atheism, was Gautama Buddha or Śākya-siṁha Buddha. There is no evidence whatsoever that Sugata Buddha, Lord Viṣṇu's incarnation, was in any way connected with atheism. Śākya-siṁha or Siddhārtha Buddha received the name Gautama from his spiritual master Gautama Muni, who belonged to the Kapila dynasty. This is confirmed in the ancient Buddhist treatise *Sundarānanda Carita:*

> *guru gotrād ataḥ kautsāste bhavanti sma gautamāḥ*
>
> "O Kautsa, because his teacher was Gautama, they became known from his family line."

Besides the *Amarakoṣa*, so highly favored by Śaṅkarācārya, there are other famous Buddhist texts like *Prajṅā-Pāramitā Sūtra, Astasahastrika Prajṅā-Pāramitā Sūtra, Sata-sahastrika Prajṅā-Pāramitā Sūtra, Lalita Vistara* etc. Proper scrutiny of these texts reveals the existence of three categories of Buddhas:

- Ādi [original] Buddha: the omnipotent Viṣṇu-avatāra incarnation of Lord Buddha.
- Bodhisattva Buddhas, including personalities like Samanta Bhadraka who were born enlightened.
- Human Buddhas like Gautama, who came to be known as Buddha after their enlightenment.

The *Amarakoṣa* states that Lord Buddha, Śrī Viṣṇu's incarnation is also known as Samanta Bhadra [universal auspiciousness], whereas Gautama Buddha is a human being. Other than the eighteen names of the Viṣṇu-avatāra Buddha mentioned in *Amarakoṣa*, many names of Lord Buddha are recorded in the above-mentioned Buddhist texts. In *Lalita Vistara*, Ch. 21 page 178, it is described how Gautama Buddha meditated on the same spot as the Ādi-Buddha.

> *ea dharaṇīmuṇde pūrvabuddhāsanasthaḥ*
> *samartha dhanur gṛhītvā śūnya nairātmavāṇaiḥ*
> *kleśaripuṁ nihatvā dṛṣtijālañ ca bhitvā*
> *śiva virajamaśokāṁ prāpsyate bodhim agryāṁ*
>
> "The one seated on the hallowed earth of the previous Buddha's birthplace is on the path of voidism and renunciation. With his weapon, the powerful bow, he vanquishes the enemies of distress and illusion. Thus with wisdom he will attain the auspicious state of grieflessness and worldly detachment."

It is evident from this verse that Gautama Buddha, realizing the spiritual potency of the previous Buddha's birthplace, chose to perform meditation and austerities in that vicinity, under a *pipal* tree. The ancient and original name of this place was Kīkata, but after Gautama attained enlightenment here it came to be known as 'Buddha Gaya' [Bodhi Gaya or Bodh Gaya]. Even to the present day, the rituals of worship to the deity of Buddha at Bodhi Gaya are conducted by a *sannyāsī* of the Giri order of the Śaṅkarācārya sect. It is commonly accepted amongst these monks that Buddha-Gaya [Viṣṇu-avatāra Buddha] was a predecessor of Gautama Buddha, who came later to the original Buddha's birthplace to practice meditation. Śākya-siṁha Buddha chose this place to attain liberation, knowing it to be saturated with immense spiritual power.

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra is a famous and authoritative Buddhist scripture. From the description of Buddha found in this book, it may be firmly concluded that he is not the more recent Śākya-siṁha or Gautama Buddha. In the beginning of this book we find Rāvaṇa, King of Lanka, praying first to the original Viṣṇu incarnation Buddha and then to the successive future Buddha. A part of this prayer is reproduced below:

> *laṅkāvatāra sūtraṁ vai pürva buddha anuvarṇitaṁ*
> *smarāmi pūrvakaiḥ buddhair jina-putra puraskṛtaiḥ*
> *sūtram etan nigadyante bhagavān api bhāṣatāṁ*
> *bhaviṣyatyanāgate kāle buddhā buddha-sutaś ca ye*
>
> Rāvaṇa, the king of Laṅka, at first recited in the *toṭaka* meter, then sang the following: "I invoke in my memory the aphorisms known as *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, compiled and propagated by the previous Buddha (Viṣṇu's incarnation). The son of Jina (Lord Buddha) presented this book. Lord Buddha and his sons, who will appear in the future, as well as Bhagavān, the Viṣṇu incarnation, will continue to instruct all from this book."

Therefore, the Buddha incarnation described in the *Linga Purāṇa, Bhaviṣya Purāṇa* and the ninth of the ten Viṣṇu incarnations mentioned in the *Vāraha Purāṇa* and *Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* is not the same personality as Gautama or Śākyamuni Buddha, who was the son of Śuddhodana. Vaiṣṇavas never worship the nihilist and atheist [*sūnyavāda*] Gautama Buddha. They only worship Lord Viṣṇu's ninth incarnation, Lord Buddha, with this prayer from the *Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* [10.40.22]:

> *namo buddhāya śuddhāya daitya-dānava-mohine*
>
> "O Supreme Lord Buddha! I offer my obeisances unto You, who are faultless and have appeared to delude the demoniac and atheistic class of men."

Earlier in *Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* [1.3.24], Lord Buddha's advent is described in the following manner:

> *tataḥ kalau sampravṛtte*
> *sammohāya sura-dviṣām*
> *buddho nāmnāñjana-sutaḥ*
> *kīkaṭeṣu bhaviṣyati*
>
> "Then, in the beginning of Kali-yuga, the Lord will appear as Buddha, the son of Añjanā, in the province of Gayā, just for the purpose of deluding those who are envious of the faithful theist."

The Buddha mentioned in this verse is Lord Buddha, the son of Añjana, also known by some as Ajina's son. Śrī Śrīdhara Svāmī writes in his authoritative commentary to this verse:

> *buddha avartāramāha tata iti añjanasya sutaḥ*
> *ajina suta it pāṭhe ajino' pi sa eva kīkaṭeṣu madhye gayā-pradeśe*

"The words *tataḥ kalau* etc. describe Viṣṇu's incarnation Buddha as the son of Añjana. *Ajina* in the word *ajina sutaḥ* actually means Añjana. Kīkata is the name of the district of Gayā.

The following quote is from *Nṛsṁha Purāṇa* [36.29]:

kalau prāpte yathā buddho bhavannārāyaṇa – prabhuḥ

"In Kali-yuga the Supreme Lord Nārāyaṇa appears as Buddha."

A fair estimate of Lord Buddha's appearance can be made from astronomical and astrological calculation to be around 4,000 years ago. Regarding the astrological facts at the time of His birth, the treatise *Nirnaya-sindhu* states in the second chapter:

jyaiṣṭha śukla dvitīyāyāṁ buddha-janma bhāviṣyati

"Lord Buddha will appear on the second day of the waxing moon in the month of Jyaiṣṭha."

Elsewhere in this book is described the procedure for Lord Buddha's worship:

pauṣa śuklasya saptamyāṁ kuryāt buddhasya pūjanam

"Lord Buddha is especially worshipped on the seventh day of the waxing moon in the month of Pausa."

The rituals, prayers and procedures for worship mentioned in these scriptures all clearly indicate that they are meant for Lord Viṣṇu's ninth *avatāra* incarnation. Lord Buddha also finds repeated mention in many authentic Vedic scriptures like *Viṣṇu Purāṇa, Agni Purāṇa, Vāyu Purāṇa* and *Skanda Purāṇa*.

The truth remains that there are many different demigods and goddesses, both real and imaginary, who are worshipped by their respective devotees, in the same way that Śākya-siṁha Buddha (who was an atheist) is worshipped or glorified by his followers. However, this kind of worship and glorification is completely separate and unrelated to *sanātana-dharma*, the eternal religion of *Vedānta-sūtra*, enunciated in its natural commentary *Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam*.

According to the German scholar Max Müller, Śākya-siṁha Buddha was born in 477 BC in the Lumbinī gardens within the city of Kapilāvastu. This ancient, and at that time, well-populated city in the Terai region of Nepal was well known. Śākya-siṁha, Śākyamuni or Gautama Buddha's father was known as Śuddhodana, while his mother was called Māyādevi; this is all accepted historical fact. Although Añjana's son and Śuddhodana's son both share the same name, Buddha, they are nevertheless two different personalities. Ādi-Buddha was born in Kīkaṭa, which is now famous as Bodhi-Gayā, while the second Buddha was born in Kapilāvastu, Nepal. Thus the birthplace, parents, and era of Viṣṇu-avatāra Buddha and Gautama Buddha are totally at variance.

The atheistic Śākyamuni Buddha had four principal disciples, who founded four systems of philosophy called Vaibhāśika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra and Mādhyamika. The Vaibhāśikas hold that every object that is perceived is real. The Sautrāntikas hold that there is no proof whether external objects really exist or not; only the ideas of objects exist, and the external objects are inferred from these ideas. Thus the Vaibhāśikas hold that external objects are directly perceived, while the Sautrāntikas maintain that the outward world is an inference from ideas. The third system of Yogācāra holds that ideas alone are real, there is no external world corresponding to these ideas, and external objects are unreal, like things seen in a dream. The Mādhyamikas maintain that even the ideas themselves are unreal, and all that really exists is the void [*śūnyam*].

These were the doctrines held by the four classes of Buddhists. All of them agree that every existing object has only a momentary existence. The first two, namely the Vaibhāśikas and the Sautrāntikas,

hold that all perceptible things may be classified as either physical or mental. The physical is subdivided into two classes, *bhūta* [elements] and *bhautika* [elementals]. Similarly mental objects are classified as either *citta* [mind] or *caittika* [mental]. They further hold that there are five *skandhas*, namely *rūpa, vijñāna, vedanā, sañjñā* and *saṁskāra*. The *rūpa-skandha* is composed of the elements earth, water, fire and air, produced by the aggregation of four kinds of atoms possessing the attributes of hardness, fluidity, hotness and mobility, respectively. These four elements comprise the bodies and senses of the various beings. The *rūpa-skandha* includes all such elements and elementals, the objects composed of them. The *vijñāna-skandha* is the stream of consciousness that gives the notion of egoism. Thus the feeling of 'I am' is the *vijñāna-skandha*, also called the *ātmā* [the enjoyer or agent]. The *vedanā-skandha* includes the awareness of pleasure and pain, and may be called the *skandha* of feeling. The *sañjñā-skandha* includes all names and words. The fifth or *saṁskāra-skandha* includes the attributes of the mind, such as affection, hatred, delusion, merit, demerit, etc. The last four *skandhas* are collectively called *citta-caittika,* mind-mental or internal objects. All activities depend upon them and they constitute the inner life of every being. All internal objects are thus called *catus-skandhī* or belonging to one of these four internal *skandhas.* All external objects belong to *rūpa-skandha* alone. Thus the whole world consists of these two kinds of objects, internal and external. Except for these two, there exists nothing else like ether, etc.

Saṁśaya [arisal of doubt]: Is this a valid theory or not?

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: This theory is valid, because it explains the world and all activities.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: This is not so, as shown in the following *sūtra*.

Sūtra 2.2.18

samudāya ubhayahetukepi tadaprāptiḥ

samudāyaḥ – the aggregate; *ubhaya-hetuke* – having two causes; *api* – also; t*at-aprāptiḥ* – there is non-establishment of that.

Even admitting that these two classes of objects are the cause of the whole aggregate, still the world order is not explained.

The theory of the Buddhists, which classifies all objects as either internal or external, is insufficient to explain the world order, because these aggregates are unintelligent, and there is no intelligence admitted by the Bauddhas that can bring about these aggregations. According to the Buddhists everything is impermanent, and there is no permanent intelligent substance that can bring about the aggregation of these *skandhas.* If it is said that they come together out of their own internal motion, then the world would be eternal, for the *skandhas* being eternal and possessing motion of their own, they will constantly bring about creation. Thus the main doctrine of the Buddhists is untenable.

Whenever we see a complicated construction or dynamic machine, we take it for granted that there is an intelligent designer and builder behind it. Even a relatively small, simple machine like an automobile requires regular maintenance by a trained mechanic, or it becomes inoperable and useless. How much more skill and intelligence must be required to maintain the operation of the sun and planets, the biosphere, or space and time themselves. Even accepting for argument's sake that the Buddhist or modern scientific model of the universe is correct, how foolish it would be to think that the great machine of the cosmic reality has no intelligence, no conscious, powerful builder or designer.

The Buddhists may object, "In our system there is a concatenation of cause and effect, beginning with *avidyā* [ignorance]. Thus through *avidyā* arises the desire, aversion, etc. which compose the *saṁskāra-skandha.* From this arises cognition, or the kindling of mind which composes *vijñāna-skandha.* From this arises the six sense organs which comprise the *vedanā-skandha,* and from sensation again arises *avidyā.* Thus *avidyā* produces *saṁskāra,* from which comes *vijñāna, nāma-rūpa* [name and form], the body, touch, sentiency, *tṛṣṇā* [thirst or desire], activity, birth, species, decay, death, grief, lamentation, pain and despondency. Thus the circle of causation goes on. We Buddhists hold this theory of the circle of causation, and as this circle is not refuted by anyone and is admitted by all, and as it moves of its own accord like a waterwheel by which water is drawn from a well, so our theory is not open to any objections you may raise."

This theory is refuted by the author in the next *sūtra*.

Sūtra 2.2.19

itaretarapratyayattvāditi cennotpattimātranimittatvāt

itara-itara – mutual; *pratyayattvāt* – because of being the cause; *iti* – thus; *cet* – if; *utpatti-mātra* – merely production; *nimittatvāt* – because of there being an efficient cause only.

[If it is said that the world is produced by] the mutual causality [of *avidyā,* etc. then we say no,] because they are merely efficient causes [of the immediately subsequent links.]

If you say that this aggregate of the world is formed by the mutual causation of *avidyā* and the rest, as described above, then we say it is not so, for each of your links of causation describes only the origin of the subsequent stage from the previous one. It only explains how *vijñāna* arises from *saṁskāra,* etc.; it does not explain how the aggregate itself is brought about. A *saṅghāta* [aggregate] like a house cannot be explained to have been produced merely by putting together bricks, mortar, etc. because this does not explain the design.

We see in the natural world that a small seed contains the possibility of the entire tree, its fruits, and the generation of further seeds. The Lord, the actual designer of the cosmic creation, is so intelligent that He can make one prototype of each species, and they continue producing unlimited descendants automatically. Scientists have boasted for many years that they will create life, but even with genetic engineering they cannot synthesize a single cell; they always have to start with an existing living entity. Therefore the creation cannot exist without God, because any aggregate including living beings requires superhuman intelligence and skill to design, create and maintain.

Any *saṅghāta* [aggregate] always shows a design, and is created for the purpose of enjoyment. The Buddhists say there is no permanent *ātmā*, and identity is momentary only. There can be no enjoyment or experience for such a temporary soul, because the momentary soul has not produced the merit or demerit whose consequences it has to enjoy or suffer; it was produced by another momentary soul. Nor can you say that the momentary soul enjoys or suffers the results of the acts done by its ancestral soul, for then that ancestral soul and its effects must be held to be permanent and not momentary; and if you hold any soul to be permanent, you give up your idea of the impermanence of everything. But if you hold everything be impermanent, then you open your theory to the objection already made in *Sūtra* 2.2.18. Hence this theory is untenable.

Sūtra 2.2.20

uttarātpāde ca pūrvanirodhāt

uttara - in the subsequent; *utpāde* - on the origination; *ca* - and; *pūrvanirodhāt* - because there is cessation of the preceding.

There can be no causal relation between *avidyā* and the rest, because when the subsequent one is produced, the preceding one ceases to exist.

In this *sūtra* the author criticizes the view that *avidyā,* etc. give rise to the subsequent terms of the series by showing that *avidyā,* etc. cannot stand in a causal relationship to the subsequent terms. The Buddhists, asserting the momentary existence of everything, admit that when a thing comes into existence in a subsequent moment, the thing that existed in the previous moment has ceased to exist; an effect produced in a subsequent moment is the result of the total destruction of the cause that existed in the previous moment. This being their doctrine, the series of *avidyā,* etc. cannot stand in a causal relationship to the subsequent terms, for the cause having totally ceased to exist, cannot stand in the relation of originator to the effect that comes into existence in a subsequent moment.

The essence of the Buddhist doctrine, like scientific materialism, is that it is a psychological trick to make the believer feel that he is not responsible for the causes or consequences of his actions. In Buddhism, the cause ceases to exist as soon as the effect manifests; in materialism, everything comes from atoms and returns to atoms at the end. In both systems there is no permanent existence of the soul, no God, and no reward or punishment after death; therefore one may as well do whatever he likes. This devastates the rationale for morality, which is the civilizing force in human society. Thus we see that cultures under the sway of Buddhism or materialism gradually deteriorate until they are just like animal society, based on nothing more than competition for sense gratification and power, with no morality.

In reality, we always perceive that the cause subsists in the effect, as a thread subsists in the cloth or clay continues to exist in the pot. But the Buddhists hold that existence arises from nonexistence, for they maintain that the effect cannot manifest without the destruction of the cause; the tree cannot appear without the destruction of the seed. Similarly the material scientists want us to believe that the gigantic cosmic creation appeared from nothing, or if there was a cause in the beginning, it has long since ceased to exist. This view is refuted by the author in the next *sūtra.*

Sūtra 2.2.21

asati pratijñoparodhā yaugapadyamanyathā

asati – if there were nonexistence; *pratijña* – admitted principle; *uparodhāḥ* – contradiction; *yaugapadyam* – simultaneity; *anyathā* – otherwise.

[If the cause] ceases to exist [when the effect manifests itself, then there results] contradiction of the admitted principle [that the universe is caused by the *skandhas*,] otherwise [there would arise] simultaneity [of cause and effect.]

If it is said that an effect may originate even when the cause is totally nonexistent, then that would contradict the admitted principle of the Buddhists that the world originates from the *skandhas*. Nonexistence being present everywhere, then anything may arise anywhere, at any time. If, however, the Buddhists say that the antecedent momentary existence of the cause lasts only as long as the effect

does not originate, then they are landed in the complimentary difficulty, namely that the cause and effect would exist simultaneously, for the cause would then remain in the effect. This would contradict the accepted doctrine of the Buddhists that everything is merely momentary. Therefore, it follows that the effect does not originate from nonexistence of the cause.

It is unreasonable and impossible that something should arise from nothingness; but the Buddhists and material scientists want us to accept that this is the case. However, we never see an actual case where something comes from nothing. The gigantic material creation must have an even more gigantic and powerful source, otherwise there is no way for it to appear out of nothing. Even if we accept just for the sake of argument the scientific argument that the material ingredients of the universe are always existing without a prior cause, or the Buddhist theory that the cause ceased to exist as soon as the creation came into existence, then as discussed above, there still must be an outside source of energy and intelligence to put those inert ingredients into motion and organize them into the complex forms and dynamic processes of the cosmos we observe today.

The Buddhists also hold that substances like a pot, etc. totally cease to exist, like the flame of a lamp that is blown out. The author next refutes the tenet that there can be absolute annihilation of a substance.

Sūtra 2.2.22

pratisaṁkhyāpratisaṁkhyā nirodhāprāptiravicchedāt

pratisaṁkhyā – depending upon the volition of some conscious entity; *apratisaṁkhyā* – not depending upon the volition of some conscious entity; *nirodhaḥ* – destruction; *aprāptiḥ* – non-establishment; *avicchedāt* – because there is no complete interruption.

Nor can there be established that there are two kinds of destruction, volitional and non-volitional, because there is never any complete interruption [of existence.]

Pratisaṁkhyā-nirodha is destruction dependent on the volition of some conscious agent, for example when a man smashes a clay pot with a hammer. *Apratisaṁkhyā-nirodha* happens by the force of time, or otherwise without dependence on the will of a sentient agent. These plus *ākāśa* [space], which the Buddhists define as the absence of all obstruction or covering, are the three kinds of nonentities accepted by the Buddhists. The two kinds of destruction and space are called *niraṇvaya vināśa* [absolute destruction] or *nirupākhya śūnyam* [total void]. Everything else is momentary only, as found in the following aphorism: "Everything which is an object of conception other than these three is temporary and composite." The author will refute the theory that *ākāśa* is a nonentity in *Sūtra* 2.2.24. The present *sūtra* refutes the wrong doctrine of the two kinds of *nirodha* [complete destruction]. These two kinds of destruction are impossible because of the absence of interruption of existence.

An object, once existent, cannot be absolutely annihilated, for the origination and destruction of a substance only mean the change of condition of the substance. When a pot is broken into pieces, the original substance of the pot continues to exist; it has merely changed its form and condition. The substance of an object undergoes modification or change of condition, but the substance remains permanently existent. One cannot say when a candle is burnt out that it is completely annihilated; it substance simply has changed state into heat, light, gases etc. that certainly still exist somewhere. We do not perceive the candle when it has been burnt out, because its substance has been transformed into a more subtle condition. As we can easily infer in the case of a pot or candle that there is no permanent

destruction, in all other cases also we will find that so-called destruction is simply a change in the state or condition of the substance, which continues to exist, albeit in a different form. Consequently absolute annihilation is an improvable impossibility.

Next the author refutes the notion of liberation as entertained by the Buddhists.

Sūtra 2.2.23

ubhayathā ca doṣāt

ubhayathā – in either case; *ca* – and; *doṣāt* – because there are objections.

In both cases there are objections, and [thus the very idea of liberation is not established.]

The word *na* [not] is understood in this *sūtra* and the three following ones from *Sūtra* 2.2.19. The Buddhists define *mokṣa* or liberation as the cessation of the cycle of *avidyā* and the rest, which constitute the world cycle called *saṁsāra*. Does this liberation accrue from direct knowledge of the truth, or does it happen by itself? It cannot be the first, for then the acceptance of *apratisaṁkhyā-nirodha,* destruction without the agency of a sentient being, would be useless. Nor can it be the latter, for then all the disciplines and methods laid down by the Buddhists for their students would become useless.

Real liberation means reinstatement of the soul, who is temporarily in a state of illusory conditioned consciousness, in his real eternal identity and normal spiritual consciousness. This can only happen through revival of his original relationship with the Supreme Personality of Godhead. The only destruction involved in the process of liberation is destruction of the false, illusory material identity based on the bodily misconception of life. This is due to be destroyed anyway by the force of time; but in actual liberation, the false ego or false material identity is permanently set aside.

The Buddhist idea of liberation is insubstantial because it is based on the mere absence of something, the destruction of an illusion that never existed in the first place. The destruction of a mirage does not automatically reveal the truth. Thus their teaching cannot stand the test of reason, and actual liberation cannot be established in their system. Next the author refutes the Buddhist doctrine that *ākāśa* is an absolute nonentity.

Sūtra 2.2.24

ākāśe cāviśeṣāt

ākāśe – in the case of *ākāśa; ca* – and; *aviśeṣāt* – because of no specific difference.

The tenet of absolute nonexistence of *ākāśa* also is untenable because there is no difference in this case either.

The Buddhist tenet that *ākāśa* or space is an absolute nonentity is untenable. Why? The *sūtra* says it is *aviśeṣāt:* because *ākāśa* is no different from any other substance that is an object of perception. When we say, "The bird flies in space," we perceive space. Space is therefore just as real a substance as earth, water, etc. As we know earth from its quality of smell, water by its quality of taste etc., we know *ākāśa* by its attribute of being the abode of objects, and by its quality of sound. Thus *ākāśa* is a real substance and not a nonentity. The Buddhists also say that air exists in *ākāśa.* If *ākāśa* is totally nonexistent, then

what would be the receptacle of air? Nor can you say that space is simply the absence of any occupying object, for this also does not stand to reason.

The logicians hold that nonexistence [*abhāva*] is of three kinds: *prāk-abhāva* [prior nonexistence], as the nonexistence of a pot before being made by the potter; *pradhvaṣṭa-abhāva* [absence by destruction], as when a pot is broken into pieces; and *atyanta-abhāva* [absolute nonexistence], as in the horn of a hare, which is a complete fiction. *Ākāśa* is none of these three kinds of nonexistence. Consequently *ākāśa* or space is not the negative substance of the logicians. If *ākāśa* were a nonentity, then the whole universe would become devoid of space. For if you say that *ākāśa* is nothing but the absence of occupying objects or covering, then it cannot be the covering of earth, etc., and if you say that it is imperceptible because there is an occupying body like the earth, etc. then you land in the position that the whole universe is without space, because something or other exists everywhere. Thus the Buddhist theory of space is untenable on either alternative.

Sūtra 2.2.25

anusmṛteśca

anu-smṛteḥ – because of memory; *ca* – and.

The fact of memory or recollection also [proves that things are not momentary.]

The Buddhist idea of the momentariness of everything is also disproved by the persistence of memory and recognition. Memory or recollection is the idea or cognition of what was previously perceived, and recognition is based on memory. In recollection we recognize a thing that was perceived in the past, and assert, "This is the thing that was seen before." This proves at least that the person who recollects is not a momentary thing, but has continuity of existence between the moment of perception and the moment of recollection.

You cannot say that this recognition of a thing that was perceived in the past is only a cognition of similarity, as in "This is the Ganges," or "This is the same flame we saw before." In the cases of the Ganges and the flame, no doubt it is a false assumption to say that they are the same things that we saw before, for the water in the river is not the same, nor the effulgent particles that compose the flame. In that case, the perception is merely of similarity, or of a familiar pattern. But unless there exists a permanent knowing subject who can perceive the similarity of the present with the past, he cannot assert that "This is the Ganges," or "This is the same flame we saw before."

The knowing, remembering or recognizing subject must be permanent, or at least have continuity of existence in time, and cannot be momentary. It may be possible that sometimes doubts may arise whether an external object is really the identically same one that was seen in the past, or merely something similar to it. But with regard to the cognizing subject, there can never arise the doubt, "Am I the same person who existed in the past?" For it impossible that the memory of something perceived by another personality would exist in one's own mind. Nor can you say that there is unity due to a succession of impressions, where one impression vanishes after giving birth to a new similar impression, and that this current of impressions gives the appearance of unity. For if the succession of impressions is identical to the original one, that is practically the same thing as admitting to the existence of a permanent chain of similar impressions, and this permanent chain may as well be called *ātmā*, and thus it would also refute the Buddhist theory. But the fact of memory, recollection or recognition cannot be explained without the permanent existence of a cognizing subject.

Moreover, what exactly is meant by ‘momentary’? Do you mean that which is related to a moment, or that which is originated or is destroyed in a moment? It cannot be the first, for every permanent object must be related to one or more moments, as many moments pass during its existence. Nor can it be the second, for we do not perceive objects coming into existence or vanishing in a moment. Thus the theory of the momentariness of all things is refuted. These same arguments also refute the theory of *dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi*, which posits that creation is constant and going on at every moment, which is only the theory of momentariness under another name. Consequently things are not momentary, but exist for definite periods of time.

The author next takes up the theory of the Sautrāntikas and proves its untenability. They maintain that objects leave their ideas in our consciousness—ideas of having a certain color, form, etc. and though they may vanish and cease to exist, they exist in our consciousness as ideas, and are inferred as such. Therefore ideas are the only really existing things, and their manifoldness is caused by the manifoldness of external objects. This view is set aside in the next *sūtra*.

Sūtra 2.2.26

nā'sato'dṛṣṭatvāt

na – not; *asataḥ* – of that which no longer exists; *adṛṣṭatvāt* – because it is not perceived.

[There can be] no [persistence of cognition] of that which no longer exists, because it is nowhere seen [to be so.]

The Sautrāntikas hold that a thing that has perished imparts its form to the cognition, and on the foundation of that form, color and so on, the thing itself is inferred. But when the substance perishes, the qualities inherent in it would perish along with it. The cognitions of its qualities, such as its color, etc. cannot be the actual qualities of the thing that has perished, for they exist only in cognition and we never see them in actual reality. All that remains are the impressions of those qualities in our minds. Once the substance itself is gone we do not see the qualities passing over to another object. Nor can you say that objects like pots, etc. are mere inferences and have no objective existence. When a person sees a pot, he says “I see the pot”; he does not say, “I have the idea of a pot in my mind, and therefore I infer that there must be something outside of me which I call a pot.” For this kind of idealism is contradicted by the very pronouncement of our consciousness that declares the pot to exist outside. It follows therefore that the existence of the pot, which is an object of perception, is not inferred from the idea of a pot formed in our cognition. Such existence is intuitively given by the very fact of perception. This is a specific objection to the Sautrāntika theory.

The author next shows a defect common to both the theories of the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas.

Sūtra 2.2.27

udāsīnānāmapi caivaṁ siddhiḥ

udāsīnānām – of persons who are perfectly indifferent and inactive; *api* – also; *ca* – and; *evam* – thus; *siddhiḥ* – accomplishment.

[If things were all momentary,] then even persons who are inactive could accomplish all their objects without exertion.

If things originate from nonexistence, because everything is momentary, then persons who never exert will accomplish their objects by their mere laziness, because effects are produced without any real cause. In the theory of universal momentariness, the thing does not exist in the next moment, and so there can be no effort made to attain a desired thing or to ward off an undesired thing, for there would remain no motive for such exertion; good things would be obtained without exertion, and evil warded off similarly. One who believes in this doctrine would never exert himself, either to attain heaven or liberation. But the Buddhists are inconsistent in their actions, for while believing in the momentariness of all objects, they still make efforts, such as study, meditation and performance of rituals, to attain *mokṣa*.

As a matter of fact, everyone believes that to attain an object he must employ appropriate means and right effort. Consequently these two schools of Buddhism merely tend to delude mankind; for they lay down practices for the attainment of heaven and *mokṣa* for souls that are, in their theory, simply momentary. And believing that entities can arise from nonentities, they still exert for the realization of their objects, as if they believed that the world originated from a real entity, the *skandhas* which according to them are real substances. Their theory being thus self-contradictory deserves no serious consideration. Thus the theories of the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas have been refuted.

Adhikaraṇa 4: The Yogācāra Theory Considered

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: Now the author considers the theory of the Yogācāras. They say that Lord Śākyamuni Buddha assumed the existence of external things, and in his systems of Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika showed the relation of those things with thought, merely out of deference to those weak-minded disciples of his who were attached to external things. In fact, Śākyamuni Buddha did not believe in the reality of the external world. His highest doctrine is represented by the Yogācāra system, according to which the *vijñāna-skandha* or cognition alone is real.

According to this system an object like a pot, etc. which is perceived in cognition is nothing more than cognition. The *vijñāna* modifies itself into the form of the object. It is not an objection that without external objects the worldly business cannot be transacted, because in a dream also there are no external objects, and still all kinds of activities are performed with the thought objects. Even those who believe in the reality of external objects have to admit that those objects are cognized insofar as the mind becomes modified into the shape of those objects. If it were not so, there would not arise phrases like “I know the pot,” or “I know the cloth.” Thus all worldly activities can go on with mere cognition, and all practical thought and communication are rendered possible with cognition alone. What, then, is the necessity of assuming the existence of an external object corresponding to those ideas? Nor can it be objected that thought-forms being very minute and subtle, cannot represent the forms of big things like a mountain. A little consideration will show that the mind can accommodate an object of any complexity or scale. Its smallness is no reason against its containing large objects, for a small object like the retina of the eye can contain within it the the entire visible external world.

Mind or idea itself is the power of illumination. It shines forth, it has a form, and because it has a form it has the possibility of shining forth in the shapes of all these objects. An objector may say that, if there are no real external objects, what causes the mind to assume the manifold shapes? To this we reply that the mind assumes different shapes according to the different *vāsanās* [desire-impressions] submerged in it. Just as these *vāsanās* left in the mind create the dream-world in sleep, so the external world in waking consciousness is also the result of the *vāsanās.* The manifoldness of cognition is thus caused by the manifoldness of the *vāsanās,* and we can easily find this out by a little thinking. For wherever there is a *vāsanā* there is a change of mental form corresponding to the *vāsanā*, but whenever the *vāsanās* are

stopped, the mind also stops. Moreover you also admit that the cognition and the object of cognition are always coexistent, and the act of perception is one. We never see an object without the corresponding conception of it, consequently there is no necessity of admitting the existence of an external object corresponding to the internal idea. But as a matter of fact the object of knowledge is identical with cognition, and is not separate from it. We are conscious of only one form, and that is the idea, though this idea appears to us at the same time as an external object. The latter, however, is an error. And since we are always conscious of ideas and things together, it is useless to assume that the object is different from the idea. Thus only ideas actually exist.

Saṁśaya [arisal of doubt]: Is everything merely an idea, and is it possible to have practical thought and communication with others without external objects, just as in a dream?

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: The Yogācāras say that all practical purposes are well rendered possible by admitting the reality of ideas only, for no good purpose is served by the additional assumption of external objects corresponding to internal ideas.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: The external world really exists, as shown by the author in the next *sūtra*.

Sūtra 2.2.28

nābhāva upalabdheḥ

na – not; *abhāva* – non-existence; *upalabdheḥ* – because they are perceived.

The external things are not nonexistent, because our consciousness [bears testimony to their existence.]

As it is consciousness alone by which we judge the existence or nonexistence of a thing, we must admit that the external things really exist, because our consciousness says that they exist. The very words we use show that we admit the existence of external things. We say "the knowledge of a pot," which assumes that the knowledge is different from the pot. The wise refuse to consider any theory that goes against the testimony of one's consciousness. The Yogācāra may say, "I also feel that the object of which I am conscious appears as an external thing; but what I affirm is that I am always directly conscious of nothing but my own ideas, hence the appearance of the so-called external things is nothing but the result of my own ideas." To this we reply that the very fact of being conscious of external things proves that there is an external object giving rise to the idea of externality.

Moreover in the sentence "I know the pot," there are three things: the knower or 'I', the knowledge and the pot, the object of knowledge. The verb *to know* is an active verb, requiring both an agent or subject, and an object. It also affirms the existence of a relationship between the subject and the object of consciousness. The whole human society believes it to be so, and makes others believe it also. Therefore to say that there is only knowledge and no object of knowledge is to court ridicule and derision. Consequently it is established that an object is separate from knowledge.

An objector may say, "If a pot and other objects are separate from the knowledge of them, how is it that this knowledge arises in cognition? If you say that it shines forth in consciousness, then by the knowledge of the one pot we ought to know everything external, because all external things have the common attribute of being different from knowledge, being its object. If one thing that is other than the knowledge of it is known, then everything that is different from knowledge must be known." To this we reply, it is not so. There is no doubt that all external objects have in common the attribute that they are

different from the sentient subject; they all come under the category of non-self or object. Certainly we can understand the general attribute of non-self by knowing one thing that is non-self. But there are many non-selves and their special relations with the self are all different; one object may be yellow, another may be red, and it cannot be said that the knowledge of the yellow object is the same as that of the red one.

Ideas and things are certainly concomitant, for they always go together. But instead of proving that things are unreal and only ideas are real, this very concomitance proves just the opposite; for the very fact that they go together proves that they are different things and not one. Moreover the Lord Buddha, while denying the reality of the external things, admitted the separate existence of the external world; for he says, "The form that is perceived internally appears like an external object." He says, "like an external object," which shows that he admits the existence of external objects. Otherwise he would not have used this word, for no one makes a comparison to something that is absolutely unreal. No one says "He is like the son of a barren woman."

Now the author refutes the theory that external objects need not exist at all, because all different ideas can be explained as originating from *vāsanās* without the necessity of believing in the real existence of any external objects. The opinion of the Yogācāras is that all practical thought and communication are possible without assuming the existence of external things, in addition to our ideas about them. As in a dream a person performs all kinds of actions and has communication with other things and objects, which are nothing but his own ideas, similarly the manifoldness of ideas in the waking state may be explained through the *vāsanās* without the necessity for external things. This view is refuted in the next *sūtra*.

Sūtra 2.2.29

vaidharmyācca na svapnā'divat

vaidharmyāt – on account of difference of nature; *ca* – and; *na* – not; *svapnādivat* – like dreams and the rest.

The ideas of the waking state are not like those of the dream state, because they are of a different nature.

The Yogācāra says, "In the dream state, in reverie and under hypnotic suggestion there are no external objects like the pot, etc. and all experience and different ideas in those states are caused merely by one's own consciousness, not by anything external to the person; so also it may be in the waking state." This view is impossible, because the ideas in the dream state are different from those of the waking state. The objects perceived in a dream are memories of waking experiences; in the waking state they are sense perceptions, not memories. The objects in the dream state can instantly change their forms, and upon waking from the dream are found to be unreal. In other words, the dream objects are sublated by waking consciousness. On the other hand, the objects perceived in waking consciousness do not change instantaneously. They retain their appearance, even after hundreds of years.

Moreover, we never have the consciousness of their being unreal; they are never sublated. Although we have said above that things perceived in dreams are mere memories, this is only a partial statement of the real fact. The opinion of Vyāsadeva is that the Supreme Lord as Supersoul creates objects in the dream state and makes the soul experience them, in response to certain *karmas* created in previous lives. Therefore they are also real, the only difference is that the Lord creates them for a temporary

purpose and for a particular soul; while He has created the external world for all souls and for the cosmic period, and given them greater permanence. This opinion will be fully explained in *Sūtra* 3.2.1, where he will show that all dream objects are creations of the Lord and not of the soul.

The author now refutes the view that the manifoldness of ideas can be explained by manifoldness of without the assumption of external objects.

Sūtra 2.2.30

na bhāvo'nupalabdheḥ

na – not; *bhāvaḥ* – existence; *anupalabdheḥ* – because they are not perceived.

[The *vāsanās*] do not exist [without corresponding external objects,] because it is never so perceived [in experience.]

The *vāsanās* cannot exist according to your theory, because you hold that there are no external objects. We know that *vāsanās* are produced by external objects; without external objects there can be no *vāsanās*. This is demonstrated by the rule of identity and difference. We never see any *vāsanās* originating without an external object. The Yogācāras cannot explain how the *vāsanās* originate. And as they do not believe in the existence of external objects, they cannot even explain the existence of *vāsanās.* The existence of *vāsanās* is impossible according to their doctrine, as they do not admit the perception of external things.

According to us, the variety of *vāsanās* is caused by the variety of external objects. A *vāsanā* is really a kind of mental impression or *saṁskāra*. This *saṁskāra* cannot exist without some permanent substratum, a medium in which it may inhere. But the Yogācāras do not believe in the existence of any permanent substratum, hence for this reason their so-called *vāsanās* cannot exist. The author shows this in the next *sūtra*.

Sūtra 2.2.31

kṣaṇikatvācca

kṣaṇikatvāt – because of momentariness; *ca* – and.

The *vāsanās* have no permanent substratum, because of the Yogācāras' theory of universal momentariness.

The word *na* [not] is understood in this *sūtra* from the previous one. According to the Yogācāras' theory there is no permanent substratum in which the *vāsanās* may inhere, for they believe that everything is momentary. According to them, the external ideas that we have during a life on earth and the cosmic ideas that end only with *pralaya* or the cessation of the world period and exist only in the Monad, are all momentary. Thus there being no conscious self that is permanent in past, present and future, it is not possible to have remembrance, recognition, and so on, which require mental impressions dependent on time, place and cause. All these *vāsanās,* memories and thoughts practically presuppose the existence of an unchangeable self or personality connected with the past, present and future. Consequently this theory is unworthy of further consideration, for it cannot explain how the

vāsanās can exist without a permanent substratum, and how they can be manifold in the absence of that substratum.

Adhikaraṇa 5: Mādhyamika Theory Refuted

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: The Yogācāra thus being refuted, now comes the Mādhyamika who holds the doctrine of the universal void. He says, "The Lord Śākyamuni Buddha admitted the existence of external objects and ideas only for the sake of his less-intelligent students who could not at once grasp his doctrine of a universal void. All the preceding theories of the momentariness of things and ideas are just concessions, and may be considered as rungs of a ladder leading to this theory. This is the real doctrine of the Buddha, for as a matter of fact, neither the external objects nor the ideas exist in reality. The only reality is *śūnyam*, the great void, and reaching this utter nothingness constitutes release or *mokṣa*.

This is the real secret taught by the Śākyamuni Buddha, and it is proved thus: *śūnya* [nothingness] is self-existent and self-proved, because no cause need be assigned for it production. Only a thing that exists requires a cause to explain its origination. But no-thing does not require either a cause or explanation. Further, a thing that exists [*sat*] cannot originate from an existing thing or being, because we do not see a tree with sprout and leaves as long as the seed is not destroyed. It is only when the seed is destroyed that the tree originates. Thus a being cannot originate from another being; not can it originate from a non-being [*abhāva*], for we do not see the origination of a tree from a seed that has been roasted. However, no-thing can originate of itself. It is not a state of consciousness, for then it would be dependent on *ātmā*, which would be a useless assumption. Nor can any motive be assigned for a thing originating from itself. Nor can it originate from anything else, for then it would follow that anything can originate from anything else, for all things are other things. Thus there being no origination, there is no destruction. Therefore words like origination, destruction, being and non-being are mere illusions, and the only reality is the *śūnyam.*

Saṁśaya [arisal of doubt]: Is it true to believe that *śūnyam* is the only reality, or is it not?

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: The *śūnyam* is the only reality, because it is self-proved while other things are based on illusion and have no real existence. The only reality is the great void.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: The *śūnyam* is not the reality, as shown in the next *sūtra:*

Sūtra 2.2.32

sarvathānupapatteśca

sarvathā – in every way; *an-upapatteḥ* – because of not being proved; *ca* – and.

The doctrine of the void is in every way unproved.

The word *na* [not] is understood in this *sūtra.* What is this *śūnyam* of yours? Is it a being or a non-being or both? You cannot establish your doctrine in any way. If you admit that *śūnyam* is a being, then you give up your position of nothingness; if you say that it is a non-being, then your declaration amounts to establishing that everything is nothing. But you must admit yourself to be a being and your reasoning also to be something and not nothing, and this contradicts your theory that everything is nothing. If you say that it is both being and non-being, you also contradict your theory land yourself in undesirable results. Moreover, the means of knowledge by which *śūnyam* is proved must at least be real and

acknowledged to be true, for if such means of knowledge and arguments are themselves nothing, then the theory of nothingness cannot be established. And if those means and arguments are true, then something certainly is established, and then the theory of universal nothingness is certainly also disproved. Thus *śūnyavāda* is disproved in every way; therefore it must be inferred that the Śākyamuni Buddha taught these self-contradictory doctrines in order to delude the world. At one time he teaches the reality of the external world, next the reality of ideas only, and then general nothingness. Thus he has made it clear that his object was to delude the *asuras*.

The Buddhist doctrine being refuted, its sister doctrine the Māyāvāda also stands defeated. The author of the *sūtras* has made no attempt to refute the Lokāyatikas or materialists, because their arguments are perfectly futile. The Dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭivāda doctrine that creation depends upon perception, and the Vivarta-vāda doctrine that creation is an illusion similar to the snake and the rope hold in common with the Buddhist teaching that all things are of momentary existence only. Hence the refutation of Buddhism refutes all these teachings as well.

Adhikaraṇa 6: The Jaina Theory Examined

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: Now the author shows the faults of the Jaina theory. The doctrine of the Jainas is that substances are of two kinds: *jīva* [souls] and *ajīva* [non-souls]. The *jīva* is sentient and intelligent, has the size of the body that it occupies, and has parts or members. The *ajīva* is of five kinds: *dharma* [merit], *adharma* [demerit], *pudgala* [bodies], *kāla* [time] and *ākāśa* [space]. *Dharma* or merit causes movement and progress, and *adharma* or demerit causes delays and obstacles; both of these are all-pervading. The *pudgala* or bodies are that which possesses color, smell, taste and touch. It is of two kinds: atomic and molecular. Air, water, fire, earth, the bodies of creatures and the various planes or worlds are compounds. The atoms, which are of one kind only, are causes. They assume different qualities through modifications. Time is a particular atomic substance that causes past, present and future. Space is one, infinite, contains other things and has dimensions. These six substances—the *jīva* and the five *ajīvas*—are called *dravyas*, and the whole world consists of them. The Jainas describe seven categories that are helpful for the purpose of release of the souls, namely *jīva* [souls], *ajīva* [non-souls], *āsrava* [influx or channel], *samvāra* [hindrance or obscuration], *nirjara* [exhaustion of passions], *bandha* [bondage] and *mokṣa* [liberation]. *Jīva* has already been defined. *Ajīva* is everything which is the object of enjoyment for the *jīvas*. The *āsrava* or channel is the senses. The *samvāra* or hindrances are lack of discrimination and dispassion, which hinder the development of discrimination, etc. *Nirjara* or exhaustion of passions is that which destroys totally or which exhausts the source of lust, anger, etc., such as austerities. Bondage or *bandha* is the cycle of birth and death, caused by eight kinds of *karmas*. *Mukti* or release consists either in remaining stationary in space above all worlds, or in which there is constant progress towards higher regions. This is accomplished by means of the practices taught in the Jaina scriptures that nullify the eight kinds of *karmas* and manifest the true nature of the soul. Their practices are called the three jewels: right knowledge, right seeing and right conduct.

They establish all these substances with their system of reasoning called *sapta-bhangi-nyāya* or *syād-vāda*. The word *sapta-bhangi* means “that system of reasoning in which the seven rules are broken.” Those seven rules are:

9. *sattvam* [existence]

10. *asattvam* [nonexistence]

11. *sat-asattvam* [existence and nonexistence]

12. *sad-asad-vilakṣaṇatvam* [something different from existence and nonexistence]
13. *sattve-sati-tad-vilakṣaṇatvam* [while there is existence, yet it is different from it]
14. *assatve-sati-tad-vilakṣaṇatvam* [while there is nonexistence, yet it is different from it]
15. *sad-assatve-sati-tad-vilakṣaṇatvam* [while there is existence and nonexistence, yet it is different from it]

Thus there are seven kinds of theories regarding the existence of the world, some holding it to be existent or real, others holding it to be unreal, a third class holding it to be neither real nor unreal, and so on. *Syād* is an indeclinable and has the sense of "somewhat, somehow or not fully." Thus they establish seven categories:

- *syād-asti* [it is somewhat, or maybe it is]
- *syād-nāsti* [it is not somewhat, or maybe it is not]
- *syād-avaktavyaḥ* [it may be predicted a little, or maybe it is not predictable]
- *syād-asti-ca-nāsti-ca* [it may be, or somewhat it is or is not]
- *syād-asti-ca-avaktavyaḥ-ca* [it may be, or somewhat it is or is not predictable]
- *syād-nāsti-ca-avaktavyaḥ-ca* [it may not be, or somewhat it is and is not predictable]
- *syād-asti-ca-nāsti-ca-avaktavyas-ca* [it may be, or maybe somewhat it is or is not, and it is not predictable]

The object of *sapta-bhangi* is to refute these seven theories of existence. This is necessary for every object is either real or unreal, eternal or non-eternal, different or nondifferent and is manifold because of these attributes. If an object is absolutely existent, then it will exist always, everywhere and in every mode, and no one will ever desire either to acquire it or to abandon it, as no one ever desires to acquire air or reject it, since it exists everywhere. Something that one already has cannot become an object for acquisition, nor is it possible to abandon it, just as gravity which is everywhere cannot be abandoned. If however something does not exist absolutely, but only conditionally, to some extent, and sometimes for one person or place and somehow, then only is it possible to make exertion and attempt to obtain it or reject it. All exertions and cessation of exertions are possible only in regard to substances whose existence is conditional. All objects are either *dravyas* or different modifications of *dravyas*, called *paryāya*. The *dravya* or substance alone is qualified as *sattva* or real, while the *paryāya* or modification has the quality of *asattva* or unreal. *Paryāya* is the particular state in which a substance may exist. The substance is permanent, but the modification is impermanent; the substance is real, its modifications are unreal; the substance is eternal, but the modifications have origination and destruction. This is the theory of the Jainas.

Saṁśaya [arisal of doubt]: These several categories taught by the Jaina Arhats—souls, non-souls, etc.—are they reasonable or not?

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: This theory is reasonable, because it is established by the seven paralogisms.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: This is, however, untrue: everything is not of an ambiguous nature as the Jainas hold. This is established by the next *sūtra*.

Sūtra 2.2.33

naikasminnasambhavāt

na – not; *ekasmin* – in one substance; *asambhavāt* – because of the impossibility.

These categories cannot be established, because it is impossible [that opposing qualities such as real and unreal can exist simultaneously] in one substance.

These categories of the Jainas and their sevenfold reasoning cannot be established, because it is not possible that contradictory qualities should exist in one substance. No one ever sees the same object to be hot and cold simultaneously. Moreover it would be useless to lay down rules for the attainment of heaven or avoidance of hell, or for *mokṣa;* because of there being no certainty of anything, what you think of as heaven might actually be hell, and *mokṣa* nondifferent from these. Since everything is ambiguous, there would be nothing to distinguish heaven, hell and *mokṣa* from one another. Confusion would arise, not only with regard to spiritual matters, but with the objects of this wold as well. If things are always indefinite, and if everything is "somewhat it is or is not," then a person wanting water to quench his thirst will accept fire, for it may be that fire is hot, or it may be cold; and so on with everything else. Similarly in this system, there exists not only difference between objects but also nondifference; thus water is not only different from fire, it is also nondifferent from it. Their logic, therefore is as fragile as the thread of a spider and cannot stand the strain of reasoning. As a matter of fact, substances are definite, and the means of establishing their definiteness are the seven logical categories or *bhangas*. The soul is the subject that makes this definition, and the fruit of this process is definite conception. But in this system of indefiniteness, nothing can be asserted as either existent or nonexistent, and nothing can be known with certainty. Therefore what is the use of examining this system any further, when nothing in it is discernible?

The modern scientists also use such indefinite logic in their statements, such as, "Our theory shows that it may be..." "We think is highly probable that..." and so on. They never make a definite statement because they know full well that the inferential logic they use is always falsifiable; in fact, this falsifiability is built into every so-called scientific theory. The scientists even argue that theories such as the *Vedānta-sūtra* philosophy, which are derived from the Absolute Truth of the *Vedas* by a process of deductive logic, are unscientific because they are not falsifiable. But that is precisely the point: the relative truths of material science are all conditional and therefore uncertain, but the eternal Absolute Truth is not falsifiable because it is unconditionally true.

In the next *sūtra* the author refutes the doctrine of the Jainas that the soul is the same size as the body.

Sūtra 2.2.34

evaṁ cātmākārtsnyam

evam – thus; *ca* – and; *ātmā* – soul; *ākārtsnyam* – not wholeness.

[And in this view of the Jainas,] the soul also loses its wholeness and becomes mutilated.

The Jaina theory is open not only to the objection of predicating contradictory attributes like existence and nonexistence to the same object at the same time; but also their conception is that the soul is divisible into parts. They hold that the *jīva* has the size of the body it animates; therefore, the soul of a child would not be able to fill the body of a grown-up man. Nor would the soul of a man be able to fill the body of an elephant if, owing to some reaction of his past *karmas*, he had to occupy that body. The body being too big for the soul, he would not be able to perceive the pleasure and pain of the entire

organism. Similarly, a human soul condemned to occupy the body of a fly or gnat would be too big, and unable to occupy it.

Sūtra 2.2.35

na ca paryāyādapyavirodhavikārādibhyaḥ

na – not; *ca* – and; *paryāyāt* – because of the assumption of sequential change; *api* – also; *avirodhaḥ* – non-contradiction; *vikārādibhyaḥ* – because it would be open to the objection of change, etc.

Nor would this contradiction be removed by assuming the theory of *paryāya*, for then the soul would be liable to change and the rest.

The Jaina may say, "The soul is really indefinite in size, and therefore when it animates the body of an infant or a youth, it has that size, and when it occupies the bodies of horses and elephants, it expands itself to that size; so it fully occupies the body that it animates for the time being, by successive expansion and contraction, and thus there is no objection to our theory that the soul is the size of the body." To this we reply that it cannot be so, because it requires the undesirable assumption that the soul is liable to change. In your own theory you admit that the soul is changeless; but if this *paryāya* theory is accepted, then the soul would become liable to change, and consequently it would become impermanent. This is a conclusion that neither you nor anyone else desires. Hence your theory is unreasonable.

There is another theory that the soul is free from change only when it assumes the body of *mukti;* in that body, the soul has the size of the body and is unchanging and permanent. This modified theory, which holds that the final size of the soul results from the *mukta-deha*, and is permanent because the soul does not pass into another body, is also unreasonable. If this final body is produced at a certain point in time, then it is also impermanent; or if it becomes the eternal body of the soul, which it possesses from the very beginning of its existence, in either case your theory of *paryāya* fails. Moreover, in your theory of everything being indefinite, the ultimate size of the soul may be either existence or nonexistent, and so there also would be no permanency of that size.

In the next *sūtra*, the author shows the faults in the theory of *mukti* as taught by the Jains.

Sūtra 2.2.36

antyāvasthiteścobhayanityatvādaviśeṣāt

antyāvasthiteḥ – in the final state; *ca* – and; *ubhaya* – both; *nityatvāt* – of being permanent; *aviśeṣāt* – because of there being no difference.

This theory is untenable because the final state of liberation is nondifferent from the worldly state, because both are eternal.

The word *na* [not] is understood in this *sūtra* from the previous one. According to the Jainas, there is no difference between the state of *mukti* and the mundane state, for both are permanent. They define *mukti* as eternal progress upward, or remaining fixed in the *aloka-ākāśa*. Thus there is no difference between between worldly existence and release; for motion, whether in the worldly cycle or in a

straight line or infinite progression is, after all, mundane. Moreover, no one can feel happiness in a state of constant upward motion, or in remaining stationary in one place without support. Both of these ideas of *mukti* of the Jainas are unsatisfying. The Jaina may say, "Such a state of constant motion or permanent fixture may be a cause of pain to an embodied soul, but not to a disembodied liberated soul." To this we say that even in a state of *mukti*, the soul has his various limbs, and feels the weight of each one just as he feels the weight of the material body. Moreover, neither the condition of eternal progress nor the permanent fixture in *aloka-ākāśa* can be said to be eternal, because both presuppose action in order to maintain them, and consequently contain the liability of certain destruction.

Therefore this Jaina theory is futile and ludicrous. This refutation of the Jaina theory also includes the refutation of the Māyāvādins, the secret friends of the Jainas, who also assert that this world is *māyā*—neither real nor non-real—and that the Brahman taught in the *Upaniṣads* is not describable by words. The Vedic literature is to be considered a source of real knowledge, but if one does not take it as it is, one will be misled. For example, the *Bhagavad-gītā* is an important Vedic literature that has been taught for many years, but because it was commented upon by unscrupulous rascals, people derived no benefit from it, and no one came to the conclusion of Kṛṣṇa consciousness. Since the purport of the *Bhagavad-gītā* is now being presented as it is, however, within four or five short years thousands of people all over the world have become Kṛṣṇa conscious. That is the difference between direct and indirect explanations of the Vedic literature. Therefore Śrī Caitanya Mahāprabhu said, *mukhya-vṛttye sei artha parama mahattva:* "To teach the Vedic literature according to its direct meaning, without false commentary, is glorious." Unfortunately, Śrī Śaṅkarācārya, by the order of the Supreme Personality of Godhead, compromised between atheism and theism in order to cheat the atheists and bring them to theism, and to do so he gave up the direct method of Vedic knowledge and tried to present a meaning which is indirect. It is with this purpose that he wrote his *Śārīraka-bhāṣya* commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtra*.

One should not, therefore, attribute very much importance to the *Śārīraka-bhāṣya*. In order to understand *Vedānta* philosophy, one must study *Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam*, which begins with the words

> *oṁ namo bhagavate vāsudevāya, janmādy asya yato 'nvayād itarataś cārtheṣv abhijñaḥ sva-rāṭ*
>
> "I offer my obeisances unto Lord Śrī Kṛṣṇa, son of Vasudeva, who is the Supreme all-pervading Personality of Godhead. I meditate upon Him, the transcendent reality, who is the primeval cause of all causes, from whom all manifested universes arise, in whom they dwell and by whom they are destroyed. I meditate upon that eternally effulgent Lord, who is directly and indirectly conscious of all manifestations and yet is fully independent." [*Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* 1.1.1]

Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam is the real commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtra*. Unfortunately, if one is attracted to Śrī Śaṅkarācārya's commentary, *Śārīraka-bhāṣya*, his spiritual life is doomed. One may argue that since Śaṅkarācārya is an incarnation of Lord Śiva, how is it that he cheated people in this way? The answer is that he did so on the order of his master, the Supreme Personality of Godhead. This is confirmed in the *Padma Purāṇa*, in the words of Lord Śiva himself:

> *māyāvādam asac chāstraṁ pracchannaṁ bauddham ucyate*
> *mayaiva kalpitaṁ devi kalau brāhmaṇa-rūpiṇā*
> *brahmaṇaś cāparaṁ rūpaṁ nirguṇaṁ vakṣyate mayā*
> *sarva-svaṁ jagato 'py asya mohanārthaṁ kalau yuge*
> *vedānte tu mahā-śāstre māyāvādam avaidikam*
> *mayaiva vakṣyate devi jagatāṁ nāśa-kāraṇāt*

> "The Māyāvāda philosophy," Lord Śiva informed his wife Pārvatī, "is impious [*asac chāstra*]. It is covered Buddhism. My dear Pārvatī, in Kali-yuga I assume the form of a *brāhmaṇa* and teach this imagined Māyāvāda philosophy. In order to cheat the atheists, I describe the Supreme Personality of Godhead to be without form and without qualities. Similarly, in explaining *Vedānta* I describe the same Māyāvāda philosophy in order to mislead the entire population toward atheism by denying the personal form of the Lord."

In the *Śiva Purāṇa* the Supreme Personality of Godhead told Lord Śiva:

> *dvāparādau yuge bhūtvā kalayā mānuṣādiṣu*
> *svāgamaiḥ kalpitais tvaṁ ca janān mad-vimukhān kuru*
>
> "In Kali-yuga, mislead the people in general by propounding imaginary meanings for the *Vedas* to bewilder them."

These are the descriptions of the *Purāṇas*. The direct meaning of the Vedic scriptures is *abhidhā-vṛtti*, or the meaning that one can understand immediately from the statements of dictionaries, whereas *gauṇa-vṛtti,* the indirect meaning, is a meaning that one imagines without consulting the dictionary. For example, one politician has said that Kurukṣetra refers to the body, but in the dictionary there is no such definition. Therefore this imaginary meaning is *gauṇa-vṛtti*, whereas the direct meaning found in the dictionary is *abhidhā-vṛtti*. This is the distinction between the two. Śrī Caitanya Mahāprabhu recommends that one understand the Vedic literature in terms of *abhidhā-vṛtti*, and He rejects the *gauṇa-vṛtti*.

The purpose of the discussions in the *Upaniṣads* and *Vedānta-sūtra* is to philosophically establish the personal feature of the Absolute Truth. The impersonalists, however, in order to establish their philosophy, accept these discussions in terms of *lakṣaṇā-vṛtti*, or indirect meanings. Thus instead of being *tattva-vāda*, or in search of the Absolute Truth, they become Māyāvāda, or illusioned by the material energy. When Śrī Viṣṇu Svāmī, one of the main *ācāryas* of the four Vaiṣṇava *sampradāyas*, presented his thesis on the subject matter of *śuddhādvaita-vāda*, immediately the Māyāvādīs took advantage of this philosophy and tried to establish their *advaita-vāda* or *kevalādvaita-vāda*. To defeat this *kevalādvaita-vāda*, Śrī Rāmānujācārya presented his philosophy as *viśiṣṭādvaita-vāda*, and Śrī Madhvācārya presented his philosophy of *tattva-vāda*, both of which are stumbling blocks to the Māyāvādīs because they defeat their philosophy in scrupulous detail. Students of Vedic philosophy know very well how strongly Śrī Rāmānujācārya's *viśiṣṭādvaita-vāda* and Śrī Madhvācārya's *tattva-vāda* contest the impersonal Māyāvāda philosophy.

Śrī Caitanya Mahāprabhu, however, accepted the direct meaning of the *Vedānta* philosophy and thus defeated the Māyāvāda philosophy immediately. He opined in this connection that anyone who follows the principles of the *Śārīraka-bhāṣya* is doomed. This is confirmed in the *Padma Purāṇa*, where Lord Śiva tells Pārvatī:

> *śṛṇu devi pravakṣyāmi tāmasāni yathā-kramam*
> *yeṣāṁ śravaṇa-mātreṇa pātityaṁ jñāninām api*
> *apārthaṁ śruti-vākyānāṁ darśayal loka-garhitam*
> *karma-svarūpa-tyājyatvam atra ca pratipādyate*
> *sarva-karma-paribhraṁśān naiṣkarmyaṁ tatra cocyate*
> *parātma-jīvayor aikyaṁ mayātra pratipādyate*
>
> "My dear wife, hear my explanations of how I have spread ignorance through Māyāvāda philosophy. Simply by hearing it, even an advanced scholar will fall down. In this philosophy, which is certainly very inauspicious for people in general, I have misrepresented the real

meaning of the Vedas and recommended that one give up all activities in order to achieve freedom from karma. In this Māyāvāda philosophy I have described the *jīvātmā* and Paramātmā to be one and the same."

How the Māyāvāda philosophy was condemned by Śrī Caitanya Mahāprabhu and His followers is described in *Śrī Caitanya-caritāmṛta, Antya-līlā*, [2.94-99], where Svarūpa-dāmodara Gosvāmī says that anyone who is eager to understand the Māyāvāda philosophy must be considered insane. This especially applies to an aspiring Vaiṣṇava who reads *Śārīraka-bhāṣya* and then considers himself to be one with God. The Māyāvādī philosophers have presented their arguments in such attractive, flowery language that hearing Māyāvāda philosophy may sometimes change the mind of a devotee who is not very advanced. But an actual Vaiṣṇava or follower of *Vedānta-sūtra* cannot tolerate any philosophy that claims God and the living being to be one and the same.

Adhikaraṇa 7: Pāṣupata System Reviewed

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: The author now refutes the opinions of sectarians like the followers of Paśupati [Śiva], Gaṇeśa and Sūrya. The Paśupatas maintain that cause and effect, *yoga* [meditation], discipline [*vidhi*] and the end of pain are five categories revealed by the great Lord Paśupati Himself to break the bonds of the conditioned soul, here called *paśu* [animal]. In this system Paśupati is the operative cause, and *mahat* and the rest are effects. The *yoga* is the concentration, meditation etc. through *oṁkāra*. The *vidhi* is the discipline of bathing three times a day etc., while the end of pain means release or *mokṣa*. These are the five categories of the Paśupatas. Similar to this doctrine are the teachings of the followers of Gaṇeśa and Sūrya, who hold these deities to be the operative cause, and *prakṛti* and time to be the causes of creation of the world through the operative agency of these deities. By worshiping these gods the soul gains proximity to them, and there accrues complete cessation of all pain, which is *mokṣa.*

Saṁśaya [arisal of doubt]: Now are these systems of the Paśupatas and the rest reasonable?

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: The *pūrvapakṣin* maintains that this system is reasonable, because we see in ordinary life also that an agent like a potter is only the operative cause of the pot that he makes; he is not its material cause. God, therefore is only the operative cause of the universe, not its material cause. The mater of the creation is supplied by the eternal *prakṛti,* and the disciples laid down are also reasonable and practical.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: This is not the right view, as the author shows in the next *sūtra*.

Sūtra 2.2.37

patyurasāmaṁjasyāt

patyuḥ – the doctrine of the three *patis* or lords; *asāmaṁjasyāt* – because of untenableness.

The teaching of Paśupati also is not right, because of its inappropriateness.

The word *na* [not] is understood in this *sūtra.* The doctrine taught by Paśupati is not right because it is inappropriate; that is, it is opposed to the *Vedas*. The *Vedas* teach that the one God, Nārāyaṇa, is the sole cause of the creation of the world, while other deities like Brahmā, Rudra, etc. are His creations. It teaches that *mokṣa* [release] depends upon *bhakti* [devotional service], *jñāna* [knowledge], and the proper performance of the duties of *varṇāśrama-dharma* [the four occupational divisions and four

spiritual orders of human life] as taught by Nārāyaṇa in the Vedic scriptures. As we find in the *Mahā-Upaniṣat* [1.1-2]:

> "Thus say the sages how creation arose. Nārāyaṇa alone existed in the beginning. There were neither Brahmā nor Īśāna, nor water, nor fire, nor moon; nor heaven nor earth, nor the stars nor the sun. He being alone, did not rejoice; so He entered into meditation. From Him thus meditating, there arose sacrifice and the hymns of the *Vedas*. From Him arose fourteen Puruṣas and one daughter: namely, the ten Indriyas and Manas, the eleventh; Tejas, the twelfth; Ahaṁkara the thirteenth, and Prāṇa the fourteenth. Fifteenth is the daughter called Buddhi. From Him arose the five *tan-mātras* and the ten *mahābhutas*. From Nārāyaṇa thus meditating there arose from His forehead Sūlapāṇi [Śiva], having three eyes and holding Śrī, truth, *brahmācārya*, austerity, dispassion, etc."

This shows that the four-faced Brahmā arose from Nārāyaṇa, and also Paśupati [Śiva]. We also find the same version in the *Nārāyaṇa-Upaniṣat* [1.1]:

> "Now verily Nārāyaṇa the Puruṣa desired "Let Me create offspring." From Nārāyaṇa was produced Prāṇa, Manas and all the sense organs. From Him arose space, air, light, water and earth, the support of all. From Nārāyaṇa arose Brahmā, from Him arose Rudra, from Nārāyaṇa was produced Prajāpati, Indra, the eight Vasus, the eleven Rudras, the twelve Ādityas, all the Devatās, all Ṛṣis, all Vedic hymns; all beings verily are produced from Nārāyaṇa and they merge into Nārāyaṇa."

So also in the *Ṛg Veda* [10.125.1-8] we find:

> "I travel with the Rudras and the Vasus, with the Ādityas and all gods I wander. I hold aloft both Varuṇa and Mitra, Indra and Agni, and the twin Aśvins. I cherish and sustain high-souled Soma and Tvaṣṭā, I support Pūṣan and Bhāga. I load with wealth the zealous sacrificer who pours the soma-juice and offers his oblations. I am the Queen, the gatherer of treasures, most thoughtful, first of those who merit worship. Thus the gods have established Me in many places, with many homes to enter and abide in. All eat the food that feeds them through Me alone—each man who sees, breathes, hears the word outspoken; they know it not, but yet they dwell beside Me. Hear, one and all, the truth as I declare it. I verily announce Myself and utter the words that gods and men alike shall welcome. I make the man I love exceedingly mighty; make him a sage, a Ṛṣi, and a Brāhmaṇa. I bend the bow for Rudra, that his arrow may strike and slay the hater of devotion. I rouse and order battle for the people, and I have penetrated earth and heaven. On the world's summit I bring forth the Father; My home is in the waters, in the ocean. Thence I extend over all living creatures, and touch even heaven with my forehead. I breathe a strong breath like the wind and tempest, while I hold together all existence. Beyond this wide earth and beyond the heavens I have become so mighty in My grandeur."

Similarly in the *Yajur Veda* [*Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4.4.21-22]:

> "Let a wise seeker of Brahman, after he has discovered Him, practice wisdom by meditating on Him. The knowers of Brahman seek to understand Him by study of the *Veda*, by sacrifice, by gifts, by fasting. He who knows Him becomes a Muni."
>
> *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ.*
>
> "It is the Self which must be observed, heard about, thought of and meditated upon with fixed concentration." [*Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4.5.6]

So also the *Smṛti-śāstra* declare the same truth over and over again, following in the footsteps of the *Vedas*. No doubt in some places the *Vedas* and the *Smṛti-śāstra* use the words Paśupati, Ganeśa, Sūrya etc. and describe them as the 'ruler of all,' etc. But in those places these words are to be taken in their etymological sense as applying to Nārāyaṇa. Thus Paśupati would mean "Lord of all souls," Ganeśa would be interpreted "the Lord of Hosts," and Sūrya would mean "the Lord of the wise," just as in the *Veda* the word Indra is the name of the Supreme Lord, being derived from the root *inda*, 'to rule.' Thus all the *Vedas* and the *Smṛtis* actually describe Nārāyaṇa, the Supreme Brahman, and not any lower deity. Therefore the proper interpretation of the Vedic texts is that the real creator is the Supreme Brahman.

> *īśvaraḥ paramaḥ kṛṣṇaḥ*
> *sac-cid-ānanda-vigrahaḥ*
> *anādir ādir govindaḥ*
> *sarva-kāraṇa-kāraṇam*
>
> "Kṛṣṇa who is known as Govinda is the Supreme Godhead. He has an eternal blissful spiritual body. He is the origin of all. He has no other origin and He is the prime cause of all causes." [*Brahma-saṁhitā* 5.1]

The sectarians like the Paśupatas and the rest have established the existence of a particular deity as the Lord simply by logic and arguments. But reasoning must be according to certain worldly rules, therefore it cannot establish the existence or nonexistence of God, because it is impossible that the Lord is merely the operative cause of the world, without being the material cause as well, for then His connection with the world cannot be established. In ordinary worldly life we see that a potter, who is merely the operative cause of the pot, has a certain connection with the clay, the material cause with which he fashions the pot. What is that connection of the Lord with the souls and the *pradhāna*, with which He creates the world? The next *sūtra* shows that the sectarians cannot establish that connection.

Sūtra 2.2.38

> *sambandhānupapatteśca*
>
> *sambandha* – connection; *anupapatteḥ* – because of the impossibility; *ca* – and.
>
> **[The Lord can have no] connection as creator of the world, because of the impossibility [of such a connection.]**

The sectarians hold that a Lord is without a body, consequently such a Lord can have no connection with matter and spirit. An embodied being, like a potter, can have such a relation with the clay because he has a body. Thus this theory cannot establish a connection between the Lord and the creation, because they imagine Him to be formless.

Sūtra 2.2.39

> *adiṣṭhānā-nupapatteśca*
>
> *adiṣṭhāna* – having a position; *anupapatteḥ* – because of the impossibility; *ca* – and.
>
> **A bodiless Lord cannot create the world, because He cannot occupy a position.**

Controlling something is a function of embodied beings. An embodied being like a potter can control the clay and produce effects like pots, by virtue of occupying a particular position. A disembodied being cannot do this. It may be objected that the soul is in principle a disembodied being, yet he rules the sense organs and the body, without any particular position, so a disembodied Lord may rule *pradhāna*. The next *sūtra* replies to this argument.

Sūtra 2.2.40

karaṇavaccenna bhogā'dibhyaḥ

karaṇa-vat – like the instruments of the senses; *cet* – if; *na* – not; *bhogādibhyaḥ* – on account of enjoyment, etc.

If [it be said that the Lord rules matter] as the soul rules sense organs, [we reply that] it cannot be so, because the soul has to undergo the experiences of pleasure and pain [owing to his *karma*, but not so the Lord.]

You cannot say that matter exists in *pralaya* and the Lord creates the world with it, controlling it just as the soul controls the sense organs, because the connection of the soul with the body is so that he may undergo certain experiences of birth and death, pleasure and pain, to get the rewards of his *karmas*. But in the case of the Lord, there is no such *karma*. Then why should the Lord have any connection with *pradhāna* in order to create the world? If you say that His connection is similar to the connection of the conditioned soul to his senses, then the Lord would come under the control of the material energy and be subject to birth and death just like the conditioned soul. This is no idea of God at all.

The sectarian Paśupata may say, "Let us admit then that the Lord also has some kind of *karma*, some kind of *adṛṣṭa*, good *karma* and good *adṛṣṭa*, and that it is on account of such *karma* that the Lord gets the body by which He creates the universe. Just as we see a mighty monarch, owing to his great merit, gets a body by which he can rule over an extensive empire." This theory is open to the objection raised in the next *sūtra:*

Sūtra 2.2.41

aṅtavattvamasarvajñatā vā

aṅtavattvam – finiteness; *asarvajñatā* – lack of omniscience; *vā* – or.

If the Lord has *karma*, however high and refined it may be, then He would be either a finite being, or not possessing omniscience.

If the Lord has a body on account of some *karma* from His previous actions, then He would be finite like any ordinary soul, nor would He be omniscient, for only one who is not subject to karma can have omniscience. The Paśupatas claim that their Lord is eternal and all-knowing; therefore a contradiction arises in their theory. The Paśupata may say, "But this objection applies to your theory also, for you believe that God is a personality." To this we reply that our theory of a personal Brahman is not open to this objection, because we do not believe in this on account of any reason and arguments, but because of the revelation of the scriptures. The sacred revelation describes Brahman with personal attributes, and we never try to reconcile this description with reason. In other words, we take the words of the

scriptures to be axiomatic, and everything else is derived from them by a process of deductive logic. We have already shown this in *Sūtra* 2.1.27.

The holy Bādārāyaṇa does not show any disrespect to the mighty deities like Paśupati or Gaṇapati or Dināpati; all that he means is that these three *patis* or lords are not independent agents, as their worshipers misconceive, but work under the will and direction of the Supreme Brahman. The author of the *sūtras* refutes only the mistaken notion of the worshipers in attributing perfect independence to their deity. Since they are agents of Brahman, demigods or lords, we acknowledge that they deserve all reverence and worship, but we do not forget their subordinate position to Brahman, the Supreme Lord.

> *guṇābhimānino devāḥ*
> *sargādiṣv asya yad-bhayāt*
> *vartante 'nuyugaṁ yeṣāṁ*
> *vaśa etac carācaram*
>
> "Out of fear of the Supreme Personality of Godhead, the directing demigods in charge of the modes of material nature carry out the functions of creation, maintenance and destruction; everything animate and inanimate within this material world is under their control." [*Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* 3.29.44]

These five *sūtras* are meant to refute the sectarian doctrine of these *patis* or lords. The word *pati* is mentioned in *Sūtra* 2.2.37 without any distinctive attribute, to apply to all three *patis*, namely the lord of the soul, the lord of the hosts, and the lord of the day. Other commentators hold that these five *sūtras* are meant to refute the argumentative philosophers and rationalists, who try to establish the existence of God by mere reason without revelation.

Adhikaraṇa 8: The Śakti Theory Reviewed

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: The author now refutes the theory of the Śaktas. They hold that Śakti alone is the cause of the world, and that She possesses the attributes of omnipotence, omniscience and the rest.

Saṁśaya [arisal of doubt]: Is it possible that Śakti could be the independent creator of the world?

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: No agent can accomplish anything without energy or Śakti. The effect, therefore, must not be attributed to the apparent agent. A red-hot iron has the power of burning but the effect of burning should properly be attributed to the fire, and not to the iron through which the fire manifests itself. It is the eternal energy, working through the Lord, that creates the world, and the Lord without energy has no creative power. Thus Śakti is the real creator.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: The author refutes this theory by the following *sūtra:*

Sūtra 2.2.42

> *utpattyasambhavāt*
>
> *utpatti* – origination; *asambhavāt* – because of the impossibility.
>
> **[Śakti alone cannot] create, because creation is impossible [without the cooperation of the Lord.]**

The word *na* [not] is understood in this *sūtra.* The followers of Śakti have imagined Her to be the sole cause of the world by reasoning alone, unsupported by Vedic authority. Since they base their theory on reason, they must be refuted by such reason as would appeal to the common sense of mankind. It is not possible that Śakti alone could be the mother of the whole universe, because by Herself, She has no power of origination. We do not find immaculate conception in this world, nor do females give birth without connection with males. To attribute omnipotence, omniscience and the rest to Śakti is merely an outcome of non-reasoning, because we do not find energy with these attributes anywhere.

A Śakta may say, "We admit that there is a Puruṣa, Lord Śiva, the husband of Śakti, and She creates the universe through Her connection with Him. To this we reply that it also is not right, as shown by the following *sūtra:*

Sūtra 2.2.43

na ca kartuḥ karaṇam

na – not; *ca* – and; *kartuḥ* – of the agent; *karaṇam* – sense organ.

The creator has no sense instruments to come into connection with Śakti.

Even if it be admitted that there is a Lord who has connection with Śakti, yet in His case there is an absence of sense instruments like a material body, etc. with which He may create the universe. Thus it is not possible that such a Puruṣa can have any connection with Śakti. However, if it is assumed that He has a body and sense organs, then the objections raised in *Sūtra* 2.2.40 would apply to Him.

An objector says, "But it need not be that the body and sense organs of the Lord are like ours, made of matter and the result of *karma;* He may have a body consisting of eternal knowledge, will etc." The author answers this argument by the following *sūtra:*

Sūtra 2.2.44

vijñānādibhāve vā tadapratiṣedhaḥ

vijñāna – knowledge; *ādi* – and the rest; *bhāve* – of the nature of; *vā* – or; *tat* – that; *apratiṣedhaḥ* – non-contradiction.

If it is said that the body of the Lord consists of knowledge and so on, then there is no contradiction, for our Brahman is such a Lord.

If this Lord of the Śaktas is admitted to have a body and sense organs consisting of eternal knowledge, will etc. then there is no contradiction; the Śakta theory would be included in the *Vedānta* theory of Brahman, for we do admit that creation proceeds from just such a transcendental Lord.

We do not refute the theory of the Śaktas as a whole, but only the portion of it that portrays Śakti as independent of the Lord. The extreme Śaktas hold that Śakti alone is the cause of the universe. This must not be respected by anyone who wishes to attain final liberation from material existence. The author, therefore, completes this Pāda with the following *sūtra:*

Sūtra 2.2.45

vipratiṣedhācca

vipratiṣedhāt – on account of contradiction with all authorities; *ca* – and.

The theory of the Śaktas is untenable, because it contradicts all sacred authorities.

The force of the word *ca* [and] in this *sūtra* is to bring in the reasoning of *Sūtra* 2.2.42. The theory that Śakti alone creates the universe is untenable, because it contradicts the Vedic revelation, the tradition and reason. As we find in the *Padma Purāṇa:*

> "The *Śruti*, the *Smṛti* and reason are unanimous in declaring that the Lord is the Supreme. He who declares anything against it is the vilest of the vile."

The arguments against the sectarian believers such as the Pāṣupatas, Śaktas and the rest also hold true against the Western religions such as the various sects of Christianity, Islam etc. All these sectarian groups are created by ordinary human reason, and have no foundation in the *Vedas;* therefore they are of limited value in providing spiritual knowledge and bringing souls to ultimate liberation. Just as the arguments against Buddhism and Jainism apply with equal force against the Māyāvāda philosophy of Śaṅkarācārya, the arguments in the last two Adhikaraṇas apply to the Western sectarian religions.

Thus in this Pāda has been shown that the paths of the Sāṅkhyas, Vaiśeṣikas and the rest down to the Śaktas, are strewn with thorns and full of difficulties, while the path of *Vedānta* is free from all these defects and must be traveled by everyone who wishes to attain final enlightenment and liberation.

Thus ends the Second Pāda of the Second Adhyāya of Vedānta-sūtra. All glories to Śrīla Prabhupāda!

Śrī Vedānta-sūtra

Adhyāya 2: No Conflict Between Vedānta and Other Vedic Scriptures

Pāda 3: The Supreme Personality of Godhead Manifests the Material Elements

vyomādi-viṣayaṁ gobhir
bibharti vijaghāna yaḥ
sa tāṁ mad-viṣayāṁ bhāsvān
kṛṣṇaḥ praṇihaniṣyati

> "May the brilliant sun of Lord Kṛṣṇa, who destroys a host of misconceptions about ether and the other elements with rays of logic, destroy the misconceptions in my heart."

The Second Pāda revealed the fallacies of theories that say *pradhāna* is the the first cause, and that claim something other than the Supreme Personality of Godhead is the first cause. This Third Pāda will show:

- That the various elements of the material world are manifested from the Supreme Personality of Godhead, and that they merge into Him at the end;
- That the individual spirit souls always existed, there not being any point in time when they were created;
- That the individual spirit souls have spiritual bodies full of knowledge
- That the individual spirit souls are atomic in size although by their consciousness they are all-pervading within the material body
- That the individual spirit souls are part and parcel of the Supreme Personality of Godhead
- That Matsya-*avatāra* and the other *avatāras* are directly the Supreme Personality of Godhead
- That the variety of situations into which the conditioned souls are placed is caused by their previous *karma*.

All these will be proved by refuting theories that claim that these statements are untrue. Although *Śrī Vedānta-sūtra* was compiled over 5,000 years ago, a clue to its enduring value is that the same arguments that refute the atheistic theories of those times apply equally to the atheistic theories of today. Thus in the refutations of Sāṅkhya and Buddhist philosophies found in the previous Pāda we also find very strong arguments against the theories of materialistic science. These theistic arguments are developed further in this Pāda.

Adhikaraṇa 1: Ether Is Created

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: *Ākāśa* or ether is subject that modern science considers thoroughly debunked, but in the Vedic literature *ākāśa* means something very specific; it signifies material space. Space is not simply the absence of any obstruction or covering, as the Buddhists and Jainas think; it is a specific material substance emanated by the Lord at the beginning of creation. It is as difficult for us to conceive of space as it is for a fish to conceive of water, and for the same reason: it is the medium in which we exist.

That space is a medium is easy to understand from the example of electromagnetic radiation. Light, radio waves and other radiative energy must have a medium in which to propagate. They are vibrations, and any vibration is the alternating compression and rarefaction of some medium. This is proved by the fact that electromagnetic radiation has a specific frequency; therefore it must be a phenomenon of the vibration of some medium. In the case of electromagnetic vibration, the medium is ether or space itself.

The *Vedas* say that ether carries the quality of sound; not the ordinary sound that is carried by air, but *anahata-nāda* or subtle sound. Subtle sound is not produced in the ordinary way by vibrating a string or other material object; neither is it heard by the ordinary ear, but directly by the inner hearing. We are all familiar with inner hearing, in the constant subvocal conversation of the mind. So the sound carried by ether is electromagnetic vibration. We now know that planets, stars and other heavenly bodies radiate all kinds of vibratory energies, from radio waves to cosmic rays. The human brain also emits electromagnetic vibrations, which can be measured by an electroencephalogram. *Ākāśa* is the medium of these subtle vibrations.

Scientific experiments such as the famous Michelson-Morley experiment, which supposedly invalidated the idea of ether or space as a substance, are actually based on a number of false assumptions. The results of the Michelson-Morley experiment only proved that either the Doppler Effect does not apply to light; or if it does, then the earth planet has its own etheric field that moves

along with it, and therefore the ether seems to be stationary from our point of view. Later work by Poincaré, Lorentz and Einstein showed that time and the dimensions of any objects at motion with respect to one another, adjust so that the speed of light remains constant for any observer. This is just another way of saying that the space [ether or *ākāśa*] contracts in the direction of motion, so that measurements such as those taken in the Michelson-Morley experiment will reveal no change in the speed of light. In either case, the existence of the ether or *ākāśa* is not invalidated; Relativity theory simply restates the experimental conditions in such a way that ether is replaced by 'the space-time continuum.' Modern science simply has given the medium of ether a more acceptable name.

Time, motion and distance are circularly defined in physics; they dance around the singularity of space or *ākāśa*, refusing to acknowledge or understand it. The entire structure of modern physics and other 'hard science' depends upon the properties of space or *ākāśa*, yet they deny its existence and simply call it something else. The space of the material creation is a product and thus a substance, albeit a subtle one; for we know from the scriptures that prior to the creation of the material world, only the spiritual world exists. Material space and time both are manifested only at the beginning of the material creation. The scientists cannot imagine that space could be created, because they have no conception of the spiritual world. Just as ether or *ākāśa* is the medium for sound vibration, similarly the spiritual world is the medium for the space of the material world. Hence ether or *ākāśa* is the subtle material substance of space, in which other material objects made of denser elements exist and move, and to which they are restricted just as the movements of a fish are limited to the water.

According to the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* and other Vedic scriptures, the various aspects of the material world are created in the following sequence: 1. *pradhāna*, 2. *mahat-tattva*, 3. false ego, 4. the *tan-mātras*, 5. the senses, and 6. the gross elements, beginning with ether. This sequence is given in the *Subala-śruti, Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* and other scriptures. The sequence found in the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* and other scriptures will also be discussed in order to show that sequence does not contradict what has already been said. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* [6.2.1-4] explains:

> *sad eva saumyedyam agra āsīt...*
>
> "O gentle one, in the beginning the Supreme Personality of Godhead alone existed, one only without an equal. Others say the void alone existed before the creation, and from that void was produced everything that exists. But, gentle one, how could that be so?" said the father, "How can the void give birth to all that exists? Therefore Sat, the Supreme Personality of Godhead alone existed in the beginning of creation, one without an equal."
>
> "The Supreme Personality of Godhead thought: 'I shall become many. I shall father children.' Then He created fire. Then fire thought: 'I shall become many. I shall father children.' Then fire created water; thus whenever anyone weeps or perspires, water comes out, for water is produced from fire. Then water thought: 'I shall become many. I shall father children.' Then water created grains; thus whenever it rains, much food is produced. From water alone is produced all food fit for eating."

This shows clearly that fire, water, and grains were created by Brahman, and are therefore products. In this, however, there is a doubt.

Saṁśaya [doubt]: Was ether ever created or not?

Pūrvapakṣa [the opponent speaks]: Because the *Śruti-śāstra* does not mention any creation of ether, therefore ether was never created, but was always existing.

This idea is expressed in the following *sūtra*.

Sūtra 2.3.1

na viyad aśruteḥ

na – not; *viyat* – ether; *aśruteḥ* – because of not being described in the *Śruti-śāstra*.

[Fire, water and food were created]; not so for ether, because that is not described in the *Śruti-śāstra*.

The *Pūrvapakṣin* says that ether is eternal and was never created. Why is that? The *sūtra* explains: "Because that is not described in the *Śruti-śāstra*." The relevant passage of *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* mentions the creation of the other elements, but it does not mention the creation of ether. In the previously quoted passage of *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* the creation of fire, water, and grains is mentioned. However there is no mention of the creation of ether. For this reason ether must not have been created. That is the meaning.

This misconception is similar to the modern scientific idea that space is ever-existing. It is refuted in the following *sūtra:*

Sūtra 2.3.2

asti tu

asti – is; *tu* – indeed.

Indeed it is so [that ether was created].

The word *tu* [indeed] is used here to remove doubt. The word *asti* [it is so] means, "It is so that ether was created." Although the creation of ether is not described in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, it is described in the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* in the following words:

tasmād vā etasmād ātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ ākāśād vāyur vāyor agnir agner āpo ābhyo mahatī pṛthivī

"From the Supreme Personality of Godhead, ether was manifested. From ether, air was manifested. From air, fire was manifested. From fire, water was manifested. From water, earth was manifested."

bhūmir āpo 'nalo vāyuḥ
khaṁ mano buddhir eva ca
ahaṅkāra itīyaṁ me
bhinnā prakṛtir aṣṭadhā

"Earth, water, fire, air, ether, mind, intelligence and false ego—altogether these eight comprise My separated material energies." [*Bhagavad-gītā* 7.4]

tāmasāc ca vikurvāṇād
bhagavad-vīrya-coditāt
śabda-mātram abhūt tasmān
nabhaḥ śrotraṁ tu śabdagam

"When egoism in ignorance is agitated by the sex energy of the Supreme Personality of Godhead, the subtle element sound is manifested, and from sound come the ethereal sky and the sense of hearing." [*Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* 3.26.32]

Another doubt is expressed in the next *sūtra*.

Sūtra 2.3.3

gauṇy asambhavāc chabdāc ca

gauṇī – figure of speech; *asambhavāt* – because of being impossible; *śabdāt* – because of scripture; *ca* – also.

Because of scripture, and because it is impossible, it must be a mere figure of speech.

An objector may say, "It is not possible that ether was created. This is confirmed by Kaṇāda Muni and other great philosophers. The *Taittirīya Upaniṣad's* description of the creation of ether is a mere figure of speech, as when, in ordinary speech one says, 'Please make some space.' For what other reasons is it not possible that ether is created? Because it is impossible to create ether. It is not possible to create ether because ether is formless and all-pervading, because it is not included in the chain of causes, and because scripture proclaims that ether is not created. *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* [2.3.2-3] proclaims:

vāyus cāntarīkṣaṁ caitad amṛtam

"Air and ether are both eternal."

This proves that ether was never created."

However, if the passage from the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* used the word *sambhūta* [created] only once to refer to the list of elements beginning with fire, how is it possible to claim that this word is used literally for all the elements and figuratively for ether alone?

The opponent of *Vedānta* replies in the next *sūtra*.

Sūtra 2.3.4

syāc caikasya brahma-śabda-vat

syāt – may be; *ca* – and; *ekasya* – of one; *brahma* – Brahma; *śabda* – the word; *vat* – like.

It may be for one, as in the word "Brahman" [in the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*].

In the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* [3.2] it is said:

tapasā brahma vijijñāsasva tapo brahma

"By performing austerities strive to understand Brahman, for austerities are Brahman."

In this passage the word Brahman is used in two ways. Used to describe the object of knowledge attained by performing austerities, Brahman is used in its literal sense. Then, equated with austerities, it is used figuratively to mean "the way to know Brahman". In the same way the word *sambhūta* in the previously discussed passage can be use literally and figuratively simultaneously. In this way the fact

that the passage of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* makes no mention of it refutes the description in other *Upaniṣads* that ether was created.

The author of the *sūtras* refutes this idea in the following words.

Sūtra 2.3.5

pratijñāhānir avyatirekāc cabdebhyaḥ

pratijñā – statement of intent; *ahāniḥ* – non-abandonment; *avyatirekāt* – because of non-difference; *śabdebhyaḥ* – from the statements of scripture.

It is affirmed because it is not different and because of the statements of scripture.

The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* [6.1.3] affirms:

yenāśrutaṁ śrutaṁ bhavati

"Now I will teach how to hear what cannot be heard."

In these words the intention to teach about Brahman is expressed. If this intention is not broken, then all that follows must be about Brahman, and it must be affirmed that nothing is different from Brahman. The idea that something is different from Brahman is to be rejected. If everything is nondifferent from Brahman, then Brahman is clearly the ingredient of which everything is made. Thus, simply by knowing Brahman one knows everything. If this is accepted, then it is also accepted that ether was created, for Brahman is the original source of everything.

The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* [6.2.1] again affirms:

sad eva saumyedam agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyam aitad-ātmyam idaṁ sarvam

"O gentle one, in the beginning the Supreme Personality of Godhead alone existed. He was alone. There was no one else. Everything has Him as its ingredient."

These words affirm that in the beginning everything was manifested from Him, and after the creation was manifested everything had Him as its ingredient. This should be accepted.

Here someone may object: "How can you talk like that? There is no clear statement in that *Upaniṣad* that ether was created."

In the following words the author of the *sūtras* replies to this objection.

Sūtra 2.3.6

yāvad vikāraṁ tu vibhāgo loka-vat

yāvat – to what extent; *vikāram* – creation; *tu* – indeed; *vibhāgaḥ* – creator; *loka* – the world; *vat* – like.

Indeed, if there is a creation there must be a creator, as we see in the world.

The word *tu* [indeed] is used here to remove doubt. The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* explains:

aitad-ātmyam idaṁ sarvam

"Everything has Him as its ingredient."

This statement shows that there is both a creator and a creation. When the *Subala Upaniṣad* and other scriptures explain that the *pradhāna*, *mahat-tattva* and other things are created, they imply that everything that exists was created. That is the meaning.

The following example from the material world may be given. A person may say, "All these are the sons of Caitra." In this way he affirms that they were all born from a man named Caitra. In the same way, when the *Upaniṣad* affirms that, Everything has the Supreme Personality of Godhead as its ingredient," it is clear that *pradhāna, mahat-tattva*, and everything else has come from the Supreme Personality of Godhead.

Thus when the *Upaniṣad* states that fire, water, and grains come from the Supreme Personality of Godhead, it means to say that everything comesfrom Him. In this way it is understand that ether also was created.

The word *vibhāgaḥ* in this *sūtra* means "creation." *Sūtra* 2.3.3 affirmed that it is not possible for ether to have been created. However, the *Śruti-śāstra* affirms that the Supreme Personality of Godhead has inconceivable powers. Even though it may be inconceivable, He can do anything without restriction. In some passages it is said that ether is immortal, which means that it is neither created nor destroyed. These statements may be taken as figures of speech because we can find other passages describing the creation and destruction of ether.

> *tvam eka ādyaḥ puruṣaḥ supta-śaktis*
> *tayā rajaḥ-sattva-tamo vibhidyate*
> *mahān ahaṁ khaṁ marud agni-vār-dharāḥ*
> *surarṣayo bhūta-gaṇā idaṁ yataḥ*
>
> "My dear Lord, You are the only Supreme Person, the cause of all causes. Before the creation of this material world, Your material energy remains in a dormant condition. When Your material energy is agitated, the three qualities—namely goodness, passion and ignorance—act, and as a result the total material energy—egotism, ether, air, fire, water, earth and all the various demigods and saintly persons—becomes manifest. Thus the material world is created." [*Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* 4.24.63]

Because ether is counted among the material elements, it must be created and also destroyed. Because ether has temporary material qualities, as fire and the other elements do, it must also be temporary, as the other elements are.

Whatever is not matter is spirit. Ether is not like eternal spirit; it is different because it is created. In this way the idea that ether was not created is disproved. Modern scientists and other philosophers who state that ether does not exist are wrong, because they are working with an incorrect definition of ether. They may as well state that "Space does not exist," which of course is nonsense. Space simply has different properties than they assume in their experiments. It must be accepted on the authority of the *Vedas* that ether exists, and was created by the Supreme Personality of Godhead in the process of manifesting the material world.

Adhikaraṇa 2: Air Is Created

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: Air is also created.

Saṁśaya [arisal of doubt]: Is air also created, or is it eternal?

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: Because it was never described in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, it is clear that air was never created.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: The author of the *sūtras* gives the following explanation to show that the arguments of the previous Adhikaraṇa also apply to the creation of air.

Sūtra 2.3.7

etena mātariśvā vyākhyātaḥ

etena – by this; *mātariśvā* – air; *vyākhyātaḥ* – is explained.

This also refers to air.

This proof that ether was created clearly shows that air, which exists within ether, must also have been created. That is the meaning. This is so because the limbs of something must have the same qualities as the whole of which they are parts. This ontological principle technically is called inheritance; the properties of the cause exist in the effect. The passage of *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* quoted in the previous Adhikaraṇa also explains that air was created from ether.

Our opponent may object: "That description of the creation of air must have been a figure of speech, because the *Śruti-śāstra* explains that air is eternal."

To this I reply: The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* affirms in a *pratijñā* [promissory] statement, *aitad-ātmyam idaṁ sarvam:* "Everything was created by the Supreme Personality of Godhead." Also *Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* [10.74.20-21] affirms this point almost in the same words:

eka evādvitīyo 'sāv
aitad-ātmyam idaṁ jagat
ātmanātmāśrayaḥ sabhyāḥ
sṛjaty avati hanty ajaḥ

"This entire universe is founded upon Him, as are the great sacrificial performances, with their sacred fires, oblations and *mantras*. Sāṅkhya and *yoga* both aim toward Him, the one without a second. O assembly members, that unborn Lord, relying solely on Himself, creates, maintains and destroys this cosmos by His personal energies, and thus the existence of this universe depends on Him alone."

In this way the creation of air is proved. When it is said that 'air is eternal,' the intention is that its existence precedes and outlives the existence of some of the other elements. Air is manifested before water, as described above, and continues to exist after the annihilation of water, as described in *Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam:*

anne pralīyate martyam annaṁ dhānāsu līyate
dhānā bhūmau pralīyante bhūmir gandhe pralīyate

apsu pralīyate gandha āpaś ca sva-guṇe rase
līyate jyotiṣi raso jyotī rūpe pralīyate

rūpaṁ vāyau sa ca sparśe līyate so 'pi cāmbare
ambaraṁ śabda-tan-mātra indriyāṇi sva-yoniṣu

yonir vaikārike saumya līyate manasīśvare
śabdo bhūtādim apyeti bhūtādir mahati prabhuḥ

sa līyate mahān sveṣu guṇesu guṇa-vattamaḥ
te 'vyakte sampralīyante tat kāle līyate 'vyaye

kālo māyā-maye jīve jīva ātmani mayy aje
ātmā kevala ātma-stho vikalpāpāya-lakṣaṇaḥ

"At the time of annihilation, the mortal body of the living being becomes merged into food. Food merges into the grains, and the grains merge back into the earth. The earth merges into its subtle sensation, fragrance. Fragrance merges into water, and water further merges into its own quality, taste. That taste merges into fire, which merges into form. Form merges into touch, and touch merges into ether. Ether finally merges into the sensation of sound. The senses all merge into their own origins, the presiding demigods, and they, O gentle Uddhava, merge into the controlling mind, which itself merges into false ego in the mode of goodness. Sound becomes one with false ego in the mode of ignorance, and all-powerful false ego, the first of all the physical elements, merges into the total nature. The total material nature, the primary repository of the three basic modes, dissolves into the modes. These modes of nature then merge into the unmanifest form of nature, and that unmanifest form merges into time. Time merges into the Supreme Lord, present in the form of the omniscient Mahā-puruṣa, the original activator of all living beings. That origin of all life merges into Me, the unborn Supreme Soul, who remains alone, established within Himself. It is from Him that all creation and annihilation are manifested." [*Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* 11.24.22-27]

Air is discussed in a separate Adhikaraṇa and *sūtra* from the discussion of ether to facilitate the argument of *Sūtra* 2.3.9.

Adhikaraṇa 3: The Eternal Supreme Personality of Godhead is not Created

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* [6.2.1] affirms:

sad eva saumyedam

"O gentle one, in the beginning the Supreme Personality of Godhead alone existed."

Saṁśaya [arisal of doubt]: A doubt may arise about this statement. Was the eternal Supreme Personality of Godhead created or not?

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: *Pradhāna*, *mahat-tattva*, and many other things that are causes or creators of other things were created, so perhaps the Supreme Personality of Godhead was also created at some point. This may be so because the Supreme Personality of Godhead is not really different from these other causes.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: The author of the *sūtras* addresses this doubt in the following words.

Sūtra 2.3.8

asambhavas tu sato 'nupapatteḥ

asambhavaḥ – the state of not being created; *tu* – indeed;*sataḥ* – of the eternal Supreme Personality of Godhead; *anupapatteḥ* – because of impossibility

Indeed, the eternal Supreme Personality of Godhead was never created, for such a creation is impossible.

The word *tu* [indeed] is used here to remove doubt and affirm the truth of this statement. The eternal Supreme Personality of Godhead was never created. Why not? The *sūtra* explains, *anupapatteḥ:* "Because that is impossible."

There is no creator of the Supreme Personality of Godhead, because it is illogical and inappropriate to assume the existence of such a creator. That is the meaning here. *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* [6.9] explains:

> *sa kāraṇaṁ kāraṇādhipādhipo*
> *na cāsya kaścij janitā na cādhipaḥ*
>
> "The Supreme Personality of Godhead is the cause of all causes. He is the king of all other causes. No one is His creator. No one is His king."

It is not possible to say that because all other causes are created by something else, therefore the Supreme Personality of Godhead must have been created by someone else; for such a statement contradicts these words of the *Śruti-śāstra*. An Absolute root cause of everything must be accepted, for if it is not, then there is the infinite regress of an unending chain of causes. By definition the root cause of everything does not have another cause, a root from which it has sprung. This is described in the *Saṅkhya-sūtra* [1.67] in these words:

> *mūle mūlābhāvāt*
>
> "This is so because the root cause of everything is not caused by another root cause."
>
> *īśvaraḥ paramaḥ kṛṣṇaḥ*
> *sac-cid-ānanda-vigrahaḥ*
> *anādir ādir govindaḥ*
> *sarva-kāraṇa-kāraṇam*
>
> "Kṛṣṇa who is known as Govinda is the Supreme Godhead. He has an eternal blissful spiritual body. He is the origin of all. He has no other origin and He is the prime cause of all causes." [*Brahma-saṁhitā* 5.1]

The modern atheistic philosophers, including the scientists, are unwilling to accept the truth of an Absolute cause because that would force them to accept the existence of the Supreme Personality of Godhead. However, this means that they are forced to accept an infinite regress of causes without any end or resolution. All their speculation is inconclusive because every cause they find must have another cause behind it. In this way they are envious, not only of the Lord, but even of their own selves. They would rather live with constant uncertainty than accept the easy and simple conclusion that the Supreme Lord is the ultimate transcendental cause of everything.

In this way the doubt that "perhaps the Supreme Personality of Godhead is created by someone else," is clearly refuted. Because the Supreme Personality of Godhead is the first cause of all causes, by definition He is not caused by someone else. However, the secondary causes, such as the *avyakta* [unmanifest or subtle material elements] and the *mahat-tattva* [the sum total of all material elements] are all created by another cause: the Supreme Personality of Godhead. The *sūtras* explaining that ether and the other material elements were all created were given as examples of this general truth.

Adhikaraṇa 4: Fire Is Manifested From Air

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: After concluding this discussion, we will consider what seems to be a contradiction in the *Śruti-śāstra's* description of fire. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* [6.2.3] explains:

> *tat tejo 'sṛjata*
>
> "Then the Supreme Personality of Godhead created fire."

In this way it is explained that the Supreme Personality of Godhead created fire.

Saṁśaya [arisal of doubt]: However, the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* [2.1.3] explains:

> *vāyor agniḥ*
>
> "From air, fire is manifested."

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: These words explain that air created fire. Someone may say that in this second quote the word "*vāyoḥ*" is in the ablative case [meaning "after fire"], and in this way there is no contradiction because both elements were created by the Supreme Personality of Godhead, and fire was created after air was created.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: Considering that someone may say this, the author of the *sūtras* speaks the following words.

Sūtra 2.3.9

> *tejo 'tas tathā hy āha*
>
> *tejaḥ* – fire; *ataḥ* – from that; *tathā* – so; *hy* – indeed; *āha* – said.
>
> **Fire comes from it. Indeed, it said that.**

From air comes fire. This is confirmed in the *Śruti-śāstra*, which explains:

> *vāyor agniḥ*
>
> "From air comes fire."

The word *sambhūta* is used here. The use of that word shows that the meaning is that from air fire is created. Also, the primary meaning of the ablative case is "from." If the primary meaning of a word makes sense, then the primary meaning should be accepted. In that circumstance the secondary meaning should not be accepted. As will be explained later, this statement does not contradict the statement that everything is created by the Supreme Personality of Godhead.

The entire sequence of the creation of the elements is explained in *Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam:*

> *nabhaso 'tha vikurvāṇād abhūt sparśa-guṇo 'nilaḥ*
> *parānvayāc chabdavāṁś ca prāṇa ojaḥ saho balam*
>
> *vāyor api vikurvāṇāt kāla-karma-svabhāvataḥ*
> *udapadyata tejo vai rūpavat sparśa-śabdavat*
>
> *tejasas tu vikurvāṇād āsīd ambho rasātmakam*
> *rūpavat sparśavac cāmbho ghoṣavac ca parānvayāt*

viśeṣas tu vikurvāṇād ambhaso gandhavān abhūt
parānvayād rasa-sparśa-śabda-rūpa-guṇānvitaḥ

"Because the sky is transformed, the air is generated with the quality of touch, and by previous succession the air is also full of sound and the basic principles of duration of life: sense perception, mental power and bodily strength. When the air is transformed in course of time and nature's course, fire is generated, taking shape with the sense of touch and sound. Since fire is also transformed, there is a manifestation of water, full of juice and taste. As previously, it also has form and touch and is also full of sound. And water, being transformed from all variegatedness on earth, appears odorous and, as previously, becomes qualitatively full of juice, touch, sound and form respectively." [*Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* 2.5.26-29]

Modern scientific thinkers should not reject this description just because it is not a literal account that can be verified in a laboratory. Such descriptions given by the scriptures in terms of consciousness, the senses and sense objects, not in terms of chemical elements, because consciousness or spirit and God are the ultimate subject matters of the scriptures. We are not interested in physical properties as much as the spiritual or psychological properties of the material creation, in order to understand the construction of the material trap and the means to winning our freedom from it. This will be described in detail in Adhyāyas 3 and 4 of *Śrī Vedānta-sūtra*.

Adhikaraṇa 5: Water Is Manifested From Fire

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: Now the author describes the origin of water from fire.

Saṁśaya [arisal of doubt]: Is fire really the origin of water, or not?

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: In some places the scriptures affirm that water is manifested from fire, and in other places the scriptures do not agree with this idea. In this way a doubt arises.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: To remove this doubt, the author of the *sūtras* gives the following explanation.

Sūtra 2.3.10

āpaḥ

āpaḥ – water.

Water.

To this *sūtra* should be added the previous *sūtra's* phrase *atas tathā hy āha* [Water comes from it. Indeed it said that.] This means that water is manifested from fire. This is so because the *Śruti-śāstra* declares it. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* [6.2.3] explains:

tad āpo 'sṛjata

"Fire created water."

Taittirīya Upaniṣad [2.1] also explains:

agner āpaḥ

"From fire water was manifested."

These two quotes are clear and need no elaborate explanation. Why water comes from fire is explained in the following words of *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* already quoted above:

> *tasmād yatra kva ca śocati svedate vā puruṣas tejasa eva tad adhy āpo jāyante*
>
> "Heat makes a person produce water. This is so when a person perspires or weeps."

Adhikaraṇa 6: Earth Is Manifested From Water, and the Word "Anna" in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad Means "Earth"

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: In the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* it is said:

> *tā āpa aikṣanta bahvayaḥ syāma prajāyemahīti tā annam asṛjanta*
>
> "Water thought: 'I shall become many. I shall father many children.' Then water created *anna*."

Saṁśaya [arisal of doubt]: What is the meaning of the word *anna* here? Does it mean "barley and other food," or does it mean "earth"?

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: In the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* it is said:

> *tasmād yatra kvacana varṣati tad eva bhūyiṣṭham annaṁ bhavaty adbhya eva tad adhy annādyaṁ jāyate*
>
> "Therefore, whenever it rains there is abundant *anna*. In this way *anna* is produced by water."

This passage seems, therefore, to support the idea that the word *anna* here means "barley and other food."

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: To explain the proper meaning here, the author of the *sūtras* speaks the following words.

Sūtra 2.3.11

> *pṛthivy-adhikāra-rūpa-śabdāntarebhyaḥ*
>
> *pṛthivi* – earth; *adhikāra* – context; *rūpa* – color;śabda – quotes from the *Śruti-śāstra; antarebhyaḥ* – because of other.
>
> **Because its color, its context, and other quotes from the *Śruti-śāstra*, all confirm that earth is the proper meaning.**

Here the meaning "earth" should be accepted. Why? Because of the context and other reasons. It should be accepted because the context [*adhikāra*] of the passage is a description of the creation of the five material elements. It is also so, because the *anna* here is described as being black in color [*rūpa*], in the words:

> *yat kṛṣṇaṁ tad annasya*
>
> "That *anna* is black in color."

It is also so because in other scriptures [*śāstrāntarebhyaḥ*] it is said [in the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*]:

> *adbhyaḥ pṛthivī*
>
> "From water, earth is manifested."

The passage: "Therefore, whenever it rains there is abundant *anna*. In this way, "*anna* is produced by water," clearly uses the word *anna* to mean "food." However, because this passage is in the context of a description of the five material elements being manifested one from the other, the "food" here is a metaphor for "earth." Thus the two meanings "food" and "earth" combine in the word *anna* in this passage.

Adhikaraṇa 7: The Elements Are Manifested From the Supreme Personality of Godhead

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: The description here, that the material elements are manifested in a particular sequence, beginning with ether, is given to remove controversy in regard to the sequence in which the elements are manifested. The fact that the *pradhāna, mahat-tattva*, and all the elements are created by the Supreme Personality of Godhead has already been proved in *Sūtra* 1.1.2 [*janmādy asya yataḥ*]. Now the author of the *sūtras* begins a more detailed description of that creation. In the *Subala Upaniṣad* it is said:

> *tad āhuḥ kiṁ tad āsīt tasmai sa hovāca na san nasan na sad asad iti tasmāt tamaḥ sañjāyate tamaso bhūtādir bhūtāder ākāśam ākāśād vāyur vāyor agnir agner āpo 'dbhyaḥ pṛthivī tad aṇḍam abhavat*
>
> "They said: 'What was in the beginning?' He replied: 'In the beginning was neither existence nor non-existence. Nothing existed and nothing did not exist. In the beginning there was darkness [*tamaḥ*]. From the darkness the origin of the material elements was born. From the origin of the material elements, ether was born. From ether, air was born. From air, fire was born. From fire, water was born. From water, earth was born. In this way the egg of the material universe was created.' "

Here it should be understood that *akṣara* [the inconceivable]*, avyakta* [the unmanifest]*, mahat-tattva* [the total material energy]*, tan-mātras* [the attributes of the elements such as sound, touch, etc.], and the material senses should also be placed in this sequence, between darkness and ether. That is the meaning included in the phrase "the origin of the material elements." This should be done to complement the following statement of Agnimalaya:

> *sandagdhvā sarvāṇi bhūtāni pṛthivy apsu pralīyate. Āpas tejasi pralīyante. Tejo vāyau pralīyate. Vāyur ākāśe pralīyate. Ākāśam indriyeṣv indriyāṇi tan-mātreṣu tan- mātrāṇi bhūtādau vilīyante. Bhūtādir mahati vilīyate. Mahān avyakte vilīyate. Avyaktam akṣare vilīyate. Akṣaraṁ tamasi vilīyate. Tama ekī-bhavati parasmin. Parasmān na san nasan na sad asat.*
>
> "When the all the elements are burned up, earth merges into water, water merges into fire, fire merges into air, air merges into ether, ether merges into the senses, the senses merge into the *tan-mātras*, the *tan-mātras* merge into the origin of the material elements, the origin of the material elements merges into the *mahat-tattva*, the *mahat-tattva* merges into the *avyakta*, the *avyakta* merges into the *akṣara*, and the *akṣara* merges into the great darkness. Then the great darkness becomes one with the Supreme. In the Supreme is neither existence nor nonexistence. Nothing exists and nothing does not exist."

The word "origin of the material elements" here means *ahaṅkāra* [false ego]. False ego is of three kinds. From false ego in the mode of goodness, the mind and the demigods are manifested. From false ego in the mode of passion, the material senses are manifested. From false ego in the mode of ignorance are manifested the *tan-mātras*, from which are manifested the ether and the other elements. In this way these different explanations all corroborate each other.

In the *Gopāla-tāpanī Upaniṣad* it is said:

> *pūrvam hy ekam evādvitīyaṁ brahmāsīt. Tasmād avkyataṁ vyaktam evākṣaraṁ tasmād akṣarān mahān mahato vā ahaṅkāras tasmād ahaṅkārāt pañca-tan-mātrāṇi tebhyo bhūtāni tair āvṛtam akṣaraṁ bhavati.*
>
> "Before the material world was manifest, only the Supreme Personality of Godhead, who is one without a second, existed. From Him came the *avyakta*. From the *avyakta* came the *akṣara*. From the *akṣara* came the *mahat-tattva*. From the *mahat-tattva* came false ego [*ahaṅkāra*]. From false ego came the five *tan-mātras*. From them came the material elements. The *akṣara* is filled with all these."

Saṁśaya [doubt]: Do the *pradhāna* and other parts of this sequence arise one from the other, or do they all arise directly from the Supreme Personality of Godhead?

Pūrvapakṣa: They arise from each other, for that is the statement of the texts.

Siddhānta [the conclusion]: The author of the *sūtras* gives His conclusion in the following words.

Sūtra 2.3.12

> *tad abhidhyānād eva tu tal liṅgāt saḥ*
>
> *tat* – that; *abhidhyānāt* – because of meditation; *eva* – indeed; *tu* – indeed; *tat* – that; *liṅgāt* – because of the body; *saḥ* – He.
>
> **Because of meditation and because of the body, it is indeed He.**

The word *tu* [indeed] is used to dispel doubt. The Supreme Personality of Godhead is the master of all potencies, including the potency of great darkness, the potency that begins the material creation. He is the direct cause, and the *pradhāna*, earth, and other features of the material creation are effects created by Him. Why is that? The *sūtra* explains: "Because of meditation and because of the body." The *Śruti-śāstra* explains:

> *so 'kāmayata bahu syāṁ prajāyeya*
>
> "The Supreme Personality of Godhead desired: 'Let Me become many. Let me create the material world.' "

Thus, it is by the desire of the all-powerful Supreme Personality of Godhead that the *pradhāna* and other features of the material world are created. That is how He is the cause of the material world. Also, the material world is the body of the Supreme Personality of Godhead. The Supreme Personality of Godhead enters the great darkness of the material world and transforms it into *pradhāna* and the other aspects of matter. In this sense, the material world is His body. This is confirmed by the *Antaryāmi-brāhmaṇa* of the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, and also by the *Subala Upaniṣad*, which explains:

> *yasya pṛthivī śarīram*
>
> "The world is the body of the Supreme Personality of Godhead."
>
> *jagṛhe pauruṣaṁ rūpaṁ*
> *bhagavān mahad-ādibhiḥ*
> *sambhūtaṁ ṣoḍaśa-kalam*
> *ādau loka-sisṛkṣayā*

"In the beginning of the creation, the Lord first expanded Himself in the universal form of the *puruṣa* incarnation and manifested all the ingredients for the material creation. And thus at first there was the creation of the sixteen principles of material action. This was for the purpose of creating the material universe." [*Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* 1.3.1]

aṇḍa-kośe śarīre 'smin
saptāvaraṇa-saṁyute
vairājaḥ puruṣo yo 'sau
bhagavān dhāraṇāśrayaḥ

"The gigantic universal form of the Personality of Godhead, within the body of the universal shell, which is covered by sevenfold material elements, is the subject for the conception of the *virāṭ-rūpa*." [*Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* 2.1.25]

Sūtra 2.3.13

viparyayeṇa tu kramo 'ta upapadyate ca

viparyayeṇa – by the reverse; *tu* – indeed; *kramaḥ* – sequence; *ataḥ* – from this; *upapadyate* – is manifested; *ca* – and.

Indeed, this sequence is also reversed.

The word *tu* [indeed] is used here for emphasis. In the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* [2.1.3] it is said:

etasmāj jāyate prāṇo manaḥ sarvendriyāṇi ca. Khaṁ vāyur jyotir āpaḥ pṛthivī viśvasya dhāriṇī

"From Him are born life, mind, all the senses, ether, air, fire, water, and earth, the support of the world."

In the *Subala Upaniṣad* the sequence is reversed, with *pradhāna* and *mahat-tattva* coming first. But this is not really an issue, because everything actually comes from the Supreme Personality of Godhead. He is present within everything, beginning with the life-air and ending with earth, and when one feature of creation comes from another, the second feature actually comes from the all-powerful Supreme Personality of Godhead present within the first feature. If this were not so, then these two different versions would contradict each other.

The Supreme Personality of Godhead is the origin of all and the creator of all. By knowing Him everything becomes known. The *pradhāna* and other features of matter, being inert and unconscious, cannot by themselves create changes in the material world. That is why the word *ca* [also] is used here. Therefore the Supreme Personality of Godhead is in every case the real cause of these transformations in the material world.

Adhikaraṇa 8: The Supreme Personality of Godhead is the Creator of Mind and Intelligence

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: Now the author of the *sūtras* removes a specific doubt.

Saṁśaya [arisal of doubt]: Are the material elements generated by the Supreme Personality of Godhead or by one another?

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: It is not proper to assume that this quotation from *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* [2.1.3] quoted in the previous purport, supports the idea that all the features of the material world are directly created by the Supreme Personality of Godhead Himself. The list given in that verse merely gives the sequence in which those material features were manifested. It says that first come the material senses and then comes the mind. This does not mean that everything comes directly from the Supreme Personality of Godhead.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: To explain the proper meaning here, the author of the *sūtras* speaks the following words.

Sūtra 2.3.14

antarā vijñāna-manasī-krameṇa tal-liṅgād iti cen nāviśeṣāt

antarāḥ – in the middle; *vijñāna* – knowledge; *manasī* – and mind; *krameṇa* – with the sequence; *tat* – of that; *liṅgāt* – because of the sign; *iti* – thus; *cet* – if; *na* – not; *aviśeṣāt* – because of not being different.

If it is said that the sequence of mind and intelligence appears in this way, then I reply: No. Because they are not different.

The word *vijñāna* here means "the material senses of the conditioned soul." If this objection is raised, then I reply: No. It is not so. Why not? The *sūtra* explains, *na viśeṣāt:* "Because they are not different." This means that the material senses and the mind are not different from the life-force, the element earth, or any of the other material features. They have all come directly from the Supreme Personality of Godhead. In this passage the life-force and all the other material features all come from the Supreme Personality of Godhead [*etasmāt:* "from Him"]. That is the meaning. The following scripture quotes also declare that the elements are all created by the Supreme Personality of Godhead:

so 'kāmayata bahu syāṁ prajāyeya

"The Supreme Personality of Godhead desired: Let Me become many. Let me create the material world."

etasmāj jāyate prāṇaḥ

"The life-force and everything else was manifested from the Supreme Personality of Godhead."

In the *Bhagavad-gītā* [10.8] the Supreme Personality of Godhead Himself declares:

ahaṁ sarvasya prabhavo
mattaḥ sarvaṁ pravartate

"I am the source of all spiritual and material worlds. Everything emanates from me."

In the *Vāmana Purāṇa* it is said:

tatra tatra sthito viṣṇus
tat tac chaktiṁ prabodhayet
eka eva mahā-śaktiḥ
kurute sarvam añjasā

"The Supreme Personality of Godhead, Lord Viṣṇu, enters everywhere and awakens the power dormant in everything. He is the supremely powerful one. He does everything perfectly."

In this way it is shown that *pradhāna* and all other material features come directly from the Supreme Personality of Godhead. That fact is not at all contradicted by the sequence of events presented in the *Subala Upaniṣad* and the other scriptures. This is so because the Supreme Personality of Godhead is the creator of the original material darkness, the *pradhāna* and the other features of the material world. Thus when the scripture says *tat tejo 'sṛjata:* "The Supreme Personality of Godhead created fire," it is understood that He also created darkness, a host of other potencies, *pradhāna*, air, and other aspects of matter. When the scriptures say *tasmād vai:* "From the Supreme Personality of Godhead everything has come," it is understood that the Supreme Personality of Godhead is the master of material darkness and a host of other potencies, the *pradhāna* and other features of matter were born from Him, and the material element ether was also manifested from Him.

Adhikaraṇa 9: All Words are Names of the Supreme Personality of Godhead

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: The Holy Names of the Supreme Personality of Godhead are eternal and innumerable. During the temporary manifestation of the material creation, some of these names are also used to refer to material personalities and objects. But the primary meaning of these words remains the Lord, since at the end of the creation the material persons and objects cease to exist.

Saṁśaya [arisal of doubt]: Is it not so that if Lord Hari is the Supreme Personality of Godhead, the master of all, and the all-pervading Supersoul, then the names of all that is moving and inert would also be names of Him?

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: It is not true that all names are names of the Lord, for words are primarily the names of the various moving and inert things. We accept the primary meaning of words as given in the dictionary, and if they also sometimes indicate Lord Hari, that is a secondary or indirect meaning.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: Thinking that someone may accept this idea that words are primarily names of various things and only secondarily names of the Supreme Personality of Godhead, the author of the *sūtras* gives the following explanation.

Sūtra 2.3.15

> *carācara-vyapāśrayas tu syāt tad-vyapadeśo 'bhāktas tad- bhāva-bhāvitvāt*
>
> *cara* – moving; *acara* – and unmoving; *vyapāśrayaḥ* – the abode; *tu* – indeed; *syāt* – may be; *tat* – of that; *vyapadeśaḥ* – name; *abhāktaḥ* – not figurative; *tat* – of Him; *bhāva* – the nature; *bhāvitvāt* – because of being in the future.
>
> **Indeed, He resides in all that move and does not move. Therefore it will be learned that every word is one of His names.**

The word *tu* [indeed] is used here to dispel doubt. The word *carācara-vyapāśrayaḥ* means that "The Supreme Personality of Godhead resides in all moving and unmoving beings." The word *tad-vyapadeśaḥ* means "the names of the moving and unmoving beings." The word *abhāktaḥ* means "These names are primarily names of the Supreme Personality of Godhead." Why is that? The *sūtra* explains: *bhāva-bhāvitvāt* [the real meaning of names will be learned in the future]. This means that by studying the scriptures one will come to understand that all words are names of the Supreme Personality of Godhead. The *Śruti-śāstras* explain:

so 'kāmayata bahu syām

"The Supreme Personality of Godhead desired: 'Let Me become many. Let me create the material world.' "

sa vāsudevo na yato 'nyad asti

"He is the all-pervading Supreme Personality of Godhead. Nothing is different from Him."

In the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* [3.7.16] it is said:

kaṭaka-mukuṭa-karṇikādi-bhedaiḥ
kanakam abhedam apīṣyate yathaikam
sura-paśu-manujādi-kalpanābhir
harir akhilābhir udīryate tathaikaḥ

"As golden bracelets, crowns, earrings, and other golden ornaments are all one because they are all made of gold, so all demigods, men, and animals are one with Lord because they are all made of Lord Hari's potencies."

The meaning is this: The names of potencies are primarily the names of the Master of these potencies. This is so because the Master is the very self of His potencies. Lord Śrī Caitanya Mahāprabhu was a teacher of grammar, He explained to His students the Vedic truth that the original meaning of every word is a Holy Name of the Lord. Material personalities and objects simply borrow their names from Him for the duration of the creation.

Adhikaraṇa 10: The Individual Spirit Souls are Eternal and Without Beginning

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: Because He is the origin of everything, the Supreme Personality of Godhead has no other origin from which He was created. This has already been described. Now we will determine the nature of the individual spirit soul.

The modern materialist philosophers do not want to admit the existence of the soul. This is because of their envy of the Supreme Personality of Godhead. As soon as one acknowledges the existence of the soul, the very next question will be about the source of the soul, and that line of inquiry has to end in the Supreme Personality of Godhead. Thus all materialist philosophies deny the existence and eternality of the soul.

Some modern theologians speculate that the soul is created at the beginning of human life, but exists forever in heaven or hell as a result of his actions in this life. They wish to avoid accepting the truth of reincarnation. However, this position leads to intractable philosophical problems, because it cannot explain how some souls are born into good families and favorable situations and others into poverty or other difficulties. It also implied that God is not fair, or that He may not be perfectly omnipotent. For if the soul is newly created, then how do we explain that some souls are born into difficult situations such as poverty and ignorance, and others are blessed with wealth, education and other advantages? This means that God is either not all-good, since He allows some new souls to suffer and others to enjoy; or that God is not all-powerful, because He cannot help that some children are born in worse circumstances than others. Of course, the real answer is that each soul exists eternally, and has specific *karma* resulting from his activities in previous lives.

We have discussed these issues earlier; the eternality of the soul, both in the past and the future, is necessary if we want to preserve the idea that God is all-knowing, all-powerful and all-good. Eternal

means beginningless and endless. Thus the idea that the soul is created at a particular time is incorrect. Therefore, first the idea that the individual soul has an origin in time will be refuted.

In the *Taittirīya Araṇyaka, Mahā-Nārāyaṇa Upaniṣad* [1.4] it is said:

> *yataḥ prasūtā jagataḥ prasūtī*
> *toyena jīvān vyasasarja bhūmyām*
>
> "From the Supreme Personality of Godhead the universe was born. With water He created the living entities on the earth."

In the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* it is said:

> *san-mūlāḥ saumyemāḥ sarvāḥ prajāḥ*
>
> "O gentle one, all living entities have their roots in the Supreme."

Saṁśaya [doubt]: Do the individual spirit souls have an origin or not?

Pūrvapakṣa [the opponent speaks]: Because He is the creator of the material universe, which contains both sentient living entities and insentient matter, the Supreme Personality of Godhead must be the creator of the individual spirit souls. Any other idea would be illogical.

Siddhānta [conclusion]: The author of the *sūtras* gives the following conclusion.

Sūtra 2.3.16

> *nātmā śruter nityatvāc ca tābhyaḥ*
>
> *na* – not; *ātmā* – the individual spirit soul; *śruteḥ* – from the *Śruti-śāstra; nityatvāt* – because of being eternal; *ca* – and; *tābhyaḥ* – from them.
>
> **Because the individual spirit soul is eternal, and because of the statements of *Śruti-śāstra* and other scriptures, [this idea about the individual spirit soul is not true.]**

The individual spirit soul was never created. Why not? The *sūtra* explains, *śruteḥ:* "Because of the statements of *Śruti-śāstra*." In *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* [1.2.18] it is said:

> *na jāyate mriyate vā vipaścin*
> *nāyaṁ kutaścin na babhūva kaścit*
> *ajo nityaḥ śāśvato 'yaṁ purāṇo*
> *na hanyate hanyamāne śarīre*
>
> "O wise one, for the soul there is neither birth nor death at any time. He has not come into being, does not come into being, and will not come into being. He is unborn, eternal, ever-existing, and primeval. He is not slain when the body is slain."

That the individual spirit soul was never born is also declared in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* [1.9]:

> *jñājñau dvāv ajāv īśānīśau*
>
> "Neither the Supreme Personality of Godhead nor the individual spirit souls were ever born."

The word *tābhyaḥ* in the *sūtra* means "The eternality of the individual spirit soul is described in the *Śruti* and *Smṛti-śāstras*." The word *ca* [and] in the *sūtra* means that the individual spirit soul is also conscious and full of knowledge.

In the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* [2.5.13] it is said:

> *nityo nityānāṁ cetanaś cetanānām*
>
> "Of all eternal living souls there is one who is the leader. Of all eternal souls there is one who is the leader."

In the *Bhagavad-gītā* the Supreme Lord explains:

> *ajo nityaḥ śāśvato 'yaṁ purāṇaḥ*
>
> "The soul is unborn, eternal, ever-existing, and primeval."

Therefore, when it is said, "Yajñadatta is born and again he dies," such words refer only to the external material body. The *jāta-karma* ceremony and other ceremonies like it also refer to the external material body. The individual spirit soul is different from the external material body and resides in it like a passenger. In the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* [4.3.8] it is said:

> *sa vā ayaṁ puruṣo jāyamānaḥ śarīram abhisampadyamānaḥ sa utkraman mriyamāṇaḥ*
>
> "At the moment of birth the spirit soul enters a material body, and at the moment of death the soul leaves the body."

In the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* [6.11.3] it is said:

> *jīvopetam vāva kiledaṁ mriyate na jīvo mriyate*
>
> "The soul resides in the material body. When the body dies, the soul does not die."

Here someone may object: "How can this be? If this is so, then this fact disagrees with the scriptural description of the individual souls' creation."

To this objection I reply: The individual spirit souls are said to be created because they are effects of the Supreme. The Supreme Personality of Godhead has two potencies—internal and external—and these are said to be His effects. Here is what makes these two potencies different. One potency is the *pradhāna* and other inert, unconscious, nonliving potencies that are meant to be objects of enjoyment and various experiences. The other potency is the individual spirit souls, who are not inert, dull matter, but conscious living beings, and who are able to enjoy and perceive various experiences. These two potencies share one common feature: that they are both the effects of the Supreme Personality of Godhead. In this way the scriptural description of the souls' creation is not contradicted; the scriptures are correct, and the individual spirit souls are never born.

All transcendental entities are eternal; they have no beginning or end. The difference between material and spiritual things is precisely that material things are temporary but spiritual things are eternal.

> *nāsato vidyate bhāvo*
> *nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ*
> *ubhayor api dṛṣṭo 'ntas*
> *tv anayos tattva-darśibhiḥ*
>
> "Those who are seers of the truth have concluded that of the nonexistent there is no endurance, and of the existent there is no cessation. This seers have concluded by studying the nature of both." [*Bhagavad-gītā* 2.16]
>
> *nātmā jajāna na mariṣyati naidhate 'sau*
> *na kṣīyate savana-vid vyabhicāriṇāṁ hi*

sarvatra śaśvad anapāyy upalabdhi-mātraṁ
prāṇo yathendriya-balena vikalpitaṁ sat

"The eternal soul was never born and will never die, nor does it grow or decay. That spiritual soul is actually the knower of the youth, middle age and death of the material body. Thus the soul can be understood to be pure consciousness, existing everywhere at all times and never being destroyed. Just as the life air within the body, although one, becomes manifest as many in contact with the various material senses, the one soul appears to assume various material designations in contact with the material body." [*Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* 11.3.38]

Adhikaraṇa 11: The Individual Spirit Souls are Both Knowledge and Knowers

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: Now that he has cleared away the obstacles of spurious, non-Vedic philosophical systems, the author of the *sūtras* considers the nature of the individual spirit soul. In this context, "knowledge" refers not to discursive thought, verbal information or symbolic manipulation, but to consciousness. Thus the soul is both conscious and consciousness, knowledge and the knower.

Consciousness is the primary issue in life. Indeed, in the absence of consciousness there *are* no other issues. Consciousness and its corollaries are fundamental to every thought, word and action. Yet how strange that there is no universally accepted, comprehensive theory of consciousness in Western science. The reason for this is clear: if the existence and transcendental nature of the soul is accepted, the next question will be "Then what is the origin of the soul?" Because they want to avoid the Supreme Personality of Godhead, science has intentionally restricted its domain to empirical investigations of the manifest objective world, while consciousness and the soul are intrinsically subjective and immanent.

Consciousness is the primary experiential fact. Without a practical theory of consciousness, science cannot adequately explain the world in which we live. Any observer must be conscious, and therefore the consciousness of the observer is critical to the outcome of any experiment. Quantum Mechanics does recognize the role of the observer in determining the outcome of an experiment; however, so far it still treats the observer's consciousness as a 'black box,' as if consciousness were proscribed from serious scientific inquiry.

Considering the profound importance of consciousness in human life, comparatively little scientific research has been done on it. And this research is deeply flawed, because it tries to treat consciousness as a material substance. This ontological error is technically called elementalism. Consciousness is not a thing but a quality of a transcendental entity, the soul. Unless we admit the existence of the soul, we can never understand consciousness, because a quality is different from a substance.

Here is a perfect example of how language can differ from reality. Just because it is possible to isolate the word 'consciousness,' it does not follow that one can isolate consciousness, because consciousness is not a thing. In reality, consciousness is inseparable from the living entity—he who is conscious of being conscious. Consciousness is never found separate from senses, form and personal identity. Any attempt to split off consciousness from its structural relationships with the living entity, form (whether material or spiritual) and identity, is a futile endeavor that can never lead to any practical application because it is against the structure of reality.

In other words, consciousness is only one member of a higher-order transcendental reality: ontologically, the soul or living entity is the root class, and his qualities such as consciousness, identity,

ideation, action etc. are subclasses. Our whole experience is a very large series of instances of these subclasses. We can very easily illustrate this in an ontological class diagram.

The living entity himself is ontologically inconceivable to us because we ourselves are living entities, and living entities are the *taṭasthā-śakti* [marginal potency] of the Supreme. The ontological conception of the Supreme and His potencies as seen by the Supreme Himself is closed to the living entities. We can never be conscious of ourselves as God sees us, just as we can never see our own eyeballs; and His consciousness and intelligence are unlimited. Therefore the ultimate meaning of the soul and his eternal relationship with the Supreme Personality of Godhead can only be revealed by the scriptures. But we can be conscious of our own consciousness, the objects of consciousness and the relationships between and among them. So in the ontology of consciousness, the living entities are the superclass or senior order, and the symptoms of the living entity, which are all subjective, are the subclasses composing the living entities' field of experience.

This ontological analysis of consciousness also explains why *bhakti* is the only path that actually leads to self-realization, because it is completely non-dual. The practices of all other forms of *yoga* change upon attainment of liberation. The *haṭha-yogī* develops mystic powers; the *karma-yogī* becomes a renunciant; the *jñāna-yogī* becomes an *avadhuta*. But the *bhakta* just keeps on doing *bhakti-yoga* eternally, in this world and the next, in heaven or hell, in *saṁsāra* or in Vaikuṇṭha. In other words, the practices of devotional service are performed in the context of an exalted transcendental ontological conception. Because this conception is transcendental, it is eternal and changeless. The practices of *bhakti*, such as chanting the Holy Name of the Lord, are both the *sādhana* [practice] and the *sādhya* [object of realization], and thus are complete, eternal and transcendental. One has to experience this to fully appreciate it.

When the mind is unified and one-pointed, such *samādhi* opens the door to connection with God. If our ontological platform is going to change, then we have not yet attained the Absolute Truth: only that which is true at all levels of form regardless of time, person, place, condition or state is the real Absolute Truth. Realization of this truth is the real goal of *Vedānta* and all the Vedic literature, and this is possible only through the non-dual methods of *bhakti-yoga*.

In the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* [3.7.22] it is said:

> *yo vijñāne tiṣṭhan*
>
> "The individual spirit soul is situated in knowledge."

In another passage it is said:

> *sukham aham asvapsaṁ na kiñcid avediṣi*
>
> "I slept happily. I did not know anything."

Saṁśaya [doubt]: Is the individual spirit soul unalloyed knowledge only, or is the soul the knower that experiences knowledge?

Pūrvapakṣa [the opponent speaks]: The individual spirit soul consists of knowledge only. This is confirmed by the statement of *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* [3.7.22]: "The individual spirit soul is situated in knowledge." The soul is not the knower or the perceiver of knowledge. The intelligence is the knower. Therefore the statement "I slept happily; I did not know anything," is spoken by the intelligence, not by the soul.

Siddhānta [conclusion]: The author of the *sūtras* gives the following conclusion.

Sūtra 2.3.17

jño 'ta eva

jñaḥ – knower; *ataḥ eva* – therefore.

Therefore he is the knower.

The individual spirit soul is both knowledge and knower. In the *Praśna Upaniṣad* [4.9] it is said:

eṣa hi draṣṭā spraṣṭā śrotā rasayitā ghrātā mantā boddhā kartā vijñānātmā puruṣaḥ

"The individual spirit soul is the seer, the toucher, the hearer, the taster, the smeller, the thinker, the determiner, the doer, and the knower."

This truth is accepted because it is declared by scripture, not because it is understood by logic. Our acceptance of the truth of scripture is described in *Sūtra* 2.1.27:

śrutes tu śabda-mūlatvāt

"The statements of *Śruti-śāstra* are the root of real knowledge."

In the *Smṛti-śāstra* it is said:

jñātā jñāna-svarūpo 'yam

"The individual spirit soul is both knower and knowledge."

Therefore the individual spirit soul is not knowledge alone without being anything else, and this is not at all proved by the statement, "I slept happily. I did not know anything," for such an idea would contradict these scripture statements that affirm the soul to be the knower. Therefore it is concluded that the individual spirit soul is both knowledge and knower. Of course, such a conclusion is beyond the limitations of Aristotelian logic; but Aristotelian logic is based on the properties of material objects, and the soul is a transcendental object, so he is not subject to the same limitations.

Adhikaraṇa 12: The Individual Spirit Souls are Atomic

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: Now the author of the *sūtras* considers the size of the individual spirit souls.

keśāgra-śata-bhāgasya śatāṁśa-sadṛśātmakaḥ
jivaḥ sūkṣma-svarūpo 'yaṁ saṅkhyātīto hi cit-kaṇaḥ

"If we divide the tip of a hair into a hundred parts and then take one of these parts and divide it again into a hundred parts, that very fine division is the size of but one of the numberless living entities. They are all *cit-kaṇa*, particles of spirit, not matter."

This is quoted from the commentary on the portion of *Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* wherein the *Vedas* personified offer their obeisances unto the Supreme Personality of Godhead. The *jīva* or living entity is an atomic particle of spirit, in exactly the same way as a photon is an atomic particle of light. In the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* [3.1.9] it is said:

eṣo 'ṇur ātmā cetasā veditavyo yasmin prāṇaḥ pañcadhā samviveśa

"When the life-breath withdraws from the five activities, the mind can understand the atomic soul."

As long as our life energy is engaged with the senses, even though we may know intellectually that we are a spirit soul, the tendency to identify with the material body persists. When the life energy is withdrawn from the senses and sense objects and remains focused on the soul or consciousness itself, then the actual nature of the soul is revealed.

Saṁśaya [doubt]: Is the individual spirit soul atomic or all-pervading?

Pūrvapakṣa [the opponent speaks]: The individual spirit soul is all-pervading. *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* [4.4.14] declares that the soul is *mahān* [great]. The statement that the soul is atomic is merely a poetic metaphor.

Siddhānta [conclusion]: The author of the *sūtras* gives the conclusion in the following words.

Sūtra 2.3.18

utkrānti-gaty-āgatīnām

utkrānti – departure; *gati* – travel; *āgatīnām* – and of return

Because of departure, travel and return.

In this *sūtra* the word *aṇuḥ* [the atomic soul] should be understood from the previous *sūtra*. In this *sūtra* the genitive case is used in the sense of the ablative. The individual spirit soul is atomic and not all-pervading. Why is that? The *sūtra* explains: "Because of departure, travel and return."

In the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* [4.4.2] it is said:

> *tasya haitasya hṛdayasyāgraṁ pradyotate. Tena pradyotenaiṣa ātmā niṣkrāmati cakṣuṣo vā mūrdhno vānyebhyo vā śarīra-deśebhyaḥ*
>
> "The soul shines in the heart. At the moment of death the effulgent soul leaves through the opening of the eyes, the opening at the top of the the head, or another opening in the body."

In the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* [4.4.11] it is said:

> *anandā nāma te lokā*
> *andhena tamasāvṛtāḥ*
> *tāṁs te pretyābhigacchanti*
> *avidvāṁso 'budhā janāḥ*
>
> "Sinful fools enter into planets known as the worlds of torment, full of darkness and ignorance."

In the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* [4.4.6] it is said:

> *prāpyāntaṁ karmaṇas tasya*
> *yat kiñcedam karoty ayam*
> *tasmāt lokāt punar etya*
> *yasmai lokāya karmaṇe*
>
> "At the time of death the soul reaps the results of his works. He goes to the world where he deserves to go. When the results of his past deeds are exhausted, again he returns to the middle planets, the world of *karma*."

In this way the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* describes the soul's travel from one place to another. If he were all-pervading, the soul would not be able to travel from one place to another, for he would already be everywhere.

In *Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* [10.87.30] it is said:

> *aparimitā dhruvās tanu-bhṛto yadi sarva-gatās*
> *tarhi na śāsyateti niyamo dhruva netarathā*
>
> "O Lord, although the living entities who have accepted material bodies are spiritual and unlimited in number, if they were all-pervading there would be no question of their being under Your control."

However, the Supreme Personality of Godhead, although all-pervading, can travel from place to place. This is possible because He possesses inconceivable powers.

Here someone may object: "The individual spirit soul can be all-pervading and unmoving, and still, because he mistakenly identifies with the external material body, he imagines that he goes and comes. He is like the ruler of a village who never really leaves his realm."

To this the reply is given: Because it is said that he both departs and returns it is not possible that the soul is actually stationary and unmoving. The author of the *sūtras* confirms this in the following words.

Sūtra 2.3.19

> *svātmanaś cottarayoḥ*
>
> *sva* – own; *ātmanaḥ* – of the soul; *ca* – and; *uttarayoḥ* - of the latter two.
>
> **Also because the last two refer to the soul.**

The word *ca* [also] is used here for emphasis. Here the word *uttarayoḥ* [the last two] means "of the coming and going." The coming and going here definitely occur to the individual spirit soul. This is so because the coming and going in the pervious *sūtra* clearly refer to an agent, to the performer of the action. The coming and going here are understood to be coming and going from a material body. This is clearly seen in the first passage of *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* [4.4.2] quoted in the previous purport. It is also seen in the following words of *Bhagavad-gītā* [15.8]:

> *śarīraṁ yad avāpnoti*
> *yac cāpy utkrāmatīśvaraḥ*
> *gṛhītvaitani samyāti*
> *vāyur gandhān ivāśayāt*
>
> "The living entity in the material world carries his different conceptions of life from one body to another as the air carries aromas. Thus he takes one kind of body and again quits it to take another."

If someone says that the soul actually never goes anywhere, although it seems to go places because of the misidentification of the external material body as the self, then I say this is a foolish idea. In the following words the *Kauśitakī Upaniṣad* refutes this idea:

> *sa yadāsmāt śarīrāt samutkrāmati sahaivaitaiḥ sarvair utkrāmati*
>
> "At the time of death the soul, accompanied by all his powers, leaves the material body."

The word *saha* [accompanied by] is used when the more important is accompanied by another of lesser importance. An example is the sentence: "The father took his meal, accompanied by [*saha*] his son." In this way the foolish example pushed forward by the impersonalists, the example of the air in the jar and in the sky, is clearly refuted.

Sūtra 2.3.20

nāṇur atac chruter iti cen netarādhikārāt

na – not; *aṇuḥ* – atom; *atat* – not that; *śruteḥ* - from the scriptures; *iti* – thus; *cet* – is; *na* – not; *itara* – other; *adhikārāt* – because of being appropriate.

If it is claimed that the *Śruti-śāstra* denies the idea that the soul is atomic, then I reply that it is not so, because those descriptions apply to someone else.

Here someone may object: "Is it not so that that the individual spirit soul is not atomic? After all, the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* [4.4.22] affirms:

sa vā eṣa mahā-jana ātmā

"The soul is very great."

After all, to be great in size is the very opposite of being atomic."

If someone claims this, then the *sūtra* replies: "No. It is not so." Why not? The *sūtra* explains, *itara:* "Because these descriptions apply to someone else." These words are descriptions of the Supreme Personality of Godhead, the all-pervading Supersoul. In the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* [4.3.7] it is said:

yo 'yam vijñānamayaḥ prāṇeṣu

"He is full of knowledge. He stays among the life-airs."

Although this passage begins by describing the individual spirit soul, it proceeds with a description of the Supreme Personality of Godhead, as is seen in a following passage [*Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4.3.13]:

yasyānuvittaḥ pratibuddha ātmā

"He is the Self who knows everything."

These words clearly describe the Supreme Personality of Godhead and not the individual spirit soul.

Sūtra 2.3.21

sva-śabdonmānābhyāṁ ca

sva – own; *śabda* – word; *unmānābhyām* – with measure;*ca* – and.

Because of its word and measurement.

The word *sva-śabda* [the word describing it] here means that the word 'atomic' is used to describe the individual spirit soul. An example of this is in *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* [2.1.9]:

eṣo 'ṇur ātmā

"The soul is atomic in size."

The word *unmāna* here means "Its measurement is atomic in size." The precise measurement of the individual spirit soul is given in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* [4.9]:

bālāgra-śata-bhāgasya
śatadhā kalpitasya ca
bhāgo jīvaḥ sa vijñeyaḥ
sa cāntantyāya kalpate

"When the upper point of a hair is divided into one hundred parts and again each of these parts is further divided into one hundred parts, each such part is the measurement of the dimension of the spirit soul."

In these two ways the atomic size of the soul is proved. The word *ānantya* here means "liberation." *Anta* means "death," and *an* means "without." Therefore the word *ānantya* means "the condition of being free from death".

Here someone may object: "Is it not so that if it is atomic in size and situated in a specific place in the material body, the soul could not perceive sensations in all other parts of the body, where the soul is not actually present?"

If this is said, then the author of the *sūtras* replies in the following words.

Sūtra 2.3.22

avirodhaś candana-vat

avirodhaḥ – not contradicting; *candana* – sandal; *vat* – like

It does not contradict; it is like sandal paste.

As a drop of sandal paste placed on one part of the body brings a pleasant sensation to the body as a whole, so the soul, although situated in one place, perceives what happens in the entire body. Therefore, there is no contradiction. In the *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa* it is said:

aṇu-mātro 'py ayaṁ jīvaḥ
sva-dehaṁ vyāpya tiṣṭhati
yathā vyāpya śarīrāṇi
haricandana-vipruṣaḥ

"As the sensation created by a drop of sandal paste pervades the entire body, so the individual spirit soul, although atomic in size, is conscious of what happens in the entire body."

Sūtra 2.3.23

avasthiti-vaiśeṣyād iti cen nābhyupagamād dhṛdi hi

avasthiti – abode; *vaiśeṣyāt* – because of being specific; *iti* – thus; *cet* – if; *na* – not; *abhyupagamāt* – because of acceptance; *hṛdi* – in the heart; *hi* – certainly.

If it is denied because it has no specific abode, then I say no, because it resides in the heart.

Here someone may object: "Is it not so that the drop of sandal paste has a single, clearly visible, place where it resides on the body but the soul has no such single residence in the body? There is no reason to make guesses about the location of the soul in the body. The soul is clearly present everywhere in the body, just as the element ether is present everywhere. Therefore the sandal-paste example is clumsy and wrong."

If this objection is raised, then the author of the *sūtras* replies: "No. It is not so." Why not? The *sūtra* explains, "Because it resides in the heart." This means that the soul really does reside in a single place in the material body. The soul resides in the heart. This is confirmed in the following words of *Praśna Upaniṣad* [3.6]:

> *hṛdi hy eṣa ātmā*
>
> "The soul resides in the heart."

In the final conclusion the spirit soul, although atomic in size is, in one sense, all-pervading throughout the entire material body. This is explained in the following *sūtra*.

Sūtra 2.3.24

> *guṇād vālokavat*
>
> *guṇāt* – by quality; *vā* – or; *āloka* – light; *vat* – like.
>
> **By quality or like light.**

Although the soul is atomic in size, it pervades the body by the quality of consciousness. Like light it pervades the entire body. As the sun, although situated in one place, fills the universe with light, so the soul fills the body with consciousness. The Supreme Personality of Godhead Himself declares this in *Bhagavad-gītā* [13.34]:

> *yathā prakāśayaty ekaḥ*
> *kṛtsnaṁ lokam imaṁ raviḥ*
> *kṣetraṁ kṣetrī tathā kṛtsnaṁ*
> *prakāśayati bhārata*
>
> "O son of Bharata, as the sun alone illuminates all this universe, so does the living entity, one within the body, illuminate the entire body by consciousness."

When the sun emanates sunlight it does not lose any atoms from its mass, nor does it become diminished in any way. Rubies and other jewels also emanate light without losing atoms from their mass or becoming diminished in any way. It is not possible to say that when light is emanated from them these things become diminished in size. The light they emanate is their quality, not their mass.

The quality can function in a plane apart from the substance that possesses it. The author of the *sūtras* explains this in the following example.

Sūtra 2.3.25

> *vyatireko gandhavat tathā hi darśayati*

vyatirekaḥ – difference; *gandha* – fragrance; *vat* – like;*tathā* – so; *hi* – indeed; *darśayati* – shows.

As a fragrance is in a different place, so it [the soul] is also in a different place. This the scripture shows.

As the fragrance of flowers or other objects may travel to a place far from its source, so the consciousness that emanates from the soul may travel from the heart and enter the head, feet, or other parts of the body. The *Kauśitaki Upaniṣad* [3.6] explains:

prajñayā śarīraṁ samāruhya

"The soul is all-pervading in the material body by consciousness."

Even though the fragrance may travel very far it is never actually separated from its source, just as the light of a jewel is also not separated from its source. In the *Smṛti-śāstra* it is said:

upalabhyāpsu ced gandhaṁ
kecid brūyur anaipuṇāḥ
pṛthivyām eva tam vidyād
apo vāyuṁ ca saṁśritam

"They who do not understand may sometimes say that fragrance is present in water. Earth is the natural home of fragrance, although it may sometimes take shelter of water or air."

In the *Praśna Upaniṣad* [4.9] it is said:

eṣa hi dṛṣṭā

"The soul is the person who sees."

Someone may doubt: "Is the consciousness that the soul possesses eternal or not? The soul is by nature unconscious. It is like a stone. Consciousness only arises when the soul comes in contact with the mind. This is seen in the scriptures' statement: 'I slept happily; I was not conscious of anything.' This statement shows that consciousness is not an inherent quality of the soul but rather is attained by contact with something else. It is like iron and fire. When placed in fire, an iron rod gradually assumes the qualities of fire. If it were an inherent quality of the soul, then consciousness would not be lost in deep sleep."

The author of the *sūtras* gives the conclusion in the following words .

Sūtra 2.3.26

pṛthag-upadeśāt

pṛthak – separate; *upadeśāt* – because of the teaching.

Because there is a specific teaching.

The soul is eternally conscious. How is that known? The *sūtra* explains. "Because there is a specific teaching." Some examples of that teaching follow.

In the *Praśna Upaniṣad* [4.9] it is said:

eṣa hi dṛṣṭā

"The soul sees eternally."

In the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* [4.5.14] it is said:

avināśī vā are ayam ātmānucitti-dharmā

"The soul's consciousness is never destroyed."

The soul does not become conscious merely by contact with the mind, for soul and mind are both indivisible and cannot interact. Turning away from the Supreme Personality of Godhead, the soul obscures its natural spiritual knowledge. Turning towards the Supreme Personality of Godhead, the soul revives its natural spiritual consciousness. This is described in the *Smṛti-śāstra:*

yathā na kriyate jyotsnā
mala-prakṣālanān maṇeḥ
doṣa-prahāṇān na jñānam
ātmanah kriyate tathā

"As by washing away the dirt that covered a jewel, the jewel's splendor is not created but merely uncovered, so by removing the dirt of materialism that covered the soul, the soul's splendor is not created, but merely uncovered.

yathodapāna-khananāt
kriyate na jalāntaram
sad eva niyate vyaktim
asataḥ sambhavaḥ kutaḥ

"As by digging a well, water is brought forth but not created, so by spiritual activities the nature of the soul is brought forth but not created. How would it be possible to create the the soul's qualities from nothing?

tathā heya-guṇa-dhvaṁsād
avarodhādayo guṇāḥ
prakāśyante na jānyante
nitya evātmano hi te

"When material faults are destroyed, the soul's qualities become revealed. The soul's qualities are eternal. They are never created."

Here someone may object: "These quotes from scripture merely show that the soul is synonymous with consciousness. They do not prove that the soul itself is conscious."

To this objection the author of the *sūtras* replies in the following words.

Sūtra 2.3.27

tad-guṇa-sāratvāt tad vyapadeśaḥ prājña-vat

tat – of that; *guṇa* – quality; *sāratvāt* – because of being the essence; *tat* – that; *vyapadeśaḥ* – designation;*prājña* – intelligent; *vat* – like.

It is called that because that is its essential nature, just as He who is intelligent.

Because the soul is consciousness itself, therefore it is conscious. Why is that? The *sūtra* explains: "It is called that because that is its essential nature."

In this *sūtra* the word *guṇa* [quality] refers to the soul's quality of consciousness. The word *sāra* means "the essential nature of the thing, the absence of which makes the thing non-existent." The word *prājña-vat* means "Like Lord Viṣṇu, who is known as *prājña* [all-knowing] because He is all knowledge.

Because He is all knowledge personified, Lord Viṣṇu is said to know everything. In the same way, because the soul is consciousness personified, therefore the soul is conscious. That the statement "The soul is consciousness personified," means the same thing as "The soul is conscious," is also confirmed in the next *sūtra*.

Sūtra 2.3.28

yāvad ātma-bhāvitvāc ca na doṣas tad-darśanāt

yāvat – as long as; *ātma* – of the soul; *bhāvitvāt* – because of existence; *ca* – and; *na* – not; *doṣaḥ* – fault; *tat* – ofthat; *darśanāt* – because of the sight.

It exists as long as the soul exists. There is no fault in this, because it is clearly seen.

There is no fault in saying that the two sentences "The soul is consciousness," and "The soul is conscious," mean the same thing. That is the meaning here. Why is that? The *sūtra* explains: "It exists as long as the soul exists. There is no fault in this, because it is clearly seen." The soul's consciousness exists for as long as the soul exists.

As long as the soul exists, the soul's consciousness will not be destroyed. The soul exists eternally, without a beginning or end in time, and the soul's consciousness also exists eternally. The sun may be given here as an example. The sun is both light and the bringer of light. As long as the sun exists it will have these two features, which are actually not different. In the same way the soul is both consciousness and conscious.

Here someone may object: "Is it not true that consciousness is born from the modes of material nature? Is it not true that, because it does not exist in the state of dreamless sleep, consciousness is not eternal? Is it not true that even when the living entity is fully awake his consciousness is in fact created by a barrage of various sense-objects?"

If these objections are raised, the author of the *sūtras* replies in the following words.

Sūtra 2.3.29

puṁstvādi-vat tv asya sato 'bhivyakti-yogāt

puṁstva – virility; *ādi* – beginning with; *vat* – like;*tu* – but; *asya* – of him; *sataḥ* – of the existing; *abhivyakti-yogāt* – because of manifestation.

But like virility and other things it exists and then is manifest.

The word *tu* [but] is used here to dispel doubt. The word *na* [it is not like that] is understood in this *sūtra*. It is not true than consciousness is non-existent in dreamless sleep and only exists in the waking

state. Why is that? The *sūtra* explains: "But like virility and other things it exists and then is manifest." In the state of dreamless sleep the soul's consciousness exists in a dormant state, and in the state of wakefulness that dormant consciousness becomes fully manifested. Here the *sūtra* gives the example of virility. In childhood virility and other qualities associated with it exist in a dormant state. Then, at the beginning of adulthood, they become manifested. In the same way consciousness is dormant in dreamless sleep and fully manifested in the waking state. This is described in the following words of *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* [4.3.30]:

> *yad vai tan na vijānāti vijānan vaitad vijñeyam na vijānāti na hi vijnātur vijñānāt viparilopo vidyate avināśitvān na tu tad dvitīyam asti tato 'nyad vibhaktaṁ yad vijānīyāt*
>
> "In the state of dreamless sleep the soul is both conscious and unconscious. The soul is always conscious, and consciousness can never be separated from it, because the soul and its consciousness can never be destroyed. Still, in the state of dreamless sleep no object is presented before the soul for it to be conscious of."

When there is no object for consciousness to perceive, then consciousness is dormant. Therefore in dreamless sleep consciousness is dormant. When the senses contact the sense objects, then consciousness becomes manifested. Had it not existed in a dormant state during dreamless sleep, consciousness could not have manifested itself in the waking state, just as a person born a eunuch cannot manifest virility at the beginning of adulthood. In this way it is proved that the individual spirit soul is atomic, is consciousness, and is conscious eternally.

Now the author of the *sūtras* refutes the theory of the Saṅkhya philosophers. "Is the individual spirit soul consciousness and nothing else? Is the individual spirit soul all-pervading? The individual spirit soul is all-pervading. This is so because the results of its actions are seen everywhere. Had it been atomic, the soul would be unable to perceive the pains and pleasures present in different parts of the body. Had it been of a medium size, the soul would not be eternal. Therefore the individual spirit soul must be all-pervading."

In the following words the author of the *sūtras* gives the proper conclusion.

Sūtra 2.3.30

> *nityopalabdhy-anupalabdhi-prasaṅgo 'nyatara-niyamo vānyathā*
>
> *nitya* – eternal; *upalabdhi* – perceptionl; *anupalabdhi* – non- perception; *prasaṅgaḥ* – result; *anyatara* – otherwise; *niyamaḥ* – restriction; *vā* – or; *anyathā* – otherwise.
>
> **Otherwise there would be eternal consciousness, eternal unconsciousness, or the limited existence of one or the other.**

If the soul were only consciousness and nothing else, and if it were all-pervading, then the soul would be either always conscious or always unconscious. Either that, or there would be a limited existence of one or the other. This is the meaning: It is clear to the entire world that consciousness and unconsciousness both exist. If the cause of this were a soul that is consciousness only and also all-pervading, then consciousness and unconsciousness would both be perceived simultaneously at every moment by the entire world. If this all-pervading soul were the cause of consciousness only and not unconsciousness, then no one would ever be unconscious, and if this all-pervading soul were the cause of unconsciousness only and not consciousness, then no one would ever be conscious.

It cannot be said that consciousness is created by contact with the senses and unconsciousness is created when there is no contact with the senses, because if the soul is all-pervading then it would be always in contact with the senses. Furthermore, if the individual spirit soul were all-pervading then everyone would simultaneously experience the pains and pleasures of everyone else. If this were so there would be no meaning to individual experience, individual desire or individual destiny. This effectively refutes the theory that the individual spirit soul is all-pervading.

However, our theory, which affirms that the spirit soul is atomic in size and different in each material body, is not refuted by these considerations. Although atomic in size, the individual spirit soul can act in any place, although it cannot act in every place simultaneously. By its quality of consciousness the individual spirit soul can pervade its material body and perceive the happiness and other sensations present in the various parts of the material body.

Adhikaraṇa 13: The Individual Spirit Soul Performs Actions

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: Now the author of the *sūtras* will consider another point. Modern science and other atheistic philosophies consider that material nature is the cause of all actions. They say that the combination and reactions of aggregates of atoms under the laws of material nature are the cause of everything. But we have already proven that matter cannot act without the initiative and superintendence of spirit. Thus the actual causes of all actions are the Supreme Personality of Godhead and the individual spirit soul.

In the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* [2.5.1] it is said:

> *vijñānaṁ yajñaṁ tanute. karmāṇi tanute 'pi ca.*
>
> "Consciousness performs *yajñas;* consciousness performs actions."

Saṁśaya [doubt]: Does the individual soul, indicated in this passage by the word "consciousness," perform actions or not?

Pūrvapakṣa [the opponent speaks]: In the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* [2.18] it is said:

> *hantā cen manyate hantuṁ*
> *hataś cen manyate hatam*
> *ubhau tau na vijānītau*
> *nāyaṁ hanti na hanyate*
>
> "Neither he who thinks the living entity the slayer nor he who thinks it slain is in knowledge, for the self slays not nor is slain."

These words clearly declare that the individual spirit soul never performs actions. In the *Bhagavad-gītā* [3.27] it is said:

> *prakṛteḥ kriyamāṇāni*
> *guṇaiḥ karmāṇi sarvaśaḥ*
> *ahaṅkāra-vimūḍhātmā*
> *kartāham iti manyate*
>
> "The spirit soul bewildered by the influence of false ego thinks himself the doer of activities that are in actuality carried out by the three modes of material nature."

In the *Bhagavad-gītā* [13.21] it is also said:

kārya-kāraṇa-kartṛtve
hatuḥ prakṛtir ucyate
puruṣaḥ sukha-duḥkhānāṁ
bhoktṛtve hetur ucyate

"Nature is said to be the cause of all material causes and effects, whereas the living entity is the cause of the various sufferings and enjoyments in this world."

Therefore the individual spirit soul does not perform actions. When a person understands the truth he understands that all actions are actually performed by the material energy, and the individual spirit soul is merely the person who experiences the fruits of action.

Siddhānta [conclusion]: In the following words the author of the *sūtras* gives the proper conclusion.

Sūtra 2.3.31

kartā śāstrārthavat-tvāt

kartā – the doer; *śāstra* – of the scriptures;*ārtha* – meaning; *vat* – possessing; *tvāt* – because of having the nature.

He performs actions. This is so because the scriptures are meaningful.

It is the individual spirit soul who performs actions, not the modes of material nature. Why is that? The *sūtra* explains: "Because the scriptures are meaningful." In the scriptures it is said:

svarga-kāmo yajeta

"A person who desires Svargaloka should perform *yajñas*."

and

ātmānam eva lokam upāsīta

"One should worship the Supreme Personality of Godhead."

These statements have meaning only if the individual spirit soul does actually perform actions. If all actions are performed by the modes of nature and the individual spirit soul never does anything, these statements of the scriptures are meaningless.

These statements of scripture are intended to motivate the individual spirit soul to act in a certain way so he can enjoy the results of his actions. It is not even possible in this way to try to motivate the inert material modes to act in any way at all.

That the individual spirit soul does actually perform actions is also confirmed in the next *sūtra*.

Sūtra 2.3.32

vihāropadeśāt

vihāra – of pastimes; *upadeśāt* – because of the teaching.

Because of the teaching about pastimes.

The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* [8.12.3] describes the activities of the liberated souls:

sa tatra paryeti jakṣan krīḍan ramamāṇaḥ

"In the spiritual world the individual spirit soul eats, plays, and enjoys."

Therefore action by itself does not brings pain and unhappiness to the soul, rather it is the bondage of the three modes of nature that brings unhappiness. This is so because the three modes of nature obscure the reality of the soul's spiritual nature.

Sūtra 2.3.33

upādānāt

upādānāt – because of taking.

Because of taking.

In the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* [2.1.18] it is said:

sa yathā mahā-rājaḥ . . . evam evaiṣa etān prāṇān
gṛhītvā sve śarīre yathā-kāmaṁ parivartate

"In the dreaming state the individual spirit soul acts like a king. The soul grasps the life-airs and does as he wishes."

In the *Bhagavad-gītā* [15.8] it is also said:

gṛhītvaitāni samyāti
vāyur gandhān ivāśayāt

"The living entity in the material world carries his different conceptions of life from one body to another as the air carries aromas. Thus he takes one kind of body and again quits it to take another."

In these passages it is seen that the individual spirit soul does perform actions, for the soul moves the life-airs as a magnet moves iron. The life-airs may move many things, but it is the individual spirit soul who moves the life-airs. Nothing else moves them.

In the following words the author of the *sūtras* now gives another reason.

Sūtra 2.3.34

vyapadeśāc ca kriyāyāṁ na cen nirdeśa-viparyayaḥ

vyapadeśāt – because of designation; *ca* – and; *kriyāyām* – in action; *na* – not; *cet* – if; *nirdeśa* – grammatical construction; *viparyayaḥ* – different.

Also because of the name in the action. If this were not so the grammatical structure would be different.

In the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* [2.5.1] it is said:

vijñānaṁ yajñaṁ tanute. karmāṇi tanute 'pi ca.

"Consciousness performs *yajñas;* consciousness performs actions."

These words clearly show that the individual spirit soul is the primary performer of Vedic and ordinary actions. If the word *vijñānam* is interpreted to mean not the individual spirit soul, but the intelligence, then the grammatical structure of the sentence would be different. Then the word *vijñāna* would be in the instrumental case, for the intelligence would be the instrument by which the action is performed. However, the word is not in the instrumental case. If the intelligence were the performer of the action here, then another word must be given in the instrumental case to show with what instrument the intelligence performs the action, for there must be an instrument in every action. However, if the individual spirit soul is the performer of the action there is not need for another word in the instrumental case to show the instrument used, for in that situation the individual spirit soul is both the performer of the action and the instrument employed.

Here someone may object: "Is it not so that the individual spirit soul, being independent and able to act as he likes, will naturally act for his own welfare and will not perform actions that bring him harm?"

To this I reply: No. It is not like that. The individual spirit soul desires to benefit himself, but because his past *karma* acts against him, he sometimes creates his own misfortune.

For these reasons it is clear that the individual spirit soul certainly performs actions. When the scriptures sometimes say that the individual spirit soul does not perform actions, the meaning is that the soul is not independent and free to do exactly everything he wishes.

Here someone may object: "It is not possible that the individual spirit soul is the performer of actions, for it is clearly seen that these actions often bring him suffering."

To this I reply: No. It is not so. If the individual spirit soul is not the performer of actions, then the scriptural descriptions of the *agnihotra, darśa*, *paurṇamāsa*, and other *yajñas* would not make any sense.

In the following words the author of the *sūtras* refutes the idea that material nature is the real performer of actions.

Sūtra 2.3.35

uplabdhi-vad aniyamaḥ

uplabdhi – consciousness; *vat* – like; *aniyamaḥ* – uncertainty.

As in the situation of consciousness, it would be indefinite.

In previous *sūtras* it was shown that if the individual spirit soul were all-pervading, then consciousness would be vague and indefinite. In the same way if all-pervading material nature were the sole performer of all actions, then all actions would bring the same result to all spirit souls simultaneously. Clearly this is not so. Also, it could not be said that the individual spirit soul would need to be near the place where a certain action was performed in order to experience the result of that action. The Saṅkhya philosophers cannot say this, for in their theory each individual spirit soul is all-pervading and is thus already near the places where all actions are performed.

Sūtra 2.3.36

śakti-viparyayāt

śakti – of power; *viparyayāt* – because of difference.

Because the power is changed.

If the material nature is the performer of actions, then material nature must also experience the good and bad results of those actions. However, the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* [1.8] affirms:

bhoktṛ-bhāvāt

"The individual spirit soul enjoys the good and bad results of actions."

In this way the idea that the material nature is the performer of actions is refuted. Because the individual spirit soul enjoys the good and bad results of actions, the individual spirit soul must also be the performer of those actions.

Sūtra 2.3.37

samādhy-abhāvāc ca

samādhi – of liberation; *abhāvāt* – because of the nonexistence; *ca* – also.

Also because there is no liberation.

Actions are meant to bring one to liberation from the material world. Because it is not possible for the material nature to act in such a way and attain such a goal, the idea that the material nature is the performer of actions cannot be entertained. Liberation means understanding the truth "I am different from matter." It is not possible for the material nature to come to this understanding because it is unconscious, and also because it really is matter. In this way it is proved that the individual spirit soul is the performer of actions.

Adhikaraṇa 14: Activity is the Soul's Nature

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: The soul is always active, as shown by the following *śloka:*

na hi kaścit kṣaṇam api
jātu tiṣṭhaty akarma-kṛt
kāryate hy avaśaḥ karma
sarvaḥ prakṛti-jair guṇaiḥ

"All men are forced to act helplessly according to the impulses born of the modes of material nature; therefore no one can refrain from doing something, not even for a moment." [*Bhagavad-gītā* 3.5]

Saṁśaya [doubt]: Are the spirit souls always engaged in action? Is there no time when they become free from activity?

Pūrvapakṣa [the opponent speaks]: The soul may become free from activity during deep sleep, or at the time of liberation. Or maybe all these activities are performed by material nature, and the soul actually does nothing at all.

Siddhānta [conclusion]: In the following words the author of the *sūtras* gives an example to show that the individual spirit soul performs actions, using either its own potency or some other instrument to perform them.

Sūtra 2.3.38

yathā ca takṣobhayathā

yathā – as; *ca* – and; *takṣa* – carpenter; *ubhayathā* – in both ways.

In both ways like a carpenter.

As a carpenter performs actions, employing both his own power and a host of tools, so does the individual spirit soul, employing both his own power and the various life airs. Thus the soul employs the material body, and other instruments also, to perform actions. It is the pure spirit soul who thus uses the modes of material nature to perform actions. That is why the scriptures sometimes say that the modes of material nature are the performer of actions.

That the individual spirit soul is indeed the performer of actions is confirmed in *Bhagavad-gītā* [13.22], where it is said:

kāraṇaṁ guna-saṅgo 'sya
sad-asad-yoṇi-janmasu

"The living entity in material nature thus follows the ways of life, enjoying the three modes of nature. Thus he meets with good and evil among the various species."

These words explain the scripture passages that declare the modes of nature to be the performers of action. It is foolish for a person to think himself the sole performer of action and ignore the five factors of action. Of course it is not that the individual spirit soul never performs any action. The idea that the soul never does anything is clearly refuted by the many scriptural statements urging the soul to act such a way that he may attain liberation. When in the *Bhagavad-gītā* [2.19] the Lord says:

nāyaṁ hanti na hanyate

"The self slays not nor is slain."

that does not mean that the individual spirit soul never performs any action, but rather that the eternal spirit soul can never be cut or slain. The meaning of the statement that the soul never acts has thus already been explained.

The devotees perform various actions of devotional service to the Lord, in both this life and the next. Because these actions are free from the touch of the modes of nature, because they are under the jurisdiction of the Lord's spiritual potency and because they lead to liberation, these actions are said not to be action, for they are not material actions. This is explained by the Supreme Lord Himself in these words:

sāttvikaḥ kārako 'saṅgī
rāgāndho rājasaḥ smṛtaḥ
tāmasaḥ smṛti-vibhraṣṭo
nirguṇo mad-apāśrayaḥ

> "One who acts without attachment is in the mode of goodness. One who is blinded with desire is in the mode of passion. One whose intelligence is broken is in the mode of ignorance. One who takes shelter of Me is free from the grip of the modes of nature." [*Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* 11.25.26]

That the pure spirit soul experiences the results of his actions is described in *Bhagavad-gītā* [13.21]:

> *puruṣaḥ sukha-duḥkhānāṁ*
> *bhoktṛtve hetur ucyate*
>
> "The living entity is the cause of the various sufferings and enjoyments in this world."

The soul experiences the results of his actions, because he is by nature conscious; the modes of nature do not experience them. This refutes the idea that the modes are active and the soul is not. In this way it is proved that it is the conscious soul who experiences happiness and other sensations. In this way the individual spirit soul brings knowledge to himself and others. Both kinds of action, direct and through the use of tools, exist for the soul. In the *Praśna Upaniṣad* [4.9] it is said:

> *eṣa hi draṣṭā spraṣṭā śrotā*
>
> "It is the soul who sees, touches, and hears."

Thus, by this example of the carpenter, the idea that the individual spirit soul is the only factor in action, and there are no others, is clearly refuted.

Adhikaraṇa 15: The Individual Spirit Soul is Dependent on the Supreme Personality of Godhead

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: Now another doubt is considered. In *Bhagavad-gītā* [18.14] Lord Kṛṣṇa tells Arjuna,

> *adhiṣṭhānaṁ tathā kartā*
> *karaṇaṁ ca pṛthag-vidham*
> *vividhāś ca pṛthak ceṣṭā*
> *daivaṁ caivātra pañcamam*
>
> "The place of action [the body], the performer, the various senses, the many different kinds of endeavor, and ultimately the Supersoul—these are the five factors of action."

Although the individual soul certainly performs actions and experiences their results, he is ultimately dependent on the Supersoul for his ability to act. He cannot act independently.

Saṁśaya [doubt]: Is the individual spirit soul independent in his actions, or does he depend on another?

Pūrvapakṣa [the opponent speaks]: The scriptures say:

> *svarga-kāmo yajeta*
>
> "One who desires Svargaloka should perform *yajñas*."

and

> *tasmād brāhmaṇaḥ surāṁ na pibet pāpmanotsaṁsṛja*
>
> "A *brāhmaṇa* should not drink liquor and should not commit sins."

That the scriptures give orders and prohibitions for the soul to follow is proof that the soul is independent, for independence means to have the power to do one thing and to refrain from doing another.

Siddhānta [conclusion]: In the following words the author of the *sūtras* gives his conclusion.

Sūtra 2.3.39

parāt tu tac-chruteḥ

parāt – from the Supreme; *tu* – but; *tat* – of that; *śruteḥ* – from the scriptures.

But from the Supreme, because of the scriptures.

The word *tu* [but] is used to remove doubt. The Supreme Personality of Godhead inspires the individual spirit soul to act. How is that known? The *sūtra* explains, *tac-chruteḥ:* "It is known from the scriptures." The scriptures give the following explanations:

antaḥ praviṣṭaḥ śāstā janānām

"Entering their hearts, the Supreme Personality of Godhead controls all living entities."

ya ātmani tiṣṭhann ātmānam antaro yamayati

"Entering their hearts, the Supreme Personality of Godhead controls all living entities."

eṣa eva sādhu karma kārayati

"The Lord engages the living entity in pious activities so he may be elevated."

Here someone may object: "So be it. However, if the Supreme Personality of Godhead is the actual performer of actions, then the orders and prohibitions of the scriptures are all meaningless. The scriptures can give orders and prohibitions only if the individual spirit soul is independent and thus has the power to make choices."

If this is said, then the author of the *sūtras* gives the following reply.

Sūtra 2.3.40

kṛta-prayatnāpekṣas tu vihita-pratiṣiddhāvaiyarthyādibhyaḥ

kṛta – done; *prayatna* – effort; *āpekṣaḥ* – relation; *tu* – but; *vihita* – ordered; *pratiṣiddha* – forbidden; *a* – not; *vaiyarthya* – meaninglessness; *ādibhyaḥ* – beginning.

But it is by effort, because then orders and prohibitions are not without meaning.

The word *tu* [but] is used here to dispel doubt. The individual spirit soul performs pious and impious deeds. Taking into consideration the individual soul's efforts, the Supreme Personality of Godhead gives him facility to act in a certain way. Therefore the previously stated objection is not valid.

The pious and impious deeds of the individual spirit soul are like different seeds that sprout into different kinds of plants. The Supreme Personality of Godhead is like the rain that falls on these seeds and makes them grow. Therefore in this situation is the Supreme Personality of Godhead is the

instrument by which these seeds of karma bear fruit. The seeds of various trees, vines, and other plants are the specific cause of these plants, and the rain that makes them grow is the general cause.

If no rain cloud brings water, there will not be any variety of sweet flowers or other plants. If there is no seed there will not any flowers or plants either. In this way the Supreme Personality of Godhead gives the results of the pious and impious deeds performed by the individual spirit soul. Even though dispatched by another, a person is still the performer of the actions he does. Therefore it cannot be said that the individual spirit soul does not perform actions.

Why is that? The *sūtra* explains: "Because then orders and prohibitions are not without meaning." The word *ādi* [beginning with] in this *sūtra* means that the Supreme Personality of Godhead gives mercy and punishment according to the pious and impious actions of the individual spirit souls. If that interpretation is accepted, then the orders and prohibitions of the scriptures are not without meaning. If the Supreme Personality of Godhead actually forces the individual spirit soul to act piously or impiously, and the soul is like a rock or a log and has no independence, then the orders of the scripture to perform pious deeds and avoid impious deeds are all worthless and should be rejected.

The scriptures say:

> *eṣa u hy eva sādhu karma kārayati taṁ yamebhyo lokebhya unninīṣate eṣa u evāsādhu karma kārayati yamadho ninīṣate. ajño jantur anīso 'yam ātmanaḥ sukha-duḥkhayoḥ īśvara-prerito gacchet svargaṁ vāśvabhram eva ca.*
>
> "The Lord engages the living entity in pious activities so he may be elevated. The Lord engages him in impious activities so he may go to hell. The living entity is completely dependent in his distress and happiness. By the will of the Supreme he can go to heaven or hell, as a cloud is driven by the air."

If this means that the individual living entity has no choice, and pious and impious deeds are forced on him by the Supreme Personality of Godhead, then the Supreme Personality of Godhead is cruel and unjust, a monster. Therefore it must be concluded that the individual spirit soul does have free will and is responsible for his actions, although he does not have the power to transfer his desire and will into concrete action unless the Supreme Personality of Godhead permits. In this way everything is explained.

Adhikaraṇa 16: The Individual Spirit Soul is Part and Parcel of the Supreme Personality of Godhead

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: Next, to corroborate the previous explanation the author of the *sūtras* explains that the individual spirit soul is part and parcel of the Supreme Personality of Godhead. In the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* [3.1.1] it is said:

> *dvā suparṇā*
>
> "The soul and the Supersoul within the body are compared to two friendly birds sitting together."

The first bird here is the Supreme Personality of Godhead and the second is the individual spirit soul.

Saṁśaya [doubt]: Is the individual spirit soul in truth the Supreme Personality of Godhead, only seeming to be different because of the illusion of *māyā*, or is the the individual spirit soul part and parcel of the Supreme Personality of Godhead, different from the Lord, but related to Him as a ray of sunlight is related to the sun?

Pūrvapakṣa [the opponent speaks]: What is the truth? The truth is the individual spirit soul covered by the illusion of *māyā* is in truth the same as the Supreme Personality of Godhead. The *Brahma-bindu Upaniṣad* [13] explains:

> *ghaṭa-samvṛtam ākāśaṁ*
> *nīyamāne ghaṭe yathā*
> *gato līyeta nākāśaṁ*
> *tadvaj jīvo nabhopamaḥ*
>
> "The space within a jar is not moved when the jar is moved, nor is it destroyed when the jar is broken. The spirit soul is like that unbreakable space."

The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* also [6.8.7] affirms:

> *tat tvam asi*
>
> "You are that [Brahman]."

Siddhānta [conclusion]: In the following words the author of the *sūtras* gives his conclusion.

Sūtra 2.3.41

> *aṁśo nānā vyapadeśād anyathā cāpi dāsa-kitavāditvam adhīyate eke*
>
> *aṁśaḥ* – part; *nānā* – many; *vyapadeśāt* – because of the teaching; *anyathā* – otherwise; *ca* – and; *api* – also; *dāsa* – servant; *kitava* – gambler; *ādi* – beginning with; *tvam* – the state of being; *adhīyate* – is read; *eke* – some.
>
> **He is a part because of the description of being many, and also because some scriptures describe him as a servant, as a gambler, or as something else.**

The individual spirit soul is a part and parcel of the Supreme Personality of Godhead as a ray of sunlight is part and parcel of the sun. The individual spirit soul is different from the Lord, dependent on the Lord, and related to the Lord. That is the meaning. Why is that? The *sūtra* explains: "Because of the description of being many." The *Subala Upaniṣad* explains:

> *udbhavaḥ sambhavo divyo deva eko nārāyaṇo mātā pitā bhrātā nivāsaḥ śaraṇaṁ suhṛd gatir nārāyaṇaḥ*
>
> "Nārāyaṇa is the transcendental Supreme Personality of Godhead. Nārāyaṇa is the creator, destroyer, mother, father, brother, home, shelter, friend and goal."

In *Bhagavad-gītā* [9.18] Lord Kṛṣṇa declares:

> *gatir bhartā prabhuḥ sākṣī*
> *nivāsaḥ śaraṇaṁ suhṛt*
>
> "I am the goal, the sustainer, the master, the witness, the abode, the refuge, and the most dear friend. I am the creation and the annihilation, the basis of everything, the resting place, and the eternal seed."

The words *nānā vyapadeśād* in this *sūtra* describe the many relationships that exist between the Supreme Personality of Godhead and the individual spirit soul, relationships like that between the creator and created, controller and controlled, shelter and person who takes shelter, master and servant,

friend and friend, and goal and seeker. Some passages in the *Atharva Veda* declare that because the Supreme is all-pervading, the individual spirit souls and the Supreme are identical. The *Atharva Veda* declares:

> *brahma dāsā brahma dāśā brahma kitavāḥ*
>
> "These servants are the Supreme. These fishermen are the Supreme. These gamblers are the Supreme."

It is not possible that this passage intends to say that the individual spirit soul is actually not different from the Supreme. It is not possible that the Supreme is simultaneously both the creator and created, the pervader and pervaded, nor is it possible that supremely intelligent Lord becomes a servant, fisherman or other lowly being. If it were true that the individual spirit souls are identical with the Supreme, then the scriptures' advice to renounce the world would become meaningless. Nor is it possible that the Supreme has become covered by the influence of illusion, for illusion has no power to bewilder the Lord. Nor is it possible that the individual spirit souls are parts of the Supreme like fragments cut with a chisel from a great stone, for that would contradict the scriptures' statements that the Supreme can neither be broken nor changed. Therefore the individual spirit soul is different from the Supreme, but related to Him as created to creator, and in other ways also. The individual spirit soul is thus a part and parcel of the Supreme. The truth is that the individual spirit soul is a potency of the Supreme Personality of Godhead. This is described in *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* [6.7.61]:

> *viṣṇu-śaktiḥ parā proktā*
> *kṣetrajñākhyā tathā parā*
>
> "Originally, Kṛṣṇa's energy is spiritual, and the energy known as the living entity is also spiritual."

When it is said that the individual spirit soul is a part of the Supreme Personality of Godhead, the word "part" is used in the same way as in the sentence, "The circle of Venus is a one-hundredth part of the moon's circle," or the same way as in the definition, "A part, although situated in a smaller area than the whole, is identical with the whole in substance." The use of the word "part" here is not different from that definition. Thus the Supreme Personality of Godhead is the master of all potencies, and the individual spirit soul is a part of the Lord's spiritual potency. This, by being a localized manifestation of one of the Lord's potencies, the individual spirit soul is a part of the Supreme Personality of Godhead. That is their relationship.

The example of the pot means that when the mistaken identification of the soul for the body is broken, the individual soul meets the Supreme Personality of Godhead. The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad's* statement *tat tvam asi* [You are that] therefore means "You are dependent on the Supreme." The context of that passage supports this view. It does not support any other interpretation. Therefore the individual spirit soul and the Supreme Personality of Godhead are separate and different. One is the controller, the other the controlled. One is all-pervading, the other atomic in size. This is directly seen in the scriptures. It is not possible to prove otherwise. In the next *sūtra* the author continues his explanation.

Sūtra 2.3.42

> *Mantra-varṇāt*
>
> *mantra* – of the *mantras; varṇāt* – from the description.
>
> **Because of the description in the Vedic *mantras*.**

In the *Rg Veda* [10.90.3] it is said:

pādo 'sya sarvā bhūtāni

"All living entities are part and parcel of the Supreme."

In this way the Vedic *mantras* declare that the individual spirit souls are part and parcel of the Supreme. The word *pāda* here means "part." No other meaning makes sense in this context. The word *sarvā bhūtāni* [all living entities] here is in the plural, whereas the word *aṁśaḥ* [part] in *Sūtra* 2.3.41 is in the singular. The singular here is used in a generic sense to denote all spirit souls. This kind of usage is also seen in many other places.

Sūtra 2.3.43

api smaryate

api – also; *smaryate* – in the *Smṛti-śāstra.*

Also in the *Smṛti-śāstra.*

In the *Bhagavad-gītā* [15.7] Lord Kṛṣṇa explains:

mamaivāṁśo jīva-loke
jīva-bhūtaḥ sanātanaḥ

"The living entities in this conditioned world are My eternal fragmental parts."

By using the word *sanātana* [eternal], the Lord refutes the idea that the living entities referred to here are the temporary external bodies in which the eternal souls reside.

In this way it is seen that the individual spirit souls are part and parcel of the Supreme and have an relationship with Him. The Supreme is the creator and dominant in other ways also, and the individual spirit souls are dependent on Him. The nature of the individual spirit souls is described in the following passage of *Padma Purāṇa:*

jñānāśrayo jñāna-guṇaś
cetanaḥ prakṛteḥ paraḥ
na jāto nirvikāraś ca
eka-rūpaḥ svarūpa-bhāk

"The individual spirit soul is the shelter of knowledge, has knowledge asone if his qualities, is consciousness, is beyond the world of matter, is never born, never changes, and has one form, a spiritual form.

aṇur nityo vyāpti-śīlaś
cid-ānandātmakas tathā
aham artho 'vyayaḥ sākṣī
bhinna-rūpaḥ sanātanaḥ

"The soul is atomic, eternal, is present by consciousness everywhere in the material body, is by nature full of spiritual bliss and knowledge, has a sense of individual identity, is unchanging, is a witness within the body, is eternal, and is different from the Supreme.

adāhyo 'cchedyo 'kledyo
'śoṣyo 'kṣara eva ca
evam-ādi-guṇair yuktaḥ
śeṣa-bhūtaḥ parasya vai

"The soul can never be burned, cut, moistened, withered, or killed. It has these and many more qualities. It is part and parcel of the Supreme.

ma-kareṇocyate jīvaḥ
kṣetra-jñaḥ paravān sadā
dāsa-bhūto harer eva
nānyasyaiva kadācana

"Thus the word *ma* refers to the individual spirit soul. The soul is the knower of the field of activities. The soul is spiritual. The soul is an eternal servant of the Supreme Personality of Godhead. The soul is never the servant of anyone else."

The phrase *evam-ādi-guṇaiḥ* [with these and many more qualities] refers to the soul's other qualities, such as his ability to perform actions, to experience sensations, to attain enlightenment, and to enlighten others. The word "enlightenment" here has two features. In the first feature the soul itself attains enlightenment. In the second feature the soul brings enlightenment to others. That is the nature of the soul. A lamp sheds light on itself and on other objects also. A jar or similar object has no power to bring light. Although a lamp may shine, because it is inanimate matter it cannot benefit from its own light. The individual soul, however, can benefit from the light it brings. Because the soul can thus become illuminated, it is said that the soul is spiritual and full of knowledge.

Adhikaraṇa 17: The Lord's Incarnations are not Part and Parcel of the Lord, for They are the Lord Himself

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: Digressing from the main topic for the moment, the author of the *sūtras* next considers the nature of the Lord's incarnations.

In the *Gopāla-tāpanī Upaniṣad* it is said:

eko vaśī sarva-gaḥ kṛṣṇa iḍya
eko 'pi san bahudhā yo 'vabhāti

"Lord Kṛṣṇa is the worshipable, all-pervading supreme controller, and although He is one, He manifests in many forms."

In the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* [1.2.3] it is said:

ekāneka-svarūpāya

"The Supreme Personality of Godhead is one, although He has many forms."

Here it is said that the Lord is one because He remains one person, even though He appears in many forms, and He is also called many because of the great variety of these forms. That is the meaning.

Saṁśaya [doubt]: Are the incarnations of the Lord, such as the incarnation Matsya, part and parcel of the Lord in the same way the individual spirit souls are, or are They different from the individual spirit souls?

Pūrvapakṣa [the opponent speaks]: There is no difference between the individual spirit souls and the incarnations of the Supreme Personality of Godhead.

Siddhānta [conclusion]: In the following words the author of the *sūtras* gives His conclusion.

Sūtra 2.3.44

prakāśādi-van naivaṁ paraḥ

prakāśa – light; *ādi* – beginning with; *vat* – like; *na* – not; *evam* – thus; *paraḥ* – the Supreme.

The Supreme is not like light or other things.

Although the Lord's incarnations, such as Lord Matsya, are called "parts" of the Supreme, They are not like the individual spirit souls. Here the author of the *sūtras* gives and example: "The Supreme is not like light or other things." As the sun and a firefly may both be called "light," but are in truth very different, and as nectar and wine may both be called "liquid," but in truth are very different, so the individual spirit souls and the incarnations of the Lord do have a similar nature in that they are all spiritual beings, but are very different in terms of size and power.

bhāvayaty eṣa sattvena
lokān vai loka-bhāvanaḥ
līlāvatārānurato
deva-tiryaṅ-narādiṣu

"Thus the Lord of the universes maintains all planets inhabited by demigods, men and lower animals. Assuming the roles of incarnations, He performs pastimes to reclaim those in the mode of pure goodness." [*Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* 1.2.34]

How could the Lord assume incarnations to maintain the universe and deliver the souls in the mode of goodness, unless He were in a superior position to the ordinary living entities? The Lord is a living entity, and the *jīva* souls are also living entities, but He is the Supreme living entity who creates and maintains all others. In the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* [2.2.13] it is confirmed:

nityo nityānāṁ cetanaś cetanānām eko bahūnāṁ yo vidadhāti kāmān

"He is the supreme eternally conscious person who maintains all other living entities."

As proved in Adhikaraṇa 12, the living entities are atomic in size, but the Lord is unlimited. Therefore in His original form or in any of His incarnations, He is the Supreme.

Sūtra 2.3.45

smaranti ca

smaranti – the *Smṛti-śāstras* say; *ca* – and.

The *Smṛti-śāstras* also say it.

In the *Varāha Purāṇa* it is said:

svāṁśaś cātha vibhinnāṁśa
iti dvedhāṁśa iṣyate
aṁśino yat tu sāmarthyaṁ
yat-svarūpaṁ yathā sthitiḥ

"It is said that there are two kinds of parts and parcels of the Supreme: direct parts and separated parts. Direct parts have exactly the same nature as the Lord.

tad eva nāṇumātro 'pi
bhedaḥ svāṁśāṁśino kvacit
vibhinnāṁśo 'lpa-śaktiḥ syāt
kiñcit sāmarthya-mātra-yuk

"Separated parts are different from the Lord. They are atomic in size and have very slight powers.

sarve sarva-guṇaiḥ pūrṇāḥ
sarva-doṣa-vivarjitāḥ

"All direct parts of the Lord are filled with all virtues and glories and free of all vices and defects."

In *Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* [1.3.28] it is said:

ete cāṁśa-kalāḥ puṁsaḥ
kṛṣṇas tu bhagavān svayam

"All the above mentioned incarnations are either plenary portions or portions of the plenary portions of the Lord, but Lord Śrī Kṛṣṇa is the original Personality of Godhead."

Thus Lord Kṛṣṇa is the original Supreme Personality of Godhead and the various incarnations, such as Lord Matsya, are parts of Him, but they are not different from Lord Kṛṣṇa, as the individual spirit souls are. Lord Kṛṣṇa is like a *vaidūrya* stone, which manifests different colors from moment to moment. In this way Lord Kṛṣṇa appears in different forms.

In His various incarnations Lord Kṛṣṇa may display all or only some of His powers. That is the description of the scriptures. Lord Kṛṣṇa, the source of all incarnations, displays all of His six transcendental opulences in full. When the Lord does not display all His opulences in full, He appears as an *aṁśa* incarnation, and when He displays even fewer of His opulences, He appears as a *kalā* incarnation. In this circumstance He is like a great teacher, learned in the six sciences, who in certain circumstances teaches only a small portion of what he actually knows.

In the *Puruṣa-bodhinī Upaniṣad* it is said that Lord Kṛṣṇa appears with all His transcendental potencies, headed by Goddess Rādhā. In the Tenth Canto of *Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* it is said that various transcendental qualities, such as being supreme over all, being filled with great love, being accompanied by loving associates, filling with wonder Brahmā, Śiva, and all the demigods, sages, and wise devotees, manifesting many pastimes, such as sweetly playing the flute, that fill everyone with wonder, displaying a great sweetness of transcendental handsomeness, and being very kind and merciful, are eternally manifested in Yaśodā's infant Kṛṣṇa. Lord Matsya and the other incarnations manifest some but not all of these qualities. Still, the incarnations of the Lord are not like the individual spirit souls, for the incarnations actually are the Lord Himself.

Now the author of the *sūtras* presents another argument.

Sūtra 2.3.46

anujñā-parihārau deha-sambandhāt jyotir-ādi-vat

anujñā – permission to act; *parihārau* – cessation from action; *deha* – of the body; *sambandhāt* – from the contact; *jyotiḥ* – eye; *ādi* – beginning with; *vat* – like.

Bondage and liberation come from contact with the material body, like the eye and other things.

Even though they are parts and parcels of the Supreme, the individual spirit souls, because beginningless ignorance, and also because of contact with material bodies, are subject to material bondage and liberation. The incarnations of the Lord, such as Lord Matsya, however, are not subject to such things.

This is the description of the *Śruti-śāstra*. In the *Śruti-śāstra* it is also said that the incarnations of the Lord do not have material bodies, but are directly the Lord Himself. That is the great difference between the individual spirit souls and the incarnations of the Lord.

The word *anujñā* here means "permission." It is by the Lord's permission that the individual spirit souls can perform pious and impious deeds, as the *Kauśītaki Upaniṣad* [3.8] explains:

eṣa eva sādhu karma kārayati

"The Lord engages the living entity in pious activities so he may be elevated."

The word *parihāra* means "liberation". This is described in the *Śruti-śāstra:*

tam eva viditvāti mṛtyum eti

"By understanding the Supreme Personality of Godhead one is able to cross beyond this world of death."

Next, speaking the words *jyotir-ādi-vat* [like the eye], the author of the *sūtras* gives an example to explain this.

The eyes of the living entities are like small portions of the sun. However, the eyes depend on the sun for the power of sight, and if the sun does not give permission in the form of the sunlight, the eyes cannot see. In this way the eyes are dependent on the sun. The sunlight on the sun-planet, however, is identical with the sun itself, and thus it makes no sense to say they are dependent on the sun. The difference between the individual spirit souls and the incarnations of the Lord is like that, the incarnations being like the sunlight and the souls being like the eyes.

Sūtra 2.3.47

asantateś cāvyatikaraḥ

asantateḥ – because of imperfection; *ca* – not; *avyatikaraḥ* – without bewilderment.

Because it is imperfect there can be no mistake.

Because he is imperfect, the individual spirit soul cannot be mistaken for an incarnation of the Lord. The individual spirit souls are therefore not the same as or equal to the incarnations of the Lord, beginning with Lord Matsya, who are all perfect. In the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* [5.9], the individual spirit soul is described in the following words:

bālāgra-śata-bāgasya

> "If we divide the tip of a hair into one hundred parts and then take one part and divide this into another one hundred parts,that ten-thousandth part is the dimension of the living entity."

Instead of being atomic and limited, as the individual spirit souls are, the Lord's incarnations, beginning with Lord Matsya, are perfect and complete in every way, as the *Īśopaniṣad* explains:

> *pūrnam adaḥ pūrṇam idam*
>
> "The Personality of Godhead is perfect and complete."

In the following words the author of the *sūtras* shows the great fault in thinking the individual soul identical with the Supreme.

Sūtra 2.3.48

> *ābhāsa eva ca*
>
> *ābhāsaḥ* – fallacy; *eva* – indeed; *ca* – also.
>
> **It is also a fallacy.**

In this *sūtra* is refuted the idea that because they are both called *aṁśas*, or parts of the Lord, therefore the individual spirit souls and the incarnations of the Lord are identical. This idea is based on the logical fallacy of *sat-pratipakṣa* [undistributed middle]. We have discussed this logical error earlier. Therefore this idea is wrong because of imperfect reasoning.

The word *ca* [also] here hints that some examples may be given to show this. One example is that of earth and sky. Earth and sky are both substances, but that does not mean that they are identical. Existence and non-existence are both categories, but that does not mean they are equal. A drop of seawater and the ocean are both salty, but they are not equal. In the same way the individual spirit souls and the incarnations of the Supreme Personality of Godhead may both be parts of the Supreme, but that does not mean that they are equal.

Adhikaraṇa 18: The Individual Spirit Souls are not all Alike

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: Concluding this digression, the author of the *sūtras* now returns to His original topic. In the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* [2.5.13] it is said:

> *nityo nityānāṁ cetanaś cetanānām*
> *eko bahūnāṁ yo vidadhāti kāmān*
>
> "The Supreme Lord is eternal and the living beings are eternal. The Supreme Lord is cognizant and the living beings are cognizant. The difference is that the Supreme Lord is supplying all the necessities of life for the many other living entities."

Saṁśaya [doubt]: In this way it is said that the individual spirit souls are eternal and cognizant. Are the individual spirit souls all alike or are they not?

Pūrvapakṣa [the opponent speaks]: The individual spirit souls are not different. They are all exactly alike.

Siddhānta [conclusion]: In the following words the author of the *sūtras* gives His conclusion.

Sūtra 2.3.49

ddṛṣṭāniyamāt

adṛṣṭa – of fate; *aniyamāt* – because of difference.

Because of different fates.

As a frog jumps a long distance, the word *na* [not] should be inserted from *Sūtra* 44. In this way this *sūtra* means the individual spirit souls are not all alike. Why is that? The *sūtra* explains: "Even though the individual spirit souls have the same nature, they have different fates." Their fates are beginningless, because the *jīvas* are eternally conditioned by material consciousness; they are different, because they have different activities and therefore different *karma*.

Here someone may object: "Are the different fates not created because the individual spirit souls have different desires and aversions?"

The author of the *sūtras* says, "No it is not so," and gives the following explanation.

Sūtra 2.3.50

abhisandhy-ādiṣv api caivam

abhisandhi – inclinations; *ādiṣu* – beginning with;*api* – also; *ca* – and; *evam* – thus.

In this way there are different desires and other things.

The different natures of the individual spirit souls are to be explained in a different way. These differences exist because of different fates. The word *ca* [and] hints that these differences exist at every moment. Desire is not the cause of material conditioning or liberation; action is. When the living entity performs impious actions, he gradually sinks down into t hellish condition of life. When the living entity performs pious actions, he gradually approaches liberation. Thus his fate is determined by actions, not words or desires.

Here someone may object: "Is it not so that these differences are created by differing environments, such as the environment of Svargaloka, the earth, or other places?"

To this the author of the *sūtras* replies, "No. It is not so." He gives the following explanation.

Sūtra 2.3.51

pradeśād iti cen nāntar-bhāvāt

pradeśāt – from the environment; *iti* – thus; *cet* – if; *na* – not; *antar-bhāvāt* – because of being understood.

If it is said that this is because of environment, then the answer is: No, because there is another reason.

The other reason mentioned here is the differing fates of the individual spirit souls. The differences here cannot be attributed to different environments, for souls in the same environment often manifest

great differences. For example, sometimes a person born in a pious family may perform very bad activities, and a person born in an impious family may become a great saintly person. Therefore a *jīva's* fate is due to his activities and not to his environment.

Vedānta-sūtra, Adhyāya 2 Pāda 4

tvaj-jātāḥ kalitotpātāḥ
mat-prāṇāḥ santy amitra-bhit
etān śādhi tathā deva
yathā sat-patha-gāminaḥ

"O Supreme Personality of Godhead, O destroyer of enemies, my life-breaths, which are born from You, have left the path of virtue. O Lord, please bring them under control and push them on the path that is right."

In the Third Pāda, contradictory scriptural passages describing the elements were harmonized. In the Fourth Pāda contradictory passages describing the *prāṇas* [life-force and senses] will be harmonized.

Adhikaraṇa 1: The Prāṇas Are Manifested From the Supreme Personality of Godhead

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: The *prāṇas* are of two kinds: primary and secondary. The secondary *prāṇas* are the eleven senses, beginning with the eyes. The primary *prāṇas* are the five life-airs, beginning with *apāna*.

First the secondary *prāṇas* will be examined. In the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* [2.1.3] it is said:

etasmāj jāyate prāṇo manaḥ sarvendriyāṇi ca

"From this are born *prāṇa*, mind, and all the senses."

Saṁśaya [doubt]: Is this description of the creation of the senses metaphorical, like the description of the creation of the individual souls, or literal, like the description of the creation of ether and the other elements?

Pūrvapakṣa [the opponent speaks]: This is explained in the following words of the *Śruti-śāstra:*

asad vā idam agra āsīt tad āhuḥ kiṁ tad āsīd iti ṛṣayo vāva te asad āsīt tad āhuḥ ke te ṛṣaya iti prāṇā vāva ṛṣayaḥ.

"He said: 'In the beginning was non-being.' They said: 'What was that non-being?' He said: 'The non-being was many sages.' They said: 'Who were those sages?' He said: 'Those sages were the *prāṇas*.' "

This passage from the *Śruti-śāstra* clearly shows that the the senses, which are here called *prāṇas* or sages, existed before the creation of the material world. Therefore the senses are like the individual spirit souls, and the scriptures' descriptions of the creation of the senses are only allegories.

Siddhānta [conclusion]: In the following words the author of the *sūtras* gives His conclusion.

Sūtra 2.4.1

tathā prāṇāḥ

tathā – so; *prāṇāḥ* – the *prāṇās*.

The *praṇas* are like that.

As ether and the other elements were manifested from the Supreme Personality of Godhead, so the *prāṇas* and the senses were also manifested from Him. That is the meaning here. In the beginning of creation the ingredients of the material world were merged together into one. Then the different ingredients were manifested. This is described in *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* [2.1.3]:

etasmāj jāyate prāṇo manaḥ sarvendriyāṇi ca

"From this are born *prāṇa*, mind, and all the senses."

The creation of the material senses is not like the creation of the conscious individual spirit souls, because the souls are free from the transformations that are always present in matter: conception, gestation, birth, growth, production of byproducts, dwindling and death. When they describe the creation of the individual spirit souls, the words of the scriptures are all allegories, but when they describe the creation of the senses, the words of the scriptures are literal descriptions. This is so because the senses are by nature material. This being so, the words *prāṇa* and *ṛṣi* [sages] in this passage refer to the Supreme Personality of Godhead. This is so because both these words are names of the all-knowing Supreme Person.

Here someone may object: "Is it not so that because the words *prāṇāḥ* and *ṛṣayaḥ* [sages] are both plural, it is not possible that they can here be names of the Supreme Personality of Godhead?"

In the following words the author of the *sūtras* answers this objection.

Sūtra 2.4.2

gauṇy asambhavāt

gauṇī – secondary meaning; *asambhavāt* – because of impossibility.

This must be a secondary use of the word, because the primary use is impossible.

The use of the plural in this passage from the *Śruti-śāstra* must be a secondary usage of the plural. Why is that? Because there is only one God and not many Gods, the plural cannot be used to describe Him. Still, the plural may be applied to Him to refer to His many different manifestations. Although the Supreme Lord is one, He appears in His many incarnations like an actor assuming different roles, or a *vaidūrya* jewel displaying different colors. In this secondary sense the plural is appropriate in relation to Him. This is confirmed by the following words of the *Śruti-śāstra:*

ekaṁ santaṁ bahudhā dṛśyamānam

"Although He is one, the Supreme Personality of Godhead is seen to be many."

The *Smṛti-śāstra* also explains:

ekāneka-svarūpāya

"Although He is one, the Supreme Personality of Godhead appears in many forms."

Sūtra 2.4.3

tat prāk śruteś ca

tat – that; *prāk* – before; *śruteḥ* – from the *Śruti-śāstra; ca* – and.

Because the *Śruti-śāstra* declares that He existed before the creation.

Because in the beginning of creation the varieties of material nature were not yet manifested, and thus the material world was all one, it is also not proper to accept the use of the plural here in a literal sense. This is so because the *Śruti-śāstras* declare that in the beginning of material creation only the Supreme Personality of Godhead existed. Therefore the plural here must be used in a secondary sense.

In the following words the author of the *sūtras* gives another reason why the word *prāṇa* should be interpreted as a name of the Supreme Personality of Godhead.

Sūtra 2.4.4

tat-pūrvakatvād vācaḥ

tat – that; *pūrvakatvāt* – because of being before; *vācaḥ* – speech.

Because speech existed before the material creation.

The word *vācaḥ* [speech] here means "the names of things other than the Supreme Personality of Godhead, the master of many spiritual potencies." This speech existed before the *pradhāna*, the *mahat-tattva*, and the other features of the material world were created. Because the names and forms of the various material features were not yet created, and because the material senses also were not yet created at that time in the beginning of creation, the word *prāṇa* here must be used as a name of the Supreme Personality of Godhead. The *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* [1.4.7] explains:

tad dhedaṁ tarhi

"In the beginning they were not manifested. Only later were the material forms and names manifested."

This explains that in the beginning of the material creation the material names and forms were not yet manifested. Thus at that time the material senses as well as the elements beginning with ether, were not yet manifested.

Adhikaraṇa 2: The Senses Are Eleven

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: After refuting this false idea about the senses, an idea that contradicts the descriptions in *Śruti-śāstra*, the author of the *sūtras* refutes a false idea about how many senses there are.

In the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* [2.1.8] it is said:

sapta prāṇāḥ prabhavanti tasmāt
saptārciṣaḥ samadhiḥ sapta-homāḥ

sapteme lokā yeṣu sañcaranti
prāṇā guhāśayā nihitā sapta sapta

"From Him come the seven *prāṇas*, the seven *arcis*, the seven *homas*, and the seven *lokas*. These seven are placed in every heart."

However, in the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* [3.9.4] it is said:

daśeme puruṣe prāṇā ātmaikadaśa

"In the living entity there are ten *prāṇas*. The soul is the eleventh."

Saṁśaya [doubt]: Are the *prāṇas* seven or eleven?

Pūrvapakṣa [the opponent speaks]: The *pūrvapakṣa* speaks the following *sūtra*.

Sūtra 2.4.5

sapta-gater viśeṣitvāc ca

sapta – of seven; *gateḥ* – because of going; *viśeṣitvāt* – because of the specific description; *ca* – also.

Because of the departure of seven and also because of a specific description.

The *prāṇas* are seven. Why is that? Because that is the opinion of scripture. In the *Śruti-śāstra* it is said:

saptānām eva jīvena saha sañcāra-rupāyā gateḥ

"Accompanied by the seven *prāṇas*, the soul leaves the body."

In the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* [6.10] it is said:

yadā pañcāvatiṣṭhante
jñānāni manasā saha
buddhiś ca na viceṣṭeta
tām āhuḥ paramāṁ gatim

"The sages say that the supreme goal is attained when the five knowers are at peace, and the mind and intelligence are no longer active."

This passage describes the condition of the senses in the state of yogic trance. This passage describes five senses, which begin with the ears. To them are added the mind and intelligence. In this way the living entity has seven senses. The *Śruti-śāstra* also describes five working instruments, beginning with the voice and hands, but these cannot be called senses in the primary meaning of the word because these instruments do not accompany the soul when he leaves the material body and also because these instruments are less useful to the soul than the seven primary senses.

Siddhānta [conclusion]: If this is said, the author of the *sūtras* replies with the following conclusion.

Sūtra 2.4.6

hastādayas tu sthite 'to naivam

hasta – the hands; *ādayaḥ* – beginning with; *tu* – but; *sthite* – situated; *ataḥ* – therefore; *na* – not; *evam* – like that.

But when he is situated in that way, the hands and other instruments are also present. Therefore it is not like that.

The word *tu* [but] is used here to begin the refutation of the *pūrvapakṣin's* objection. Although they are not included among the seven, the instruments beginning with the hands are to be considered among the *prāṇas*. Why is that? Because as long as the soul is situated in the material body these instruments help in experiencing various things and in performing various tasks. In the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* it is said:

hastau vai grahaḥ sarva-karmaṇābhigraheṇa gṛhītāḥ hastābhyāṁ karma karoti.

"The hands are a sense, for with the hands one grasps things and performs actions."

There are more than seven senses: there are five knowledge-acquiring senses, five working senses, and the mind. In this way there are eleven senses. In the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* [3.9.4] it is said:

ātmaikādaśa

"The *ātmā* is the eleventh sense."

The word *ātmā* here means the mind. In this way it should be understood. There are five objects of perception: sound, touch, form, taste, and smell. To perceive these objects there are five knowledge-acquiring senses: ears, skin, eyes, tongue, and nose. There are five kinds of action: speech, grasping, moving, excretion, and reproduction. To perform these actions there are five working senses: voice, hands, feet, anus, and genital.

To co-ordinate the actions of all these and to take consideration of the three phases of time [past, present and future], there is the mind. Sometimes the mind is considered to have four aspects. In this way the actions of the mind are: desiring, coming to conclusions, understanding one's identity, and thinking. To perform these actions the mind is divided into the heart [*manaḥ*], intelligence [*buddhi*], false ego [*ahaṅkāra*] and thinking [*citta*]. In this way there are eleven senses.

Adhikaraṇa 3: The Senses are Atomic in Size

Next the author of the *sūtras* considers the question of the nature and size of the senses.

Saṁśaya [doubt]: Are the senses all-pervading or are they atomic?

Pūrvapakṣa [the opponent speaks]: The senses must be all-pervading, for things can be seen or heard from far away.

Siddhānta [conclusion]: In the following words the author of the *sūtras* gives his conclusion.

Sūtra 2.4.7

aṇavaś ca

aṇavaḥ – atoms; *ca* – and.

They are also atoms.

The word *ca* [also] is used here to indicate certainty. The eleven senses are atomic in size. This is so because the *Śruti-śāstra* declares that the senses leave the material body. Things can be heard from far away and in other ways be perceived from far away because the quality or power of the senses extends beyond the senses themselves. As the individual spirit soul is all-pervading within the material body, although he is situated within the heart, so the senses can also act at a distance. In this way the theory of Saṅkhya philosophers, that the senses are all-pervading, is refuted.

Adhikaraṇa 4: The Principal Prāṇa [the Life-Force] has an Origin

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: In the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* [2.1.3] it is said:

> *etasmāj jāyate prāṇaḥ*
>
> "From Him the *prāṇa* [life-force] is born."

Here the word *prāṇa* means "the principal *prāṇa*."

Saṁśaya [doubt]: Is the principal *prāṇa* [life-force] created in the same way the individual spirit soul is 'created,' or is this *prāṇa* created in the same way ether and the other elements are created?

Pūrvapakṣa [the opponent speaks]: The *Śruti-śāstra* declares:

> *naiṣa prāṇa udeti nāstam eti*
>
> "This *prāṇa* is never born and never dies."

The *Smṛti-śāstra* also declares:

> *yat-prāptir yat-parityāga*
> *utpattir maraṇaṁ tathā*
> *tasyotpattir mṛtiś caiva*
> *kathaṁ prāṇasya yujyate*
>
> "Birth and death come and go. How can birth and death affect the *prāṇa*?"

Therefore it is concluded that the principal *prāṇa* is created in the same way the individual spirit soul is created.

Siddhānta [conclusion]: In the following words the author of the *sūtras* gives His conclusion.

Sūtra 2.4.8

> *śreṣṭhaś ca*
>
> *śreṣṭhaś* – the principal one; *ca* – also.
>
> **The principal one also.**

The principal *prāṇa* [life-force] is created in the same way ether and the other elements are created. This is confirmed in the words of the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* [2.1.3]:

> *jāyate prāṇaḥ*
>
> "The *prāṇa* was created."

In its *pratijñā* statement the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* declares:

sa idaṁ sarvam asṛjata

"He created everything."

To avoid contradicting these words, it must be accepted that the principal *prāṇa* was also created. For this reason the scriptural passages stating that the *prāṇa* was never created should be understood allegorically and not literally. One *prāṇa* is called the principal *prāṇa* because it maintains the material body. So its meaning can be carried into the next *sūtra*, this *sūtra* is given separately and not joined to the previous *sūtra*.

Adhikaraṇa 5: The Principal Prāṇa [Life-Force] is not Air

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: Now the nature of the principal *prāṇa* [life-force] will be examined.

Saṁśaya [doubt]: Is the principal *prāṇa* air alone, the vibration of air, the activities of air or a condition of air when it goes to another place? Which is it?

Pūrvapakṣa [the opponent speaks]: It is the external element of air. This is confirmed in the following statement of *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* [3.1.5]:

yo 'yaṁ prāṇaḥ sa vāyuḥ

"The *prāṇa* is air."

Or, perhaps the principal *prāṇa* is the activities of air, the inhalation and exhalation of breath. In this way it is proved that the principal *prāṇa* is air.

Siddhānta [conclusion]: In the following words the author of the *sūtras* gives His conclusion.

Sūtra 2.4.9

na vāyu-kriye pṛthag upadeśāt

na – not; *vāyu* – air; *kriye* – action;*pṛthak* – different; *upadeśāt* – because of the teaching.

It is neither air nor the activities of air, because the teaching is that it is different.

The principal *prāṇa* [life-force] is neither air nor the movements of air. Why is that? The *sūtra* explains: "Because the teaching is that it is different." The previously quoted passage of the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* [2.1.3] said that both air and *prāṇa* are born from the Supreme. In this way it should be understood that air and *prāṇa* are different, for they are mentioned separately. If air and *prāṇa* were identical, then there would be no need to mention them separately in this passage. If *prāṇa* were the movement of air, then there would also be no need to mention them both in this way. It is seen that the movements of fire and the other elements are not separately mentioned in this passage. The statement of the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* that "*Prāṇa* is air," means that *prāṇa* is a specific kind of air, and that *prāṇa* is not a separate element like fire and the other elements. That is the meaning here.

In the *Kapila-sūtra* [2.31] it is said:

sāmānya-karaṇa-vṛttiḥ prāṇādyā vāyavaḥ pañca

"The five airs, beginning with prāṇa, perform the actions of the senses in general."

Thus the Saṅkhya philosophers claim that *prāṇa* performs the actions of all the senses. This cannot be, for it is not possible for the single *prāṇa* to perform all the actions of all the senses.

Adhikaraṇa 6: The Principal Prāṇa [Life-Force] is an Instrument Used by the Soul

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: In the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* it is said:

> s*upteṣu vāg-ādiṣu prāṇa eko jāgarti. Prāṇa eko mṛtyunānāptaḥ. prāṇaḥ samvargo vāg-ādīn samvṛṅkte. prāṇa itarān prāṇān rakṣati māteva putrān.*
>
> "When speech and the other senses sleep, *prāṇa* alone remains awake. *Prāṇa* alone is untouched by death. *Prāṇa* controls speech and the other senses. As a mother protects her children, so one *prāṇa* protects the other *prāṇas*."

Saṁśaya [doubt]: Is this principal *prāṇa* identical with the independent spirit soul residing in the material body or is this principal *prāṇa* an instrument that assists the spirit soul?

Pūrvapakṣa [the opponent speaks]: Because the *Śruti-śāstra* describes this *prāṇa* as having many powers and glories, therefore this principal *prāṇa* is the independent spirit soul.

Siddhānta [conclusion]: In the following words the author of the *sūtras* gives His conclusion.

Sūtra 2.4.10

> *cakṣur-ādi-vat tu tat saha śiṣṭhyādibhyaḥ*
>
> *cakṣuḥ* – the eyes; *ādi* – beginning with; *vat* – like; *tu* – indeed; *tat* – that; *saha* – with; *śiṣṭhyā* – teaching; *ādibhyaḥ* – because of beginning with.
>
> **Indeed, it is like the eyes and other senses, because it is taught along with the senses.**

Here the word *tu* [indeed] is used to dispel doubt. The *prāṇa* [life-force] is an instrument used by the individual spirit soul. It is like the eyes or the other senses. Why is that? The *sūtra* explains: "Because it is taught along with the senses." The *prāṇa* is described along with the eyes and senses. Things of a like nature are generally described together. As example of that is the Bṛhadratha meters, which are described together. This is also confirmed by the use of the word *ādi* [beginning with] in the *sūtra*.

That the *prāṇa* is here grouped with the senses is seen in the following passage:

> *yatra vāyaṁ mukhyaḥ prāṇaḥ sa evāyaṁ madhyamaḥ prāṇaḥ*
>
> "There is a principal *prāṇa* and there is a secondary *prāṇa*."

In this way the idea that the *prāṇa* is the independent spirit soul is refuted.

Adhikaraṇa 7: The Principal Prāṇa [Life-Force] is the Primary Instrument of the Soul

Here someone may object: "Is it not so that if it is to be counted among the senses, the principal *prāṇa* must have a function to perform where it assists the soul? The principal *prāṇa* has no such function. Also, if the principal *prāṇa* is one of the senses, then the senses, beginning with the eyes, would be twelve in number."

In the following words the author of the *sūtras* answers this objection.

Sūtra 2.4.11

akaraṇatvāc ca na doṣas tathā hi darśayati

akaraṇatvāt – because of not having a sepcific function; *ca* – and; *na* – no; *doṣaḥ* – fault; *tathā* – so;*hi* – indeed; *darśayati* – shows.

Also, there is no fault in not having a function, for the scriptures show it.

The word *ca* [also] is used to answer the previous objection. The word *karaṇa* here means "activity." It is not a defect on the part of the *prāṇa* that is has no specific function to assist the soul, for it does have an important function in that it is the support and the resting place of the physical senses. That is the meaning here. In the following passage, the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* [5.1.1] shows this:

atha ha prāṇā aham śreyasi vyūdire. . . .

"The senses argued among themselves. Each one said: `I am the best.' They then approached their father, Lord Brahmā, and asked him, 'O lord, who among us is the best?' Brahmā replied, 'He whose departure causes the greatest calamity for the body is the best.

"Then the voice departed from the body and stayed away for an entire year. When he returned, he asked: 'How is it that you were able to live without me?' Although it could not speak, still the body could breathe with the *prāṇa*, see with the eyes, hear with the ears, and think with the mind. Then the voice again entered the body.

"Then the eyes departed from the body and stayed away for an entire year. When they returned, they asked: 'How is it that you were able to live without me?' Although it could not see, the body could breathe with the *prāṇa*, speak with the voice, hear with the ears, and think with the mind. Then the voice again entered the body.

"Then the ears departed from the body and stayed away for an entire year. When they returned, they asked: 'How is it that you were able to live without us?' Although it could not hear, still the body could breathe with the *prāṇa*, see with the eyes, speak with the voice, and think with the mind. Then the ears again entered the body.

"Then the mind departed from the body and stayed away for an entire year. When he returned, he asked: 'How is it that you were able to live without me?' Although it could not think, still the body could breathe with the *prāṇa*, see with the eyes, speak with the voice, and hear with the ears. Then the mind again entered the body.

"When the *prāṇa* was about to depart it began to uproot all the senses. It became like a spirited horse uprooting the posts to which it is tethered. Then the other senses appealed to the *prāṇa*, 'Please do not go. Please stay with us. You are the best of all of us.'"

In this way it is seen that the principal *prāṇa* has an important function to perform in relation to the spirit soul. The soul is the enjoyer and the performer of actions. The soul is like a king, the senses his royal attendants, and the principal *prāṇa* his prime minister, who helps attain the king's objectives. In this way the *prāṇa* is the most important of the soul's instruments. However, the *prāṇa* is still not independent of the soul itself.

Adhikaraṇa 8: The Principal Prāṇa has Five Functions

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: In the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* [1.5.3] it is said:

sa eṣa vāyuḥ pañca-vidhaḥ prāṇo 'pāno vyāna udānaḥ samānaḥ

"The *prāṇa* is air. There are five *prāṇas: prāṇa, apāna, vyāna, udāna, and samāna."*

Saṁśaya [doubt]: Are these five, beginning with *apāna*, different from *prāṇa*, or are they merely different functions of *prāṇa*?

Pūrvapakṣa [the opponent speaks]: Because they have different names and functions, therefore they are different.

Siddhānta [conclusion]: In the following words the author of the *sūtras* gives his conclusion.

Sūtra 2.4.12

pañca-vṛttir mano-vad vyapadiśyate

pañca – five; *vṛttiḥ* – functions; *manaḥ* – the mind; *vat* – like; *vyapadiśyate* – is said.

Like the mind, it is said to have five functions.

The *prāṇa* is one, although it assumes five different functions when present in the different places in the body, such as the heart. In this way the *prāṇa* is described. In this way these are different functions of *prāṇa* and not different *prāṇas* themselves. Because these functions are different, therefore different names are employed. Still there is no difference in their natures. In the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* [1.5.3] it is said:

prāṇo 'pāno vyāna udānaḥ samāna iti. etat sarvaṁ prāṇa eva.

"There are five *prāṇas: prāṇa, apāna, vyāna, udāna,* and *samāna*. These five are all one *prāṇa*."

In this way *prāṇa* is like the mind. In the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* [1.5.3] it is said:

kāmaḥ saṅkalpo vikalpo vicikitsā śraddhā dhṛtir adhṛtir hrīr dhīr bhīr ity etat sarvaṁ mana eva.

"The mind's functions are: desire, determination, doubt, error, faith, steadfastness, unsteadiness, shame, intelligence and fear. All these are mind."

All these have different functions and different names, but they are not different from mind itself. They are the various functions of the mind. In the *yoga-śāstra* also it is said that the mind has five functions. This is the meaning of the scriptures, either hinted at or explicitly shown in the texts.

Adhikaraṇa 9: The Principal Prāṇa is Atomic

Saṁśaya [doubt]: Is the principal *prāṇa* atomic or all-pervading?

Pūrvapakṣa [the opponent speaks]: In the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* [1.3.22] it is said:

sama ebhis tribhir lokaiḥ

"*Prāṇa* is equal to the three worlds."

This and other passages of *Śruti-śāstra* declare that *prāṇa* is all-pervading.

Siddhānta [conclusion]: In the following words the author of the *sūtras* gives his conclusion.

Sūtra 2.4.13

aṇuś ca

aṇuḥ – atomic; *ca* – also.

It is also atomic.

The principal *prāṇa* is also atomic in size. This is so because the *Śruti-śāstras* declare that the principal *prāṇa* leaves the material body at the time of death. Scriptural passages describing the principal *prāṇas* as atomic should be understood to mean that living entities everywhere are dependent on the principal *prāṇa*.

Adhikaraṇa 10: The Supreme Personality of Godhead is the Moving Force Behind the Prāṇa

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: In the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* it is said:

supteṣu vāg-ādiṣu prāṇa eko jāgarti.

"When speech and the other senses sleep, *prāṇa* alone remains awake. *Prāṇa* alone is untouched by death. *Prāṇa* controls speech and the other senses. As a mother protects her children, so one *prāṇa* protects the other *prāṇas*."

In this way the function of the principal *prāṇa* is described. The functions of the secondary *prāṇas* are described in the following passage:

sapteme lokā yeṣu sañcaranti

"The *prāṇas* move in seven realms."

Thus the secondary *prāṇas* move among the senses.

Saṁśaya [doubt]: Do the secondary *prāṇas* move by their own power among the senses, or does something else create the movement of the *prāṇas?* Are the *prāṇas* moved by the demigods, the individual spirit soul or the Supreme Personality of Godhead?

Pūrvapakṣa [the opponent speaks]: Endowed with the power of action, the *prāṇas* move themselves. Or perhaps the demigods move them. In the A*itareya Upaniṣad* [2.4] it is said:

agnir vāg bhūtvā mukhaṁ prāviṣad

"Becoming speech, Agnideva entered the mouth."

Or perhaps the individual spirit soul moves the *prāṇas*. This may be so because the *prāṇas* are instruments the soul uses to attain enjoyment.

Siddhānta [conclusion]: In the following words the author of the *sūtras* gives His conclusion.

Sūtra 2.4.14

jyotir-ādy-adhiṣṭhānaṁ tu tad āmananāt

jyotiḥ – effulgence; *ādy-adhiṣṭhānam* – the supreme ruler; *tu* – indeed; *tat* – that; *āmananāt* – because of the description.

Indeed, light is the controller, because that is the description.

The word *tu* [indeed] is used here to dispel doubt. The word *jyotiḥ* [light] here means "the Supreme Personality of Godhead." He is the mover [*adhiṣṭhānam*] of the prāṇas. The affix *lyuṭ* in the word *adhiṣṭhānam* makes it mean "the mover." Why is the Supreme Personality of Godhead the mover of the *prāṇas*? The *sūtra* explains: "Because that is the description." This means "Because it is understood that the Supreme Personality of Godhead, as the all-pervading Supersoul, moves the *prāṇas* and senses. In the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* [3.7.16] it is said:

yaḥ prāṇeṣu tiṣṭhan

"The Supersoul stays in the midst of the *prāṇas* and moves them."

That the demigods and the individual spirit soul may also move the *prāṇas* is not disputed here, but the *prāṇas* cannot move themselves, for they are only inert matter. Hoping to enjoy, the individual spirit soul also moves the *prāṇas*. That is described in the next *sūtra*.

Sūtra 2.4.15

prāṇavatā śabdāt

prāṇavatā – by the person who possesses the *prāṇas; śabdāt* – because of the *Śruti-śāstra.*

By the person who possesses the *prāṇas*, because of the *Śruti-śāstra.*

The word *prāṇavatā* [the person who possesses the *prāṇas*] refers here to the individual spirit soul. Hoping to enjoy, the spirit soul moves the *prāṇas* and senses. Why is that? The *sūtra* explains, *śabdāt:* "Because of the *Śruti-śāstra*." In the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* [2.1.18] it is said:

sa yathā mahā-rājo jānapadān gṛhītvā sve janapade yathā- kāmaṁ parivartate evam evaiṣa etat prāṇān gṛhītvā sve śarīre yathā-kāmaṁ parivartate.

"As a great king rules the subjects in his kingdom, so the individual spirit soul rules the *prāṇas* in his body."

This is the gist of the matter: The Supreme Personality of Godhead is the supreme ruler of the *prāṇas* and the demigods and the individual spirit soul also rule the senses. The former [the demigods] rule the *prāṇas* and senses by enabling them to act, and the latter [the individual spirit souls] rule the *prāṇas* and senses with the hope of attaining enjoyment. By exerting their wills, the individual souls thus move the *prāṇas*.

There is no alternative to this description. This the author of the *sūtras* explains in the following words.

Sūtra 2.4.16

tasya ca nityatvāt

tasya – of this; *ca* – and; *nityatvāt* – because of eternality.

Because this is eternal.

Because He has an eternal relationship with them, the all-powerful Supersoul is the actual controller and mover of them. He should be considered the primary mover and controller. This is confirmed in the words of the *Antaryāmi-brāhmaṇa* [*Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 3.7].

Adhikaraṇa 11: The Principal Prāṇa is not a Sense

In this subject another doubt is raised.

Saṁśaya [doubt]: Are the principal *prāṇa* and the other *prāṇas* also senses?

Pūrvapakṣa [the opponent speaks]: Because they assist the individual spirit soul, all the *prāṇas* are considered to be senses.

Siddhānta [conclusion]: In the following words the author of the *sūtras* gives His conclusion.

Sūtra 2.4.17

> *ta indriyāṇi tad vyapadeśād anyatra śreṣṭhāt*
>
> *te* – they; *indriyāṇi* – senses; *tat* – that; *vyapadeśāt* – because of the description; *anyatra* – otherwise; *śreṣṭhāt* – from the best.
>
> **They are senses, for that is the description. Only the principal one is not.**

With the sole exception of the principal *prāṇa*, the *prāṇas* are all senses. Why is that? The *sūtra* explains: "For that is the description." In the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* [2.1.3] it is said:

> *etasmāj jāyate prāṇaḥ*
> *manaḥ sarvendriyāṇi ca*
>
> "From the Supreme Personality of Godhead are born the principal *prāṇa*, the mind and the senses."

In this way, with the sole exception of the principal *prāṇa*, the *prāṇas* are the senses, such as the ears and the others. In the *Smṛti-śāstra* it is said:

> *indriyāṇi daśaikaṁ ca*
>
> "There are eleven senses."

In another place in the *Śruti-śāstra* it is said:

> *prāṇo mukhya sa tv anindiriyam*
>
> "The principal *prāṇa* is not a sense."

Here someone may object: "Is it not so that in the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* [1.5.21] it is said:

> *hantasyaiva sarve rūpam asāmetyetasyaiva sarve rūpam abhavat.*
>
> "The senses then assumed the form of the principal *prāṇa*. They all assumed his form."

Because the secondary *prāṇas* are senses and because the secondary *prāṇas* are merely functions of the principal *prāṇa*, therefore the principal *prāṇa* is also a sense. How can you claim, then, that the principal *prāṇa* is not a sense?"

To the this objection the author of the *sūtras* gives the following reply.

Sūtra 2.4.18

bheda-śruteḥ

bheda – difference; *śruteḥ* – from *Śruti-śāstra.*

Because the *Śruti-śāstra* says it is different.

In the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* [2.1.3] it is said:

prāṇo manaḥ sarvendriyāṇi

"From the Supreme Personality of Godhead are born the principal *prāṇa*, the mind and all the senses."

In this way, because it is mentioned apart from the senses in this passage, the principal *prāṇa* is clearly different from the senses. That is the meaning here.

Here someone may doubt: "The mind is also mentioned apart from the senses in this passage. It must be that the mind is not a sense."

This doubt is answered by the following words of *Bhagavad-gītā* [15.7]:

manaḥ ṣaṣṭhīndiyāni

"The mind is one of the six senses."

Lord Kṛṣṇa also declares [*Bhagavad-gītā* 10.22]:

indriyāṇāṁ manaś cāsmi

"Of the senses I am the mind."

Sūtra 2.4.19

vailakṣaṇyāc ca

vailakṣaṇyāt – because of different qualities; *ca* – also.

Also because of different qualities.

During sleep the principal *prāṇa* is active, but the ears and other senses are not. The principal *prāṇa* supports the body and senses, but the senses are only instruments for perception and work. In these ways the principal *prāṇa* and the senses have different qualities. Thus it is said that as the individual spirit souls are dependent on the Supreme Personality of Godhead, so the senses are dependent on the principal *prāṇa*.

Adhikaraṇa 12: The Forms of the Material World are Created by the Supreme Personality of Godhead

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: The scriptures declare that the material elements, the senses, everything else in the material world, and the individual spirit souls also, are all manifested from the Supreme Personality of Godhead. Now we will consider the question: Who created the individual forms [*vyaṣṭi*]

of this world? After describing the creation of fire, water, and earth, the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* [6.3.2-4] explains:

> *seyam devataikṣata hantāham imās tisro devatā anena jīvenātmanānupraviśya nāma-rūpe vyākaravāṇi tāsāṁ tri-vṛtam ekaikaṁ karavāṇīti. Seyaṁ devatemās tisro devatā anena jīvenātmanānupraviśya nāma-rūpe vyākarot tāsāṁ tri-vṛtaṁ tri-vṛtam ekaikām akarot.*
>
> "After creating the splendid elements of fire, water, and earth, the Supreme Personality of Godhead thought, `Now I shall enter these three splendid elements with the individual souls and thus I shall create names and forms. One by one, I shall make them three.' Then the Supreme Personality of Godhead entered those three splendid elements with the individual souls, created names and forms, and, one by one, made the splendid elements into three."

Saṁśaya [doubt]: Is this creation of names and forms the work of the Supreme Personality of Godhead or an individual spirit soul?

Pūrvapakṣa [the opponent speaks]: It is the work of an individual spirit soul. In the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* the Lord says, "With an individual soul I shall create." The instrumental case here is not used in the sense of "with." When the meaning of an agent is possible in this case it is not reasonable to accept a meaning that carries the sense of a preposition. Neither is the meaning of an instrument possible here, for the Supreme Personality of Godhead can do anything simply by His will, and therefore He has no need is employ an individual spirit soul to do anything. Neither can it be said that in this situation the entrance into the creation is done by an individual spirit soul and the creation of names and forms is done by the Supreme Personality of Godhead, for the use of the indeclineable past participle here indicates that the entrance and the act of creation were both performed by the same agent. Neither is the use of the first-person in the verb *vyākaravāṇi* [I shall create] inappropriate here, for it is like saying, "With a spy I will enter the enemy army and see it." Neither is all this merely my own idea, for the *Śruti-śāstra* declares:

> *viriñco vā idaṁ virecayati vidadhāti brahmā vāva viriñca etasmād dhīme rūpa-nāmanī*
>
> "The demigod Brahmā is called *viriñca* because he organizes [*virec*] the material universe. From him have come the names and forms of the material universe."

The *Smṛti-śāstra* also declares:

> *nāma-rūpe ca bhūtānām*
>
> "The demigod Brahmā created the names and forms of the creatures in the universe."

Therefore the creation of names and forms was done by an individual spirit soul.

Siddhānta [conclusion]: In the following words the author of the *sūtras* gives His conclusion.

Sūtra 2.4.20

> *saṁjñā-mūrti-kḷptiś ca tri-vṛt kurvata upadeśāt*
>
> *saṁjnā* – names; *mūrti* – forms; *kḷptiḥ* – creation;*ca* – and; *tu* – but; *tri-vṛt* – in three parts; *kurvate* – does; *upadeśāt* – from the teaching.
>
> **But the creation of names and forms in groups of three is done by the creator, for that is the teaching.**

The word *tu* [but] is used here is begin the refutation of the opponent's argument. Here the word *saṁjñā-mūrti* means "names and forms" and the word *kḷptiḥ* means "creation." The words *tri-vṛt kurvataḥ* [done by the creator] indicate that this creation was done by the Supreme Personality of Godhead Himself and not by an individual spirit soul. Why is that? The *sūtra* explains, *upadeśāt:* "Because that is the teaching." Thus the scriptures affirm that this creation was done by the Supreme Personality of Godhead. Thus the creation of threes and the creation of names and forms were both done by the same creator. That is the meaning.

The creation of threes was effected in the following way:

> *trīṇy ekaikaṁ dvidhā kuryāt*
> *try-ardhāni vibhajed dvidhā*
> *tat-tan-mukhyārdham utsṛjya*
> *yojayec ca tri-rūpatā*
>
> "The creator divides in half each of the three elements. Three of these halves He then divides in half again. Then He joins the smaller halves to the larger halves. In this way the compound elements, made of three parts, are created."

This is like the process called *pañcī-karaṇa*. It cannot be said that this creation of threefold compound elements is within the power of the demigod Brahmā. That is so because Brahmā was born after the universal egg had been created from these threefold compound elements made of fire, water, and earth. This is corroborated by *Manu-saṁhitā* [1.9]:

> *tasminn aṇḍe 'bhavad brahmā sarva-loka-pitāmahaḥ*
>
> "Brahmā, the grandfather of all the worlds, was born in the egg of the universe."

Therefore the creation of names and forms and the creation of threefold compound elements were both done by the same creator. It should not be thought, because of the sequence apparently described in the text, that the creation of names and forms preceded the creation of threefold compound elements. The creation of threefold compound elements came first, and only after that creation the creation of name and forms was effected. The universal egg cannot be created by the elements of fire, water and earth before those elements are compounded in the three ways. That this is not possible is described in the following words of *Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam* [2.5.32-33]:

> *yadaite 'saṅgatā bhāvā*
> *bhūtendriya-mano-guṇāḥ*
> *yadāyatana-nirmāṇe*
> *ne śekur brahma-vittama*
>
> "O Nārada, best of the transcendentalists, the forms of the body cannot take place as long as these created parts, namely the elements, senses, mind, and modes of nature, are not assembled."
>
> *tadā saṁhatya canyonyaṁ*
> *bhagavac-chakti-coditāḥ*
> *sad-sattvam upādāya*
> *cobhayaṁ sasṛjur hy adaḥ*
>
> "Thus when all these became assembled by the force of the energy of the Supreme Personality of Godhead, this universe certainly came into being by accepting both the primary and secondary causes of creation."

The process of *pañcī-karaṇa* is also described here. In this way the creation should be understood. In the process of *pañcī-karaṇa* each of the five elements is divided in half, half of the halves are again divided in half, and the smaller halves are then joined with the larger in compound elements. In *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* [6.5.1] it is said:

> *annam aśitaṁ tridhā vidhīyate*
>
> "When food is eaten it is transformed in three ways."

This transformation is completely different from the threefold combination of earth and the other elements previously described. Therefore this passage cannot be used to support the theory that the individual spirit soul is the creator of the names and forms of this world. The scriptural passage uses the phrase *ātmanā jīvena*. By thus placing these two words in apposition, it is clear that the word *jīva* [individual soul] here means "by the Supreme Personality of Godhead, whose potency is the individual spirit souls." In a similar way the passage beginning with the words *virñco vā* is also explained.

Understood in this way the indeclineable past participle *praviśya* and the third-person verb following it can be understood in their primary meanings without any difficulty. In this way it is easily seen that the two actions described by the words *praviśya* and *vyākaravāṇi* are certainly performed by the same agent. Therefore it is certainly the Supreme Personality of Godhead who performed the act of creation described in the verb *vyākaravāṇi*. This is corroborated by the following words of *Taittirīya Araṇyaka* [3.12.16]:

> *sarvāṇi rūpāṇi vicitya dhīro*
> *nāmāni kṛtvābhivadan yad āste*
>
> "The all-knowing Supreme Personality of Godhead created all forms and names."

Adhikaraṇa 13: The Vehicles of the Soul are Made of Earth

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: Now the nature of the material body, which is called by the name *mūrti* will be examined. In the *Bṛhad-ārayaṅka* [3.2.13] it is said that the material body is made of earth:

> *śarīraṁ pṛthivīm apy eti*
>
> "The material body becomes earth."

However, in the *Kauṇḍinya-śruti* it is said that the material body is made of water:

> *adbhyo hīdam utpadyate āpo vāva māṁsam asthi ca bhavanty āpaḥ śarīram āpa evedaṁ sarvam.*
>
> "From water the material body is created. Water becomes transformed into flesh and bones. The entire body is water."

Another text of the *Śruti-śāstra* claims that the material body is made of fire:

> *saḥ agner deva-yonyāḥ*
>
> "The demigods' bodies are made of fire."

Saṁśaya [doubt]: What is the truth here?

Pūrvapakṣa [the opponent speaks]: One text says the material body is made of earth, another says it is made of water, and another that it is made of fire. Because the scriptures give these three differing explanations, the truth cannot be ascertained.

Siddhānta [conclusion]: In the following words the author of the *sūtras* give His conclusion.

Sūtra 2.4.21

māṁsādi bhaumaṁ yathā-śabdam itarayoś ca

māṁsa – flesh; *ādi* – beginning with; *bhaumam* – earth; *yathā* – as; *śabdam* – the *Śruti-śāstra; itarayoḥ* – of the other two; *ca* – also.

As the *Śruti-śāstra* says, the flesh and other ingredients are made of earth. It also so for the other two.

Flesh and other ingredients are made of earth. However, blood is made of water, and bones are made of fire. This is described in the *Śruti-śāstra* [*yathā-śabdam*]. In the *Garbha Upaniṣad* it is said:

yat kaṭhiṇaṁ sā pṛthivī yad dravaṁ tad āpo yad uṣṇaṁ tat tejaḥ

"What is hard in the body is made of earth, what is liquid is made of water, and what is hot is made of fire."

In this way it is proved that all material bodies are made of these three elements.

Here someone may object: "If the material elements are all compounded of three elements, none of the elements pure, but all of them mixtures of elements, then why do the scriptures say, 'This part of the body is made of fire, this part is made of water, and this part is made of earth'?"

To this objection the author of the *sūtras* gives the following reply:

Sūtra 2.4.22

vaiśeṣāt tu tad-vādas tad-vādaḥ

vaiśeṣāt – because of the specific nature; *tu* – but; *tat* – of that; *vādaḥ* – statement; *tat* – of that; *vādaḥ* – statement.

Because of its specific nature, thus it is so said. Thus it is so said.

The word *tu* [but] is used to dispel doubt.

Everywhere in the material world the elements are arranged in threefold compounds with one element predominating. The elements are therefore named according to the predominating element. The word *tad-vādaḥ* is repeated to indicate the end of the chapter.

Epilogue

vardhasva kalpāga samaṁ samantāt
kuruṣva tāpa-kṣatim āśritānām
tvad-aṅga-saṅkīrṇi-karāḥ parās tā
himsrā lasad-yukti-kuṭhārikābhiḥ

"O tree that fulfills all desires, please extend yourself in all directions. To they who take shelter of you please give the shade that stops all troubles. The glistening axes of logic have now cut away the underbrush that choked you."